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 Abstract 
Proportionality is used by the UK Courts when reviewing the Convention-compatibility 
of the activities of the other branches of government. There are two related problems 
with the current analysis of proportionality. First, there has been a heavy emphasis on 
the division of constitutional space between the judiciary and the other branches of 
government. This focus on spatial conceptions of institutional responsibility has 
distracted attention from the structure of the relationship between proportionality and 
deference. The second problem is that there has been insufficient attention paid to the 
manner in which the test is affected by the distinctions between the different 
governmental institutions which can be judicially reviewed under the HRA. The 
individual stages of proportionality are based on certain premises about the institution 
being reviewed. This needs to be explicit if a sophisticated understanding of 
proportionality is to be developed. 
I plan to overcome these two problems by setting out a structural, institutionally 
sensitive model of proportionality and deference. The model is structural in that it takes 
account of the operation of deference within the process of proportionality. The model 
is institutionally sensitive in that it takes account of the differences between the 
institutions which the courts can review under the HRA. The model is based on the 
work of Alexy, but adapted for the UK context and developed to make it institutionally 
sensitive. I trace the operation of this structural model through three institution-specific 
case studies in order to establish its relevance in the UK. The case studies concern 
administrative decision-making in immigration cases, rule-making in criminal justice 
cases and judgments concerning both administrative decisions and legislation in 
housing cases. This diverse range of subject matter provides the basis for proving the 
applicability of the structural, institutionally sensitive model, which overcomes the two 
related problems with the existing analysis. 
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Chapter 1: Two related problems  
 
 
The principle of proportionality is now a standard test used by the UK Courts to assess 
whether governmental activity violates many of the individual rights set out in the 
European Convention on Human Rights (‘the Convention’), which was incorporated 
into domestic law by the Human Rights Act 1998 (‘the HRA’).1 The concept of 
proportionality is closely related to the self-restraining judicial principle that when the 
courts engage in judicial review they should pay some deference to the judgment of the 
original decision-maker.  
To date, there has yet to be a sophisticated analysis of proportionality and deference 
under the HRA. It is my contention that such an analysis has been prevented by two 
problems. The first problem is the ‘spatial metaphor’2 and the second problem is lack of 
what I call ‘institutional sensitivity.’ The spatial metaphor describes deference as 
something which is in opposition to proportionality rather than something which can be 
integrated into it. The lack of institutional sensitivity arises from a failure adequately to 
recognise that there are differences between the institutions of government which are 
                                                
1 See R (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] UKHL 26; [2001] 2 AC 532 and R v 
A (No 2) [2001] UKHL 25; [2002] 1 AC 45. Daly was concerned with the right to correspond with legal 
representatives and R v A was concerned with the right to fair trial. 
2 This phrase was coined by Murray Hunt. See Hunt, M. ‘Sovereignty’s Blight: Why Contemporary 
Public Law Needs the Concept of “Due Deference”’ in Bamforth, N. and Leyland, P. (eds.) Public Law in 
a Multi-layered Constitution (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2003). 
9 
subjected to proportionality review under the HRA. Some of those differences can have 
a significant effect on the operation of proportionality and deference.  
These two problems are closely related to one another. The failure to overcome a spatial 
model of the relationship between proportionality and deference has hampered attempts 
to make deference more institutionally sensitive. Conversely, the failure to develop an 
institutionally sensitive model of proportionality has undermined the understanding of 
the various stages of the proportionality test in a manner which further entrenches the 
spatial metaphor. It is not possible to solve one of these problems without also solving 
the other. 
In this thesis, I am seeking to address both problems. In this introductory chapter I give 
a detailed explanation of the difficulties caused by the spatial metaphor and the lack of 
institutional sensitivity. In the remainder of the thesis, I set out a structural model of 
proportionality and deference which I argue gives a sophisticated account of the 
relationship between the two, and in particular overcomes the weaknesses in the spatial 
metaphor. I develop this model to take account of relevant institutional characteristics 
of governmental bodies which are judicially reviewed under the HRA; thus making the 
model ‘institutionally sensitive’. This institutional sensitivity enables me to show the 
manner in which the specific features of a governmental body being reviewed can 
impact upon the operation of the proportionality test under the HRA.  I then show that 
the model can be seen to work in existing HRA case law in three thematic case studies. 
The application of the model in these case studies will show that there is an order to the 
existing HRA case law that has not always been previously evident. 
Before explaining the two problems with which this chapter is concerned, I will briefly 
set out the parameters of proportionality and deference under the HRA. 
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1.1: JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER THE HRA – PROPORTIONALITY AND 
DEFERENCE 
The possible introduction of proportionality into UK law was mooted for some time 
prior to the HRA3 but the absence of a fundamental rights document impeded it.4 The 
proportionality test has been used for some time by the European Court of Human 
Rights (‘the ECHR’) when interpreting the Convention.5 The House of Lords has 
accepted that the Convention requires the use of the proportionality test.6 It is therefore 
understandable that it was imported into the UK in the aftermath of the passage of the 
HRA. The courts have confirmed that (for the time being at least) proportionality is not 
an independent head of review and it is only applicable where a Convention right is 
engaged.7  
Most Convention rights can be limited by the state, provided that the limitation meets 
the standard of proportionality.8 The proportionality test entails a series of questions, 
which a reviewing court will ask when examining the Convention compatibility of a 
government measure which infringes a Convention right. While the precise formulation 
                                                
3 Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister of State for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374; R v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department ex parte Brind [1991] 1 AC 696; R v Ministry of Defence ex parte Smith 
[1996] QB 517. See also Jowell, J. and Lester, A. ‘Beyond Wednesbury: Substantive Principles of 
Administrative Law’ [1987] PL 368; and Jowell, J. and Lester, A. ‘Proportionality: Neither Novel Nor 
Dangerous’ in Jowell J. and Oliver, D. (eds.) New Directions in Judicial Review (London: Stevens, 1988). 
4 See de Búrca, G. ‘Proportionality & Wednesbury Unreasonableness: The Influence of European Legal 
Concepts on UK Law’ in Andenas, M. English Public Law and the Common Law of Europe (London: 
Key Haven, 1998); and Elliott, M. ‘The Human Rights Act 1998 and the Standard of Substantive Review’ 
(2001) 60 CLJ 301. 
5 See Sunday Times v UK (1979-80) 2 EHRR 245; Handyside v UK (1979-80) 1 EHRR 737. 
6 R (ProLife Alliance) v British Broadcasting Corporation [2003] UKHL 23; [2004] 1 AC 185, at 202 per 
Laws LJ. 
7 See Association of British Civilian Internees – Far Eastern Division v Secretary of State for Defence 
[2003] EWCA Civ 473. Although it has been recognised that proportionality might eventually become an 
independent head of review, the House of Lords has recently declined to decide this issue conclusively: 
see Somerville v Scottish Ministers [2007] UKHL 44; [2007] 1 WLR 2734, per Lord Hope and Lord 
Rodger. 
8 It is generally accepted that proportionality does not apply to Articles 2, 3 4 & 7 of the Convention. See 
further Palmer, S. ‘A Wrong Turning: Article 3 ECHR and Proportionality’ (2006) 65 CLJ 438. However, 
this has been disputed by Simon Atrill: see Atrill, S. ‘Keeping the Executive in the Picture: A Reply to 
Professor Leigh’ [2003] PL 41. 
11 
of the test by the UK courts has not always been consistent, it now seems clear that 
there are four questions to be asked of an impugned measure by the reviewing court:  
1. Was the objective of the measure sufficiently important? (legitimate objective) 
2. Was the measure rationally connected to the objective? (rational connection) 
3. Did the measure go no further than was necessary to achieve the objective? 
(minimal impairment) 
4. Was a fair balance struck between the rights of the individual and the interests of 
the community? (overall balance)9 
In two early cases (Daly v Secretary of State for the Home Department10 and R v A (No 
2)11) the House of Lords applied a proportionality test which consisted solely of the first 
three questions.12 However, there was a parallel strand of case law, going back to cases 
such as Samaroo v Secretary of State for the Home Department,13 which applied the 
fourth question as the central plank of proportionality. The House of Lords has recently 
affirmed that all four questions are contained in the proportionality test.14 As I will 
show in later chapters, the focus on particular stages of the test can be necessitated by 
the institutional characteristics of the body being judicially reviewed. 
This multi-stage proportionality test can be applied by the courts to all other branches of 
government where the activities of those branches intrude upon Convention rights. The 
HRA gives courts a limited power of judicial review of legislation.  The Courts can 
                                                
9 Samaroo v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] EWCA Civ 1139. 
10 [2001] UKHL 26; [2001] 2 AC 532. 
11 [2001] UKHL 25; [2002] 1 AC 45. 
12 This three-part proportionality test was set out by Lord Clyde in de Freitas v Permanent Secretary of 
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Lands and Housing [1999] 1 AC 69, at 80, and this formulation was 
cited with approval by Lord Steyn in R (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] 
UKHL 26; [2001] 2 AC 532 and R v A (No 2) [2001] UKHL 25; [2002] 1 AC 45. 
13 [2001] EWCA Civ 1139. 
14 Huang v Secretary of state for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 11; [2007] 2 AC 167, at 187. See 
generally Beatson, J., Grosz, S., Hickman, T., Singh, R. and Palmer, S. Human Rights: Judicial 
Protection in the United Kingdom (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2008), at 202-206. 
12 
either interpret a statute in accordance with the Convention15 or make a declaration of 
incompatibility and remit the matter to Parliament for clarification.16 A declaration of 
incompatibility does not affect the continued operation of the statute. It is entirely for 
Parliament to decide whether or not to remedy the incompatibility. Where the 
challenged measure is an action of a public body other than Parliament, the courts will 
be able to overturn the decision on human rights grounds.17 It is noteworthy that in the 
Daly and R v A cases, the House of Lords introduced an identical proportionality test for 
review of both administrative action and legislation.18 The courts have different powers 
in relation to each and there are significant institutional differences between 
administrative bodies and Acts of Parliament. However, a uniform test was used for 
both.  
The introduction of a concrete set of fundamental rights in the HRA raised important 
questions regarding the role of judicial power in the UK. There has been heated 
academic debate regarding the very existence of a judicial power to oversee the 
activities of other branches of government.19 It is understandable that the extent to 
which courts can use the HRA to scrutinise the other branches of government is also 
controversial.  The courts have come to accept that when they engage in HRA-based 
judicial review they should pay some deference to the judgment of the original 
decision-maker.20 This has been articulated variously in the case law as ‘deference’21 a 
                                                
15 Human Rights Act 1998, Section 3. 
16 Human Rights Act 1998, Section 4. 
17 Human Rights Act 1998, Section 6. 
18 R (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] UKHL 26; [2001] 2 AC 532 involved a 
challenge to a ministerial rule, whereas R v A (No 2) [2001] UKHL 25; [2002] 1 AC 45 was a challenge 
to legislation. The two cases were decided within a week of each other in May 2001. 
19 Forsyth, C. ‘Of Fig Leaves and Fairy Tales: The Ultra Vires Doctrine, The Sovereignty of Parliament 
and Judicial Review’ (1996) 55 CLJ 122; and Elliott, M. ‘The Demise of Parliamentary Sovereignty? The 
Implications for Justifying Judicial Review’ (1999) 115 LQR 119; Craig, P. ‘Competing Models of 
Judicial Review’ [1999] PL 428; Allan, T.R.S. ‘Constitutional Dialogue and the Justification of Judicial 
Review’ 2003 OJLS 563; Poole, T. ‘Questioning Common Law Constitutionalism’[2005] Legal Studies 
142. 
20 The European Court of Human Rights applies a ‘margin of appreciation’ to states when scrutinising 
their compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights. See further Arai-Takahashi, Y. The 
Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the Principle of Proportionality in the jurisprudence of the ECHR 
(Oxford: Intersentia, 2002). 
13 
‘margin of discretion’22 and a ‘discretionary area of judgment’.23 More recently, the 
House of Lords has noted the need for proportionality to be guided by a concept of 
‘relative institutional competence’.24  
This is a very brief overview of the landscape within which this thesis operates: the 
HRA introduced litigable human rights to UK law. Where a person is of the view that a 
measure taken by a public body (including Parliament) has breached their rights, they 
can challenge that measure in court. In order to decide whether or not the right has been 
violated, the courts often use the multi-stage proportionality test. The courts are the 
primary ‘doers’ of proportionality. 25 When ‘doing’ proportionality to the decisions of 
other branches of government, the courts will pay deference to aspects of the decision-
making process which gave rise to the challenged measure.  
This landscape has not yet been sufficiently explored. At the time of the introduction of 
the HRA, Kentridge noted that ‘the most difficult and important problem facing British 
courts will be to develop (or, rather, invent) a coherent and defensible doctrine of 
proportionality’26 A decade later, there is a consensus that this has not been achieved. 
Hickman argues that while proportionality was a great advance, there had not been a 
‘well-thought-out, clear, consistent and principled approach to its content and 
structure.’27 This view has been expressed by other commentators28 and even the 
                                                                                                                                          
21 R v DPP, ex parte Kebilene [2000] 2 AC 326. 
22 R (Farrakhan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] EWCA Civ 606; [2002] QB 1391. 
23 Lester, A. and Pannick, D. (eds.) Human Rights Law and Practice (London: Butterworths, 1999) at 74. 
Cited with approval in R v DPP, ex parte Kebilene [2000] 2 AC 326, at 381, per Lord Hope. 
24 A&X v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56; [2005] 2 AC 68. 
25 Some analysis of the proportionality of proposed legislation is undertaken by Parliament’s Joint 
Committee on Human Rights. See Feldman, D. ‘Can and Should Parliament Protect Human Rights?’ 
(2004) 10 European Public Law 635. However, the bulk of the application of proportionality has been in 
the courts. 
26 Kentridge, S. ‘The Incorporation of the European Convention’ in University of Cambridge Centre for 
Public Law, Beatson, J., Forsyth, C. and Hare, I. (eds.) Constitutional Reform in the United Kingdom 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1998), at 70. 
27 Hickman, T. ‘The Substance and Structure of Proportionality’ [2008] PL 694, at 714.  
28 See for example, Clayton, R. ‘The Human Rights Act Six Years On: Where Are We Now?’ [2007] 
EHRLR 11; and Martin, M. and Horne, A. ‘Proportionality: Principles and Pitfalls – Some Lessons from 
Germany’ [2008] JR 169. 
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judiciary themselves.29 It is evident that the process which occurs when a court 
undertakes a proportionality analysis is not yet fully understood. In this thesis, I set out 
a structural, institutionally sensitive model of proportionality and deference. I expect 
this to make significant strides in deepening the usual analysis of proportionality review 
under the HRA. 
 
 
1.2: PROBLEM ONE – THE SPATIAL METAPHOR 
Within human rights-based judicial review, deference to the primary decision-maker is 
an important complement to the proportionality test. There are legitimate circumstances 
where the courts cannot or should not second-guess aspects of the original decision. The 
dominant approach to understanding how deference operates under the HRA is the 
‘spatial metaphor’. In this section, I will initially set out the main features of the spatial 
metaphor. I then briefly examine two prominent strands of proportionality theory, each 
of which is based on a spatial approach. The section concludes with an analysis of the 
limitations of the spatial understanding of proportionality and deference. 
The term ‘spatial metaphor’ was initially coined by Hunt as a way of explaining the 
courts’ approach to deference in the early years of the HRA. 30 The courts have 
recognised that there is a ‘discretionary area of judgment’ for primary decision-makers 
to which the courts should defer.31 The idea of an ‘area’ to which deference is due 
expressly divides the constitutional landscape up into separate spaces for the courts and 
                                                
29 Huang v Secretary of State for the Home Department  [2005] EWCA Civ 105; [2005] 3 WLR 488 
(CA), at 513 per Laws LJ. 
30 Hunt ‘Sovereignty’s Blight’, above n2. 
31 Lord Hope cited this term with approval in R v Director of Public Prosecutions, ex parte Kebilene 
[2000] 2 AC 366, at 381. The term ‘discretionary area of judgment’ was initially formulated by Lester 
and Pannick. See: Lester and Pannick, Human Rights Law and Practice, above n23, at 74. Another 
commonly used term is the ‘margin of discretion’, which is also a spatial term. See R (Farrakhan) v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] EWCA Civ 606; [2002] QB 1391, at 1417 per Lord 
Phillips. 
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the other arms of government. Hunt argues that this is a form of non-justiciability 
doctrine, whereby certain issues are removed from judicial scrutiny.  
The spatial metaphor is based on the assumption that rights require the demarcation of 
certain zones of autonomy for the different institutions of government, outside of which 
they should not stray. This is done by setting out two separate and opposing ‘spaces’: 
one space for the human right (as protected by the courts) and another space for 
government autonomy. Inevitably, human rights and state power will come into 
conflict. Proportionality and deference are a means of resolving such conflicts. The 
spatial approach associates proportionality with rights and it associates deference with 
governmental autonomy. If proportionality ‘wins’ in a given case, then the human right 
also ‘wins’. If deference ‘wins’ then governmental autonomy ‘wins’ too.  
The spatial metaphor charges the courts with determining the size of the discretionary 
area of judgment. In the first instance, the spatial approach seeks to determine the scope 
of that area based on the subject matter of a given case. If the subject matter deals with 
economic and social policy, then the courts should give a large degree of deference. If 
the case concerns the right to fair trial, then the courts should defer less. Subsequently 
the bases for deference have been elaborated further. It has been recognised that there 
are some institutions which deserve more deference than others. For example, in his 
dissenting judgment in International Transport Roth GmbH v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department, Laws LJ recognised that greater deference was due to Parliament 
than is due to an administrative official. 32 
The spatial metaphor developed as a way of describing deference. As a result of these 
origins, it treats proportionality and deference as separate issues. In its crudest from, the 
spatial metaphor requires a reviewing court to determine whether or not it should defer 
                                                
32 [2002] EWCA Civ 158; [2003] QB 728, at 765-767. Laws LJ’s elements of deference were cited with 
approval in the House of Lords in the case of R (ProLife Alliance) v British Broadcasting Corporation 
[2003] UKHL 23; [2004] 1 AC 185 per Lord Walker.  
16 
to the primary decision-maker before engaging in a proportionality review. The 
dominance of the spatial metaphor has led to proportionality and deference being dealt 
with as two distinct questions, which has oversimplified the relationship between them.  
This spatial approach assumes that the primary connection between proportionality and 
deference is that the tension between the two of them causes some clearly identifiable 
bright line to be moved backwards and forwards. The line marks out the border between 
the limits of judicially enforceable rights on the one hand, and the powers of other 
institutions of government on the other. More detailed interactions between 
proportionality and deference are not explored and while the debate varies in terms of 
its sophistication, it is still predominantly trapped in this paradigm. 
This spatial conception of proportionality and deference in opposition to each other can 
be seen in the literature on the HRA. For example, Blake describes proportionality as 
drawing ‘a line in the sand identified by principle and justice beyond which the 
executive cannot go.’33 With regard to the discretionary area of judgment Blake asks 
‘how could the dimensions of this area be measured?’34 This question is clearly 
premised on the spatial metaphor. Similarly, Poole recently contended that ‘there is no 
built-in limit to the proportionality test’ and so it can ‘be applied almost infinitely 
forcefully or infinitely cautiously, producing an area of discretionary judgement that can 
be massively broad or incredibly narrow’.35 Leigh has analysed the post-HRA standard 
of review by dividing the analysis into ‘expansionary arguments’ in favour of a stricter 
standard of judicial review and ‘limiting arguments’ in favour of a less strict standard.36 
This presupposes a spatial conception of competence as between decision-maker and 
reviewing court, where the mechanism of review (proportionality) and the level of 
                                                
33 Blake, N. ‘Importing Proportionality: Clarification or Confusion’ [2002] EHRLR 19, at 27. 
34 ibid, at 21. 
35 Poole, T. ‘The Reformation of English Administrative Law’ (2009) 68 CLJ 142, at 146. 
36 Leigh, I. ‘The Standard of Judicial Review after the Human Rights Act’ in Fenwick, H., Phillipson, G. 
& Masterman, R. (eds.) Judicial Reasoning under the UK Human Rights Act (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007). 
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scrutiny are separate, parallel factors which are in tension with one another, rather than 
being integrated in a meaningful way.  
The focus on the demarcation of a space for rights and a space for government makes 
the spatial metaphor good at explaining the outcomes of HRA-based judicial review. 
However, it does very little to explain the process of judicial reasoning which leads to 
those outcomes. Once the process is examined, it becomes clear that it is inaccurate to 
suggest that deference is somehow separate from proportionality or a prior condition for 
the operation of proportionality. The inputs and outcomes of proportionality analysis 
may be spatial questions, but the way in which proportionality and deference operate to 
produce those outcomes is not a solely spatial question. I argue that there is a complex 
structural relationship between the two which must be understood in order fully to 
explain the process by which proportionality review operates.  
In an article discussing deference, Jowell gives a brief explanation of how deference 
applies differently at the legitimate aim and minimal impairment stages of 
proportionality.37 His analysis is short: he only covers two of the four parts of the 
proportionality test and the discussion is limited to a single institutional setting. The 
article does not purport to provide a comprehensive explanation of the relationship 
between proportionality and deference and a full-scale examination of that relationship 
is still required. However, Jowell’s contribution is most welcome and it is one of the 
only attempts to move past an understanding of proportionality and deference in 
opposition to one another.  
The spatial metaphor has been a useful fiction for judicial review theory in the past, 
where the courts were primarily concerned with limiting arbitrary governmental power 
and setting out the limits of the powers of the courts. To some extent the heavy 
influence of the spatial metaphor on proportionality and deference can be explained by 
                                                
37 Jowell, J. ‘Judicial Deference: Servility, Civility Or Institutional Capacity’ [2003] PL 592, at 598-599. 
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the traditional judicial review standard of reasonableness.38 Reasonableness was built 
on the premise that within the ‘four corners’ of administrative law principles, the 
discretion of decision-makers was ‘an absolute one’.39 The case law leading up to the 
introduction of proportionality highlighted the need for increased scrutiny in cases 
involving fundamental rights.40  However, these cases were still applying the 
reasonableness standard and so, if anything, this jurisprudence entrenches the spatial 
metaphor.  
The spatial fiction has carried over into the HRA-era. The focus on deference as 
something which is separate from proportionality is undoubtedly fruit from the 
Wednesbury tree. Theorists want to know ‘where does proportionality leave the 
distinction between appeal and review?’41 The focus on these two polarities has 
overshadowed any meaningful exposition of what proportionality actually is rather than 
what it is not.  Proportionality has been variously described as ‘constitutional review’42 
which requires a higher degree of scrutiny and as ‘a formal approach with a variable 
content, rather than a fixed standard.’43 Clayton suggests that ‘proportionality does not 
require a court to re-evaluate the underlying merits of the case: instead the court must 
assess the process or methodology used by the decision-maker in arriving at its 
decision.’44 Each of these propositions goes some way towards elaborating the concept 
of proportionality, but they all understand proportionality by reference to the distinction 
                                                
38 See Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB  223. See also 
Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister of State for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374. For an early 
criticism of unreasonableness relative to proportionality see:  Jowell and Lester ‘Beyond Wednesbury’, 
above n3; and Jowell and Lester ‘Proportionality: Neither Novel Nor Dangerous’, above n3. 
39 Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB  223, at 228 per 
Lord Greene MR. 
40 See Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister of State for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374; R v 
Ministry of Defence, ex parte Smith [1996] QB 517; and R (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2001] UKHL 26; [2001] 2 AC 532 and R v A (No 2) [2001] UKHL 25; [2002] 1 AC 45. 
41 Beatson, J., Matthews, M. and Elliott, M. Administrative Law: Text and Materials (3rd ed., Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2005). 
42 Jowell ‘Judicial Deference’, above n37, at 598-599. See also Jowell, J. ‘Beyond the Rule of Law: 
Towards Constitutional Judicial Review’ [2000] PL 671. 
43 Leigh, I. ‘Taking Rights Proportionately: Judicial Review, the Human Rights Act and Strasbourg’ 
[2002] PL 265, at 278. 
44 Clayton, R. ‘Developing Principles for Human Rights’ [2002] EHRLR 175, at 186. 
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between reasonableness review and appeal. They fail to explain proportionality on its 
own terms.  
As will become clear in subsequent chapters, proportionality is far more sophisticated 
than Wednesbury unreasonableness, and if understood fully, it can transcend the spatial 
metaphor. The emphasis on the demarcation of zones restricts an understanding of how 
the proportionality test actually functions. The demarcation of such zones is often an 
outcome of proportionality analysis, but this is not a prerequisite of proportionality, it is 
a consequence of it. 
Two views of proportionality and deference have been particularly prevalent in the 
literature, both of which are based on the spatial metaphor. One conceives of 
proportionality as just another version of Wednesbury unreasonableness, the other views 
it as a way for judges to provide the ‘correct’ answer. Rivers describes these as the 
‘reasonableness-conception’ and the ‘correctness-conception’ of proportionality.45 
Some theorists see proportionality as just an offshoot of reasonableness which entails a 
high level of deference. Others contend that proportionality requires a court to find the 
correct human rights answer and so afford less deference. Both are unnecessarily 
reductive and obfuscate the processes underlying these disputes. 
 
1.2.1: Proportionality as reasonableness 
In 1999 Lord Hoffmann described proportionality as an aspect of irrationality and 
commented that he sees ‘little future for proportionality in this country as a freestanding 
principle’.46 This reasonableness-conception arose in cases such as R (Mahmood) v 
                                                
45 Rivers, J. ‘Proportionality and Variable Intensity of Review’ (2006) 65 CLJ 174, at 192-193. Thomas 
made a similar analysis based on earlier debates, see Thomas, R. Legitimate Expectations and 
Proportionality in Administrative Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2000), at 95-97. 
46 Hofffman, Lord ‘The Influence of the European Principle of Proportionality upon UK Law’ in Ellis, E. 
(ed.) The Principle of Proportionality in the Laws of Europe (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1999), at 114. 
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Secretary of State for the Home Department47 in which Lord Phillips MR held that the 
HRA required a court to assess whether the decision of an authority was within a range 
of reasonable decisions. While the Court accepted that proportionality would allow a 
smaller range of action, the assessment was still deeply entrenched in the Wednesbury 
model.48  
Elliott contends that the difference between reasonableness and proportionality is one of 
degree not type.49 He suggests that the two tests are very similar and not, as is often 
suggested, competing. He contends that both tests recognise the need for balance but 
that the ECHR jurisprudence affords a smaller zone of discretion to the executive. On 
Elliott’s analysis both the Wednesbury test and proportionality entail the drawing of a 
dividing line between an area where the decision-maker has discretion and another area 
where she does not. He also argues that both tests are applied with varying levels of 
scrutiny, but this is presented in a spatial fashion. 
This line of analysis has led over time to an understanding of proportionality which 
requires decision-makers to use the language of human rights when reaching their 
decisions, rather than making decisions which are substantively Convention-compatible. 
This approach has been roundly rejected by the House of Lords and a focus on the 
substantive human rights outcome of a decision seems now to be the required 
standard.50 Notwithstanding this, Leigh and Masterman have expressed concern that 
                                                
47 [2001] 1 WLR 840. 
48 This model was further propounded in cases such as Samaroo v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department  [2001] EWCA Civ 1139; Edore v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] 
EWCA Civ 716; [2003] 1 WLR 2979; and R (Razgar) v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
[2004] UKHL 27; [2004] 2 AC 368 per Lord Carswell. 
49 Elliott ‘Standard of Substantive Review’, above n4. Elliott bases his argument on the more robust 
formulation of unreasonableness that was recognised pre-HRA as being necessary in rights cases. See: 
Bugdaycay v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1987] AC 514 and R v Ministry of Defence, ex 
parte Smith [1996] QB 517. 
50 See R (SB) v Governors of Denbigh High School [2006] UKHL 15; [2007] 1 AC 100 and Belfast City 
Council v Miss Behavin’ Ltd [2007] UKHL 19; [2007] 1 WLR 1420. This was also a central finding of 
Huang v Secretary of state for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 11; [2007] 2 AC 167. See Clayton, 
G. ‘Prediction or Precondition? The House of Lords Judgment in Huang & Kashmiri’ (2007) 21 JIANL 
311. However, Poole argues that there may still be situations, particularly in immigration decisions where 
the decision-maker is under an obligation to make a decision in convention specific terms, see Poole 
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where a court focuses exclusively on the ‘overall balancing’ element of proportionality, 
this could be the basis for the reintroduction of Wednesbury through the back door.51 
 
1.2.2: Proportionality as correctness 
Clayton is critical of the degree of deference exercised in cases such as Mahmood.52 He 
argues that proportionality must be strictly applied if it is to be of any value in 
protecting fundamental rights and that ‘the deferential view taken towards an 
administrative decision to implement the Secretary of State's policy is difficult to 
understand’.53 Blake is also critical of deference to the public authority since it appears 
to ‘subjugate the Court's duty to ensure that administrative action was Convention-
compatible, to the executive's freedom within limits of rationality to form policies and 
select preferred solutions.’ 54 More recently, Knight has argued that the reasoning of the 
primary decision-maker is only relevant on the basis that if the primary decision-maker 
conducts its own human rights balancing analysis, then ‘the “correct” result is more 
likely to be reached’.55 These schools of thought are examples of the ‘proportionality as 
correctness’ view. 
Edwards is another adherent of this approach.56 He argues forcefully that a strict 
application of the proportionality test is required to establish whether limitations on 
rights are legitimate. He is concerned that too much deference can lead to superficial 
                                                                                                                                          
‘Reformation of English Administrative Law’, above n35, at 150. See further: Knight, C. 
‘Proportionality, the Decision-Maker and the House of Lords’ (2007) 12 JR 221; and Young, A.L. ‘In 
Defence of Due Deference’ (2009) 72 MLR 554. 
51  Leigh, I. and Masterman, R. Making Rights Real: The Human Rights Act in its First Decade (Oxford: 
Hart Publishing, 2008), at 152. See also: Leigh ‘Standard of Judicial Review’, above n36 at 199; and 
Leigh ‘Taking Rights Proportionately’, above n43, at 276-277. 
52 Clayton, R. ‘Regaining a Sense of Proportion: The Human Rights Act and the Proportionality 
Principle’ [2001] EHRLR 504. 
53 Clayton ‘Developing Principles’, above n44, at 187. See also Clayton ‘The Human Rights Act Six 
Years On’, above n28. 
54 Blake ‘Importing Proportionality’, above n33, at 22-23. 
55 Knight ‘Decision-Maker and the House of Lords’, above n50, at 224. 
56 Edwards, R.A. ‘Judicial Deference under the Human Rights Act’ (2002) 65 MLR 859. 
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reasoning and is particularly critical of the application of deference prior to the 
limitation analysis itself. He contends that there is a risk that indiscriminate judicial 
deference can cause the minimal impairment stage of the proportionality test to become 
diluted. Edwards is aware of the need to apply deference within the proportionality 
analysis, which is undoubtedly a positive development. However, he does not flesh out 
the connections between proportionality and deference. His analysis is not a rejection of 
spatial conceptions of deference, but merely a rejection of the level of space that has 
been given. Writing around the same time, Leigh warned that proportionality should not 
‘become a Trojan horse by which judicial deference can be smuggled back into the 
domestic legal system.’57 Again this shows a spatial view of deference and 
proportionality which expresses a desire to see less space for deference. 
Not all proponents of the correctness-conception are fans of proportionality. Nicol 
argues that the division of competences between the judiciary and the other branches of 
government ‘ebbs and flows with the respective assertiveness of judicial and elected 
officials’58 and that the law is increasingly ineffective at separating the roles of judges 
from politicians. He views this as a cause for great concern and contends that  ‘[a]t its 
most intrusive, the doctrine of proportionality points to a single lawful solution.’59 
Nicol’s main criticism is that the HRA brings questions of political morality into 
judicial review. This is indicative of the spatial underpinnings of his understanding of 
proportionality and deference.60 He is concerned that by allowing the courts to decide 
questions of political morality, proportionality permits the courts to intrude upon a 
space which should belong to Parliament.  
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Hickman separates out the minimal impairment and the overall balance stages of the 
test. 61  In effect he sees overall balance in reasonableness-type terms and he suggests 
that minimal impairment should be dispensed with because it suggests that wherever 
there is a less intrusive option this must be taken. He claims that ‘the proportionality 
test, applied in this way, would extinguish the discretion of a public authority as to how 
best to achieve policy goals.’62 Again, this analysis is predicated on a conception of 
deference which pits it against proportionality, rather than integrating it within 
proportionality. 
 
1.2.3: The limitations of the spatial metaphor 
There is a legitimate desire to situate proportionality and deference in the existing 
public law tapestry by connecting them to traditional judicial functions, most notably 
reasonableness review and appeal. Arguments about proportionality have a tendency to 
connect it to one or other of these, by describing it either as a branch of reasonableness 
or as a correctness test, akin to an appeal on the merits. This attempt to understand by 
analogy is understandable. However, there comes a point when analogy becomes a 
hindrance and something has to be understood on its own terms. This has not yet 
occurred with proportionality and deference under the HRA.  
There are two main limitations of the spatial metaphor. First, its heavy focus on 
normativity and the separation of powers has prevented a meaningful analysis of the 
structure of the relationship between proportionality and deference. As a result, the 
process which occurs in proportionality-based judicial review has not yet been 
adequately explained. Secondly, the spatial metaphor has prevented the development of 
an institutionally sensitive approach to proportionality. The second difficulty flows 
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from the first and is of particular importance for this thesis. I will explain each difficulty 
in turn. 
The spatial metaphor is heavily focused on normative issues at the expense of an 
analytical approach. It over-simplifies proportionality-based rights adjudication, to an 
extent that renders the metaphor unrealistic. The discussion is largely about how much 
deference the courts ought to give, without any recognition of how deference and 
proportionality relate to one another. I do not seek to deny that the limitation of rights 
and state power is properly an outcome of a proportionality analysis. The problem is 
that the spatial view does not explain the process of proportionality.  
Proportionality and deference are concerned with defining human rights and 
determining the limits of state power. These are deeply normative issues and I accept 
that they must be addressed. It is undoubtedly important to discuss whether government 
ought to be permitted to limit rights in a certain way and whether the courts ought to be 
permitted to make certain decisions instead of the other branches of government. Such 
things are fundamental to the operation of judicially enforceable human rights. 
However, while it is valuable to consider these normative issues related to 
proportionality and deference, those normative issues are concerned with the outcomes 
of HRA adjudication. If the debate about deference is focused on the question of the 
extent of deference due and when it should be afforded, then the question of how 
deference is afforded is overlooked. The proportionality test, unlike Wednesbury 
unreasonableness, does not require a court to ask a single question of a challenged 
measure. Proportionality requires a court to ask a series of questions, each of which is 
based on certain assumptions. Some of these questions involve normative issues; other 
questions involve empirical issues. 63  Deference will not operate in the same manner in 
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relation to each question within the proportionality test. However, this fact is 
overlooked by solely spatial accounts of proportionality. A supplementary structural 
account is required. Such an account can explain the relationship between the different 
stages of proportionality and deference permits a more detailed understanding of the 
process which occurs. This in turn permits normative arguments to be applied to the 
appropriate aspects of the proportionality analysis, rather than being made in very 
generalised terms about HRA review as a whole.  
A short example helps to illustrate this point. One of the elements of the proportionality 
test requires a court to ask whether a challenged measure went no further than was 
necessary to achieve its objective. This requires the reviewing court to decide whether 
or not there was a less rights-restrictive alternative available to the primary decision-
maker which would still achieve the objective being pursued by that decision-maker. If 
a hypothetical local authority was seeking to evict a tenant it might do so on the basis 
that it was necessary to prevent anti-social behaviour caused by the tenant’s eldest son. 
The tenant might challenge that eviction on the ground that it was a disproportionate 
interference with her right to respect for home life. Part of the tenant’s case might be 
that she was prepared to ask her son to leave the house and that if he did so the anti-
social behaviour would be eliminated. 
Whether or not this is a less rights-restrictive measure which still achieves the objective 
is an empirical question which must be decided by the reviewing court as part of the 
proportionality test. There may disagreement about the answer to this question. The 
local authority may have doubts about whether or not the son is actually likely to leave. 
There may be a third alternative which would achieve the objective but be less 
restrictive of the tenant’s rights than eviction would be. When deciding whether 
eviction is the least rights-restrictive alternative, the court may decide to defer to the 
view of the local authority on this matter, or on a related matter which affects it. If the 
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court does so, then it is affording deference to the fact-finding capabilities of the local 
authority. This is a very particular form of deference and in this instance it is connected 
to one particular part of proportionality. The questions involved at this point of the 
analysis are not normative, they are empirical. Normative arguments about the 
legitimate limits of governmental autonomy are of little use in deciding the level of 
deference to be afforded at this point in the proportionality test. 
Other forms of deference may arise at other stages. At the final stage of proportionality, 
the court would examine whether or not there is an overall balance between the 
objective of preventing anti-social behaviour and the eviction. This is not a factual 
issue, and so the deference linked to the overall balance question is of a different form 
to the deference linked to the minimal impairment question. Normative arguments 
would be valuable at this point. 
The preceding is a very crude example and I will give a more comprehensive exposition 
of the links between proportionality and deference in later chapters. However, at this 
point, the example should help to illustrate that there are different parts to 
proportionality and there are different forms of deference. Different parts of 
proportionality connect with different forms of deference in specific cases. An 
examination of the structure of the relationship between proportionality and deference 
will help to elaborate the process by which proportionality adjudication occurs. A solely 
spatial approach cannot achieve this, because it treats proportionality and deference as 
separate questions. In truth, they are a series of questions which interact with each other 
in order to produce a particular outcome. 
This has not been achieved to date because the reasonableness and correctness 
conceptions of proportionality are both heavily focused on normative arguments. They 
effectively form opposite viewpoints of the same normative debate regarding the 
balance of power to be struck between the courts and the other arms of government. The 
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analysis of deference has focused excessively on general theories of the separation of 
powers, rather than analysing deference in terms of its relationship to the structure of 
the proportionality test. Neither approach permits the sort of step-by-step analysis of 
proportionality and deference that I have set out in the local authority example. The 
reasonableness and correctness conceptions only address the normative issues. The 
intermingling of normative and epistemic questions is not accounted for.  
A normative analysis of the appropriate powers and roles under the HRA is based on 
assumptions about the structure and operation of the proportionality test as it relates to 
deference. The dominance of the spatial view has hidden these assumptions. A deeper 
analysis of the technical operation of proportionality review is required if the 
assumptions are to be brought out into the daylight and the normative arguments are to 
be permitted to develop beyond a turf war. A workable model of the structural 
relationship between proportionality and deference can provide a framework for the 
normative arguments regarding rights and governmental power to develop beyond their 
current level. Proportionality has a specific designated structure and so it is possible to 
understand deference within that structure.  
It has been argued that the courts should get rid of proportionality altogether and focus 
solely on the normative questions. Tsakyrakis, writing about ECHR jurisprudence, 
suggests proportionality claims to be objective and morally neutral, when in fact it is 
not.64 These criticisms of rights adjudication may have some weight but for the 
purposes of this thesis, they must be discounted for two reasons. First, I do not argue 
that proportionality is a means of providing a correct answer to normative questions. 
Rather, I argue that it is a means of providing a transparent process of decision making 
in matters which involve some normative questions and some empirical questions. I do 
not subscribe to a ‘right answer thesis’. What I am seeking to do is provide a framework 
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within which normative questions can be addressed. Secondly, and perhaps more 
practically, the UK courts have committed themselves to proportionality and there does 
not seem to be any reduction in the pace with which it is being applied. If judges are 
using this process to reason on rights cases, then a sophisticated explanation of that 
process is needed. 
The second difficulty with the spatial metaphor is that it is an impediment to the 
development of an institutionally sensitive approach to proportionality. As will be made 
clear in later chapters, the proportionality test does not operate in a uniform manner 
across the range of government activity. Certain parts of the test may be more or less 
important depending on the body being judicially reviewed. Making this aspect of 
proportionality adjudication explicit is crucial if a more sophisticated account of 
proportionality and deference is to be developed. In order to do this the structure of 
proportionality and its interaction with deference must be fully accounted for. 
The spatial metaphor has managed to take some account of institutional sensitivity in 
deference.65 However, it cannot explain the way in which the operation of the 
proportionality test (as opposed to deference) will be affected by the institutional 
features of the body being judicially reviewed. Spatial conceptions of proportionality 
are fundamentally about the appropriate extent of judicial power, not the manner in 
which that power is exercised.  
The spatial metaphor obfuscates the institutional issues which can arise within 
proportionality analysis. I return briefly to the local authority example (again this will 
be a cursory illustration; a more detailed explanation of institutional sensitivity will 
follow below and in later chapters). Local authorities operate their housing policies 
under statutory schemes. If the statute required the authority to seek an eviction in any 
case where there is proof of anti-social behaviour, then it would not have had any 
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choice but to evict the tenant. When the reviewing court applied the minimal 
impairment stage of the test, it would be asking a question which had already been 
answered by the institutional setting in which the decision to evict was made. If the 
court asked ‘was there a less rights-restrictive alternative available to the local 
authority?’ the answer would be no. However, this is not because a less restrictive 
alternative does not exist; it is because the local authority does not have the power to 
choose such an alternative.  
If the court were to apply the spatial metaphor, it would separate out deference and 
proportionality. It might decide that it was appropriate to defer to the decision of the 
local authority because the subject matter concerned social policy and the authority had 
more expertise. The court might then apply the minimal impairment arm of the 
proportionality test in a deferential manner and conclude that the eviction satisfied that 
part of the proportionality test. On such an analysis, it would not be possible to tell 
whether the outcome was the result of the level of deference that was afforded or 
because part of the test was irrelevant. Indeed, it would not necessarily be clear that the 
minimal impairment part of the test was irrelevant, since there would be little reason for 
the court to turn its attention to that issue. These institutional issues cannot be 
meaningfully explored as long as proportionality and deference are understood solely in 
spatial terms. A structural approach is a prerequisite to an institutionally sensitive 
approach. 
 
 
1.3: PROBLEM TWO – THE LACK OF INSTITUTIONAL SENSITIVITY 
The second problem with the existing literature on proportionality in the UK is that 
insufficient attention has been paid to the institutional and functional distinctions 
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between the various types of governmental activity which a court may be called upon to 
review under the HRA. While there has been a great deal of discussion about the 
relative institutional features of the judiciary on one hand and ‘the government’ on the 
other, there has been little focus on the fact that there are varying institutions within ‘the 
government’ which themselves have different features and competences. The UK 
Courts can be called upon to consider proportionality-based challenges to all forms of 
government activity, from the decisions of appointed officials to primary legislation66 
and everything in between. (In this thesis I use the terms ‘government’ and 
‘governmental’ in their broad sense to encompass all public bodies covered by the 
HRA, including Parliament.) There has been some recognition of the need to examine 
the different institutional reasons for deference.67 However, no such recognition has 
arisen with regard to proportionality itself. The four stages of the proportionality test are 
based on certain assumptions about government measures being challenged as 
Convention-incompatible. These assumptions do not hold for all institutional situations. 
When a court is reviewing one branch of government, some of these assumptions may 
come to the fore, whereas they could be of less relevance if the court is reviewing a 
different institution of government.  
Making these institutional aspects of proportionality clear is valuable of itself. 
However, it is also necessary if the spatial metaphor is to be overcome. If these 
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institutional factors are not made explicit, then it will not be possible to integrate 
deference within proportionality. The reduced application of certain parts of the test can 
happen both because of the institutional features of the challenged decision-maker and 
because of deference. In order to overcome the spatial fiction, a theory of 
proportionality must be clear about which of these factors is at work. 
 
1.3.1: Proportionality and the range of governmental activity 
The subject matter of a proportionality review will broadly fit into two categories of 
decision: rule-making and case-specific administrative decision-making. Most 
government activity which can be challenged under the HRA will fall into one of these 
two categories. There are also distinctions between the levels of autonomy enjoyed by 
government actors. For example, Parliament has much broader powers than other rule-
makers. As was explained briefly above, there are four elements to the proportionality 
test: legitimate objective; rational connection; minimal impairment; and overall balance. 
There are certain institutional features which will affect the premises upon which these 
four elements are based. 
Parliament will have a very wide amount of choice as to which objectives it pursues. 
This is not true of decision-makers further down the governmental food-chain. An 
appointed official may have some discretionary powers, but the objectives they pursue 
will have been set for them elsewhere. This means that asking whether or not the 
objective of a measure was legitimate requires a different analysis when asked of the 
outcomes of primary legislation than when it is asked of the actions of an appointed 
official.68 
                                                
68 Furthermore, under section 6(2) of the HRA, if a public authority is mandated to act in a Convention-
incompatible way by an Act of Parliament, then the actions of the public authority will not be deemed to 
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Rational connection has not been a significant element in very many HRA 
proportionality cases. However, there are institutional factors which could potentially 
arise. Whether or not a measure is capable of achieving its stated objective may be 
moot. In such instances the courts may decide to defer to the expertise of the decision-
maker on the matter. Levels of expertise will differ depending on the institution 
involved.  
The minimal impairment element of proportionality requires an examination of whether 
there was, in any particular case, a less rights-restrictive measure available. This 
presupposes that there is a range of measures available to the decision-maker. This 
cannot be assumed of all governmental activity. Parliament has a wide power to choose 
the specific measure it uses to pursue a particular aim. Many appointed officials have no 
choice whatsoever, which renders this element of the test defunct when a court is 
reviewing the actions of certain institutions. 
The overall balance stage of proportionality requires a reviewing court to measure the 
impact of the challenged governmental action on Convention rights and the extent to 
which that action will achieve the stated objective. Such measurement might be quite 
straightforward in cases where the action only affects one individual. The same cannot 
be said for a rule of very wide application, where measurement of these two factors can 
be very complex. 
A further issue of institutional sensitivity arises in relation to cases where a public 
authority exercises legislative powers. If there is an infringement of human rights, a 
court will need to address its proportionality review to either the decision of the public 
authority or the legislation or both. O’Brien describes these as ‘applied review’ and 
                                                                                                                                          
be unlawful. This is an issue for both legitimacy of objective and rationality of connection within the 
proportionality test. 
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‘legislative review’ respectively. 69 He points out that the relationship between these two 
modes of review is just as critical as the relationship between sections 3 and 4 of the 
HRA, but has received far less attention.  Where a court is called upon to assess the 
Convention compatibility of governmental action which is the product of multiple 
levels of decision-making, the proportionality analysis becomes even more complex and 
so institutional sensitivity is particularly important in these ‘multi-level’ cases. 
  
1.3.2: Institutional sensitivity and proportionality 
Current discussion of proportionality is unduly selective in its institutional assumptions 
about governmental activity. Analysis tends to either focus on an administrative law 
model or a legislative model. Under the administrative model, the assumptions 
underlying traditional judicial review are assumed to apply to all proportionality 
review.70 The great concern of the legislative model is the dangers of judges taking the 
power to define the scope of rights away from the democratic powers, which implies a 
concern for the sovereignty of Parliament.71  
It is somewhat telling that Daly is regularly referred to as the watershed for 
proportionality in judicial review.72 This assertion is based on Lord Steyn’s judgment 
which introduced the three-part proportionality test used in the Privy Council case of de 
Freitas v Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Lands and 
                                                
69 O’Brien, D. ‘Judicial Review under the Human Rights Act 1998: Legislative or Applied Review?’ 
[2007] EHRLR 550. 
70 Clayton ‘Developing Principles’, above n44; Elliott, M. ‘The Human Rights Act 1998 and the Standard 
of Substantive Review’ [2002] JR 97. 
71 Nicol, ‘Law and Politics’, above n58; Hiebert, J.L., ‘Parliament and the Human Rights Act: Can the 
JCHR Help Facilitate a Culture of Rights?’ (2006) 4 IJCL 1. It is noteworthy that Elliott, who addresses 
proportionality in administrative law, does not give detailed consideration to proportionality when he 
analyses the sovereignty of Parliament. See Elliott, M. ‘Parliamentary Sovereignty and the New 
Constitutional Order: Legislative Freedom, Political Reality and Convention’ (2002) 22 Legal Studies 
340. 
72 This has been expressed repeatedly in the literature, for example, see Poole ‘Reformation of English 
Administrative Law’, above n35, at 146; and Clayton, R. and Ghaly, K. ‘Shifting Standards of Review’ 
[2007] JR 210, at 214-215. 
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Housing.73  However, Lord Steyn had introduced precisely the same test six days 
previously in R v A (No 2) as a basis for analysing the proportionality of legislation. 
Furthermore, while his comments in Daly were effectively obiter dicta, the use of the 
test in R v A (No2) was central to his judgment. The focus on Daly is indicative of the 
institutionally insensitive analysis of proportionality under the HRA. Prior to the HRA, 
judicial review in the UK was focused almost exclusively on administrative decision-
making. It is understandable that an administrative law case would be cited as the 
introduction of the test. However, this focus on Daly serves to minimise the importance 
of the legislative review aspect of proportionality analysis. 
Hickman seeks to provide an analysis of the structure of proportionality by separating 
out the minimal impairment and overall balance parts of the test. 74 However, he is 
hampered in his efforts by institutional insensitivity. While he accepts that the House of 
Lords confirmed that both are part of the test in Huang,75 he is concerned that there is 
not sufficient clarity about which of the two tests is the dominant one. If an 
institutionally sensitive approach is taken, it can be shown that this issue is contingent 
on the features of the government body being judicially reviewed. Hickman argues that 
‘[p]ut simply, courts and public officials address different questions.’76 While this is 
true, he fails to give adequate recognition to the fact that so too do administrators and 
ministers, or ministers and Parliament, and that these differences impact on which limb 
of the test is dominant. 
As with the spatial metaphor, there are good historical reasons for this lack of 
institutional sensitivity. In general, there has been limited discussion of the separation of 
                                                
73 [1999] 1 AC 69. The formulation used includes the first three parts of the proportionality test: 
legitimate objective, rational connection and minimal impairment. 
74 Hickman ‘Substance and Structure’, above n 27, at 711-714. 
75 Huang v Secretary of state for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 11; [2007] 2 AC 167. 
76 Hickman ‘Substance and Structure’, above n 27, at 699. 
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powers in the UK77 and the understanding of the relationship between the legislature 
and the executive is still often very traditional.78 It is still accepted doctrine that the 
powers of government in the UK are unified in the Crown.79 Over the past half century, 
there has been a very substantial growth in the administrative state80 coupled with the 
dominance of two heavily-whipped political parties81 and an increasing use of delegated 
legislation.82  This has reduced the powers of Parliament while at the same time 
increasing the powers of the executive in a way that makes it quite understandable that 
many would view governmental activity as being a single amorphous mass. Indeed, in 
some instances, government is a single amorphous mass: many state bodies and 
agencies have been set up to regulate certain discrete fields and these bodies regularly 
control rule-making, policy-setting and adjudication on those rules.83 The same is true 
of much of local government.84 This constitutional backdrop goes some way to 
explaining the lack of institutional sensitivity in modern proportionality analysis in the 
UK. 
                                                
77 See Barendt, E. ‘Separation of Powers and Constitutional Government’ [1995] PL 599; Saunders, C. 
‘Separation of Powers and the Judicial Branch’ [2006] JR 337. Craig examines the separation of powers, 
but like much of the analysis of this topic, he is concerned primarily with the separation between the 
courts and the other branches, rather than between the executive and the legislature: Craig, P. 
‘Fundamental Principles of Administrative Law’ in Feldman, D. (ed.) English Public Law (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2004). 
78 See generally Dicey, A.V. Introduction to the Study of the Constitution (10t ed. London: MacMillan, 
1959). For a HRA-era defence of Dicey, see Young, A.L. Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Human 
Rights Act (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2008). 
79 Loughlin, M. The Idea of Public Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2003) at 23-25. 
80 Supperstone, M., Goudie, J. and Walker, P. Judicial Review (3rd ed. London: LexisNexis Butterworths, 
2005), at 8-10; and Loughlin, ‘Idea of Public Law’, above n79, at 8-12. 
81 Lijphart, A. Patterns of Democracy: government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999), at 13-14. 
82 There are now thousands of statutory instruments passed each year; see www.opsi.gov.uk. See also 
Ganz, G., ‘Delegated Legislation: A Necessary Evil or a Constitutional Outrage?’ in Leyland, P. and 
Woods, T., Administrative Law Facing The Future: Old Constraints and New Horizons (Blackstone 
1997); and Barber, N.W. and Young, A.L. ‘The Rise of Prospective Henry VIII Clauses and their 
Implications for Sovereignty’ [2003] PL 112. 
83 Barendt ‘Separation of Powers’, above n77, at 607. 
84 See generally Turpin, C. and Tomkins, A. British Government and the Constitution (6th ed. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), at 244-259. 
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Admittedly, there has been some recognition of the variety of forms of governmental 
activity to which proportionality can apply.85 Prior to the entry into force of the HRA, 
Feldman noted that proportionality would be applied in different ways depending on 
various factors, one of which was source or form of interference.86 He distinguished 
between legislative rules, individual decisions and policy powers and suggested that the 
UK Courts were more likely to use proportionality for administrative law than for 
review of primary legislation.87 While these contributions were certainly valuable, they 
need to be developed further in order to address the issues that arise within the structure 
of proportionality when it is applied to varying forms of government activity. 
The interplay between the legislative and administrative levels of proportionality has 
also received a certain amount of attention. 88 Clayton is critical of judicial decisions in 
which it has been held that ‘the statutory scheme represents Parliament's view of 
striking a balance so that there is no scope for undertaking a proportionality exercise by 
looking at the particular circumstances in an individual case.’89 Feldman argues that 
Parliament ‘does not make proper judgments about the limits to the proportionality of 
power-conferring legislation’90 and so it is left to decision-makers to decide for 
themselves. While Feldman views this in a negative light, Sales and Hooper contend 
that proportionality actually requires legislation to give decision-makers wide 
discretion, so that their decisions can be more fact-sensitive. 91 While this recognition of 
effect of multi-level decision-making on proportionality is certainly valuable, there has 
not yet been an analysis of how the test itself is affected by the institutional setting. 
                                                
85 For example, Blake comments on the fact that much proportionality case law has focused on the Home 
Office and has included challenges to legislation, policies and individual decisions. See Blake ‘Importing 
Proportionality’, above n33, at 20. 
86 Feldman, D. ‘Proportionality and the Human Rights Act 1998’ in Ellis, E., (ed.) The Principle of 
Proportionality in the Laws of Europe (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1999), at 137. 
87 Feldman, ‘Proportionality and the Human Rights Act’, above n86, at 138-139. 
88 See O’Brien ‘Legislative or Applied Review?’, above n69. 
89 Clayton ‘The Human Rights Act Six Years On’, above n28, at 23. 
90 Feldman, D. ‘Human Rights, Terrorism and Risk: The Roles of Politicians and Judges [2006] PL 364, 
at 377. 
91 Sales, P. and Hooper, B. ‘Proportionality and the Form of Law’ (2003) 119 LQR 426. 
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The confusion regarding institutional roles in proportionality has already impacted on 
the quality of judicial reasoning. For example, in the case of R v Shayler92 the House of 
Lords examined the Convention compatibility of the Official Secrets Act 1989 (‘the 
OSA’). There was a scheme in place whereby a person bound by the OSA could make a 
request to certain officials if they wished to make a disclosure that would otherwise be 
in breach of the OSA. The House of Lords noted that a refusal of such a request would 
be subject to proportionality-based judicial review if the refusal affected Article 10 of 
the convention. The House therefore held that the OSA was Convention-compatible. 
This is an unsatisfactory decision. The House’s assessment of the legislation was 
sidetracked by a hypothetical assessment of an administrative decision-making process 
which had not even occurred. The HRA challenge brought in this case was to the 
legislation itself and yet instead of assessing the proportionality of the OSA, the House 
of Lords was content to presume that any Convention-incompatible use of the OSA 
would be weeded out by proportionality-based judicial review. If a more institutionally 
sensitive approach had been adopted, better quality reasoning could have been expected, 
regardless of the eventual outcome. 
 
1.3.3: Institutional sensitivity and deference 
Unlike proportionality, deference has been approached in an institutionally sensitive 
manner both by commentators and the judiciary. Not long after the entry into force of 
the HRA there was a recognition that different levels of deference should be afforded to 
administrative action as opposed to primary legislation. 93 The dissenting judgment of 
Laws LJ in International Transport Roth GmbH v Secretary of State for the Home 
                                                
92 [2002] UKHL 11; [2003] 1 AC 247. 
93 See Clayton ‘Developing Principles’, above n44, at 187. 
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Department94 is a much celebrated exposition of the bases on which deference might be 
paid. It is possible to distil these bases into the complementary concepts of democratic 
legitimacy95 and ‘relative institutional competence’96 thus separating the institutional 
reasons for deference into their two primary elements. These two ideas have been 
recurring themes in the literature on proportionality and deference,97 although not all 
commentators have accepted democratic legitimacy as a basis for deference under the 
HRA.98  
Unfortunately, discussion of the institutional reasons for deference has not yet broken 
free of the spatial understanding of the relationship between proportionality and 
deference.99 Hunt, who is deeply critical of the spatial metaphor, sees it as creating a 
non-justiciability hurdle, marking out certain issues as being beyond judicial oversight. 
100 His answer to this problem is to introduce a standard of ‘due deference’. This 
standard is based on the actual features of the decision-maker, particularly with regard 
to democratic legitimacy and institutional competence. While Hunt succeeds in 
developing an institutionally sensitive concept of deference, he fails to overcome the 
spatial metaphor with regard to proportionality and so his overall analysis is limited. 
Instead of a line delimiting the sphere of autonomy of the courts from the sphere of 
                                                
94 [2002] EWCA Civ 158; [2003] QB 728, at 765-767. Laws LJ’s elements of deference were cited with 
approval in the House of Lords in the case of R (ProLife Alliance) v British Broadcasting Corporation 
[2003] UKHL 23; [2004] 1 AC 185 per Lord Walker.  
95 See Lester ‘Five Years On’, above n67, at 265. Democratic legitimacy is at the heart of ‘dialogue’ 
models of judicial review of primary legislation, although in the UK these models have not tended to give 
much detail on the operation of the proportionality test. See: Clayton, R. ‘Judicial Deference and 
“Democratic Dialogue”: The Legitimacy of Judicial Intervention under the Human Rights Act 1998’ 
[2004] PL 33; Hickman, T. ‘Constitutional Dialogue, Constitutional Theories and the Human Rights Act 
1998’ [2005] PL 306; and Young, A.L. Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Human Rights Act (Oxford: 
Hart Publishing, 2008). Turner has expressed concerns about the effect that ‘expertization’ has on 
political discourse. See Turner, S.P. Liberal Democracy 3.0 (London: Sage, 2003). 
96 This term was introduced into the case law in A&X v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
[2004] UKHL 56; [2005] 2 AC 68, at 102 per Lord Bingham. See a detailed consideration of competence 
as a basis for deference see Jowell ‘A Question of Competence’, above n67. 
97 See for example: Steyn, Lord ‘Deference: A Tangled Story’ [2005] PL 346; Clayton, R. ‘Principles for 
Judicial Deference’ [2006] JR 109; Sayeed, S ‘Beyond the Language of “Deference”’ [2005] JR 111. 
98 See Phillipson, G. ‘Deference, Discretion, and Democracy in the Human Rights Act Era’ (2007) 60 
CLP 40; and Jowell ‘Servility, Civility Or Institutional Capacity’, above n37. 
99 See for example Keene, Sir D. ‘Principles of Deference under the Human Rights Act’ in Fenwick, H., 
Phillipson, G. & Masterman, R. (eds.) Judicial Reasoning under the UK Human Rights Act (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007) 
100 Hunt ‘Sovereignty’s Blight’, above n2. 
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autonomy of other arms of government, Hunt gives us two lines, based on two differing 
standards. His analysis does not provide a substitute for the spatial metaphor; he merely 
develops it on its own terms. It is as if Hunt has split the spatial metaphor into two sub-
planes, on which the metaphor and its limitations survive. Hunt claims that due 
deference can overcome the problem of a ‘non-justiciability’ concept of deference 
which is inherent in the spatial metaphor. Allan dismisses this, suggesting that ‘[d]ue 
deference turns out, on close inspection, to be non-justiciability dressed in pastel 
colours.’101  
Gearty also addresses institutional sensitivity in deference. He argues for a subject-
matter analysis, which falls along similar lines to that of Hunt. He uses the metaphor of 
a swimming pool to suggest when and if courts should undertake detailed scrutiny of 
the decision-maker. 102 At the shallow end of the pool is legal principle and at the deep 
end is public policy. According to Gearty, the judiciary should stay in the shallow end. 
Kavanagh challenges Gearty’s analysis, arguing that the cases under the HRA ‘do not 
arise in separate categories marked “legal principle” or “public policy.” Rather, they are 
often, if not typically, entwined.’103 Controversial cases will arise at the halfway point 
in the swimming pool; the line between an uncomfortable judge and a drowned one will 
be thin. 
Julian Rivers notes that ‘there is uncertainty as to the conceptual structure within which 
debates about relative institutional competence and legitimacy can take place.’104 While 
it is clear that there has been a recognition that deference is institutionally contingent, 
there has been a corresponding failure to recognise that this is also true of 
                                                
101 Allan, T.R.S. ‘Human Rights and Judicial Review: A Critique of Due Deference’ (2006) 65 CLJ 671, 
at 689. Allan’s own analysis of deference is itself deeply rooted in a spatial understanding of the 
operation of judicial review and his argument is based on the correctness-conception of rights based 
judicial review discussed above. 
102 Gearty, C. Principles of Human Rights Adjudication (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) at 121-
122. 
103 Kavanagh ‘Deference or Defiance?’ above n67, at 197. 
104 Rivers, ‘Variable Intensity of Review’, above n45, at 176. 
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proportionality. The spatial metaphor will not be overcome until there is an explicit 
elaboration of both the structural relationship between proportionality and deference 
and the institutional contingency of the sub-stages of proportionality test. 
 
 
1.4: GOALS OF THESIS AND OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS 
The review of the existing literature on proportionality and deference in this chapter has 
established that the spatial metaphor and institutional insensitivity have not been 
adequately addressed and that they are related problems. It is my view that 
proportionality has been an over-discussed and yet under-analysed field. Proportionality 
has the potential to be a valuable judicial tool: it is significantly more sophisticated than 
previous approaches to rights-based judicial review. If the structure of the test is 
adequately understood, deference can be integrated into the individual stages of the test. 
This structural model will provide a significant advance on previous attempts to explain 
the operation of deference under the HRA. In order for the structural model to be 
possible, an institutionally sensitive approach to each of these stages is required. The 
institutional factors which affect the stages of the proportionality test must be explicit in 
order to avoid confusing them with the institutional factors in which deference is 
grounded.  
In this thesis, I will undertake a detailed analysis of the structure of proportionality and 
deference and develop this structural model in order to make it institutionally sensitive. 
My over-arching goal is to give a detailed account of the operation of proportionality 
and deference in a way which transcends the pitfalls in the existing literature. In order to 
achieve this, I will show that there is a structure to the proportionality test as applied in 
the case law under the HRA. I will explain that this structure can accommodate 
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deference within the elements of the proportionality test. I will also show that certain 
aspects of proportionality are minimised or emphasised depending on the institution 
being judicially reviewed, in much the same way that occurs with deference. The 
application of the structural, institutionally sensitive model will enable some order to be 
put on the existing HRA proportionality case law. A clear doctrine of proportionality 
under the HRA has yet to emerge. In this thesis, I aim to go some way towards 
imposing some shape on the existing jurisprudence. 
Aside from the elaboration of the nature of proportionality under the HRA, I expect two 
other outcomes from my analysis. First, it will be easier to apply proportionality in a 
manner which is internally logically consistent. This will prevent the use of judicial 
reasoning which misunderstands the institutional aspects of proportionality. I term this 
‘institutionally perverse reasoning’. Secondly it will be possible for normative 
arguments about the proper division of governmental powers to be made in a more 
focused way, so that they can be applied to specific aspects of the structure of the test 
(e.g. overall balance, legitimate aim). This will allow for a more meaningful discussion 
of the normative issues in proportionality than the current approach of making 
normative arguments in general terms directed at the test as a whole. Such arguments 
are based on implicit institutional assumptions which limit their effectiveness. If the 
institutional assumptions are made explicit, then the debate can begin to move forward. 
In Chapter 2, I will set out a structural model of proportionality based on the work of 
Robert Alexy. Alexy’s model is based on the test as applied by the German 
Constitutional Court, the Bundesverfassungsgericht (‘BVerfGE’). However, as I will 
show, the elements of the German test are all present in the UK case law, so an 
importation of Alexy’s model is feasible. Alexy explains proportionality as the 
optimisation of competing principles. He uses this analysis to explain the interaction 
between the minimal impairment arm of proportionality and the overall balancing arm. 
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Alexy’s model also describes deference as integrated within the stages of the 
proportionality test. He divides deference into ‘structural’ and ‘epistemic’ and explains 
how they relate to each stage of proportionality. My exposition of Alexy’s model will 
adapt it to the UK context so that it can form the basis for the analysis of the structure of 
proportionality and deference that follows. 
Alexy’s model is focused solely on judicial review of legislation and so in Chapter 3 I 
will develop it by explaining a number of specific institutional distinctions which affect 
the operation of proportionality in all fields. In doing so, I am not seeking to set out a 
comprehensive theory of institutional difference in government. The purpose of Chapter 
3 is to explain differences which are relevant to the structural model of proportionality, 
so that it can be made institutionally sensitive. In addition to these I will explore the two 
institutional features which provide the main reasons for deference. I will also look at 
the way in which a challenged decision can be the product of multiple levels of 
government decision-making. As I noted above, these ‘multi-level decisions’ pose 
particular issues for the proportionality test and I will examine those here. 
In the remainder of the thesis, I will show how the structural, institutionally sensitive 
model of proportionality and deference operates in existing HRA case law. This will be 
done through three thematic case studies: immigration, criminal justice and housing. 
The HRA cases on immigration to date have been heavily focused on one-off decision-
making. Much of the proportionality analysis in the field of criminal justice has been 
concerned with rule-making: predominantly primary legislation, although other, non-
Parliamentary, rules have featured too. I have chosen these two case studies because 
they are at opposite ends of the institutional spectrum, and so they will provide a strong 
contrast. The proportionality cases on housing have entailed an element of both one-off 
decision-making and rule-making and some of them have involved multi-level 
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decisions. These three case studies will enable me to develop a detailed analysis of the 
recurring institutional patterns within the proportionality test in the UK case law.  
The first case study is set out in Chapter 4. In this chapter I will look at the 
proportionality case law relating to immigration. The challenged decisions in the bulk 
of immigration cases have been made on an individualised basis by appointed officials. 
Such officials are at one end of the institutional spectrum as regards the institutional 
distinctions which are relevant to proportionality. This – coupled with the fact that there 
have been a significant number of proportionality decisions on immigration – makes the 
field an ideal case study for this thesis. I will show how the structural model of 
proportionality can be seen at work in these cases provided an institutionally sensitive 
approach is taken. I will also explain how the courts’ approach to deference in these 
cases can be explained in terms of the structural model, permitting the integration of 
deference into the proportionality test. 
Chapter 5 is the second case study, in which I will examine the proportionality case law 
relating to the criminal justice system. I have defined this broadly to include prisons and 
terrorism as well as mainstream substantive criminal law. In the cases I examine, the 
challenged measures are rules of general application adopted by various levels of 
government, up to and including Parliament itself. These cases are a valuable 
institutional counterpoint to the immigration decisions and will help to illustrate the 
importance of an institutionally sensitive model. In this chapter I will show how this 
institutional setting leads to specific emphases in the application of the structural model 
of proportionality. I will also explain the operation of deference in these cases as it 
relates to that structural model. 
Chapter 6 is the third case study, which is concerned with housing cases. As with the 
other two case studies, there has been a good deal of judicial consideration of this field. 
Housing cases have regularly involved HRA challenges that were addressed to multiple 
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levels of government simultaneously. These multi-level cases will further elaborate the 
effect that institutional distinctions have on the operation of proportionality. I will show 
that the structural, institutionally sensitive model of proportionality and deference can 
be seen at work in these cases. I will also give examples of cases where the internal 
logic of proportionality has been undermined by a lack of judicial understanding of the 
institutional and structural features of the test. 
The final chapter sets out the conclusions of this research. The HRA proportionality test 
affirmed in Huang involves a series of steps. I will show that while the test itself is of 
universal application, in certain institutional settings, some of the elements of the test 
are either emphasised or minimised. Furthermore, once this institutionally sensitive 
approach is taken, it is possible to accommodate deference into the proportionality test, 
by using Alexy’s formulation of structural and epistemic deference. I will finish by 
reflecting on some of the expected outcomes of this research. 
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Chapter 2: Importing Alexy: towards a structural 
understanding of proportionality and deference in the UK 
 
 
In Chapter 1, I identified two problems with the current understanding of 
proportionality and deference in the UK. First, the current literature on proportionality 
has been dominated by a ‘spatial metaphor’ which seeks to understand deference in 
terms of zones of competence. Secondly, little attention has been paid to the distinction 
between the different types of governmental activity which can be judicially reviewed 
under the Human Rights Act 1998 (‘the HRA’).  
The spatial metaphor focuses on the separation of powers between the courts and the 
other arms of government. Spatial arguments about proportionality are essentially 
normative debates about government power. The attention given to such debates has 
prevented any rigorous analysis of the structure of how the proportionality test actually 
operates. An analysis of that structure could explain how deference operates within that 
structure. In this thesis I wish to move away from the normative debates concerning 
what proportionality should or should not be doing. I want instead to look at the process 
of proportionality and examine how it actually works in practice. I am not suggesting 
that normative arguments are irrelevant to judicial review under the HRA. My 
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contention is that normative arguments are only part of the picture. It is the other part of 
that picture that I am exploring in this thesis. 
I plan to give a meaningful account of deference within the structure of proportionality. 
This requires a structural model of proportionality, which must be institutionally 
sensitive if it is to take account of the full range of HRA proportionality review. The 
four stages of the proportionality test are based on certain premises which will be 
affected by distinctions between the various governmental bodies which can be 
judicially reviewed under the HRA. These distinctions need to be accounted for. 
This model will provide a more sophisticated account of proportionality and deference. 
It will also provide a structure into which normative arguments about the separation of 
powers can be made in a more productive way. This will allow such arguments to be 
made against a background of a proper account of the process in which courts are 
engaged when they apply the proportionality standard.  
My starting point for building this model is the work of Robert Alexy. In A Theory of 
Constitutional Rights1 (TCR) Alexy sets out a general theory of constitutional rights. He 
focuses on the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz), but much of his analysis is relevant to 
judicially enforceable fundamental rights generally, and can be applied to adjudication 
under the HRA, as was noted by Rivers, who translated the book into English.2  TCR is 
a structural theory of constitutional rights. Contained within it is a structural discussion 
of the operation of the principle of proportionality which integrated deference into the 
stages of the proportionality test. In this thesis, I am specifically concerned with the 
elements of TCR which provide a structural theory of proportionality. As I will show, 
the German test contains the same elements as the UK test, so the model is well suited 
                                                
1 Alexy, R. and Rivers, J. (Translator) A Theory of Constitutional Rights (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2002). 
2 See ‘Translator’s Introduction’ in Alexy TCR, above n1; and Rivers, J. ‘Fundamental Rights in the UK 
Human Rights Act’ in Menéndez, A.J. and Eriksen, E.O. (eds.)  Arguing Fundamental Rights (Dordrecht: 
Springer, 2006). See also Rivers, J. ‘Proportionality and Variable Intensity of Review’ (2006) 65 CLJ 
174. 
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for the UK context. Also, Alexy focuses heavily on case law in his model. Such an 
approach can be more easily adapted to a common law jurisdiction than a more 
doctrinaire civil law model. By using Alexy’s theory as a basic framework, I aim to 
expound a structural theory for the British case law. 
Alexy expresses concern that there is insufficient clarity about the structure of 
constitutional rights norms and that ideological influences have been over-accentuated 
at the expense of analytical clarity.3  This mirrors the problems which I have 
highlighted in Chapter 1 with the scholarship on proportionality and deference in the 
UK. The structural nature of Alexy’s theory is of particular value in deepening our 
understanding of proportionality and deference in the UK; because instead of asserting 
what the correct scope of rights should be, it provides a descriptive account of how 
judicially enforceable fundamental rights actually work in practice in the courts. Alexy 
moves beyond a solely normative theory of what the content of rights should be or who 
should get to decide that content. He expressly countenances that the analytical aspects 
of his theory should be applicable as a framework theory to other normative arguments.  
In this chapter I will set out Alexy’s model of the structure of proportionality and 
deference and explain how it can be applied to the UK. Alexy’s model of 
proportionality focuses solely on rights-based judicial review of the legislature. It 
therefore needs to be adapted in order to expand his ideas across a range of government 
functions, in order to make it institutionally sensitive. In essence, this chapter is about 
importing Alexy’s ideas into the UK context and the next chapter is about translating 
them more effectively and developing them further. 
This chapter is divided into five sections. In the first I look at the elements of the UK 
and German proportionality tests in order to establish the similarities between the two. 
In the second section, I set out Alexy’s consideration of the nature of fundamental rights 
                                                
3 Alexy TCR, above n1, at 13-18. 
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norms. He characterises rights norms as principles and this is the basis upon which he 
proceeds with his structural theory. In the third section I consider the individual steps of 
the proportionality test and Alexy’s analysis of how they work. In the fourth section of 
this chapter I set out Alexy’s theory of deference, which accommodates judicial 
deference to the primary decision-maker within the proportionality test. This is a key 
innovation of Alexy’s work and it is of particular relevance to the UK. In the final 
section, I will look at the limitations of Alexy’s model for the UK context and set the 
stage for the development of his theory which I undertake in Chapter 3.  
 
 
2.1: ELEMENTS OF THE PROPORTIONALITY TEST 
Before moving into the substantive discussion of Alexy’s model, it is important to 
address a preliminary issue concerning the applicability of a German model to the UK 
jurisprudence. Alexy’s model is based on the German Constitution and the 
jurisprudence of the German Constitutional Court (the Bundesverfassungsgericht, or, 
‘BVerfGE’). In this thesis, I am setting out a similar framework for the HRA and the 
UK Courts. I will do this by importing and translating Alexy’s model.  
The role of proportionality analysis is to assess the legitimacy of government measures 
which impinge on fundamental rights.4 The BVerfGE uses a three-stage proportionality 
test. The House of Lords has recently affirmed that the test to be used in the UK is a 
four-stage test.5 The two tests differ slightly in the way in which they are set out. 
However, as I will show, both tests contain the same four fundamental elements. 
                                                
4 The BVerfGE is concerned with ‘constitutional rights’ and the British Courts are concerned with ‘human 
rights’. In practical terms, the two are identical. In this chapter I use the term ‘fundamental rights’ as a 
collective term to describe both forms of right. 
5 Huang v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 11; [2007] 2 AC 167. 
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The three elements of the German test are: suitability, necessity and proportionality 
stricto sensu.6 The ‘suitability’ arm of the test requires that the measure in question 
actually be capable of achieving its aim. It does not need to completely realise the aim, 
but must go some way towards it. The second arm of the German test, ‘necessity’, 
requires that the least rights-intrusive means of achieving the aim be used. So, even if 
the challenged measure is suitable, it may not be the least rights-intrusive measure 
available and may fall foul of this stage of the test. The third stage, ‘proportionality 
stricto sensu’ requires that there be an overall balance between the seriousness of the 
intervention on the constitutional right and the gravity of the reasons for the measure.7 
These three elements are all present in the UK test.  In Huang v Secretary of State for 
the Home Department8 the House of Lords drew on previous jurisprudence and 
affirmed that the test in the UK involved four elements. The first three are contained in 
an oft-cited passage from the judgment of Lord Clyde in the Privy Council decision in 
de Freitas v Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Lands and 
Housing:  
‘In determining whether a limitation is arbitrary or excessive he said that the court 
would ask itself:  
“whether: (i) the legislative objective is sufficiently important to justify limiting 
a fundamental right; (ii) the measures designed to meet the legislative objective 
are rationally connected to it; and (iii) the means used to impair the right or 
freedom are no more than is necessary to accomplish the objective.”’9 
                                                
6 These three stages were affirmed in 1958 in the Apothekenurteil judgment BVerfGE 7 S 377. See further 
Emiliou, N. The Principle of Proportionality in European Law: A Comparative Study (The Hague: 
Kluwer Law International, 1996) at 25. 
7 ibid, at 26-37. See also Kommers, D.P. The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of 
Germany (2nd ed., Durham N.C.: Duke University Press, 1997), at 46. 
8 [2007] UKHL 11; [2007] 2 WLR 581. 
9 [1999] 1 AC 69, at 80 
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In Huang, the House of Lords affirmed that the applicable test in the UK also contained 
a requirement that an overall balance be struck between the needs of the individual and 
of the community as a whole.10  
The House’s affirmation of this final, overall balance, element was not its first 
introduction into UK proportionality. It had been utilised in the jurisprudence as early as 
200111 but had not always been applied consistently. As will be shown throughout this 
thesis, the application of the proportionality test has not always been uniform. In later 
chapters, I will set out the institutional reasons why this is so. However, at this stage it 
is sufficient to note that the similarities between the UK and German tests are easily 
established. The requirement that there be a rational connection between a measure and 
its objective mirrors the requirement that a measure be capable of achieving its aim. The 
requirement that a measure restrict a right as little as possible matches the German 
necessity requirement and overall balance asks the same questions of measure as 
proportionality stricto sensu. The German test does not expressly include the ‘legitimate 
objective’ arm of the UK test, although the BVerfGE does address the legitimacy of the 
aim, albeit in a different manner.12 It is sufficient that the German test entails three of 
the UK test’s elements. As will be shown, the UK’s separate legitimate objective 
element can be accommodated within Alexy’s model and indeed the latter will be 
strengthened as a result. 
 
 
 
                                                
10 Hickman has questioned whether or not this final elements is subordinate to the minimal impairment 
test or vice versa see Hickman, T. ‘The Substance and Structure of Proportionality’ [2008] PL 694. 
11 See Samaroo v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] EWCA Civ 1139. See generally 
Beatson, J., Grosz, S., Hickman, T., Singh, R. and Palmer, S. Human Rights: Judicial Protection in the 
United Kingdom (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2008), at 202-206. 
12 See Emiliou ‘Principle of Proportionality in European Law’, above n6 at 25. 
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2.2: THE NATURE OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS NORMS 
The use of human rights (or ‘fundamental rights’) as a basis for litigation is a relatively 
new practice in UK judicial review.13 A human rights norm is significantly different to 
the types of norm that courts ordinarily consider. In order to understand the operation of 
proportionality, the nature of the norms to which it applies must be examined. 
In TCR Alexy draws on the work of Ronald Dworkin, and his division of legal 
standards into rules and principles.14 Dworkin first introduced the distinction between 
rules and principles in the 1970s as a critique of legal positivism. Dworkin was 
conscious that not everything decided by a court could be based on a stated rule, but 
was unhappy with the positivists’ argument that this left judges free to fill in the blanks 
as they saw fit.15 Dworkin argued that the filling in of gaps in rules, was based on legal 
principle. He described principles and rules as being substantially different in character. 
Rules have an all-or-nothing character: they either apply or they do not. Principles are 
different in that they do not necessarily apply, they can be applied to varying degrees 
and it is not feasible to create an exhaustive list of all legal principles (while it is 
theoretically possible to list all rules). Unlike rules, principles do not provide an account 
of the legal consequences of their own realisation.  
Dworkin’s approach forms the basis for Alexy’s explanation of the nature of 
fundamental rights.16 Fundamental rights are norms that exist at an extremely high 
degree of abstraction, particularly when compared to norms contained in other sources 
of law, such as statutes. As such, they come closer to the realm of principles than rules 
and Alexy argues that many constitutional rights norms are in fact principles, not rules. 
                                                
13 Notwithstanding the running debate about common law constitutionalism, see generally: Allan, T.R.S. 
Constitutional Justice: A Liberal Theory of the Rule of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) and 
Craig, P. ‘Constitutional Foundations, The Rule of Law and Supremacy’ [2003] PL 92. 
14 See Dworkin, R. Taking Rights Seriously (London: Duckworth, 1977), at 22-28. 
15 See Hart, H.L.A. The Concept of Law (2nd ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994). 
16 Although it is worth noting that Dworkin himself does not use the principles model for rights, which he 
characterises as ‘trumps’. See: Dworkin, R. ‘Rights as Trumps’ in Waldron, J. (ed.) Theories of rights 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984). 
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Conflicts of rules are resolved in a very different manner than are collisions between 
principles.17 Where two rules conflict, either an exception is written into one of them, or 
else one of them becomes invalid. Where two rights come into conflict, then the two 
competing principles must be reconciled in some manner. It would be wrong to suggest 
that one right will always trump another right in all circumstances, since it would be 
relatively easy to think of a circumstance in which it would be unjust to do so. The 
outcome of a conflict between two constitutional principles of equal notional weight 
must be decided according to the concrete facts of a specific case and cannot be decided 
in the abstract, as would be the case if they were rules.  
Alexy gives the example of the decision of the German Constitutional Court in the 
Lebach case18 which concerned a tension between an individual’s right to personality 
and the freedom of the press. Neither of these two rights can be stated to be more 
important than the other in the abstract. As such, the principles have to be weighed 
against each other according to the facts of the case. The outcome of that case is a 
specific rule, which says that in those particular circumstances, one has priority over the 
other. This means that while constitutional rights norms are principles in the abstract, 
they can become rules when put into a particular set of facts, so that they can bind 
subsequent cases that match that fact pattern in a rule-like manner. Once it is accepted 
that fundamental rights norms operate as principles which produce fact-specific rules, it 
becomes evident that a theory of balancing rights against each other based on a model 
of principles is an appropriate model for explaining this process.  
However, Alexy goes further than this and argues that the role of principles is not 
limited to rights. He is clear that certain collective interests can constitute competing 
principles for the purpose of constitutional adjudication. He argues that these must be 
identified and he gives examples of numerous public interest principles which have 
                                                
17 Alexy, R. ‘On the Structure of Legal Principles’ (2000) 13 Ratio Juris 294, at 295-297. 
18 BVerfGE 35, 202. 
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been applied in past German constitutional case law: for example public health, the 
security of the state and the protection of a free democratic order.19 In this respect Alexy 
differs from Dworkin, insofar as Dworkin is only prepared to characterise principles as 
reasons for individual rights, not as reasons for competing public interest norms.20 This 
is central to Alexy’s conception of the proportionality principle, which involves a 
balancing of competing principles against one another. Such a model cannot operate if 
certain public interests are not seen as being based on principles.  
As the example of the Lebach judgment shows, it is not possible to state in the abstract 
that one fundamental right is more important than another in all cases. Similarly, it is 
not possible to state in the abstract that a particular fundamental right will be 
outweighed by a particular public interest consideration in all circumstances. The 
characterisation of rights norms and the public interest as principles can account for 
this. 
Habermas has criticised the model of rights as principles.21 He draws a distinction 
between rights as norms and rights as values arguing that the former are deontological, 
whereas the latter are teleological. For Habermas, a right must be a norm and must have 
a deontological or ‘ought’ character. He argues that any model of rights as principles 
will necessarily entail the reduction of rights to the status of values. He contends that 
this places rights on the same level as policy arguments, and that this gives too much 
leeway for the dilution of rights.22  
                                                
19 Alexy TCR, above n1, at 65. 
20 ibid, at 66. Habermas takes the same view as Dworkin. He argues that ‘only rights can be trump in the 
argumentation game.’ See Habermas, J. and Rehg, W. (Translator) Between Facts and Norms: 
Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (Oxford: Polity Press, 1996), at 259. 
21 Habermas, ‘Between Facts and Norms’, above n20, at 253-255. 
22 These criticisms are noted in the postscript to TCR. See: Alexy TCR, above n1, at 388-390. 
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The core of this criticism is that rights and collective interests are being put on an equal 
footing.23 However, Habermas is incorrect to suggest that Alexy is reducing rights from 
the status of norms to the status of values. What actually occurs in Alexy’s model is that 
certain public interests are raised from the status of values to the status of norms. Alexy 
is explicit that principles are deontological and that this is a qualitative difference 
between principles and values.24  His characterisation of rights as principles makes it 
clear that he is not seeking to undermine their deontological character. Instead he is 
prepared to accept that certain public interests are also deontological. 
Both the German Constitution and the European Convention on Human Rights (‘the 
Convention’) expressly countenance the limitation of rights in the public interest in 
certain instances. This means that in certain situations there must be public interests 
with sufficient normative weight to justify restricting fundamental rights. As such it is 
not possible to describe the operation of fundamental rights in Germany or the UK 
without accepting that certain public interests can be deontological. However, 
characterising the public interest as a principle to be balanced against fundamental 
rights does not mean that government is entitled to trample on any right it chooses and 
use some amorphous ‘public policy’ basis to excuse it. Only certain public interests will 
be accepted. Therefore, the real issue thrown up by Habermas’s criticism is not whether 
rights are values or norms relative to public interests. The issue is how to distinguish 
between public interests that are values and public interests that are norms. Only public 
interests which have the status of norms can be deemed to be principles for the purposes 
of Alexy’s model. The exclusion of certain public interest reasons as illegitimate is 
necessary in order to avoid a form of utilitarian cost-benefit analysis for all rights 
                                                
23 Habermas makes his comments as part of a general criticism of the self-understanding of the BVerfGE 
which covers the work of numerous jurists. See Habermas, ‘Between Facts and Norms’, above n20, at 
253-267. A full response to the general criticism is unnecessary for the purposes of this thesis, provided 
Habermas can be rebutted in relation to Alexy’s model. 
24 Alexy TCR, above n1, at 92-93. 
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(which is what Habermas is seeking to avoid). Such an approach would fundamentally 
undermine the protections afforded by the Convention and the Grundgesetz.  
Kumm discusses this issue and points out that it is necessary to ensure that only certain 
public interest goals can be used to limit rights. For Kumm, some public interest goals 
can never acquire the status of principles and so can never be the basis of a 
proportionality analysis. Effectively, he is endorsing the division of public interest goals 
into deontological and teleological norms. He describes the principles which do not 
suffice for the purposes of limiting human rights as ‘excluded reasons’, which he sees 
as being complementary to the proportionality principle.25 Alexy takes a slightly 
different route, but reaches a similar conclusion. He argues that this concept of 
‘excluded reasons’ can in fact be accommodated within his overall model of 
proportionality, in that such reasons would be given a weight of zero within any 
balancing exercise, and so would never prevail in a proportionality analysis.26 For 
Alexy, such excluded reasons would be invalid principles.27 Kumm is arguing that 
certain public interest goals must be excluded from the outset. Alexy is arguing that 
those goals should be given a status whereby they are deemed incapable of ever limiting 
any right. The practical effect of each approach is the same. 
It is clear that Alexy’s model of proportionality only permits public interests with a 
certain normative force to be used in the proportionality analysis. Some public interest 
goals will reach the standard of principles, whereas others will not. In certain very clear-
cut cases, it may be easy to illustrate the distinction between public interests that qualify 
as principles and those that are illegitimate. For example, limitations on the right to 
respect for family life may arise in the context of immigration control. The state may 
                                                
25 Kumm, M. ‘Political Liberalism and the Structure of Rights: On the Place and Limits of the 
Proportionality Requirement’ in Pavlakos, G. (ed.) Law, Rights and Discourse: The Legal Philosophy of 
Robert Alexy (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007). 
26 Alexy, R. ‘Thirteen Replies’ in Pavlakos, G. (ed.) Law, Rights and Discourse: The Legal Philosophy of 
Robert Alexy (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007). See also Alexy’s consideration of ‘invalid principles’ in 
Alexy TCR, above n1, at 61-62. 
27 Alexy TCR, above n1, at 61-62. 
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wish to restrict immigration for various reasons. The goal of protecting national security 
would usually qualify as a principle. However, if the goal of the restriction on 
immigration were the exclusion of members of certain specific ethnic groups, then that 
would almost certainly not qualify as a principle. While this example illustrates the 
distinction being drawn, in most cases it will not be a straightforward exercise to 
determine which public interests qualify as valid principles and which ones do not. 
Alexy’s model assumes the segregation of those public interests that have the status of 
deontological norms and those that are ‘excluded reasons’. The possibility of achieving 
such segregation is also presupposed in any system of adjudication which permits the 
limitation of rights in the public interest (as is the case in both Germany and the UK). 
However, Alexy’s model does not purport to provide a mechanism for conducting this 
segregation. Alexy seeks to describe the structure of the proportionality process rather 
than to prescribe the content of rights. Human rights and deontological public interests 
are both inputs of proportionality analysis. These inputs must be defined. While Alexy’s 
model can tell us at which stage in the process the definition occurs, it does not provide 
a comprehensive account of how that definition is conducted.  
Whether a public interest is a principle for the purposes of proportionality is a deeply 
normative question. A meaningful examination of that question requires a reviewing 
court to consider complex issues of political morality. A comprehensive legal 
mechanism for separating valid public interest principles form illegitimate goals is 
certainly desirable, but it is not provided by Alexy’s model.  
I do not purport to present such a mechanism in this thesis. Like Alexy, I am seeking to 
provide an account of the proportionality process, rather than conclusively answer the 
normative questions that arise within it. My contention is that certain public interests are 
principles and that once a court is satisfied that a public interest is a principle then the 
court may proceed with the proportionality analysis. While I accept the importance of 
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defining which public interests are principles, this is a separate normative question 
which can be accommodated within the framework presented here. A structural model 
of proportionality and deference permits moral disagreements about the legitimacy of 
certain public interest aims. The value of the structural model for the purposes of those 
disagreements is that it allows them to be focused on the particular normative issue of 
whether a specific public interest aim is a principle. As was discussed in Chapter 1.2, 
normative arguments about proportionality have, to date, been made in an unstructured 
fashion which has obscured the very process that I am seeking to clarify.28 
There are two techniques currently employed by the UK courts to determine whether a 
public interest is a legitimate principle. Neither technique is a comprehensive system for 
determining which public interests have sufficient normative weight to be put in the 
balance against human rights. However, each technique has gone some way to making 
explicit the moral reasoning underlying such a decision. While greater clarity would be 
welcomed, I am not seeking to provide it here. I will outline each technique briefly here 
and then show them in operation in the case studies in Chapters 4, 5 & 6. 
In the first instance, the courts have been guided by the first arm of the UK 
proportionality test, which entails an explicit control on using excluded reasons as 
public interest. The first part of the test requires that the public interest objective being 
pursued by the challenged measure is ‘sufficiently important to justify limiting a 
fundamental right’.29 This is a high threshold which will exclude common or garden 
public policy considerations from being treated as being on the same constitutional 
plane as human rights. As such, only substantial and important public interest aims can 
                                                
28 For example, Tsakyrakis criticises the proportionality test on the basis that ‘it pretends to be objective, 
neutral, and totally extraneous to any moral reasoning’. The main thrust of his argument focuses on the 
definition of the principle used to limit the human right. His critique of this definitional stage is certainly 
valid. However by levelling his attack at proportionality as a whole, he seeks to discount the whole 
process because of difficulties of definition of the inputs of that process. See Tsakyrakis, S. 
‘Proportionality: An Assault on Human Rights?’ (2009) 7 IJCL 468. 
29 de Freitas v Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Lands and Housing [1999] 1 
AC 69, at 80. Cited with approval by Lord Steyn in R (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home 
department  [2001] 2 AC 532. 
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be used as principles to be balanced against rights. This limb of the test is relatively 
loosely framed, and it could be argued that it is somewhat circular. However, it does at 
least show that the UK courts are only prepared to accept certain public interests as 
principles and they seek to explicitly examine this normative issue.  
The second approach employed by the UK judiciary has been to use the text of the 
Convention itself when undertaking this onerous task of discerning legitimate 
objectives. Articles 8-11 list specific public interest principles which can be taken into 
account when the courts are called on to determine whether or not there has been a 
violation of a protected right. Public interests that fall within these provisions may 
achieve the status of principles for the purposes of rights adjudication. As I will show in 
the case studies in Chapter 4, 5 & 6, the UK Courts have been strongly guided by these 
provisions when deciding whether a public interest was a ‘legitimate objective.’ 
These limitation provisions of the Convention are a recognition of the need to balance 
rights against the public interest, which in certain contexts will be unavoidable. This can 
also be seen in Article 6, which ostensibly contains an absolute protection of the right to 
fair trial, but admits that a balancing exercise is required to determine what the content 
of that right is.30 The European Court of Human Rights (‘the ECHR’) has been clear 
that where such a balancing occurs, it must be in pursuit of a legitimate aim.31 ECHR 
jurisprudence on this point has been used by the UK Courts when discerning whether 
limitations on Article 6 are in pursuit of a legitimate aim.  
                                                
30 See van Dijk, P. and van Hoof, G.J.H. Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (4th ed. Oxford: Intersentia, 2006), at 511-650. 
31 See  Arai-Takahashi, Y. The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the Principle of Proportionality in 
the Jurisprudence of the ECHR (Oxford: Intersentia, 2002), at 35. However, it is worth noting that, as 
with other applications of the proportionality test, there is no  comprehensive mechanism for determining 
which aims are legitimate. The issue is dealt with on a somewhat ad hoc basis, although through the 
development of case law, certain aims have been given detailed exploration. 
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Another, related, feature of rights norms is that they have a semantically open texture 
which can give rise to the possibility of derivative norms.32 Not only do Convention 
rights norms not provide an account of their own realisation, they often do not even 
provide an account of their own content. For example, the right to respect for private 
life in Article 8 does not, by its own terms, set out whether this includes a principle that 
individuals have a right to build relationships with people outside of their family,33 or 
that the preservation of mental stability is a precondition to the exercise of Article 8 
rights.34 These sub-norms are judicially derived from the right as laid down. The broad 
nature of human rights norms means that they will inevitably require the articulation of 
specific principles in a given case.  
The possibility of derivative norms also arises with public interest principles. For 
example, Article 8 of the Convention expressly countenances the limitation of the right 
to respect for family life in order to protect the ‘economic well-being of the country’. 
Over time, this public interest principle has been developed to include the sub-norm of 
immigration control. 35 Recognition of this derivative feature of certain public interest 
principles is important in ensuring that illegitimate aims are excluded as bases for 
limiting rights. As was discussed above, it can be difficult to distinguish between public 
interests that are principles and those that are merely goals. It is important that any 
derivative public interest be examined with the necessary rigour to ensure that it has 
sufficient normative force to qualify as a principle. If ‘definitional generosity’ is used in 
assessing these derivative public interests, then an aim which constitutes a valid 
principle may be permitted to introduce a sub-aim which is not a valid principle.36 
                                                
32 Alexy TCR, above n1, at 33-38. 
33 B v Secretary of State for the Home Department Unreported, Court of Appeal, 18 May 2000. 
34 R (Razgar) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 27; [2004] 2 AC 368. 
35 See Ahmut v Netherlands (1997) 24 EHRR 62; Gül v Switzerland (1996) 22 EHRR 93. 
36 The term ‘definitional generosity’ is used by Tsakyrakis in criticising the lack of explicit moral 
reasoning in the ECHR’s approach to determining whether an aim is ‘legitimate’ for the purposes of 
limiting a Convention right. See Tsakyrakis ‘An Assault on Human Rights?’, above n28. 
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The precise definition of the inputs of proportionality analysis in a specific case is 
essential. The exact public interest being pursued must be made explicit and fully 
assessed to determine its legitimacy. If the public interest aim is overly broad or 
insufficiently defined, then this will affect the operation of the proportionality analysis. 
The narrow definition of what is an acceptable aim is an important normative 
prerequisite.  As was noted above, a comprehensive account of how that normative 
process of definition ought to occur is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, from 
the point of view of describing the structure of proportionality, the pitfalls involved with 
derivative norms must be recognised. 
There is a positive (or at least less cautionary) aspect to the recognition that principles 
can entail derivative norms. This recognition is an important step in moving past a 
spatial conception of proportionality and deference. Convention rights themselves do 
not need to be viewed solely as a hard-edged mass into which no intrusion is permitted. 
Instead, Convention rights can be the source of rights principles, which interact with 
public interest principles and produce case-by-case outcomes. These fact-specific 
outcomes build up over time to create a framework of human rights rules. The 
determination of sub-principles involves important normative considerations, but once 
those initial moral decisions are made, a more sophisticated account of the 
proportionality process can be developed. 
A further answer to Habermas’s concern about dilution of rights can be seen in the way 
Alexy’s exposition of proportionality builds up a set of fact-specific constitutional rules. 
It is from these cases that the hard crust of fundamental rights is built. As was discussed 
above, fundamental rights in the abstract are too indeterminate to function as rules 
rather than principles. They are nonetheless norms, and their normative force can be 
seen in their application by the courts through the proportionality test. Where a court 
makes a fact-specific determination that a given fundamental right has not been 
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adequately protected, then a fundamental right rule arises from that case. In many 
instances, the boundary of rights is produced through the process of proportionality. 
Habermas proposes that where norms conflict, only one of them will be appropriate and 
so the norms can be ‘fit together into a unified system designed to admit exactly one 
right solution for each case.’37 While this might be a legitimate description of the rules 
that are the outcome of proportionality analysis, it does not take account of the 
balancing of principles which is implied in that outcome. 
These fact-specific rules help both the courts and the other arms of government to 
discern the specific content of rights in a manner which develops over time through the 
case law. While this approach might seem unsatisfactory to a continental constitutional 
lawyer, this sort of system is central to the way common law nations do their legal 
business.  
Habermas’s dilution criticism is therefore partially answered if Alexy’s model is 
applied in the UK. The UK proportionality test has a stated restriction on the public 
interest principles which may be pursued at the expense of rights. Admittedly, the 
operation of this restriction could be developed to make the moral considerations 
involved more explicit. However, it is nonetheless an important recognition that some 
goals are illegitimate when it comes to limiting rights. The UK also has a system of 
binding precedent, which means that fact-specific human rights rules will develop over 
time. These two factors go some considerable way to avoiding the risk of a heavy 
dilution of human rights. 
 
 
 
                                                
37 Habermas, ‘Between Facts and Norms’, above n20, at 261. 
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2.3: PROPORTIONALITY AS OPTIMISATION OF PRINCIPLES 
The recognition of rights as principles is the first step in understanding the operation of 
the proportionality test. The second step is to look at how these principles function 
within the proportionality test itself. In order to explain this process, Alexy uses the 
concept of optimisation. 
Optimisation is central to Alexy’s work. In his postscript to TCR, Alexy sums up his 
theory: ‘[t]he central thesis of this book is that regardless of their more or less precise 
formulation, constitutional rights are principles and that principles are optimisation 
requirements.’38  Proportionality analysis is concerned with determining whether or not 
the limitation of a human right is permissible, having regard to the public interest which 
the government decision-maker is seeking to pursue. (Although I use the term ‘public 
interest’ throughout this chapter, this can include conflicts of rights in situations where 
the decision-maker is trying to protect one human rights principle at the expense of 
another.)  Alexy argues that an understanding of rights and the public interest which is 
based on principles requires a mechanism for resolving conflicts when those principles 
come into competition with each other. His analysis is centred on the idea that 
principles must be balanced against one another in such a way that they are each 
realised to the greatest degree possible.39 On this basis, he contends that principles 
require proportionality and that the proportionality principle ‘logically follows from the 
nature of principles; it can be deduced from them’.40 As such, the rights principle and 
the public interest principle need to be optimised relative to each other. This requires 
that each be realised to an extent where neither can be realised any further without any 
cost to the other.41 Alexy traces this concept through the various stages of the 
                                                
38 Alexy TCR, above n1, at 388. 
39 See generally Alexy ‘Structure of Legal Principles’, above n17. 
40 Alexy TCR, above n1, at 66. 
41 This is generally referred to as ‘Pareto-optimality’ named after the Italian economist Vilfredo Pareto. 
Alexy uses the term ‘Pareto-optimality’ throughout his work. 
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proportionality test, focusing particularly on the last two stages: minimal impairment 
and overall balance. 
It is important to realise that Alexy’s optimisation model of proportionality is about 
improving both of the principles being balanced in so far as is possible. The goal is not 
for one principle to win; it is for both principles to win to the greatest extent achievable.  
 
 
2.3.1: Legitimate aim and suitability 
The first limb of the German test requires that the challenged measure be ‘suitable’. In 
the UK there is an additional stage which requires the measure to be in pursuit of a 
legitimate objective as well as being ‘rationally connected’ to that objective. This part 
of the test requires that the challenged measure actually be capable of achieving its aim. 
Alexy points out that if a measure (M) limits one principle (P1) but does nothing to 
promote the principle against which it is being balanced (P2), then it is not suitable. A 
detriment to P1 that does nothing to achieve P2 does not achieve anything other than a 
limitation of P1 for its own sake. As such, ‘P1 and P2, when taken together, prohibit the 
use of M. This shows that the principle of suitability is nothing other than an expression 
of the idea of Pareto-optimality: one position can be improved without detriment to 
another.’42  
The suitability point can be seen at work in UK case law. In Secretary of State for the 
Home Department v Akaeke43 the Court of Appeal refused to permit the removal from 
Britain of a Nigerian woman who had entered the UK illegally and then married a 
British citizen. The argument made by the Home Secretary was that she should be 
required to go to Nigeria and apply from there for leave to enter the UK to live with her 
                                                
42 Alexy, R. ‘Constitutional Rights, Balancing and Rationality’ (2003) 16 Ratio Juris 131, at 135. 
43 [2005] EWCA Civ 947. 
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husband. This was supposed to discourage others from ‘jumping the queue’. There had 
been extraordinarily long delays in the processing of the woman’s application to the 
Home Office. The Court expressed the view that the delay was so onerous that no 
prospective immigrant would be prepared to endure it in order to be exempted from the 
need to get entry clearance in their country of origin. On this basis, the Court expressed 
doubts about whether or not the removal of the applicant would actually do anything to 
deter other potential ‘queue-jumpers’. This suggests that the court did not believe that 
the challenged measure was suitable to achieve the legitimate aim of preventing queue-
jumping.44 
Once the model of principles is accepted, rational connection to a legitimate objective is 
an obvious requirement. Rivers characterises legitimate aim and rational connection as 
‘threshold criteria’45 and suggests that they are in fact presupposed by the second and 
third stages of the proportionality test.46 An illegitimate aim will not be sufficient to 
derive a ‘public interest principle’ and so will not justify the balancing exercise in the 
first place. This suggests that the legitimate aim arm of the test is inherent in balancing. 
Similarly, as was just noted, a measure that does not achieve any protection of one 
principle cannot justify an intrusion on the other.  
The legitimate aim stage is also important for the further reason that it requires a court 
to define precisely which two principles are being optimised. As was discussed above, 
only certain public interests have the status of principles. At the legitimate aim stage of 
proportionality the reviewing court will examine the normative force of the public 
interest goal being pursued by the decision-maker. Also, fundamental rights norms have 
a semantically open texture and can lead to derivative norms. Since proportionality 
                                                
44 It is not entirely clear from the judgment whether the measure was deemed Convention incompatible on 
the basis of this point or on the overall balancing point. See Chapter 4.1.3 and Chapter 4.3.3 for further 
discussion.  
45 Rivers ‘Variable Intensity of Review’, above n2, at 195-198. 
46 Rivers, J. ‘Proportionality, Discretion and the Second Law of Balancing’ in Pavlakos, G. (ed.) Law, 
Rights and Discourse: The Legal Philosophy of Robert Alexy (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007), at 171. 
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involves balancing two principles against one another, it is crucial that the principles be 
clearly defined. Where a derivative rights norm is the subject of a proportionality test, 
then the court must be very specific about precisely which derivative norm is being 
used. 
This point is well illustrated by the dicta of Sedley LJ in B v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department.47 The case concerned the Home Secretary’s attempt to deport an 
Italian national who had been convicted of very serious crime. Sedley LJ expressly 
refused to countenance deportation itself as the aim and required another public interest 
justification to form the basis of the proportionality analysis instead. If deportation had 
been permitted as the aim, then nothing short of deportation could achieve that aim. The 
aim had to be construed in terms of crime prevention and the protection of public safety 
in order to conduct the proportionality analysis. This shows how important it is to 
define the aim of a challenged measure. 
 
2.3.2: Factual optimisation 
Alexy describes the second stage of the German test (necessity) as ‘factual 
optimisation’. In the UK this stage is usually referred to as ‘minimal impairment.’  This 
stage of the proportionality test requires a court to look and see whether there is another 
measure which would also realise the public interest principle but would be less 
restrictive of the affected fundamental right. Where a government measure infringes 
upon a right unnecessarily, then the right has not been optimised. If an alternative 
measure would realise the public interest aim to the same degree, but have a less severe 
impact on the Convention right, then the alternative measure should be chosen. In such 
a situation, it makes no difference to the public interest which measure is chosen, since 
                                                
47 Unreported, Court of Appeal, 18 May 2000. 
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both protect the public interest to the same extent. However, the choice of measure is 
important from the perspective of the fundamental right, since the latter measure has a 
less profound effect on it. This involves a choice between various measures which are 
in fact available to the decision-maker: hence it is called factual optimisation. This 
element of the test assesses the means available to the government in pursuing one 
principle and tells the court which of those means it should choose. However, factual 
optimisation only tells the court which of the available means is preferable. It does not 
tell the court whether any or all of the means are unacceptably intrusive. Kumm has 
noted that this stage of the proportionality test is empirical.48 
Factual optimisation can be seen at work in the series of burden of proof cases taken 
under the HRA.49 For example, in R v Lambert50 the House of Lords considered the 
public interest in controlling the unauthorised possession of dangerous drugs and the 
Article 6 right to the presumption of innocence. The challenged legislation put a legal 
burden on the defendant to disprove an element of the offence. A majority of the House 
accepted that a shifting of the evidential burden would achieve the public interest aim to 
the same extent as the shifting of the legal burden of proof, and so the shifting of the 
legal burden would not be the least rights-intrusive option. Conversely, Lord Hutton 
took the view that an evidential burden would not achieve the public interest to the 
same extent. This is an important illustration of the parameters of factual optimisation. 
It only requires the use of the measure which is least rights-intrusive chosen from 
among the measures which achieve the public interest to the required extent. It is not, as 
                                                
48 Kumm ‘Political Liberalism and the Structure of Rights’, above n25, at 137. 
49 See for example: R v Lambert [2002] 2 AC 545 and Sheldrake v Director of Public Prosecutions; 
Attorney General’s Reference (No 4 of 2002) [2004] UKHL 43; [2005] 1 AC 264. 
50 [2001] UKHL 37; [2002] 2 AC 545. 
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is sometimes suggested, a requirement that the achievement of the public interest be 
diluted in favour of the protected right.51  
 
2.3.3: Legal optimisation 
Neither Alexy nor the proportionality test leaves the matter with factual optimisation, 
and with good reason. While it might be less rights-intrusive to use a lethal injection to 
punish a recidivist double-parker than to use a firing squad, neither measure could 
reasonably be described as a proportionate response to violations of the Road Traffic 
Acts. Once the least intrusive means of achieving a particular legitimate aim has been 
chosen, the question still remains whether the level of intrusion on the protected right is 
in fact justified by the public interest being pursued.  
The issue of whether the least intrusive measure is nonetheless unduly intrusive is 
addressed at the third stage of proportionality: proportionality stricto sensu, which 
Alexy terms ‘legal optimisation’. In the UK this is generally referred to in terms of 
striking a ‘fair balance’ between the rights of the individual and the needs of the 
community as a whole.52 The term ‘legal optimisation’ can be slightly misleading: legal 
optimisation is one of the most fact-sensitive aspects of the proportionality analysis, and 
also one of the most normative.  Factual optimisation involves an assessment of whether 
there is, in fact, a less restrictive means available to a decision-maker, which is an 
empirical issue. Legal optimisation is concerned with whether the right balance has 
been struck. This stage of the test involves a normative assessment of the facts.53 
Legal optimisation requires that the more intrusive the measure is on a right, the more 
important must be the public interest being pursued. The death penalty for road traffic 
                                                
51 This is the basis for Hickman’s criticism of minimal impairment. See Hickman ‘Substance and 
Structure’, above n10, at 702. 
52 See Samaroo v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] EWCA Civ 1139; and Huang v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 11; [2007] 2 WLR 581. 
53 See Kumm ‘Political Liberalism and the Structure of Rights’, above n25, at 137. 
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offences is unlikely to meet this threshold. The Court will examine whether the overall 
benefit to the public interest principle justifies the level of restriction of the rights 
principle. The structured analysis of the earlier parts of the test allows this last stage to 
be extremely fact-sensitive. Alexy sums up the legal optimisation process as follows: 
‘the greater the degree of non-satisfaction of, or detriment to, one principle, the greater 
must be the importance of satisfying the other.’54 This is what Alexy calls ‘the law of 
balancing’. 
This sort of reasoning is evident in cases such as Samaroo v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department55 in which Dyson LJ concluded that it was proportionate to deport a 
convicted drug trafficker whose wife and children lived in the UK and were likely to 
remain here even if he was removed. Dyson LJ held that the deterrent effect this would 
have on drug trafficking generally would be important enough to justify the impact on 
the right to respect for family life. Dyson LJ placed heavy emphasis on the importance 
of overall balance in proportionality analysis. He held that ‘[b]roadly speaking, the 
more serious the interference with a fundamental right and the graver its effects, the 
greater the justification that will be required for the interference.’56 This is almost 
identical to Alexy’s law of balancing.  
The idea of balancing, or ‘legal optimisation’ is one of the most controversial aspects of 
Alexy’s model. Habermas objects to balancing on the ground that it removes the 
‘firewall’ of rights and takes the decision out of the realm of correctness and right and 
wrong. For Habermas ‘weighing takes place either arbitrarily or unreflectively, 
according to customary standards and hierarchies’.57 Habermas is concerned that the 
limitation of rights must be done in a rational manner and he argues that balancing is 
not rational. Alexy rejects this analysis on the basis that balancing can be seen as 
                                                
54 Alexy TCR, above n1, at 102. 
55 [2001] EWCA Civ 1139. 
56 ibid at paragraph 28. 
57 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, above n20, at 259. 
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rational once it is accepted that it involves three distinct steps, each of which is itself 
rational. First the level of interference with the first principle is assessed, then the 
importance of the satisfying the competing principle is assessed. Finally, the court looks 
at whether the importance of satisfying the second principle justifies the level of 
interference with the first. Alexy contends that Habermas’s criticism would only be 
valid if it were not possible to make rational judgments about each of these three things. 
Alexy gives a detailed account of the manner in which the BVerfGE addresses these 
questions and the reasoned manner in which it reaches its conclusions.58 He points out 
that these judgments are the reasons for the proportionality decision. In making rational 
decisions about each of these three sub-points, the court is building towards a rational 
decision on the overall balance or legal optimisation of the principles in the case.59 
Kumm argues that certain means-ends fits are not permissible, giving the example of 
killing one person to save five. 60 This is undoubtedly a fair point, but it does not mean 
that overall balancing is not legitimate. Kumm recognises that there is a normative 
element to the balancing exercise, and the exclusion of certain means-ends fits is a 
normative limit on how far it can go. However, this does not undermine the existence of 
balancing, it merely shows how it can provide a framework for normative argument. 
 
2.3.4: A fact-sensitive structural model 
At this stage it should be clear that what Alexy is doing with this model is describing a 
process of constitutional adjudication, not setting out a catch-all formula for answering 
difficult questions. The normative issues such as the level of importance of a particular 
                                                
58 See Alexy, ‘Constitutional Rights, Balancing and Rationality’, above n42, at 136-138. 
59 Steven Greer has analysed the rationality of the balancing exercise carried out by the European Court 
of Human Rights when undertaking proportionality analysis. He concludes that the Court’s use of 
balancing is much closer to Alexy’s view than to that of Habermas. See Greer, S. ‘“Balancing” and the 
European Court of Human Rights: A Contribution to the Habermas-Alexy Debate’ (2004) 63 CLJ 412. 
60 Kumm ‘Political Liberalism and the Structure of Rights’, above n25. 
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public interest or the correct balance in legal optimisation still need to be tackled. 
Alexy’s contribution is to give us a framework of the process of adjudication within 
which the balancing of rights and the public interest occurs. 
Möller challenges this contention. 61 According to Möller, certain legitimate theoretical 
perspectives about rights cannot be accommodated within the model. Möller contends 
that this means that Alexy’s model does not have the framework character that would be 
necessary for it to be a structural theory. Möller gives examples of theories of rights 
which place an extremely high value on certain rights. He suggests that Dworkin would 
not countenance balancing of the ‘principle’ of freedom of speech. He also argues that 
Nozick would be totally opposed to the possibility of interfering with the right to 
property in order to pursue a welfare state. He suggests that the only balancing outcome 
possible for either of these normative systems would be 100 per cent for the right and 0 
per cent for the public interest. However, it is clear that Alexy is prepared to accept this 
extreme outcome of balancing. In response to another of Kumm’s discussions of 
proportionality, he suggests that there is no reason why a principle cannot be given a 
value of zero or an infinite value when engaging in balancing. He accepts that this 
shows that there are limits to balancing, but points out that ‘[t]he fact that balancing has 
limits of this kind is not to say, however, that proportionality does not remain at the 
centre of rights analysis.’62 While it is unlikely that Alexy would use the zero/infinite 
value version of balancing, his response does protect the contention that the argument is 
structural.   
Aside from this absolutism versus balancing argument, there is a deeper element to 
Möller’s criticism, particularly in relation to the Nozickian perspective on property 
rights. Möller argues that an adherent of a Nozickian viewpoint would put such a 
significant value on property rights and such a small value on the welfare state that she 
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62 Alexy ‘Thirteen Replies’, above n26, at 344: ‘Reply 5 to Mattias Kumm’. 
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would not be prepared to countenance the two being balanced against one another. This 
is not really a criticism of the concept of balancing; it is a criticism of the choice of 
public interest goal. The Nozickian is of the view that the welfare state is not a 
‘legitimate aim’ where property rights are concerned. If the normative perspective of the 
Nozickian were introduced at an earlier stage of the proportionality test, then the 
balancing test would not be relevant since the aim would not be deemed legitimate. This 
is not to suggest that the welfare state is never a legitimate aim. However, the legitimate 
aim limb of proportionality can be used to screen out certain public interest goals. This 
means that even some more extreme normative positions can be accommodated within 
Alexy’s framework. This shows it is possible to have a structural model which explains 
the operation of proportionality without taking a particular view of the normative 
content of rights. As was discussed above, Alexy’s model is not seeking to establish a 
conclusive account of which public interests have a normative character. As was 
discussed above, that distinction is a separate normative issue. The value of the model is 
that once it is decided which public interests have a normative character, the 
relationship between those public interests and competing rights can be fully explored.  
A further attack on Alexy’s model is made by Adler, who claims that rights and the 
public interest are fundamentally incommensurable.63 ‘[t]here might be rational support 
for any given outcome, but no tie-breaker to enable us to choose between alternative 
lines of rationality’64 He accepts that Alexy’s model shows structured reflective 
outcomes from rights cases but denies that balancing can provide a mechanism for 
finding the ‘true’ answer to a rights question without reducing the interests being 
balanced to a common scale, which he denies is possible, as they are incommensurable. 
Adler suggests that the outcome of rights cases is based more on an emotional response 
                                                
63 See Adler, J. ‘The Sublime and the Beautiful: Incommensurability and Human Rights’ [2006] PL 697. 
64 ibid, at 699. 
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than on a rational one. Much of Adler’s argument is directed at the concept of judicially 
enforceable rights, rather than the structural aspects of Alexy’s theory.  
Adler’s argument must be rejected for three reasons. First, from a theoretical 
perspective, Adler’s incommensurability argument is overly simplistic: he seeks to 
claim that individual rights and public interests cannot be rationally compared because 
on a utilitarian cost-benefit analysis public interests will always win. This fails to take 
account of the qualitative differences in the way that rights are valued. Sunstein points 
out that the values inherent in rights are plural and diverse rather than unitary.65 Once 
this is accepted, the balancing exercise becomes more nuanced, making it more than 
just an economic cost-benefit analysis.  
Secondly, Adler’s position is premised on the idea that proportionality purports to 
provide a single right answer to all rights problems. This confuses the normative 
arguments for a particular outcome in a given case and the structure within which those 
arguments are considered. Proportionality cannot provide a single right answer on its 
own; its real value is that it gives a more developed, rational mechanism for coming to a 
conclusion. Alexy does not claim that proportionality will, of itself, provide a single 
correct answer to a rights problem. As was noted above, the question whether a 
particular aim is legitimate is an important normative issue which must be addressed 
before the balancing process begins. He provides a structural theory of proportionality 
which purports to describe how proportionality can be used as a framework mechanism 
for deciding rights cases. 66 Alexy accepts that the balancing is at the discretion of the 
one carrying it out and that all of the usual means of legal argumentation can be applied 
to that process. 67 The essential contribution of Alexy’s theory of proportionality is not 
that it tells us what the right answer is, but that it explains how the answers are arrived 
                                                
65 Sunstein, C.R. ‘Incommensurability and Valuation in Law’ (1994) 92 Mich LR 779, at 831. 
66 Alexy TCR, above n1, at 101. 
67 ibid, at 107. 
  73 
at. The explanation of the derivation and balancing of principles and the operation of 
deference within that balancing has the potential to provide a clearer picture of how 
human rights adjudication operates than the spatial theories that have been so dominant 
in the UK. I argue that this process is already in operation in the UK. 
The third reason to reject the incommensurability argument is a purely practical one. 
Once litigable human rights are introduced into a society there is an implicit acceptance 
that rights and the public interest may come into conflict and that it will be up to judges 
to resolve those conflicts. This acceptance is explicit in jurisdictions where 
proportionality has been expressly endorsed as a mechanism for human rights 
adjudication, as is the case in the UK. Adler’s incommensurability argument is an 
attempt to deny that those conflicts can ever be resolved by any rational scheme other 
than a crude cost-benefit analysis. Such a defeatist position simply gives up the ghost of 
any possibility that a more sophisticated explanation of the process can be devised. The 
Convention rights are now a part of the UK legal landscape. The ECHR has been using 
proportionality analysis for three decades.68 It seems clear that proportionality analysis 
is going to remain a significant element of UK public law. Aside from the other reasons 
for rejecting Adler’s position, there is a strong basis for arguing that since 
proportionality has arrived and seems here to stay, we would do well to try to 
understand how it works. 
Although Alexy’s model of human rights norms as principles could be seen to suggest 
that the extent of rights is indeterminate, this is not in fact the case. Optimisation causes 
constitutional law to become concretised over time. Each time a proportionality 
decision is reached by a court, a fact-specific rule is created. This has the qualities of a 
rule (as opposed to a principle), in that it has an all or nothing character. Alexy 
describes the system by which optimisation creates these rules as the ‘law of competing 
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principles’ which states that: ‘the circumstances under which one principle takes 
precedence over another constitutes the conditions of a rule which has the same legal 
consequences as the principle taking precedence.’69 This optimisation produces a fact-
specific rule, which is a condition of precedence between two principles. By deciding 
specific cases, the courts build up a series of rules, which form the hard edges of human 
rights. For example, the burden of proof cases discussed above have produced a rule 
that evidential burdens on the defendant in criminal law are to be preferred over legal 
burdens. Thus, a rights principle and a public interest principle are factually and legally 
balanced to produce a rights rule. As more and more of these rules are produced, the 
limits of rights and of state power are defined.  
 
 
2.4: ALEXY’S THEORY OF DEFERENCE 
Many of the critics of proportionality and judicially enforceable rights have strong 
concerns about the possibility that every aspect of every governmental decision could 
be made by a judge.70 However, judges do not apply proportionality in this way and are 
at pains to give leeway to the other arms of government where it is due. In the UK this 
has generally been referred to as ‘deference’. Alexy’s model of proportionality takes 
account of deference and, unlike existing UK theories, Alexy’s model integrates 
deference into the structure of proportionality.  
Alexy uses the term ‘discretion’ instead of ‘deference.’ Although the two are 
functionally synonymous, for clarity of exposition I have chosen to use the term 
‘deference’ throughout this thesis as it is more widely recognised in the UK. In addition 
to this, the term ‘discretion’ has a specific meaning in British administrative law and I 
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am concerned to ensure as little confusion as possible arises from the already complex 
taxonomy I am applying. I will therefore explain Alexy’s theory as a theory of 
‘deference’ notwithstanding the fact that he uses the term ‘discretion’.  
Alexy classes deference into two categories: structural and epistemic deference.71 
Structural deference relates to the deference afforded to the decision-maker in choosing 
between constitutionally permissible (i.e. rights-compatible) options.72  Epistemic 
deference is the deference afforded to a decision-maker when there is some unavoidable 
uncertainty involved in the decision-making. When looking at a challenged government 
measure, it will not always be possible to make a precise measurement of the realisation 
of the fundamental right or the public interest. In such circumstances, it may be 
appropriate to afford the primary decision-maker some deference. 
 
2.4.1: Structural deference 
The different stages of the proportionality test place certain requirements on 
government decision-makers. However, these stages do not necessarily point to a single 
rights-compatible outcome. Where there are multiple permissible answers to a question 
posed by the proportionality test, the decision-maker is given ‘structural deference’. 
This deference can arise at three stages of the test: legitimate aim, factual optimisation 
and legal optimisation.73  
Structural deference arises at the legitimate aim stage when the decision-maker has a 
choice as to which ends to pursue. Some ends will not be permitted if they fail the 
                                                
71 Alexy TCR, above n1, at 388-425. Matthias Klatt uses this distinction as a way of developing an 
understanding of judicial discretion in the context of the Hart-Dworkin debate. See Klatt, M ‘Taking 
Rights Less Seriously. A Structural Analysis of Judicial Discretion’ (2007) 20 Ratio Juris 506. 
72 Alexy TCR, above n1, at 393. 
73 Rivers suggests that structural discretion can also arise in the setting of the relationship between factual 
and legal optimisation. See Rivers, ‘Second Law of Balancing’, above n46, at 170-171. While his 
analysis is undoubtedly a valuable contribution, it is at a level of abstraction which is arguably 
unnecessary for the purposes of this thesis.   
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‘legitimate aim’ arm of the test74 but numerous public interest objectives will pass that 
stage. Where there is more than one public interest objective which reaches the 
normative standard of a ‘principle’, then structural deference gives the decision-maker a 
freedom to choose which of those objectives to pursue. For example, Article 10 of the 
Convention permits the limitation of freedom of expression for certain specific 
purposes, including national security and the prevention of crime. It is up to the 
government to decide which of these two legitimate aims to pursue. A reviewing court 
will afford a structural deference to that choice of aim in that it will not question the 
decision to pursue, for example, the goal of national security instead of the goal of 
crime prevention.  
Structural deference can also arise in factual optimisation, which requires a decision-
maker to choose the least rights-restrictive option available. There may be two 
measures, each of which achieves the public interest to the same extent and each of 
which has the same level of impact on a fundamental right. In such a situation, the 
decision-maker is given structural deference regarding the choice between them. For 
example, a prison governor might wish to decrease the availability of drugs in prisons 
by having a daily search of each cell using sniffer dogs. Alternatively a policy of strip-
searching prisoners after they had received visitors might be pursued. If a court were 
called upon to address the proportionality of each of these measures, it might take the 
view that each involved the same level of intrusion on the prisoners’ Article 8 rights. In 
those circumstances, the prison governor would be afforded structural deference 
concerning the choice of  which measure to implement. This is structural deference in 
factual optimisation. 
Structural deference is most likely to arise in the UK at the legitimate aim stage and the 
factual optimisation stage. It is also possible for structural deference to arise in legal 
                                                
74 See for example the dicta of Sedley LJ in B v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Unreported, 
Court of Appeal, 18 May 2000) in which he refused to accept deportation as an aim. 
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optimisation, although this is less likely to be significant in case law under the HRA. 
Structural deference in legal optimisation gives decision-makers a choice between what 
Alexy calls ‘stalemates’.75 Stalemates arise in situations where the public interest 
principle and the human rights principle are equally balanced. There are two forms of 
structural deference in legal optimisation: structural deference between stalemates and 
structural deference in stalemates.  
Structural deference between stalemates gives decision-makers a choice between a high 
level of rights intrusion paid for with a high level of public interest realisation on the 
one hand and a low level of rights intrusion with a low level of public interest on the 
other. This is unlikely to be a central issue in any legal optimisation analysis under the 
HRA. Decision-makers are afforded structural deference concerning the choice of 
legitimate objective. Implicit in that is deference to the decision-maker’s choice of the 
level of public interest to be pursued. Once that level has been set, the choice of a 
balanced measure will flow directly from it, and so there will be no need for separate 
structural deference at the overall balancing stage. For example, once the prison 
governor decided on the level of decrease in drug availability she wished to pursue, then 
legal optimisation would indicate which measures were proportionate. There would be 
no need to compare those measures to other measures which involved a greater or lesser 
level of decrease in drug availability. 
Structural deference in a stalemate arises when a public interest and a right are equally 
balanced. Where this occurs, the decision-maker has a choice as to which of the two 
principles to prioritise. Obviously, if the case makes it to court, the decision-maker will 
have chosen to prioritise the public interest, and so this form of structural deference is 
unlikely to be an explicit factor in any HRA case. For example, once the prison 
governor decided to pursue the anti-drugs policy, then by implication the reduction of 
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drug availability was going to take priority over the prisoners’ rights in any situation 
where the two were equally balanced. 
These two branches of structural deference in legal optimisation are to some extent 
implied by the legal optimisation requirement itself. Legal optimisation requires a 
balance between the public interest and the human right. The stalemates Alexy 
discusses are situations where that balance has been struck. In such cases, legal 
optimisation has little more to say about the measure, so it makes sense that the 
decision-maker should be permitted to either choose which principle to prioritise or to 
choose which level of public interest protection to pursue. However, as I have 
explained, structural deference in legal optimisation is unlikely to be a central issue in 
any HRA cases. I have only explained it here for the purposes of giving a 
comprehensive account of Alexy’s theory. 
One difficulty with the structural deference model is that it assumes that it is possible 
precisely to compare the level of intrusion on a right compared with the level of 
realisation of the public interest. Alexy accepts that precise measurement is not always 
possible and that ‘[l]egal scales can thus only work with relatively crude divisions and 
not even that in all cases.’76 However, while such measurements might be crude, it is 
generally possible to determine relative levels of intrusion and protection and to use 
these as a basis for rational argument about where the balance between intrusion and 
protection should lie. Determining these levels is a substantial part of the job of a court 
charged with human rights adjudication and so an expectation that judges should do it in 
these circumstances should not be an impediment to the structural theory of 
proportionality. If uncertainty arises in these measurements, the courts may opt to use 
Alexy’s other form of deference: epistemic deference.  
 
                                                
76 Alexy TCR, above n1, at 408. 
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2.4.2: Epistemic deference 
Alexy’s concept of epistemic deference relates to the reliability of assessments made by 
primary decision-makers. This falls into two categories, empirical and normative. 
Empirical epistemic deference relates to knowledge and fact-finding. In many instances 
it might not be possible to prove conclusively that a certain policy will realise the public 
interest. Alexy argues that if you were to require 100 per cent certain proof of protection 
of the public interest for all intrusions on rights, then the legislature would be absolutely 
prohibited from doing a significant number of things.77 Empirical epistemic deference 
relates both to knowledge of the extent to which policies will be successful and to the 
level at which they will intrude upon a fundamental right. 78 It will often be impossible 
to know conclusively what effect a measure will have on a right or public interest 
principle. This is particularly true of the public interest. 79 In such circumstances, it is 
not necessarily appropriate for a court to supplant the primary decision-maker’s analysis 
of the impact with the court’s own. The decision-maker may have more expertise and a 
greater understanding of the facts of a situation than the court and so an estimate by the 
decision-maker on the impact of the measure on the relevant principle will be afforded 
greater weight. An obvious example of this is a threat to national security. The 
assessment of such threats is a process of very complicated guesswork and it is rarely 
possible to show conclusively that a threat exists. In such situations, the relevant 
decision-maker may be given some degree of empirical epistemic deference.  
Empirical epistemic deference can be seen in the reasoning of majority judgments of the 
House of Lords in A&X v Secretary of State for the Home Department.80 The House 
                                                
77 Alexy TCR, above n1, at 417. 
78 ibid, at 415. See also: Rivers, ‘Second Law of Balancing’, above n46, at 180-183. 
79 See Rivers, ‘Second Law of Balancing’, above n46, at 180-183. 
80 [2005] 2 AC 68. 
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examined Parliament’s finding that there was a public emergency81 and paid a large 
degree of deference to that finding. Lord Bingham noted that the Home Secretary, his 
colleagues and Parliament were better placed than the courts to make such a decision 
which ‘involved a factual prediction of what various people around the world might or 
might not do, and when (if at all) they might do it, and what the consequences might be 
if they did.’82  
The other form of epistemic deference is ‘normative’. Normative epistemic deference 
has to do with deciding between two outcomes on the basis of a normative assessment 
of their relative importance. The idea is that where two principles are being balanced, 
there will be occasions where a choice has to be made between prioritising one or the 
other of them. If this choice occurs in circumstances where each principle receives 
enough protection for it to be realised, then the choice of which principle to favour is up 
to the decision-maker. The normative assessment of the decision-maker is accepted by 
the courts. Alexy gives the example of a piece of redundancy legislation in Germany 
which favoured employers over employees. Two sets of constitutional rights were in 
issue and the BVerfGE was satisfied that the measure protected both sets of rights up to 
a minimum standard and as such the choice about which set of rights to prioritise was 
left up to the legislature.83 The operation of normative epistemic deference is similar to 
structural deference, but it can be distinguished from it. Normative epistemic deference 
concerns choices about what the correct balance should be. Structural deference affords 
a decision-maker a choice between measures which are correctly balanced. 
                                                
81 At issue in this case was a derogation from certain Convention rights under Article 15, which permits 
certain derogations in a time of public emergency. Article 15 requires a proportionality test to be applied 
and the issue of whether or not there is a public emergency operates in the same manner as the legitimate 
aim stage of the test. See further van Dijk and van Hoof Theory and Practice of the ECHR, above n30 at 
1062-1064. 
82 [2005] 2 AC 68, at 102. The applicants subsequently brought an unsuccessful case to the Grand 
Chamber of the ECHR. The ECHR agreed with the view of the House of Lords on whether there was a 
public emergency. The ECHR noted that ‘[w]eight must, therefore, attach to the judgment of the United 
Kingdom's executive and Parliament on this question.’ See A v United Kingdom (Application No: 
3455/05) Judgment of the Grand Chamber, 19 February 2009 
83 Alexy TCR, above n1, at 415. 
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Epistemic deference can arise within both the factual and legal optimisation stages of 
proportionality. Factual optimisation requires that the least rights-intrusive means of 
achieving the public interest be used. In order to assess which means of achieving the 
public interest is the least intrusive, a determination will have to be made as to the 
impact of each of the available means on the fundamental right principle and on the 
public interest principle. This may involve empirical measurements which cannot be 
entirely certain, in which case the decision-maker will be afforded empirical epistemic 
deference.  
At the legal optimisation stage, the court will have to assess the level of impact on the 
fundamental right and the level of realisation of the public interest in order to determine 
whether they are balanced. The issue of whether they are balanced may involve 
empirical or normative uncertainty. The reviewing court may not be in a position to 
know exactly how extensive the realisation of the public interest principle will be under 
a particular measure. The court may not wish to disturb the decision-maker’s findings as 
to the correct means-ends balance to be struck. In situations where this sort of 
uncertainty arises, the reviewing court will afford the decision-maker empirical or 
normative epistemic deference. 
It is also conceivable that epistemic deference could arise at the rational connection 
stage of proportionality. If there is uncertainty about whether or not a particular measure 
achieves the public interest at all, then a court might be prepared to afford empirical 
epistemic deference to the decision-maker. However, as rational connection is rarely the 
key battleground in proportionality cases, it is difficult to show this in operation in the 
case law. 
Epistemic deference is also important in relation to Habermas’s criticism that legal 
optimisation is not rational. As was noted above, Alexy responded to that criticism by 
breaking legal optimisation into three questions: what is the level of realisation of the 
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public interest? What is the level of intrusion on the right? Is a fair balance struck? 
Empirical epistemic deference will potentially play a role in the first two questions and 
normative epistemic deference will play a role in the third.  
There is a relationship between structural and epistemic deference,84 which goes some 
way to explaining the framework within which deference operates. Structural deference 
in factual optimisation can arise where there are two options which both achieve the 
public interest to the same extent and which are equally rights-intrusive. However, the 
level of intrusion upon a human rights principle is not something that can always be 
precisely measured. A restriction on a right might be deemed more, or less, severe by 
two different courts or decision-makers who consider the issue. Even more opaque is 
the level of promotion of the public interest, which Alexy clearly countenances will 
sometimes be an educated guess taken by a decision-maker to which a court will defer. 
Structural deference in factual optimisation is reliant on a determination of the level of 
limitation of one right and the level of promotion of the other.85 Where these 
determinations involve empirical uncertainty, they will be subject to epistemic 
deference. The more epistemic deference is afforded to a decision-maker, the larger the 
range of measures that the court is going to accept as balanced and so the greater the 
likelihood of structural deference being relevant. 
 
2.4.3: The level of deference 
So far I have explained Alexy’s structural model of proportionality and the 
classification he gives to the different forms of deference that can be afforded to a 
decision-maker within that model. For Alexy, proportionality is about optimising 
fundamental rights principles against public interest principles. In seeking to find the 
                                                
84 Alexy TCR, above n1, at 413-414. 
85 This point is picked up by Rivers: Rivers, ‘Second Law of Balancing’, above n46, at 177. 
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means of achieving the public interest which has the least intrusion upon the 
fundamental right, the court is engaged in an exercise of factual optimisation. In seeking 
to find an overall balance between the means used and the ends achieved, the court is 
engaged in an exercise of legal optimisation. Alexy’s two forms of deference relate to 
these two processes differently. Structural deference is connected to factual 
optimisation: it affords the decision-maker a choice between equally balanced measures 
and permits the decision-maker some discretion in setting the goals to be achieved in 
the first place. Epistemic deference is connected directly to factual and legal 
optimisation: where there is uncertainty about the effect of a measure,  the decision-
maker can be afforded deference in their assessment of those effects, be they empirical 
or normative. I have also explained how epistemic deference can be connected to the 
operation of structural deference within factual optimisation. Deciding whether or not 
two measures are equally balanced may require the decision-maker to be given some 
leeway in their analysis of the facts. 
In setting out his theory of deference, Alexy recognises two important principles. On 
the one hand, rights must be protected but on the other hand, as much decision-making 
as possible should be undertaken by the elected legislature. A total prioritisation of 
rights or democracy would lead to either no legislative freedom or no rights-protection. 
Alexy recognises this problem and attempts to devise a means of dealing with it.  
While the theory of deference detailed so far gives an effective description of the 
operation of structural and epistemic deference within the structure of the 
proportionality test, it does not give much guidance on the degree of deference to be 
afforded to a primary decision-maker. Categorising deference as structural or epistemic 
tells a court at which stage of the proportionality test to afford deference. It does not tell 
the court how much deference to afford. Alexy and Rivers both recognise there is a 
need for a formal principle for deciding the level of deference. Alexy sees structural 
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deference as being largely limited by its own terms and suggests a formal principle that 
is limited to epistemic deference. Rivers on the other hand sees a need for guidance with 
both types and suggests a formal rule to cover all deference.86 
Alexy is prepared to accept a large degree of epistemic deference in cases involving a 
light intrusion on a fundamental right. However, where the intrusion is more extreme, 
he contends that the level of deference should be lessened. On this basis, he suggests a 
‘second law of balancing’ which is: ‘the more heavily an interference in a constitutional 
right weighs, the greater must be the certainty of its underlying premisses.’87 Thus, 
where there is a substantial detriment to a right, the epistemic deference afforded to the 
decision-maker will be less than where there is a lesser intrusion on the right.  
Rivers’ model accepts the basic principle underlying Alexy’s test but seeks to develop it 
such that it can also cover structural deference. He suggests that the formal principle 
should be: ‘the more serious a limitation of rights is, the more intense should be the 
review engaged in by the court.’88 He argues that the more weighty the right, the less 
scope for structural deference; the more serious the infringement, the more empirical 
evidence is required to show the means achieves the aim and the more the court will be 
prepared to look for small increases in rights-protection. It is interesting to note that 
models of deference along the lines Rivers suggests have been expressly countenanced 
in human rights jurisprudence in the UK even before the advent of the HRA. In R v 
Ministry of Defence ex parte Smith The Court of Appeal accepted the principle that 
‘[t]he more substantial the interference with human rights, the more the court will 
require by way of justification before it is satisfied that the decision is reasonable’.89  
                                                
86 Rivers, ‘Second Law of Balancing’, above n46, at 185-187. 
87 Alexy TCR, above n1, at 418. See also Alexy, R. ‘On Balancing and Subsumption. A Structural 
Comparison’ (2003) 16 Ratio Juris 433. 
88 Rivers, ‘Second Law of Balancing’, above n46, at 187. 
89 [1996] QB 517 at 554 per Sir Thomas Bingham MR (as he then was). The formulation of this test 
comes from the submission of David Pannick QC, who was counsel for three of the appellants in that 
case.  Sir Thomas accepted Mr Pannick’s submission that this formulation was an accurate distillation of 
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Rivers’ second law has the potential to be more institutionally sensitive than Alexy’s in 
that it can be applied in two ways. It can be used to set the level of deference to be 
afforded to a policy-maker based on the importance of the Convention right at stake. It 
can also be used to set the level of deference to be afforded to an administrative 
decision-maker’s finding of fact in a specific case. Notwithstanding this feature of 
Rivers’ test, the distinction between deference to policy-makers and deference to 
administrative decision-makers needs to be more explicit. I anticipate that this can be 
achieved through the development of a structural, institutionally sensitive theory of the 
proportionality test as a whole and I will show how this is the case in the next chapter. 
What Alexy attempts to set out, and what I am seeking to develop in this thesis, is a 
‘structural’ model of proportionality and deference which can accommodate different 
normative arguments about the appropriate scope of rights while channelling them in a 
way that is more effective. Admittedly, the two formulations of the second law of 
balancing discussed here are essentially normative arguments. They are fundamentally 
concerned with the level of deference which ought to be afforded to a decision-maker. 
However, a different basis for the level of deference could be substituted without 
disrupting the structure of the overall model.  
In this thesis, I am not seeking to provide a conclusive answer to normative questions 
about rights. Instead, I am seeking to elaborate the process by which rights adjudication 
occurs and through that elaboration, put some shape on the existing HRA case law. The 
normative question of the level of deference (like the question of the legitimacy of a 
public interest objective) is a question with a particular place in the proportionality test. 
My purpose here is to show where that question fits into the structure of the test, not to 
conclusively answer the question. 
                                                                                                                                          
the  principles set out in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Bugdaycay [1987] AC 
514 and R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Brind [1991] 1 AC 696. See also R v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Leech [1994] QB 198. 
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2.5: THE LIMITATIONS OF ALEXY 
Given the complexity of the issues discussed in this chapter, some recounting of the 
basic ideas is appropriate at this juncture.  In this chapter I have shown how Alexy 
characterises rights and the public interest as principles which compete with one another 
and need to be reconciled using the proportionality test. The test has four stages. The 
first two, legitimate aim and rational connection, are threshold issues. The key business 
of proportionality is done at the last two states: minimal impairment and overall 
balance. Alexy’s model accounts for these two stages in terms of optimising the 
competing principles. This optimisation theory of proportionality is a useful and 
sophisticated exposition of the operation of the test as an interaction of competing 
norms. It is this structural analysis of the proportionality test which allows Alexy to 
account for the role of deference within the structure of proportionality. Alexy classifies 
deference as structural or epistemic and explains how these forms of deference arise at 
different stages of the proportionality test. This classification and integration of 
deference is only possible because the structure of proportionality has been explained in 
such detail.  This is a major improvement on existing theories of proportionality and 
deference in the UK. As was discussed in Chapter 1, the UK discussion of 
proportionality is trapped in the spatial metaphor, which sets up proportionality and 
deference as being in opposition to one another.  
However, Alexy’s model suffers from a significant limitation for the purposes of UK 
proportionality: he adopts an institutionally rigid approach. He explains proportionality 
and deference exclusively in terms of the judicial review of legislation. The manner of 
his discussion of proportionality suggests that he has conceived of his model solely in 
terms of this particular form of judicial review. This is perfectly understandable for a 
model based on the jurisprudence of the BVerfGE, which is a constitutional court 
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concerned with review of legislation.90 However, the lack of institutional sensitivity in 
Alexy’s structural theory means that it is not possible to import his approach directly 
into the UK, where judicial review theory must accommodate a wide variety of 
governmental action. The value of Alexy’s model is as a basis upon which to build a 
domestic UK approach. If the structural model is to be effective in the UK, it must be 
adapted to take account of the wide variety of governmental institutions which can be 
subjected to HRA-based proportionality review. 
Alexy’s model of factual and legal optimisation is a valuable starting point, but it must 
be accepted that these two arms of the proportionality test do not apply to all forms of 
governmental activity in the same way. This is evident from a cursory examination of 
the stages of proportionality across a range of government bodies. At the legitimate aim 
stage, Parliament will have a very wide amount of choice in identifying which public 
interest principle to pursue. This is not true of appointed public officials. Institutional 
difference is even more acute at the factual optimisation stage. If a court is asking 
whether there is a less rights-restrictive alternative available to a decision-maker, the 
court is presupposing that there is a range of options available. While this is certainly 
the case at the level of primary legislation, it is not true of an appointed official 
exercising an adjudicative power. For example, a Home Office official making a 
decision in an asylum application can decide to grant or deny asylum. That is the extent 
of her options. In such a situation, factual optimisation will have little to add to the 
analysis. Legal optimisation will also operate differently depending on the institution 
concerned. Whether the balance struck is acceptable can depend on a number of factors, 
such as the level of generality of a decision. If a government measure only affects one 
individual, in one particular case, then questions asked about the public interest and the 
impact of rights are set in a very different context when compared to a piece of 
                                                
90 Federal administrative law is dealt with by the Federal Administrative Court, the 
Bundesverwaltungsgericht. 
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legislation, which affects everyone. In the latter case, the question may be much more 
difficult to answer. 
Institutional factors will also affect Alexy’s model of deference. First, these factors will 
affect deference wherever they affect proportionality, since the model integrated 
deference into proportionality. For example, if the institutional setting of an 
administrative case is such that factual optimisation has no meaningful role to play, then 
structural deference will not be relevant either. Secondly, Alexy’s categories of 
deference are based on institutional assumptions in much the same way as is the model 
of factual and legal optimisation. For example, empirical epistemic deference arises 
where there is uncertainty as to facts and the reviewing court decides to defer to the 
decision-maker’s view of those facts. For Alexy, the decision-maker is always the 
legislature, so the level of expertise can be assumed. In the UK, the level of expertise 
and competence of the various institutions of government can vary significantly. If there 
is less expertise, then there is less reason for empirical epistemic deference. Similarly, 
normative epistemic deference affords leeway to a decision-maker on issues of 
normative uncertainty. Since Alexy is focused on the legislature, he can presume a large 
degree of democratic legitimacy in the making of normative assessments. Such 
assumptions cannot be made of every official in the British system of governance. 
Alexy provides a model for establishing the level of deference to be afforded to the 
primary decision-maker, but this is done in a somewhat free-floating manner. Alexy and 
Rivers both give a version of the ‘second law of balancing’ which is supposed to help 
gauge the level of deference to be paid. However, this is expressed solely in term of the 
impact on the right, and no account is taken of institutional differences between 
decision-makers. I contend that the specific features of particular institutions can 
provide reasons for affording them deference. If the institutional setting of a challenged 
measure were to be explored further, then it should be possible to have a basis for 
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affording deference that goes beyond the level of intrusion on the right. I am not 
suggesting that the level of intrusion is not relevant to deference. However, I wish to 
establish that there are other factors that are also relevant to deference. Alexy does not 
consider these factors. Rivers recognises that there are different reasons for affording 
deference but is not prepared to accept that they should be criteria in assessing the 
correct level of deference.91 I disagree with this proposition, and I will show in the next 
chapter the way in which these elements can be usefully explored when assessing 
deference.  
Overall, the conceptual value of Alexy’s structural theory is significant, but its 
immediate practical utility in the UK is undermined somewhat by its one-dimensional 
institutional presuppositions. A structural model along the lines of Alexy’s has the 
potential to overcome the spatial metaphor of proportionality and deference by 
explaining the relationship between the two more fully. However, if Alexy’s model 
were to be adopted wholesale in its current institutionally blinkered form, then it would 
be undermined by differences between the institutions to which it was applied. This 
would hamper the model’s ability to explain the structure of proportionality and 
deference because institutional factors would be at play in the background. If problems 
were to arise with the model, it would not be possible to trace their origins precisely. If 
the institutional presuppositions are challenged and overcome, then Alexy’s theory has 
the potential to provide a comprehensive structural model of proportionality and 
deference in the UK. The missing ingredient is institutional sensitivity, which I will be 
adding throughout the rest of this thesis.  
 
 
 
                                                
91 Rivers ‘Variable Intensity of Review’, above n2, at 205. 
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2.6. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter I have set out the main features of Alexy’s structural theory of rights 
insofar as it applies to proportionality analysis. I have shown how he characterises 
rights norms and certain public interest goals as ‘principles’ and how the interaction of 
these principles gives rise to an understanding of proportionality based on factual and 
legal optimisation. These principles are the inputs of proportionality. While Alexy does 
not give a perfect account of how the inputs are derived, he does show the process by 
which they interact in a manner which has not been achieved elsewhere. In addition to 
this I have set out Alexy’s theory of the deference to be afforded to the original 
decision-maker. By categorising deference as structural or epistemic, Alexy manages to 
integrate deference into the structure of the proportionality test. This is of great 
significance for UK theories of proportionality which have been hamstrung to date by 
an over preoccupation with a spatial conception of rights. 
The explanation of the relationship between proportionality and deference is, of itself, a 
good reason for applying Alexy’s model to the HRA, but there are further benefits to 
Alexy’s model. Alexy shows that when human rights principles and public interest 
principles interact in a specific case, a human rights-based rule is created, which will 
then be applicable to similar cases. This focus on case law as the driver of developments 
in human rights rule is apposite for a common law system. The focus on how 
proportionality works in individual cases is also of significance in that it puts the 
adjudicating court at the centre of the test.  
I will show that the various elements of Alexy’s model are currently present in the 
jurisprudence of the UK Courts on the HRA. Rivers has suggested that the UK courts 
need to move towards an optimisation theory of proportionality.92 I contend that all of 
the elements of Alexy’s model are already evident in the UK. The difficulty is not that 
                                                
92 See Rivers ‘Variable Intensity of Review’, above n2. 
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the elements have not been applied. The difficulty is that they have been applied in a 
disparate fashion and the overall structure has not always been made explicit. I will 
show these elements in the detailed case studies contained in Chapters 4, 5 & 6 of this 
thesis.  
However, before going on to that stage, it is important to take account of the full range 
of judicially-reviewable government decision-makers in the UK. There is no separate 
constitutional court in the UK: all judicial powers are exercised in a unified court 
system.93  This places a limitation on the value of Alexy’s theory to the UK. Because 
Alexy bases his theory on the jurisprudence of the BVerfGE, which is primarily 
concerned with the constitutionality of legislation, his model is focused exclusively on 
proportionality review of statute law. As I have indicated, proportionality of executive 
and administrative action is not adequately accounted for. The UK model of 
proportionality is applied across the entire range of governmental activity. Because 
there is a single court system, applying a single set of rights to a multiplicity of 
institutions, the theory of proportionality needs to take full account of distinctions 
between those institutions. In order for Alexy’s model to be fully transplanted into the 
UK, it must also be adequately translated, and it is to this task that I turn in the next 
chapter. 
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Chapter 3: Developing Alexy: institutional sensitivity and 
the structural model of proportionality and deference 
 
 
In Chapter 2, I set out the basic elements of Alexy’s structural model of proportionality. 
As I explained, Alexy only applies his model to judicial review of primary legislation. 
In the UK, the Human Rights Act 1998 (‘the HRA’) can be applied to all levels of 
government activity.1 In this chapter, I develop Alexy’s model so that it can take 
account of the full range of government action. By doing this, I add the element of 
‘institutionally sensitivity’ to the structural model. 
The central purpose of the proportionality test in the UK is to allow judges to decide 
whether or not governmental actions are compatible with the European Convention on 
Human Rights (‘the Convention’) which was incorporated by the HRA. The judiciary 
are the primary ‘doers’ of proportionality under the HRA.2 Aggrieved individuals who 
have been affected by a government measure petition an appropriate court and ask the 
judge(s) to find that the effect the measure has had on their Convention rights is 
                                                
1 Although, as has been noted, the courts do not have the power to declare primary legislation invalid. 
2 Parliament’s Joint Committee on Human Rights also has a role in assessing the proportionality of 
legislation before it is passed. See Feldman, D. ‘The Impact of Human Rights on the Legislative Process’ 
(2004) 25 Statute Law Review 91; Feldman, D. ‘Can and Should Parliament Protect Human Rights?’ 
(2004) 10 European Public Law 635; and Hiebert, J.L. ‘Parliament and the Human Rights Act: Can the 
JCHR Help Facilitate a Culture of Rights?’ (2006) 4 IJCL 1. However, the Committee’s role is limited to 
the period before a Bill becomes law. After legislation is enacted, it is the judiciary who generally assess 
its compatibility with the Convention. 
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disproportionate. In examining the governmental measure, the judge applies the 
proportionality test in order to find out if the measure is Convention-compatible.3  
When undertaking this proportionality analysis, the judiciary give deference to the 
primary decision-maker where such deference is warranted.  
The outcomes of proportionality cases under the HRA build over time to set out the line 
between what is and is not acceptable on proportionality grounds. In that sense, the 
courts are creating a tapestry of human rights rules through their individual rulings. In 
this sense, judges are not only ‘doers’ of proportionality in specific cases, through the 
proportionality test, they are also building the hard edges of the protected rights, which 
then informs subsequent cases and the development of future governmental measures. 
When a judge is applying the proportionality test to a challenged government act, she 
asks a series of questions about that government act. What I wish to establish in this 
chapter is that the premises upon which those questions are based can change depending 
on which institution of government is being reviewed. Those changes need to be 
accounted for because they can affect the operation of proportionality and deference.  
In ‘doing’ proportionality, judges can be called upon to examine the actions of a vast 
swathe of public bodies. Much attention has been paid to the institutional differences 
between the courts on one hand and the other arms of government on the other. Far less 
attention has been paid to the differences between these other arms of government 
                                                
3 Recent decisions of the House of Lords indicate that proportionality under the HRA is a substantive 
standard and is concerned with the actual result of the measure, not the decision-making process by which 
it was introduced. There was some controversy over precisely what a reviewing court was looking for 
when examining proportionality. It had been argued on that the court must examine whether the 
challenged measure was itself proportionate. It had also been contended that the court’s role was to 
examine whether the decision had been reached in a proportionate manner. This was a tension between a 
view of proportionality as requiring a substantive outcome or a formal process from the primary decision-
maker. The matter was recently settled by the House of Lords in R (SB) v Governors of Denbigh High 
School [2006] UKHL 15; [2007] 1 AC 100. Lord Hoffmann held (at 126) that the relevant article was 
‘concerned with substance, not with procedure’ and that ‘what matters is the result’. A similar stance was 
taken in Belfast City Council v Miss Behavin’ Ltd [2007] UKHL 19 [2007] 1 WLR 1420.  There has been 
some academic commentary suggesting that there is still space for a review of the decision-makers view 
of proportionality, but the House does not seem to have endorsed this. See Poole, T. ‘The Reformation of 
English Administrative Law’ (2009) 68 CLJ 142. See also Poole, T. ‘Of Headscarves and Heresies: The 
Denbigh High School Case and Public Authority’ [2005] PL 685.  
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insofar as these affect judicial review.  Such differences are significant for judges who 
are applying the proportionality standard, both in relation to the proportionality test 
itself and to the level of deference to be afforded to the challenged decision-maker. 
Reviewing the actions of an appointed official in the Home Office is a qualitatively 
different task than that of reviewing the actions of Parliament.4  
As was explained in Chapter 1, the dominance of the spatial metaphor and a lack of 
institutional sensitivity have been recurring problems in the understanding of 
proportionality and deference in the UK.  In Chapter 2, I showed how, prima facie, 
Alexy’s model could form the basis for a structural model for the UK proportionality 
test which integrates deference into the stages of the proportionality test. This would 
help to overcome the spatial metaphor. However, as it stands, Alexy’s model is not 
institutionally sensitive enough: his focus is entirely on the legislature. For Alexy’s 
model to be adapted to the UK it must be developed in a way that accounts for the 
institutional distinctions between the different government bodies whose actions can be 
challenged in court under the HRA.  
In this thesis I am seeking to establish that there is a discernable structure to the 
operation of proportionality and deference under the HRA. All of the elements of that 
structure can be found in the existing HRA case law. The structural model does not 
need to be imposed; it merely needs to be explained. The structural model is affected by 
the nature of the institution being judicially reviewed.  By establishing an institutionally 
sensitive version of Alexy’s model I am arguing that there is a universal proportionality 
test which can be applied to any governmental activity which is challenged under the 
HRA. However, certain aspects of that model are either emphasised or reduced in 
importance depending on the institutional setting. 
                                                
4 While the courts do not have the power to strike down Acts of Parliament under the HRA, they do have 
a power to review their Convention-compatibility. While the possible outcomes of a challenge to primary 
legislation may be different to other types of government activity, there is still a central role for the 
proportionality test when the courts are reviewing legislation. 
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In this chapter I will explain the way in which institutional distinctions will affect the 
operation of the structural model of proportionality and deference if it is applied in the 
UK. The chapter is divided into four main sections. In the first, I give a brief description 
of the different types of government activity which can be subjected to proportionality 
review. In this section I also introduce three hypothetical examples which will be used 
throughout the chapter. In the second section, I will explain how different institutional 
features can impact on the operation of proportionality and deference in the structural 
model. I have identified three specific areas of difference between the three forms of 
government activity which will affect Alexy’s model: the choice of objectives; the 
range of measures open to the decision-maker; and the scope of application of the 
challenged decision. In the third section, I look at how proportionality and deference 
will operate if a court is called upon to assess the proportionality of multiple levels of 
government decision-making which have interacted to produce a challenged 
government action (e.g. an official exercising a statutory power). Such cases involve a 
series of sub-decisions, made at different levels of government. I call these ‘multi-level 
decisions’. In the fourth section I will discuss the institutional reasons for affording 
deference to a decision-maker. I will examine how they relate to Alexy’s concepts of 
structural and epistemic deference. In this section I will also examine how the 
institutional features of sections 3 & 4 of the HRA affect deference. 
This chapter will introduce institutional sensitivity into the structural model. Once I 
have set out the institutional and functional distinctions and shown how they impact on 
the model, the stage will be set to test the applicability of this model to the HRA case 
law. I will do this in the three case studies in the following chapters, which are case 
studies of the operation of proportionality in three different fields.  
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3.1: FORMS OF GOVERNMENT ACTIVITY 
The purpose of this chapter is to develop Alexy’s model so that it becomes sensitive to 
the institutional differences between various forms of government activity. As a 
preliminary matter, it is important to establish the different types of government activity 
which might be challenged in court on proportionality grounds under the HRA. The 
subject matter of a proportionality-based judicial review will broadly fit into two 
categories of decision: case-specific administrative decisions and generalised policy 
decisions which set rules. For example, a decision to refuse asylum to an applicant is a 
one-off decision made by an administrative official. The Sexual Offences Act 2003 is a 
generalised policy set out as a series of rules. While these two examples are at the 
extremes of the spectrum, these two core roles recur again and again at different levels 
of government. 
The work of Denis Galligan is instructive on this point. He distinguishes between the 
two core roles, which he calls ‘adjudication’ and ‘policy making’.  He then sub-divides 
each of these two into a further two categories. His four categories of governmental 
decision are:  
1) adjudication;  
2) modified adjudication;  
3) specific policy issues; and  
4) general policy issues.5  
Adjudication and modified adjudication are individualised determinations of rights and 
duties which take place within a normative framework of settled standards. 
Adjudication only has a direct affect on the parties to the specific dispute (although it 
                                                
5 Galligan, D.J. Discretionary Powers: A Legal Study of Official Discretion (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1986), at 114-117. 
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may have some precedential impact). Court cases are an archetypal example of 
adjudication although this can also include certain administrative tribunals. This first 
category of government action is more properly a description of what a judge engages 
in when ‘doing’ proportionality. It is Galligan’s other three categorisations which help 
illustrate the types of government activity which judges will be called upon to review 
for Convention-compatibility. 
Galligan’s second category of ‘modified adjudication’ is like adjudication in that it 
results in an individualised decision, but in these situations the framework of standards 
is less certain and there is more discretion to include matters of policy and preference. 
This sort of decision is generally entrusted to administrative officials and includes 
immigration, social welfare and some planning decisions. Galligan’s third category, 
‘specific policy decisions’ relate to particular decisions which affect a large number of 
interests, such as where to build a motorway, whether or not to expand an airport etc. 
There is a large degree of discretion in these decisions although there may be some 
settled standards. His fourth category, ‘general policy issues’, involves a substantial 
discretion although there might be some abstract standards and a large range of interests 
can be affected. These three categories are instructive as a starting point from which to 
examine variations in forms of government action which are subject to proportionality 
review.  
The distinction between specific policy decisions and general policy decisions is 
essentially one of degree rather than of substance. Galligan’s analysis is limited to acts 
of the executive branch of government and he does not apply his model to Acts of 
Parliament. His ‘general policy decision’ category could certainly be applied to primary 
legislation. However, while Acts of Parliament may be similar forms of decision to 
general policy emanating from the executive, there are very specific institutional issues 
relating to Parliament which establish primary legislation as a discrete form of 
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governmental activity. For the purposes of this thesis, the categorisation of 
governmental activity must take account of primary legislation. Therefore, I will amend 
Galligan’s categorisation slightly. Modified adjudication is a good description of 
administrative decision-making, so I will follow Galligan’s definition on that category. 
Policy decisions of the executive, whether general or specific have enough of the same 
institutional features to be combined into one category. I will describe this as ‘non-
parliamentary rule-making’. The third category is ‘primary legislation’ which has all of 
the features of Galligan’s ‘general policy issues’ but with the additional factor that they 
are promulgated by a directly elected legislature, rather than an executive official.  
Modified adjudication and primary legislation are at opposite ends of the institutional 
spectrum. This makes them particularly valuable in elaborating the need for institutional 
sensitivity. Non-parliamentary rule-making involves a very wide range of activities; it 
could certainly be sub-divided into different categories. However, I am not going to do 
so. In this thesis I will be concentrating more heavily on the other two forms of 
government activity, since the substantial contrast between the two is the most effective 
way of elaborating the need for institutional sensitivity. The case studies in Chapters 4 
and 5 are heavily focused on modified adjudication and primary legislation, although 
Chapter 5 does give some consideration to non-parliamentary rule-making. This does 
not mean that greater exploration of non-parliamentary rule-making is not valuable. It is 
just that I am seeking to establish the parameters of the institutionally sensitive model, 
and so the more extreme contrasts are of more immediate use. I accept that it might 
initially appear overly simplistic for a discussion of non-parliamentary rule-making to 
treat school uniform policy and delegated legislation as been essentially the same thing. 
I wish to stress that this is done with good reason. Once the institutional factors have 
been fully explored through using heavily contrasting government bodies, then it will be 
possible to examine the more nuanced areas of difference at some later stage. 
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The distinctions between these types of governmental activity have ramifications for 
proportionality and deference. In order to illustrate this, I will use three hypothetical 
examples throughout this chapter. While fictional, each is a plausible example of the 
sort of government act that might be challenged on Convention grounds. They are the 
sorts of cases that judges evaluate using proportionality: 
• Mr Green (modified adjudication): The first hypothetical example concerns a 
first instance immigration decision, made by an appointed official at the United 
Kingdom Border Agency (UKBA).6 A fictional immigrant, ‘Mr Green’, is an 
Afghan citizen, who has been living in the UK for the past five years with his 
British born wife and their three young children (all of whom hold British 
citizenship). Mr Green initially entered the UK illegally and when the authorities 
discovered him he applied for asylum. His asylum claim was rejected. He made 
a further application for leave to remain which was refused by a UKBA official. 
This was refused under paragraph 322(5) of the immigration rules, on the basis 
that the security services have reason to believe that Mr Green is a member of a 
proscribed organisation and poses a threat to national security (although he has 
not been charged with any offence under anti-terrorism legislation). Mr Green is 
challenging the decision to refuse him leave to remain on the basis that it is a 
violation of his Article 8 right to respect for family life. 
• Blue school (non-parliamentary rule): The second hypothetical example 
concerns a fictional school, ‘Blue School’. Blue School is a state run secondary 
school7 with a diverse student body representing a wide range of religious 
affiliations. In the past year, there have been four serious violent incidents at the 
                                                
6 The UK Border Agency took over various immigration functions as of April 2008. It is currently a 
shadow agency of the Home Office; full executive agency status is expected during the course of 2009. 
For further information, see www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk. 
7 For the purposes of section 6 HRA a school may be a ‘public authority’ which bears Convention 
obligations. 
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school. Each one arose out of disturbances which were initiated at religious 
meetings held by students during the school day. In response to this, the 
governing body has decided that group religious meetings will no longer be 
permitted on school property. Only individual, solitary religious observance will 
be allowed. A group of students are challenging the decision on the basis that it 
is a violation of their Article 9 right to freedom of religion.8 
• The Red Act (primary legislation): The third hypothetical example concerns a 
fictional piece of legislation, ‘the Red Act’. The Red Act was passed in response 
to a series of violent attacks on people arrested on suspicion of offences under 
anti-terrorism legislation. A number of suspects (who were subsequently 
acquitted) were attacked by violent groups and three suspects were murdered. 
The Red Act states that it is an offence to publish the name of a person 
suspected of a terrorism offence (where that person has not yet been convicted). 
A person convicted of an offence under the Red Act is liable, on indictment, to a 
maximum sentence of ten years imprisonment. Three journalists have 
challenged the Red Act on the basis that it is a violation of their Article 10 right 
to freedom of expression.  
I will return to these examples throughout this chapter to illustrate the way in which the 
differences between the three institutions from which these decisions emanated can 
affect the operation of the proportionality test.  
 
 
 
                                                
8 I have chosen quite a low-level example of non-parliamentary rule-making in order to distinguish it 
from primary legislation more fully. Delegated legislation could also be used as an example, but as it 
emanates from central government, the contrast with Acts of Parliament is less stark. 
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3.2: INSTITUTIONAL SENSITVITY, OPTIMISATION AND DEFERENCE 
In Chapter 2, I showed how Alexy’s model of the operation of proportionality describes 
the elements of the test in terms of factual and legal optimisation of human rights 
principles and public interest principles. Factual optimisation requires that the least 
intrusive means of achieving a government objective be used. Legal optimisation 
requires that there be an overall balance between the level of intrusion on a human right 
and the level of achievement of the public interest. Alexy describes deference as either 
structural or epistemic. Structural deference arises in the setting of objectives and where 
there is a choice between rights-compatible means. Epistemic deference arises where 
there is uncertainty and the primary-decision-maker’s assessment of empirical or 
normative questions is deferred to by the reviewing judge. Alexy integrates these two 
forms of deference into the optimisation model of deference. Structural deference can 
arise at the legitimate objective stage and the factual optimisation stage. Epistemic 
deference can arise at the factual and legal optimisation stages. 
Judges use proportionality to examine the Convention-compatibility of three different 
types of government activity. The differences between these types of activity will 
impact on the model of proportionality and deference. There are three specific 
institutional factors which affect the operation of the structural model of proportionality 
and deference: 1) the decision-maker’s freedom to choose its own objectives; 2) the 
range of measures available to the decision-maker; and 3) the scope of the decision. I 
will look at each of these three factors separately. 
 
3.2.1: Choice of objectives 
Different institutions of government have different levels of control over the objectives 
they pursue. The UKBA official in Mr Green’s case has no choice of objective: she 
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must fulfil the duties placed on her by the Immigration Rules. Conversely Parliament 
had a wide choice of objectives when passing the Red Act. A judge applying the 
proportionality test in a HRA challenge to either of these decisions must take account of 
this difference. 
The UK proportionality test requires that the legislative objective be ‘sufficiently 
important to justify limiting a fundamental right’.9 As was discussed in Chapter 2.2, this 
limb of the test, combined with the text of the Convention is used to identify those 
public interests which have sufficient normative force to justify limiting human rights. 
It is noteworthy that the wording of this stage of the proportionality test requires that the 
legislative objective be legitimate. This is despite the fact that the proportionality test is 
applied to government institutions with no legislative power. This implicitly accepts 
that some decision-makers have their objectives set for them by a different level of 
government. The wording of this arm of the test is a recognition of institutional 
difference, although the full ramifications of it for the later stages of the proportionality 
test have yet to be fully fleshed out.  
It is clear from Alexy’s model that identifying the public interest objective is an 
important preliminary step for a court conducting a proportionality analysis of the 
challenged measure. The public interest objective of a government measure is described 
as a principle which must be optimised relative to a competing human rights principle. 
Alexy’s theory is predicated on the idea that principles are optimisation ‘commands’.10 
The human rights principle and a public interest principle both ‘command’ that they be 
realised to the greatest extent possible. Julian Rivers accepts the characterisation of 
human rights principles as optimization commands, but takes issue with Alexy’s 
characterisation of the public interest as a ‘command’. Rivers points out that the 
                                                
9 de Freitas v Minister for Agriculture and Fisheries [1999] 1 AC 69, at 80 per Lord Clyde. Cited with 
approval in R (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] UKHL 26; [2001] 2 AC 532 
and R v A (No 2) [2001] UKHL 25; [2002] 1 AC 45. 
10 See Alexy, R. ‘On The Structure of Legal Principles’ (2000) 13 Ratio Juris 294. 
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legislature can choose whether or not to pursue a particular public interest principle, and 
so according to Rivers, the public interest principle is an ‘optimisation permission’, not 
a command.11    
In fact, they are both correct. The reason for the confusion is that neither of their 
analyses of proportionality takes full account of institutional differences between 
decision-makers. Once an objective has sufficient normative force to be used to limit 
human rights, it is a public interest principle for the purposes of the structural model. 
That public interest principle can be a command or a permission, depending on the 
institutional setting in which the decision is made. In Mr Green’s case, the parameters 
of the decision have already been set. Paragraph 322(5) of the Immigration Rules is 
clear that a person who poses a threat to national security should not be permitted leave 
to remain. The UKBA official does not get to choose which goals she wishes to pursue. 
She is not permitted to optimise the public goal of protecting national security; by the 
terms of her remit, she is required to do so.  
Conversely, rule-makers will have more choice in the public interests pursued. The 
level of choice may vary. For some rule-makers the choice will be limited. The board of 
governors of Blue School can make policies towards a specified list of ends such as 
school discipline, promoting the wellbeing of students or improving educational 
standards. The range of objectives is small and the board is under a duty to pursue all of 
them to some extent. Like the UKBA official in Mr Green’s case, the governors of Blue 
School have limited ability to set their objectives, although they do have a wider range 
of objectives to pursue. In the case of the Red Act, the choice of objectives is incredibly 
broad. Parliament is under no external legal obligation to pursue the goal of preventing 
attacks on terror suspects. It chose to pursue that goal, but it could just as easily have 
                                                
11 Rivers, J. ‘Proportionality, Discretion and the Second Law of Balancing’ in Pavlakos, G. (ed.) Law, 
Rights and Discourse: The Legal Philosophy of Robert Alexy (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007), at 168. 
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left things as they stood. In this sense, for Parliament, the public interest is an 
optimisation permission, whereas for the other two decision-makers, it is an 
optimisation requirement. The structural model of proportionality and deference should 
take account of this difference. 
In addition to this requirement/permission distinction, the choice of objectives open to a 
decision-maker will affect how much work a reviewing court will need to do in 
identifying the principles to be optimised. The court must be clear precisely which 
competing principles are at stake in a proportionality case.12 The optimisation process in 
Alexy’s model is based on the relationship between a public interest principle and a 
human rights principle. Different public interest principles will interact with the human 
rights principle in different ways and lead to different outcomes. For example if the goal 
of the Red Act was the prevention of crime, then this might interact with the Article 10 
right differently than if the identified principle was national security. 
If the goal pursued by a decision-maker has already been set for it elsewhere, then 
identifying the public interest principle will be a relatively straightforward task. If the 
decision-maker gets to choose its own goals, then it will be more complicated. Mr 
Green’s application was decided on the basis of stated national security goals, set out in 
the Immigration Rules. The precise objective of the Red Act is less clear. It could have 
been the protection of the right to life, the prevention of crime and disorder, the 
administration of justice or any other related goal. If a court were reviewing the 
proportionality of the Red Act, it would need to look more deeply into the precise 
public interest pursued than would be required if it were reviewing Mr Green’s 
deportation.  
Official decision-makers enjoy a certain leeway in exercising their powers. Galligan 
points out that even though a power may be limited by statute and the goal very clearly 
                                                
12 See Rivers, J. ‘Proportionality and Variable Intensity of Review’ (2006) 65 CLJ 174. 
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stated, there are still sub-goals and strategies for achieving the main goal which the 
decision-maker will decide upon herself and this gives such a person a good degree of 
leeway in how the goal is pursued. Galligan argues that political leanings, policy 
preferences and moral outlook are likely to play an important role in this.13  The 
objectives which an administrative decision-maker is supposed to achieve will be set for 
it by an external rule-making authority and some constraints may also be set out, in 
terms of what factors need to be considered etc. The decision-maker’s own 
understanding of the goal will heavily inform the operation of their discretion as will 
various other factors, including their moral outlook and their relationship to community 
morality, the availability of resources and the concept of fairness to name just a few.14 
This is well illustrated in the decision to ban group worship in Blue School. While 
protecting the welfare of the students is a clear duty placed on the governors, they may 
have acted as they did in pursuit of the ‘sub-goal’ of calming religious tensions through 
a restriction on religious meetings in the school. This is a sub-goal of the goal of 
protecting the welfare of the students. The sub-goal was chosen by the governors 
themselves, it is not a goal which was imposed externally. Had the sub-goal been 
differently formulated, then the policy adopted could have been different. This sort of 
situation needs to be accommodated within the structural model of proportionality and 
deference. A reviewing court would need to decide whether it was the sub-goal or the 
primary goal which was the public interest principle upon which the ban was based.  
The job of defining the objective becomes even more difficult at the level of Parliament. 
Even where there are lists of the objectives which may be pursued when limiting a right, 
as is the case in Articles 8-11 of the Convention, the terms used are so broad that many 
governmental pursuits could feasibly be worked into them. Some possible goals of the 
Red Act have already been mentioned, but there could easily have been others. Great 
                                                
13 Galligan Discretionary Powers, above n5, at 109-114. 
14 ibid, at 129-163. 
106 
 
care must be taken by a reviewing court to ensure that it defines the objective of the 
challenged measure in very precise terms. As will be seen in later chapters, this can 
have a significant knock-on effect on the rest of the analysis. 
The choice of objective will also affect structural deference. As was discussed in 
chapter two, structural deference can arise in three ways: choosing the objective to be 
pursued, choosing between equally rights-intrusive measures and choosing between 
equally balanced measures (although, as was noted in Chapter 2.4.1, the last of these is 
unlikely to arise under the HRA). The first of these is what Alexy calls ‘end-setting’ 
structural deference.15 This form of structural deference is only relevant where the 
decision-maker is actually in a position to exercise a choice of objectives. The UKBA 
official in Mr Green’s case did not have a choice as to which goals to pursue and so 
end-setting structural deference is not relevant to a HRA challenge to the UKBA 
official’s decision. Conversely, both the governors of Blue School and Parliament have 
a degree of choice as to which end to pursue (this choice is significantly wider for 
Parliament). As such, the possibility of end-setting structural deference can potentially 
arise in each of those two cases. 
In situations where the decision-maker does have some power to determine the 
objective pursued, epistemic deference can arise in a court’s assessment of the objective 
chosen. Optimisation of principles entails a measurement of the level of importance of a 
public interest principle.  A reviewing court may be faced with uncertainty as to the 
importance of the objective. There might be good reasons to defer to the decision-
maker’s view of what is or is not important in a society. The decision-maker might be in 
a better position to make a measurement than the court can be expected to. This could 
arise in the case of Blue School, where the level of importance of the violent incidents 
and the possibility of their recurrence could be better measured by the governors of the 
                                                
15 Alexy TCR, above n15, at 395-396. 
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school than by the court reviewing the governors’ decision. This would be empirical 
epistemic deference, since it concerns the measurement of effects on a group of people 
and of possible future outcomes. The goal of the Red Act might also be afforded 
empirical epistemic deference. Parliament might be given deference regarding its 
assessment of the extent of the problem of attacks on terrorism suspects. 
 
3.3.2: Range of measures 
When a decision-maker is pursuing an objective, the range of measures available as a 
means of pursuing that objective can vary considerably. This is not only a question of 
the practical realities of whatever problem the decision-maker is grappling with. It is 
also affected significantly by institutional distinctions between decision-makers. 
Parliament’s choice of measures is potentially infinite. The same is not true of many 
administrative officials at lower levels of government, although their decisions regularly 
have an impact on human rights. 
The nature of modern government is such that administrative decision-makers are far 
more likely to have a very limited range of measures available to them. By and large, 
such decision-makers decide whether or not a particular rule applies to a particular case. 
For example, in Mr Green’s case, the only options open to the UKBA official were to 
grant leave to remain or to refuse leave to remain. In Blue School, the governors had 
other options for achieving the desired outcome apart from an outright ban on group 
worship. For example, the school could have increased teacher presence at religious 
services or put a cap on the number of worshipers who could be present. In the case of 
the Red Act, the range of options was enormous. Parliament could have mandated 
greater protection and/or surveillance of terror suspects; it could have legislated for the 
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monitoring of the groups responsible for the previous attacks; it could have legislated 
for all terror suspects to be taken into protective custody.  
The range of measures available to a decision-maker has a significant impact on the 
factual optimisation stage of the proportionality test. Proportionality comes into play 
when a challenged measure brings a public interest principle into competition with a 
human rights principle. Factual optimisation requires a reviewing court to examine 
whether there is another measure available which would realise the public interest to the 
same extent while intruding upon the human right to a lesser extent. This presupposes 
that another option that would pursue the public interest was available to the decision-
maker. This will rarely be the case with administrative decision-makers.  
In Mr Green’s case, the UKBA official had no range of measures available; she was 
faced with a binary choice. Where the range of options is limited to such a large extent, 
then factual optimisation cannot be applied in any meaningful way. It is pointless to ask 
if a less rights-restrictive way of achieving the public interest was available when they 
had no other way of achieving the public interest.  In these cases, legal optimisation will 
be crucially important. Administrative decision-makers work within frameworks of 
rules. No matter how precisely those rules are defined, they will not be able to 
anticipate every situation to which they will be applied. It is inherent in the operation of 
administrative discretion that some cases will fit the rules better than others. This leaves 
open the possibility of injustice through either overly rigid enforcement of the rules or 
through lax application of the standards which underpin them. In such instances, if 
Convention rights are engaged, the legal optimisation arm of proportionality is likely to 
be the key battleground in deciding whether the impugned decision was or is 
Convention-compatible. In Mr Green’s case, this means that a court reviewing the 
decision to deport him will be primarily concerned with balancing his right to family 
life against the interest in national security. In this institutional setting, factual 
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optimisation is minimised to a very large extent and so legal optimisation is heavily 
emphasised. In Samaroo v Secretary of State for the Home Department16 Dyson LJ 
considered that the factual optimisation arm of proportionality should only be applied 
where there is a ‘blanket policy’ as was the case in Daly17 whereas the decision 
challenged in the Samaroo case only fell to be considered on the basis of overall 
balancing, because it was an individualised administrative decision. In Chapter 4, I will 
elaborate on this minimisation of factual optimisation in proportionality cases dealing 
with challenges to administrative decision-making.   
Where the challenged measure is a rule, rather than an administrative decision, the 
situation is quite different. The extent to which factual optimisation will apply to a 
given case will depend on the range of options available to the decision-maker and this 
will vary across the different levels of governmental rule-making institution. The 
governors of Blue School will have fewer options open to them than are available to 
Parliament. The greater the number of options, the greater the extent to which a factual 
optimisation of principles can be undertaken. If we ask what other options the governors 
of Blue School had for preventing further religious violence, we will find that we can 
write a list, but not a particularly long one. When we ask the same question of 
Parliament’s options when passing the Red Act, the list is considerably longer. 
The range of options will also affect the operation of structural deference. As was 
discussed in Chapter 2.4, this is likely to arise in relation to the choice of objectives and 
factual optimisation. At the factual optimisation stage of proportionality, the reviewing 
court asks if a less rights-restrictive measure was available to the decision-maker.  For 
structural deference to arise at this stage there must actually be a range of measures 
available. On this basis, it is evident that structural deference is relevant to the Red Act 
                                                
16 [2001] EWCA Civ 1139. 
17 ibid, at paragraph 19. 
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and to the actions of the governors of Blue School, since in each case the decision-
maker had a range of options from which to choose. For example, a reviewing court 
might take the view that Blue School could have limited group worship to non-
denominational inter-faith services. The court might deem that this intrudes on the 
Article 9 rights of the students to the same extent as limiting religious observance to 
private individual worship. If the court was also satisfied that both measures protected 
the safety of the students to the same extent, then each would be equally rights-
intrusive. This would mean that at the factual optimisation stage of proportionality there 
would be a structural deference available to the school governors as to which measure 
was chosen. This situation can be contrasted with Mr Green’s case. The UKBA official 
only had two options available: leave to remain and deportation. Leave to remain would 
protect the human rights principle, but would not realise the public interest principle. 
Deportation would realise the public interest principle, but would severely impact on 
the human rights principle. In such a situation, no structural deference can arise, 
because there is no choice of equally rights-intrusive means. 
 
3.2.3: Scope of the decision: individual vs. general 
One of the defining features of Galligan’s ‘modified adjudication,’ as practiced by 
administrative officials, is that it relates to specific decisions in individual cases. Such 
decisions involve a determination being made regarding how a particular person or 
situation is to be treated. Conversely, rule-making entails the setting of policies which 
will be of general application to a group. The key distinction here is between a rule and 
a ruling. A ruling is focused on the instant case and seeks to resolve some particular 
issue that has arisen. To that degree, rulings are not particularly forward looking, 
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beyond the settlement of the immediate dispute.18 For example, the decision to deport 
Mr Green affects only him and not other immigrants.  
The legal optimisation stage of proportionality requires that an overall balance be struck 
between the realisation of the public interest and the protection of the individual right.19 
A very substantial intrusion on an individual right is not to be tolerated unless it is 
accompanied by a similarly large realisation of the public interest. Deciding whether 
this balance exists requires a measurement of both the intrusion on the human right and 
the level of realisation of the public interest. This measurement aspect of legal 
optimisation is closely related to Alexy’s concept of epistemic deference. It will be 
recalled that epistemic deference arises where there is uncertainty in the proportionality 
assessment and the court is satisfied that the primary decision-maker’s view of that 
uncertainty is to be respected. The level of intrusion on a right and the level of 
protection of the public interest are much easier to measure in a specific case than in the 
abstract. In Mr Green’s case, there is a particular individual whose rights are affected 
and a particular expected outcome, which will be quantifiable to a greater or lesser 
extent. This means that the legal optimisation arm of proportionality is more 
straightforward when reviewing administrative decisions. It also means that there will 
be less uncertainty, and so less need for epistemic deference. 
This contrasts with policy powers which involve the making of rules. Rule-making is 
primarily concerned with the setting of goals and norms of general application. The ban 
on group worship in Blue School affects all of the students but does not affect anyone 
outside the school; the Red Act affects the freedom of expression of everyone in the 
UK. Neither Parliament nor public bodies that make rules are concerned with specific 
cases in the way that administrative decision-makers are. There is a difference of degree 
                                                
18 See Galligan Discretionary Powers, above n5, at 117. 
19 Alexy TCR, above n15, at 50-56. 
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between legislation and non-parliamentary rule-making whereas there is a difference of 
substance between the nature of primary legislation and administrative decisions. The 
governors of Blue School’s ban is similar in nature to the Red Act, it just covers fewer 
people whereas both of these decisions differ qualitatively from Mr Green’s case.  
The generalised scope of rules means that they will necessarily exclude factors which 
might be important in one case but which would be of less significance in others. Rules 
are created in the abstract, based on various assumptions about the generalities of a 
class of potential fact patterns. This is done with a view to ensuring efficiency, 
consistency and preventing arbitrary use of discretion.20 Galligan describes rules as 
being potentially both under-inclusive and over-inclusive21 because they affect the 
interests of multiple parties simultaneously and in circumstances whereby those 
interests may be divergent. In addition to the generalised application of rules,22 they are 
also concerned with future planning, whereas administrative decisions are concerned 
with past or current events. This can be seen with the Blue School ban and the Red Act, 
both of which were designed to prevent future problems across a range of individuals.  
The forward-looking and generalised scope of rules makes it more difficult for a 
reviewing court to measure the effects of the rule on the public interest. This has 
implications for legal optimisation and epistemic deference. While a HRA challenge to 
a rule will involve a particular case, a reviewing court’s decision on Convention 
compatibility will require the consideration of factors beyond that case. The level of 
public interest achieved by a rule must be measured by the effect of the rule across the 
board, not just in relation to one individual claim. Given the range of people affected, 
the public interest outcomes from the Blue School ban and the Red Act will be much 
trickier to measure than in the case of Mr Green’s deportation. It may be that the ban on 
                                                
20 Baldwin, R. Rules and Government (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), at 12-14. 
21 Galligan Discretionary Powers, above n5, at 129-132. 
22 ibid, at 116. 
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group religious meetings in Blue School reduces the incidence of violence, but it may 
also deepen religious tensions. Similarly, the Red Act may well protect terror suspects, 
but it could just as easily increase the public’s sense of outrage. As such, the legal 
optimisation stage of the proportionality test will be more complex than would be the 
case with Mr Green. This also means that there will be more scope for epistemic 
deference. When a court is reviewing the proportionality of either the Blue School ban 
or the Red Act, it may be prepared to accept the evaluation of the decision-maker as to 
the expected outcomes of the rule.  
The scope of the decision can also affect the evaluation of the human rights principle in 
legal optimisation. Where a court is reviewing the Convention-compatibility of a rule, 
the level of intrusion on the human rights of people not involved in the case will be of 
significance. I am not suggesting that they are parties to the proceedings. The point is 
that the level of intrusion on the protected right as a whole will have some bearing on 
the reviewing court’s evaluation of whether an overall balance has been struck between 
the right and the public interest (i.e. whether the measure is legally optimised). For 
example, in Blue School, the effect of the ban on all religious students will enter into 
the analysis as well as its effect on those taking the case. Similarly with the Red Act, the 
effect of the legislation on the freedom of expression of everyone in the UK will 
inevitably arise in the consideration of whether the legislation is Convention-
compatible. Again, this makes legal optimisation more difficult and raises issues of 
epistemic deference in a way which does not occur in cases such as Mr Green’s.  
The facts of the individual case are the sole consideration when a court reviews the 
proportionality of an administrative decision, but the facts are merely a starting point 
when reviewing rules. The broader effects must also be looked at, which complicates 
the task. This raises issues for legal optimisation and increases the potential for 
epistemic deference. 
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The pressure which a broad scope of a decision can put on legal optimisation may have 
the effect of causing a reviewing court’s proportionality analysis to focus more heavily 
on factual optimisation. In the case of the Red Act, it is easy enough for a court to think 
of a less restrictive way of protecting the terror suspects. It is much more difficult for 
the court to measure precisely the impact of the Act on both the right to freedom of 
expression across the society and the level of protection of the public interest that the 
Act provides. Such measurements will be somewhat easier in the case of Blue School, 
because while the decision is of general application, it is limited to the school itself, 
rather than society at large. However, the potential for a heavy focus on factual 
optimisation instead of legal optimisation is evident in the case of Blue School too. As 
will be shown in later chapters, it is often the case that one of the two forms of 
optimisation involved in the proportionality test will do most of the heavy lifting when a 
court reviews the proportionality of a governmental act. As was noted above, with 
administrative decisions, it is likely that factual optimisation will be defunct, leaving 
most of the work to legal optimisation. Conversely, where a court is reviewing the 
Convention-compatibility of non-parliamentary rules and primary legislation, the 
difficulty of assessing legal optimisation means that there is a lot of scope for factual 
optimisation to become the central focus the proportionality analysis. 
I have now examined three areas of difference between government institutions – the 
choice of objectives, the range of measures and the scope of the decision – and  have 
shown how these three factors can impact on factual and legal optimisation and 
structural and epistemic deference. Once all of this has been recognised, institutional 
sensitivity can be introduced into the structural model of proportionality and deference. 
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3.3: MULTI-LEVEL DECISION-MAKING 
In this chapter I am concerned with how a court’s analysis of proportionality and 
deference will be affected by the institutional features of the government body being 
judicially reviewed. Up to now, I have been looking at situations where the challenged 
measure is of one type and is carried out by one institution. However, the complex and 
interdependent nature of modern government in the UK is such that where a measure 
affects an individual’s human rights it can often be the outcome of more than one 
decision-making process at more than one level of government. This multi-level 
decision-making must be accounted for in a truly institutionally sensitive model of 
proportionality and deference.  
Mr Green’s case is a good example of this sort of decision. Up to now, I have been 
looking at the convention compatibility of the decision to deport. However, the decision 
was made on the basis of the Immigration Rules, which were promulgated by the Home 
Secretary in accordance with the provisions of the Immigration Act 1971. As such, Mr 
Green’s case can actually be seen to involve three levels of government: the UKBA 
official, the Home Secretary’s rule-making powers; and Parliament. 
Administrative officials will be constrained in their decision-making by a framework of 
rules, which are set for them by other institutions.23 Often they will be required to 
pursue certain objectives, rather than be merely permitted or empowered to pursue 
them.24 Where the objective is obligatory, that obligation will have been created by 
another level of government. For example, in Mr Green’s case, the UKBA official is 
bound to apply the Immigration Rules. The UK proportionality test requires that the 
‘legislative objective’ of a challenged government measure be legitimate. This is despite 
the fact that the challenged decision may have been made by an administrative official 
                                                
23 Wade, H.W.R. and Forsyth, C.F., Administrative Law (9th ed, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) 
at 354. 
24 Galligan Discretionary Powers, above n5, at 109-114. See also section 3.2.1 above. 
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with no legislative power. Therefore, if Mr Green wished to challenge the Convention 
compatibility of the objective the UKBA official was pursuing, he would need to 
challenge the Immigration Rules. He could go even further and challenge the 
Immigration Act 1971, under which as we have seen the Immigration Rules are 
promulgated.   
Section 6(2) of the HRA states that the Convention-compatibility of the decision of a 
public authority cannot be challenged if that authority was required to act in a particular 
way because of primary legislation. It would be open to a reviewing court to find that 
the UKBA official in Mr Green’s case was exempted by section 6(2) because the 
Immigration Act 1971 required the deportation. If a court made such a finding and Mr 
Green wished to challenge the Convention compatibility of the decision to deport him, 
he would again need to challenge the Immigration Act itself.  
O’Brien gives some consideration to these sorts of multi-level decisions. 25 He points 
out that a court will need to address its proportionality review to either the decision of 
the public authority or the legislation or both. O’Brien describes these as ‘applied 
review’ and ‘legislative review’ respectively. O’Brien notes that the approach of the 
courts has been to refuse to consider the Convention compatibility of the statutory 
provision itself unless the powers it grants can only ever be exercised in an 
incompatible way.26 Where both incompatible and compatible applications are 
available, the courts seem satisfied to focus solely on judicial review of that decision.27 
Section 6(2)(a) of the HRA exempts a public authority from the requirement to act in a 
Convention-compatible manner where, as a result of primary legislation, it could not 
have acted differently. Section 6(2)(b) exempts the public authority from the 
                                                
25 O’Brien, D. ‘Judicial Review under the Human Rights Act 1998: Legislative or Applied Review?’ 
[2007] EHRLR 550. 
26 See R (Gillan) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2006] UKHL 12; [2006] 2 AC 307. 
27 O’Brien ‘Legislative or Applied Review?’, above n25, at 559-567. 
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requirement to act in a Convention-compatible manner if it is acting to give effect to 
provisions of primary legislation which are themselves Convention-incompatible and 
cannot be read down to remove the incompatibility. The purpose of these provisions is 
to respect the sovereignty of Parliament. Sections 6(2)(a)&(b) have been interpreted by 
the House of Lords in R (Hooper) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions 28 and R 
(Wilkinson) v Inland Revenue Commission.29  The House concluded that section 6(2)(a) 
arose where the public authority was acting under a statutory duty. It also held that 
section 6(2)(b) was to be given a wider interpretation: where a public authority is acting 
to give effect to a Convention-incompatible statute and it has both compatible and 
incompatible courses of action open to it, section 6(2)(b) will not require the public 
authority to choose the compatible course. The reason for this was that to require the 
public authority to choose the compatible course would be to change the statutory 
power into a statutory duty and preclude the possibility of the public authority giving 
effect to the incompatible legislation.30 This indicates a permissive approach to 
administrative decision-makers when they are acting pursuant to Convention-
incompatible legislation. 
Administrative decision-makers may also be required to interpret the rules under which 
they operate. They will take various practical factors into account when doing this and 
their outlook will also effect their interpretation.31 It may not always be clear whether 
an administrative decision is caused primarily by the rules under which it was made or 
by the decision-makers interpretation of those rules. In Mr Green’s case, the UKBA 
official’s understanding of the Immigration Rules could be as important as the Rules 
themselves. For example, the official’s understanding of the term ‘national security’ and 
                                                
28 [2005] UKHL 29; [2005] 1 WLR 1681. 
29 [2005] UKHL 30; [2005] 1 WLR 1718. 
30 See R (Hooper) v Secretary of state for Work and Pensions [2005] UKHL 29; [2005] 1 WLR 1681, at 
1701, per Lord Hope. This point was recently affirmed in Doherty v Birmingham City Council [2008] 
UKHL 57; [2008] 3 WLR 636. 
31 Galligan Discretionary Powers, above n5, at 129-140; and Baldwin Rules and Government, above n20, 
at 25. 
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of her role in protecting it may have had a significant effect on the outcome of the 
decision.  It may be necessary for Mr Green to challenge that interpretation in addition 
to both the actual decision and the rules themselves.  
Multi-level decision-making can also arise with rule-making powers exercised by 
government officials up to and including government ministers. These powers are 
themselves limited by a framework of rules which are in the first instance contained in 
primary legislation, but may be refined by sub-rules promulgated at a higher level of the 
executive. This can be seen in the example of the Blue School ban on group religious 
meetings. The ban itself is a rule, but the need to make that rule is derived from other 
rules such as the provisions of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974. It will also be 
affected by other rules, such as policies set out by the Secretary of State for Children, 
Schools and Families. This framework of rules will operate through both any specific 
restraints included in the legislation and through the objectives and purposes for which 
the power was granted. If any of the students wish to challenge the rules under which 
the ban was made, they may need to look beyond the decision of the school governors 
to implement the ban. They may have to challenge rules under which the ban was made. 
As with Mr Green’s deportation, the decision to ban group worship in the school is not 
only constrained by the rules within which the school governors operate. It is also based 
on the governors’ interpretation of those rules. Again, it may be necessary to challenge 
the interpretation of the rules as well as the rules themselves.  
The constraints placed on institutions exercising rule-making powers are very similar to 
those placed on administrative decision-makers exercising adjudicative powers. The 
distinction is that where a governmental rule is made under the auspices of a statutory 
power, it involves filling in gaps in the existing framework of norms and rules. Where 
an administrative decision is made under a statutory power, the decision-maker is 
applying the existing rules to the facts of a specific case.  
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Multi-level decision-making involves one rights-intruding outcome, which is the 
product of multiple decisions made by different institutions. It is also possible for a 
HRA challenge to be made against a rights-intrusive outcome which is the product of 
multiple decisions made by the same institution, exercising different functions. It is not 
uncommon for a government body to be responsible both for the setting of policies and 
standards and the execution of those policies or standards.32 For example, if three 
students at Blue School were to be expelled for breaching the ban on group religious 
meetings, then the governors of the school would have both made a rule and then made 
an administrative decision based on that rule. The rights-intrusive outcome would be a 
product of both layers of decision-making.  
Some government decision-makers, most notably ministers, may have the power to set 
rules and the power to make decisions under those rules. The two governmental 
functions are unified in a single state actor, but they are still separate decisions. Allan 
notes the dangers inherent in the ‘exercise of broad discretionary power by the 
executive, circumscribed only by its own broadly framed official rules’. 33 However, 
precisely this situation is regularly permitted.34 This is evidenced by the use of skeleton 
acts and delegated legislation. The use of such rule-making process has expanded 
considerably in past decades, while the level of Parliamentary supervision of delegated 
legislation has receded. In certain instances ‘Henry VIII’ clauses can be used to allow 
delegated legislation to amend the legislation under which it is made, thus giving the 
                                                
32 Galligan Discretionary Powers, above n5, at 21-22. 
33 Allan, T. R. S, Constitutional Justice: A Liberal Theory of the Rule of Law (Oxford University Press, 
2001) at 47-52. 
34 See for example Report of the Inquiry into the Export of Defence Equipment and Dual-Use Goods to 
Iraq and Related Prosecutions (‘the Scott Report’), HC 115 HMSO, 1996. See also Tomkins, A., The 
Constitution After Scott: Government Unwrapped (Oxford: Clarendon, 1998) and Ganz, G., ‘Delegated 
Legislation: A Necessary Evil or a Constitutional Outrage’ in Leyland, P. and Woods, T., (eds.) 
Administrative law facing the future : old constraints and new horizons (London: Blackstone, 1997). 
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rule-maker the power to change the constraints under which they operate.35 While such 
instruments have not been the subject of much proportionality analysis, the existence of 
this power shows the potential for a HRA challenge to multiple, related decisions from 
the same institution all of which contribute to a single rights-intrusive outcome. 
The foregoing is important for proportionality analysis because it shows that a particular 
outcome can be the result of a series of decision-making processes. A litigant seeking to 
have her Convention rights protected may wish to challenge any or all of those levels of 
decision-making. Where multiple levels of decision-making are being considered it is 
vitally important that each level be analysed separately. As I have explained in some 
detail in this chapter, the institutional context of a decision will impact on each stage of 
the proportionality test. Where multiple levels of government are being challenged at 
the same time, the institutional qualities of each level must be accounted for if 
proportionality and deference are to operate effectively.  
Returning to Mr Green’s example, he may seek to challenge the Convention-
compatibility of the decision to deport him, the Immigration Rules and the Immigration 
Act. At the level of the decision to deport, the UKBA official had no choice in the 
objectives being pursued, there was no range of options to choose from and the scope of 
the decision was very narrow. As such, identifying the public interest principle will be 
straightforward. Factual optimisation and structural deference will be irrelevant, since 
there is no range of options available. The impact of the deportation on Mr Green’s 
Article 8 rights and on national security will be relatively easy to measure. There may 
be some scope for epistemic deference with regard to the public interest at this stage, 
but the court will be able to address the impact on Mr Green’s Article 8 rights with 
some precision.  
                                                
35 See Barber, N.W. and Young, A.L. ‘The Rise of Prospective Henry VIII Clauses and their Implications 
for Sovereignty’ [2003] PL 112; and Forsyth, C. and Kong, E. ‘The Constitution and prospective Henry 
VIII Clauses’ [2003] JR 17. 
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The challenge to the Immigration Rules will work differently. The Home Secretary’s 
objectives were constrained to some extent by the Immigration Act, so the objective 
being pursued may be less easy to identify than with the UKBA official. The range of 
options open to the Home Secretary in setting out the Immigration Rules will be wider 
than were open to the UKBA official. For example, a provision could have been made 
for a hearing to be held where someone is suspected of being a threat to national 
security. This would have been a less rights-intrusive means than requiring deportation. 
This indicates that factual optimisation will be of particular relevance to a HRA 
challenge to the Immigration Rules. Legal optimisation may be trickier when looking at 
the Immigration Rules. The level of public interest achieved by having the rules in their 
current form may be tough to measure. Balancing that against the deportation of people 
suspected of being a threat to national security will be a complex task involving some 
uncertainty. Epistemic deference is therefore likely to be a substantial issue.  
A challenge to the Immigration Act 1971 itself would run along the same lines as the 
challenge to the Immigration Rules, but would be on a bigger scale. Parliament’s choice 
of objectives is very broad, so a reviewing court would need to define the objective of 
the Immigration Act with some precision. That choice of objectives would be afforded 
end-setting structural deference. There would have been a substantial range of measures 
available to Parliament at the time of passing the Act, so there is a lot of scope for 
factual optimisation and the reviewing court could give a lot of attention to whether the 
least rights-restrictive options were pursued in the Act. This would be tempered by the 
fact that the specific option was not chosen by Parliament, but by the Home Secretary. 
Insofar as factual optimisation applied to the Act, structural deference would also be a 
consideration. The legal optimisation stage of a review of the Act itself would be very 
complex, given the wide-ranging effect on rights and public interest issues involved. 
Difficulties of measurement would give rise to epistemic deference. 
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I have just set out the application of Alexy’s proportionality model to each of the three 
institutional levels which cumulatively led to Mr Green’s deportation. This three-
dimensional application of proportionality is extremely complex and some parts of the 
proportionality test did not arise in any meaningful way at certain stages. Factual 
optimisation was not an issue at the level of the UKBA official. Legal optimisation 
became too abstract to be meaningful at the level of the Immigration Act 1971.  
It could be argued that best approach to a proportionality review of multi-level decision-
making would be a fragmentation of the test. The institutionally relevant stages of the 
test might be applied to the institutions they most affected. For example, as previously 
explained, factual optimisation in a binary administrative decision is pointless. If the 
test is to be spread out across Mr Green’s case, then factual optimisation would be most 
appropriately applied to the Immigration Rules or the Immigration Act and legal 
optimisation would be best applied to the decision of the UKBA official. This sort of 
fragmentation would avoid the repetition of stages of the test in institutional settings 
where they do not provide any useful analysis. 
However, the risk with fragmenting the test in this way is that the various stages of the 
test get applied to institutions where they have no relevance. Proportionality could be 
misapplied in a way which would undermine the test completely. For example, in Mr 
Green’s case, factual optimisation could be applied only to the UKBA official and legal 
optimisation could be applied only to the Immigration Rules and the Immigration Act 
1971. Such an application of proportionality would provide no meaningful analysis and 
the outcome would tell the reviewing court very little about the convention 
compatibility of the decision to deport Mr Green. Such an application of proportionality 
would undermine the assumptions upon which I have shown the proportionality test to 
be based. While a fragmented application is possible, it must be done in a way that 
avoids this type of institutionally perverse reasoning.  Such reasoning is unfortunately 
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quite prevalent in the HRA case law on housing, as I will show in Chapter 6. In order to 
avoid institutionally perverse applications of proportionality, a safer approach would be 
to apply each stage of the proportionality test to each level of the challenged decision.  
This example shows the complexity of multi-level decision-making for the purposes of 
proportionality and the manner in which the test becomes stratified. Certain aspects of 
proportionality (and by extension certain aspects of deference) are applied to different 
levels of the decision process. The value of a structural, institutionally sensitive model 
is particularly evident in these cases. Where a court fully understands the 
proportionality process, the forms of deference, the reasons for deference and the 
institutional framework of the decision, then the stratification of the test is not 
necessarily problematic. This type of issue can be seen in the case-law on housing, 
much of which concerns local authority action within a statutory scheme. However, as 
will be shown in Chapter 6, when this stratification is done in a slipshod manner, then 
the proportionality analysis has on occasion been greatly undermined. 
 
 
3.4: INSTITUTIONAL SENSITIVITY AND THE REASONS FOR DEFERENCE 
In this section I will move beyond the impact that institutional factors have on the 
operation of proportionality and deference and consider the impact that such 
institutional factors have on the level of deference to be afforded. When a court is using 
the proportionality principle to review the Convention-compatibility of a challenged 
government act, the intensity of the court’s review can be tempered by deference to the 
decision-maker. As has been shown, Alexy accommodates the concept of deference 
within his model of proportionality and divides it into two forms: structural and 
epistemic. Structural deference arises in relation to choosing the public interest to be 
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pursued and in selecting between equally rights-intrusive measures.36 Epistemic 
deference relates to how the proportionality test deals with uncertainty.37 Alexy further 
sub-divides epistemic deference into ‘normative’ and ‘empirical’. Normative epistemic 
deference arises where there is doubt as to the balance to be achieved between a right 
and the public interest. In those circumstances it may be more appropriate to defer to the 
original decision-maker’s judgment. Empirical epistemic deference arises when it is not 
possible to precisely measure the level of impact on a right or the level of realisation or 
importance of the public interest.  
For example, whether or not Mr Green poses a threat to national security is a difficult 
empirical question, which may give rise to empirical epistemic deference. Whether or 
not his deportation strikes the right balance between his family rights and national 
security is a contentious normative question, which may give rise to normative 
epistemic deference. 
Empirical and normative uncertainty are qualitatively different. In Chapter 2.4, I 
showed how these two forms of uncertainty have a different effect on the various stages 
of the proportionality test. Similarly, in this chapter, I will show that the reasons for 
affording deference where there is empirical uncertainty are not the same as the reasons 
for affording normative deference. 
Both Alexy and Rivers suggest that the level of deference to be afforded to a decision-
maker can be explained in terms of the impact on the protected right. They each provide 
a slightly different exposition of a principle, which they both call the ‘second law of 
balancing’.38 For Alexy it is: ‘the more heavily an interference in a constitutional right 
weighs, the greater must be the certainty of its underlying premisses.’39 For Rivers it is: 
                                                
36 See Alexy TCR, above n15, at 394-401. 
37 ibid, at 414-416. 
38 See Chapter 2.4.3 above. 
39 Alexy TCR, above n15 at 418.  
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‘The more serious a limitation of rights is, the more intense should be the review 
engaged in by the court.’40 Alexy’s model is, by its own terms, limited to epistemic 
deference, since he describes it in terms of certainty. Rivers is prepared to use the 
second law of balancing in relation to structural deference as well as epistemic 
deference.  
The level of intrusion on the protected right is certainly a legitimate reason for 
deference and a reviewing court would do well to take it into account.41 However, 
affording deference to decision-makers involves more than just an analysis of the level 
of intrusion on the right. The level of deference to be afforded is inextricably linked to 
the institutional features of the decision-maker. As has already been seen in this chapter, 
challenges to government action under the HRA cover a wide range of government 
activity. There are different reasons for affording deference to different institutions. 
These can be clearly identified if an institutionally sensitive approach is taken.  
As was discussed in Chapter 1, the institutional reasons for deferring to decision-makers 
have been identified by authors such as Murray Hunt,42 Jeffrey Jowell43 and Conor 
Gearty.44 The reasons fall into two broad categories: ‘democratic legitimacy’ and 
‘institutional competence’. Democratic legitimacy suggests that certain decisions should 
be taken by the body most answerable to the electorate. Institutional competence 
                                                
40 Rivers ‘Second Law of Balancing’, above n11, at 187. 
41 Even prior to the introduction of the HRA and proportionality in the UK, the British courts recognised 
that scrutiny would need to be more intense where a fundamental right was at issue See R v Ministry of 
Defence ex parte Smith [1996] QB 517. See also R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte 
Bugdaycay [1987] AC 514; R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Leech [1994] QB 
198. 
42 Hunt, M. ‘Sovereignty’s Blight: Why Contemporary Public Law Needs the Concept of ‘Due 
Deference’ in Bamforth, N. and Leyland, P. (eds.) Public Law in a Multi-layered Constitution (Oxford: 
Hart Publishing, 2003). 
43 Jowell, J. ‘Judicial Deference: Servility, Civility Or Institutional Capacity’ [2003] PL 592; and Jowell, 
J. ‘Judicial Deference and Human Rights: A Question of Competence’ in Craig, P. and Rawlings, R. 
(eds.) Law and Administration in Europe: Essays in Honour of Carol Harlow (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2003). 
44 Gearty, C.A. Principles of Human Rights Adjudication (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) at 119-
120. 
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suggests that certain decisions should be taken by the body with the greatest degree of 
expertise.  
These reasons fit very well into Alexy’s model of deference, which as it stands, 
accounts for the operation of deference within proportionality but does not explain the 
different institutional reasons for that deference. An institutionally sensitive model of 
proportionality and deference needs to account for the reasons for affording a decision-
maker the types of deference described by Alexy. In this section I will examine the 
operation of democratic legitimacy and institutional competence as reasons for 
deference within the structural model.  
As will become clear, structural deference and normative epistemic deference are 
grounded in democratic legitimacy.  Empirical epistemic deference is most closely 
based on institutional competence, since it requires that the best guess available be 
followed in cases of uncertainty as to facts. In order to make a determination on 
deference, a court engaged in a proportionality case must examine whether or not these 
reasons for deference are actually present. A generalised theory of deference based on 
democracy and restraint is of little use without institutional sensitivity.  
In this section, I will also consider the way in which sections 3 & 4 of the HRA interact 
to produce very specific issues of proportionality and deference which are unique to 
legislation. These two provisions can impact on both the proportionality test and 
deference in a manner which is not possible with other forms of government action and 
so I will set out the particular features of this distinctive institutional setting.  
 
3.4.1: Democratic legitimacy 
Democratic legitimacy is the main reason why a decision-maker would be afforded 
structural deference or normative epistemic deference. In Alexy’s model structural 
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deference relates to the choosing of objectives and choosing between equally rights-
intrusive or equally balanced options. Normative epistemic deference relates to deciding 
on the right balance to be struck when uncertain moral issues arise. These two forms of 
deference relate to the answering of important societal questions: What goals should 
government pursue? Which measure is most appropriate? Which principles does the 
society prioritise? In a society where a heavy premium is placed on democratic 
decision-making, these questions should be answered in a way that best reflects the will 
of the society as a whole. Alexy notes that that the ‘democratically elected legislature 
should take as many important decisions for society as possible.’45 As such, the main 
reason to afford a decision-maker structural deference and normative epistemic 
deference is democratic legitimacy. Where a court is reviewing the Convention-
compatibility of a decision, its measurement of deference will be affected by this 
criterion. The more democratically legitimate a primary decision-maker is, the more 
structural or normative epistemic deference it should be afforded.  
For example, in passing the Red Act Parliament chose to pursue the objectives of 
protecting suspected persons and reducing crime and disorder. A court will be very slow 
to find that an objective pursued by the supreme legislature is illegitimate.46 This is 
because of Parliament’s high degree of democratic legitimacy, on the basis of which it 
is afforded a large amount of structural deference. Conversely, the ban on group 
worship in the Blue School hypothetical example was instituted by a board of governors 
of a secondary school. While some school boards do have an element of community 
participation involved in selecting their members, they do not have the same level of 
democratic legitimacy as Parliament. Therefore, the governors of Blue School deserve 
less structural deference. 
                                                
45 Alexy TCR, above n15 at 418. 
46 As was noted, the UK test requires the objective to be ‘sufficiently important to justify limiting a 
fundamental right’ See de Freitas v Minister for Agriculture and Fisheries [1999] 1 AC 69, at 80 per 
Lord Clyde. 
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Democratic legitimacy is also a strong reason for normative epistemic deference, which 
allows the courts to pay deference to a balancing of principles that has been conducted 
by another arm of government. This deference is afforded where there is doubt as to the 
correct balance to be struck. This will be widest for Parliament since it is elected to 
make normative judgments on behalf of the population as a whole. For example, the 
Abortion Act 1967 was based on the tension between the right to life of the unborn 
child and the right to bodily integrity of the mother. Resolving this tension is a deeply 
normative issue and is fundamentally related to the relative weight a society gives to 
these two rights. On a question of public morality such as this, it is better to leave the 
decision to the more democratically accountable body (i.e. Parliament and not the 
courts47).   
It is clear that democratic legitimacy is the reason for structural deference and 
normative epistemic deference. However, democratic legitimacy is not a binary concept 
which is either present or not present. It can be present to varying degrees. A court 
reviewing the Convention-compatibility of a governmental action will need to be clear 
on exactly how much democratic legitimacy the decision-maker can assert. This has 
been consistently misunderstood in the existing academic literature and case law on 
proportionality. The executive is repeatedly referred to as being ‘elected’ or 
‘democratic’48 despite the fact that no executive officer in the UK is directly elected to 
any such position. Where such democratic accountability does attach to the executive, it 
is derivative, insofar as it relates to Parliamentary scrutiny.   
A better view of the variation in levels of democratic legitimacy can be seen in the 
judgment of Laws LJ in International Transport Roth GmbH v Secretary of State for the 
                                                
47 See generally Waldron J. ‘The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review’ (2006) 115 Yale LJ 1346. 
48 R v DPP ex parte Kebilene [2000] 2 AC 326, at 381 per Lord Hope. Lord Hope referred to the 
discretionary area of judgment which should be afforded ‘on democratic grounds, to the considered 
opinion of the elected body or person’. This was notwithstanding the fact that the decision to deport the 
applicant in that case had been taken in the first instance at a relatively low level within the Home Office. 
129 
 
Home Department.49 He outlined the tensions between democratic legitimacy and the 
protection of fundamental rights. He held that ‘greater deference is to be paid to an Act 
of Parliament than to a decision of the executive or subordinate measure’50 reasoning 
that the tension between democracy and the rule of law is more acute in the case of the 
legislature than in the case of the executive, which is the legislature’s delegate. Primary 
legislation is at the apex of democratic legitimacy in the UK. All of the members of the 
lower (and dominant) house of Parliament are directly elected and Parliament conducts 
its decision-making in an open and transparent way, involving public debates and 
recorded votes. Local authorities also have a very high degree of democratic 
accountability51  and they exercise administrative powers within a framework of rules, 
some of which may be of their own making. This high level of democratic legitimacy is 
a strong reason for structural deference and normative epistemic deference. 
The democratic legitimacy of rule-making institutions other than Parliament or local 
government is less certain. Cabinet ministers produce a very substantial amount of 
law,52 but their democratic legitimacy is derivative and limited. The minister is usually 
an elected MP who has been appointed to cabinet by the Prime Minister.53 The minister 
is democratically answerable to her constituents, and to Parliament as a whole.54 This 
does not equate to direct democratic accountability, but involves a step of remove from 
the general population. Furthermore, the system of parliamentary government in place 
in the UK is such that the executive will, necessarily, be able to command a majority 
vote in the House of Commons. This reduces the ability of Parliament as a whole to 
scrutinise the highest levels of the executive, which further reduces the democratic 
                                                
49 [2002] EWCA Civ 158; [2003] QB 728. 
50 ibid, at 765. 
51 See generally Carnwath, R. ‘The Reasonable Limits of Local Authority Powers’ [1996] PL 244. 
52 See Ganz, ‘Delegated Legislation', above n34. 
53 See Turpin, C. and Tomkins, A. British Government and the Constitution (6th ed. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007) at 366-376. 
54 See Radford, M. ‘Mitigating the Democratic Deficit? Judicial Review and Ministerial Accountability’ 
in Leyland, P. and Woods, T., Administrative Law Facing The Future: Old Constraints and New 
Horizons (Oxford: Blackstone, 1997). 
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legitimacy of rules made by ministers.55 There is certainly some democratic legitimacy 
at this level of government, but it is not as strong a reason for structural deference and 
normative epistemic deference as is the case with Parliament and local government. 
At lower levels of government, democratic legitimacy is even more limited. The 
depiction of the executive as democratically accountable is particularly misleading 
where the administrative decision-maker is an appointed civil servant. There are 
thousands of civil servants employed to assist in the ‘development of policy and the 
delivery of public services.’56  The personnel of most institutions of government do not 
change with each election and it takes a very significant act of misconduct to prompt a 
dismissal. Immigration, policing, public prosecutions and education are just some of the 
areas where unelected, professional civil servants exercise much of the administrative 
power. These administrative decision-makers are employed without being 
democratically accountable in anything other than a highly formal sense. There is 
therefore little reason to afford such decision-makers structural deference or normative 
epistemic deference. 
The variation in democratic legitimacy is further compounded by the level of oversight 
the population exercises over a decision-maker. The passage of important legislation 
will be the subject of public discussion and much of the electorate will be apprised of it. 
This is because legislation is of such general application. Administrative decisions will 
apply to an individual or to a relatively small group. As a very small number of people 
are affected by the decision, the likely democratic ramifications of any great outcry on 
their part will be greatly limited. This reduces the democratic oversight of a decision 
and decreases the level of democratic legitimacy of that decision.  
                                                
55 See Laws, Sir J., ‘Law and Democracy’ [1995] PL 72, at 90. 
56 Tomkins, A., ‘The Struggle to Delimit Executive Power in Britain’ in Craig, P. and Tomkins, A., (eds.) 
The Executive in Public Law: Power and Accountability in Public Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2006), at 22. 
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In certain instances, democratic legitimacy can be afforded by consultation and the 
involvement of stakeholders (although as Baldwin points out, this argument is not 
without its difficulties).57 This highlights the importance of the factual context in which 
governmental rules are formulated. A high degree of participation, either through 
Parliamentary scrutiny or through some form of consultation will be a basis for a high 
degree of democratic legitimacy of the governmental rule itself. For example, in the 
case of Blue School, if the decision to ban group religious meetings was taken after a 
meaningful consultation with the parents of students enrolled at the school, then there 
would be a greater degree of democratic legitimacy. 
Overall, where a government decision-maker has more democratic legitimacy, there is a 
more compelling reason for a court to afford that decision-maker structural deference or 
normative epistemic deference when reviewing the Convention-compatibility of that 
decision-maker’s actions. Parliament deserves more structural and normative epistemic 
deference than the executive, because there is a more compelling reason for that 
deference. Government ministers should get some deference, because they are more 
democratically accountable than the courts. Where an appointed official has no 
democratic accountability, there is no reason for granting them deference. It is very 
important that the factual context in which the decision was made be taken into account 
when considering the level of structural and normative epistemic deference to be 
afforded. Many of the arguments made against proportionality are based on a concern 
that the judiciary is liable as a consequence of applying the test to start providing ‘right 
answers’ to political and policy questions. That tendency can be tempered by structural 
deference and normative epistemic deference, each of which is based, as we have seen, 
on democratic legitimacy. 
 
                                                
57 Baldwin Rules and Government, above n20, at 44. 
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3.4.2: Institutional competence 
Alexy’s conception of empirical epistemic deference is concerned with how a court 
should approach findings of fact on issues that are uncertain and indeterminate. This 
relates to the reliability of the underlying premises upon which a decision is based.  A 
government institution might argue that there is a public health problem, a threat to 
national security or a threat of a natural disaster. All of these arguments involve 
educated guesswork of one form or another, which is inherent in the job of governing. 
In certain circumstances it may be extremely difficult to prove what effect a measure 
will have on the public interest. In such circumstances, empirical epistemic deference 
might come into play. It may not always be possible to measure precisely how much a 
particular measure will realise the public interest or limit a human right. Where 
questions such as this arise it may be appropriate to afford the decision-maker epistemic 
deference.  
The concept of relative institutional competence has been recognised as a ground for 
deference in proportionality in the UK both by academic commentators58 and the 
courts.59 This is the main reason for affording a decision-maker empirical epistemic 
deference. Where the decision-maker has a greater degree of expertise in a particular 
area, then the decision-maker’s assessments of uncertainty can be seen as more reliable, 
and so the courts will defer to them. The courts should not do this unless they are 
actually satisfied that the decision-maker’s level of expertise is in fact high. 60 It should 
not be assumed that certain bodies are good at certain things in the absence of evidence. 
                                                
58 See for example Gearty Principles of Human Rights Adjudication, above n44 at 117-145; Jowell, 
‘Servility, Civility Or Institutional Capacity’, above n43; Jowell, ‘A Question of Competence’, above 
n43; Kavanagh, A. ‘Deference or Defiance? The limits of the Judicial Role in Constitutional 
Adjudication’ in Huscroft, G. Expounding the Constitution: Essays in Constitutional Theory (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
59 A & X v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56; [2005] 2 AC 68, at 102 per 
Lord Bingham. 
60 Turner, among others, has criticised the over-use of experts and the ‘expertization’ of public discourse. 
See Turner, S.P. Liberal Democracy 3.0 (London: Sage, 2003). These concerns are undoubtedly valid, 
however within the very specific environment of judicial review, it seems acceptable to defer to expertise 
in certain circumstances. 
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Where a court is reviewing the Convention-compatibility of a government activity, it 
should examine the degree of institutional competence before affording any empirical 
epistemic deference. 
Parliament itself has quite a limited fact finding capacity, so it is difficult to contend 
that it is relatively more competent to decide issues of factual uncertainty than are the 
courts. However, Parliament’s assessments of fact are essentially derivative from facts 
found by the executive and so, if those assessments are based on genuine expertise, then 
they can be deferred to. This can be seen by the way particular government departments 
will have specific expertise, which will inform proposed legislation very heavily. Most 
legislation is initiated by ministers, who have large bodies of civil servants at their 
disposal. In such cases there may be strong reasons for affording legislation empirical 
epistemic deference, but the institution being granted the deference will in effect be the 
ministry which initiated the legislation.  
Looking at the hypothetical example of the Red Act, it is clear that the measurement of 
the problem of attacks on terrorism suspects is not conducted by Parliament itself. The 
assessment of the level of the problem would come from the police and security 
services, which are under the auspices of the Home Office. While the ban on publishing 
the names of terrorism suspects was enacted by Parliament, this would have been done 
on the recommendation of the Home Secretary. A HRA challenge to the ban using a 
proportionality standard would require not only a measurement of the ban’s impact on 
human rights, but also its level of realisation of the public interest. Deference paid to the 
measurement of the extent of the problem and/or the degree to which the ban would 
solve it is deference paid to the police, security services and the Home Office, not 
deference paid to Parliament.  
It is therefore difficult to set out a broad policy about the level of empirical epistemic 
deference to be afforded to Parliament, since the expertise of Parliament is derivative. 
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This contrasts with structural deference, where a principled basis for a wide degree of 
deference for Parliament can be easily established on the basis of the high degree of 
democratic legitimacy. 
Non-parliamentary rule-making bodies often have some relevant expertise in a 
particular area. This sort of basis fits very well with the concept of empirical epistemic 
deference. Prison governors are particularly well acquainted with the running of 
prisons61 and local authorities are particularly well acquainted with housing policy.62 
When non-parliamentary bodies set out rules of general application, the decision can 
often be expected to have been informed by the expertise of that body in the specific 
area. Understandably, a court will have some regard to this expertise when reviewing 
the Convention-compatibility of a challenged decision. For example, in the Blue School 
example, the board of governors of the school will have a much better idea of the extent 
of the problem of religious violence in the school than would a reviewing court. It is 
unlikely that a court would undermine the governors’ assessment of the extent of the 
problem unless there was some evidence that it is a totally spurious assessment.  
Administrative bodies are often given the power to make one-off decisions in individual 
cases because of the need for a concentration of a particular sort of knowledge and 
proficiency in a given area. Where there is uncertainty as to whether something is or is 
not the case, then the level of expertise a body has will be of great relevance for whether 
or not the decision-maker should be given deference in exercising that power. In the 
hypothetical example of Mr Green, the UKBA official is part of an executive body 
created to specialise in immigration issues. The assessment of Mr Green’s threat to 
national security will most probably have been based on information from the security 
services. Each of these two institutions has a particular level of expertise, which 
                                                
61 See for example Hirst v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] EWHC 602 (Admin). 
62 See for example R (Baker) v First Secretary of State[2003] EWHC 2511 (Admin). 
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provides a strong reason for empirical epistemic deference concerning their factual 
assessments. 
However, it should be borne in mind that within the realm of administrative decision-
making, expertise is focused directly on an instant case rather than on a policy or goal. 
This may have both strengths and weaknesses. While the expertise may permit a very 
nuanced and detailed determination, it may also be affected by more general ideas about 
what the purpose of the power is and what the nature of the area is. It is important to 
ensure that deference is afforded on the basis of an actual exercise of expertise. A 
further point is that something might be within the particular expertise of the judiciary, 
in which case there is a reason for less deference because of the court’s expertise. 
Institutional competence is a reason for deference where the court cannot determine the 
issue adequately itself. Institutional competence is therefore relative.  
If empirical epistemic deference is to be applied effectively, account should be taken of 
the source of the expertise. As has been shown, this will vary across institutions and 
will be exercised in different ways. The most important implication of this is the 
assessment of the impact of a measure on competing principles. Where the decision-
maker is better placed than the court to make this assessment, then the court will afford 
it empirical epistemic deference based on institutional competence.  
 
3.4.3: Sections 3 & 4 of the HRA and Parliament 
A further institutional distinction arises in relation to the potential outcomes of a 
successful HRA challenge to an Act of Parliament. It has been argued that the effect of 
the HRA is such that ‘Parliament is no longer supreme and that its processes may be 
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subject to judicial scrutiny and criticism’.63 However this scrutiny operates in a very 
specialised way with regard to primary legislation.64 All other forms of governmental 
activity can be struck down by the courts for incompatibility with the Convention. This 
is not possible with primary legislation. The courts have two courses of action when 
they find a difficulty with a piece of primary legislation on HRA ground. First, they 
must try to read the legislation in a Convention-compatible manner where possible.65 If 
such a reading is not possible then the legislation can be declared incompatible.66 The 
effect of such a declaration is merely that Parliament is invited to change the legislation 
and the incompatible Act will remain in force until Parliament chooses to make such a 
change.  
The rarefied mechanism of sections 3 and 4 of the HRA raises questions about  the 
manner in which deference should be afforded to Parliament. There has been a 
substantial amount of academic commentary on the relationship between sections 3 and 
4.67 I am not attempting to resolve all of the issues raised in those debates. When the 
Act was introduced, it was thought that this was the most appropriate mechanism and I 
am not seeking to challenge that. My purpose here is to explain the operation of sections 
3 and 4 in terms of the structural model of proportionality and deference that I have 
been outlining. 
While at first glance, section 3 might seem the more deferential course, section 4 can 
actually have less impact on Parliament’s original decision. Klug has argued that no 
                                                
63 Green, N., ‘Proportionality and the Supremacy of Parliament in the UK’ in Ellis, E., (ed.) The Principle 
of Proportionality in the Laws of Europe (Oxford: Hart, 1999). See also Loughlin, M., Sword and Scales: 
An Examination of the Relationship Between Law & Politics (Oxford: Hart, 2000) at 38-41. 
64 See generally Gearty, C.A. ‘Reconciling Parliamentary Democracy and Human Rights’ (2002) 118 
LQR 248 and Gearty Principles of Human Rights Adjudication, above n44, at 8-30. 
65 Human Rights Act 1998, Section 3. 
66 Human Rights Act 1998, Section 4. 
67 See for example: Nicol, D. ‘Statutory Interpretation and Human Rights after Anderson’ [2004] PL 274; 
Kavanagh, A. ‘Unlocking the Human Rights Act: The “Radical” Approach to Section 3(1) Revisited’ 
[2005] EHRLR 259; Young, A.L. ‘Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza: Avoiding the Deference Trap’ [2005] PL 
23; and Kavanagh, A. ‘Choosing Between Sections 3 and 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998: Judicial 
Reasoning after Ghaidan v. Mendoza’ in Fenwick, H., Phillipson, G. & Masterman, R. (eds.) Judicial 
Reasoning under the UK Human Rights Act (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
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deference whatever should be afforded to Parliament, since the mechanisms set out for 
review of primary legislation in the HRA already include such a large measure of 
deference.68 Since a declaration of incompatibility does not affect the status of the 
challenged statute, there is a large degree of deference built into the system. While this 
is true of section 4, it cannot be said of the operation of section 3 which has been 
applied in a quite forthright manner by the judiciary. Section 3 has been used to ‘read 
down’ legislation; in effect substituting a less rights-restrictive measure for the measure 
set out in the legislation69 The courts are also quite content to define legislation in a 
manner which is totally at odds with the intention of Parliament. 70 This is 
notwithstanding their own injunction to themselves to interpret and not to legislate.71 
The choice between Sections 3 and 4 can have significant implications for the operation 
of proportionality and deference. ‘Reading down’ under section 3 will require the use of 
factual optimisation. The very nature of section 3 interpretation requires a reviewing 
court to examine whether there is another, less rights-intrusive way of interpreting the 
statute. Where a court is satisfied that a less rights-restrictive means of achieving the 
public interest is available and that it can be accommodated within the language of the 
statute, then that alternative measure will be substituted. This means that two things 
occur simultaneously: the court finds that a measure has failed the factual optimisation 
stage and the court rectifies that failure. This is far less likely to occur with non-
parliamentary rules; those are usually struck down and sent back to their maker. It is 
only section 3 that allows the court to make a finding that the measure is 
disproportionate and remedy that lack of proportionality.  
                                                
68 Klug, F. ‘Judicial Deference under the Human Rights Act 1998’ [2003] EHRLR 125. 
69 See for example R v Lambert [2001] UKHL 37; [2002] 2 AC 545. 
70 See R v A (No 2) [2001] UKHL 25; [2002] 1 AC 45; and Sheldrake v Director of Public Prosecutions - 
Attorney General's Reference (No 4 of  2002) [2005] 1 AC 264. See further Chapter 5 below. 
71 See R v A (No 2) [2001] UKHL 25; [2002] 1 AC 45, at 87 per Lord Steyn; and International Transport 
Roth GmbH v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] EWCA Civ 158; [2003] QB 728, at 
758 per Simon Brown LJ. See also Kavanagh, A. ‘The Elusive Divide between Interpretation and 
Legislation under the Human Rights Act 1998’ (2004) 24 OJLS 259. 
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In Alexy’s terms this can be described as a total denial of structural deference through a 
very intensive application of factual optimisation. The court asks if there was a less 
rights-restrictive alternative and if one can be found that fits the words of the statute 
(even if they are stretched) then the court can implement that alternative itself. This can 
happen even where there are multiple alternative measures available. Because the court 
inserts a specific less rights-restrictive measure in place of the challenged measure, 
Parliament is not afforded the opportunity to choose a less rights-restrictive measure for 
itself. (Admittedly Parliament always has the option to legislate for such a measure, but 
that is after the fact of proportionality analysis.) The important thing for the structural 
model of proportionality and deference is that section 3 can be used within factual 
optimisation in a way that entails an automatic restriction of structural deference. I do 
not wish to express a view on whether this is a positive or negative aspect of section 3.  
According to Klug’s analysis, a declaration of incompatibility entails a wide degree of 
deference; section 4 is therefore arguably more deferential than section 3. However, the 
deference involved in a section 4 declaration cannot be explained as deference within 
the structural model of proportionality. In Alexy’s analysis deference is afforded to the 
legislature where a legislative measure is deemed to be proportionate, having taken 
account of structural or epistemic deference within the proportionality analysis. Section 
4 arises where a court has found a measure to be disproportionate. It is therefore a sort 
of ‘deference after the fact’.  To this extent, section 4 can perhaps be seen as providing 
the courts with the freedom to engage in a very intensive proportionality analysis of 
primary legislation, without the need to give much regard to epistemic or structural 
deference, since a level of deference is already built into the system.  
Section 4 can be accommodated into Alexy’s model by considering the reasons for 
deference discussed above. Democratic legitimacy is a less compelling reason if a 
finding of incompatibility is not going to affect the outcome, since the decision will still 
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ultimately be taken by Parliament. As such, the level of structural deference or 
normative epistemic deference to be afforded under section 5 need not be that large, and 
in some cases such deference may be unnecessary. Conversely, where there is 
uncertainty as to facts, empirical epistemic deference may still be appropriate if the 
legislation is based on facts found by an appropriately competent body, such as a 
government department with a large degree of expertise in a particular area. This sort of 
approach can facilitate the development of a ‘constitutional dialogue’ between 
Parliament and the courts.72 The courts can be strident in their analysis of legislation, 
because the court’s decision is only a response to legislation, not a final determination 
of its validity.  
 
 
3.5: CONCLUSION 
The purpose of the proportionality principle under the HRA is to assist judges in 
determining whether a particular governmental act which impacts on Convention rights 
is compatible with the Convention. The range of governmental activity in the UK is 
broad enough that institutional differences will impact on the way a court’s 
proportionality assessment operates.  
In this chapter I have sought to develop Alexy’s structural model of proportionality and 
deference to take account of the different forms of governmental action which can be 
subjected to proportionality review. I have classed governmental activity into three 
forms: modified adjudication; non-parliamentary rule-making; and primary legislation. I 
have shown how the choice of objectives, the range of options and the scope of the 
                                                
72 Clayton, R. ‘Judicial Deference and “Democratic Dialogue”: The Legitimacy of Judicial Intervention 
under the Human Rights Act 1998’ [2004] PL 33. See also Hickman, T.R. ‘Constitutional Dialogue, 
Constitutional Theories and the Human Rights Act 1998’ [2005] PL 306. 
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challenged decision can vary across different institutions of government. I have 
explained the way in which these differences can affect the operation of Alexy’s model 
of proportionality and deference. The choice of objectives will affect the operation of 
the legitimate aim stage of the test as well as affecting how clearly the principles at 
stake in the proportionality analysis are defined. The extent of the choice of objectives 
available to a decision-maker will also impact on structural deference. I have shown 
how the range of options affects factual optimisation and structural deference. I have 
highlighted the fact that in certain situations, where the range of options is very small, 
these two aspects of proportionality can be rendered meaningless. I have also shown 
how the scope of decision-making will have a significant impact on legal optimisation 
and epistemic deference. 
In the second section of this chapter I set out the issues relating to government action 
which is the outcome of multiple decisions, made at different levels of government. I 
have shown the complexity involved in such situations. These types of cases raise the 
possibility of stratifying the proportionality analysis and I have shown the pitfalls 
involved with this. This highlights the need for institutional sensitivity in 
proportionality analysis. 
I have also given detailed consideration to the reasons for affording a decision-maker 
deference and I have linked them into the structural conceptions of deference in Alexy’s 
model. The level of intrusion upon the human right is undoubtedly a valid reason for a 
low level of deference, but there are also institutional reasons and I have sought to 
elaborate on their impact on the structural model. I have shown how democratic 
legitimacy is the basis for structural deference and normative epistemic deference. I 
have shown how institutional competence is the basis for empirical epistemic deference. 
I have also illustrated how the levels of democratic legitimacy and institutional 
competence will vary across the institutions of government in the UK. In addition to 
141 
 
this, I have addressed the particular issues which sections 3 and 4 of the HRA throw up 
for a court faced with the problem of the amount of deference to be paid to Parliament. 
This discussion of the reasons for deference has again shown the importance of 
institutional sensitivity in proportionality and deference. 
In order to show that the structural, institutionally sensitive model set out above is 
applicable in the UK, I will now undertake a detailed analysis of the existing case law 
under the HRA in three specific fields. I contend that all of the features of Alexy’s 
structural model of proportionality and deference can be seen at work in the 
jurisprudence of the UK Courts, and that these various features operate differently in 
different institutional settings. I will examine the case law in three discrete case studies. 
The case studies are based on institutional distinctions, which show the value of an 
institutionally sensitive approach to the structure of proportionality and deference. 
As I have shown in this chapter, there is a particularly pronounced fault-line in the test 
between administrative decision-making and the exercise of rule-making powers. 
Administrative decision-making is adjudicatory and of individual application while 
rule-making powers concern policy and are of general application. This distinction is 
the basis upon which I have chosen two of my case studies. Immigration decisions are 
primarily concerned with administrative decisions and they are the subject matter of 
Chapter 4. There have been a number of significant criminal justice cases dealing with 
primary legislation and some dealing with executive rule-making. These cases will be 
examined in the second case study in Chapter 5. These two case studies have been 
chosen because the governmental activities under consideration in each of them are at 
opposite ends of the institutional spectrum. This substantial contrast will enable a 
detailed elaboration of institutional factors.   
In the third case study, set out in Chapter 6, I will look at proportionality cases in the 
field of housing. These cases  have involved decisions taken at a single level of 
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government as well as at multiple levels. In the housing case study I will illustrate the 
impact that multi-level decision-making can have on the operation of proportionality. In 
some of the multi-level cases the optimisation model can be seen to work very well. In 
others, confusion concerning the stratification of proportionality has caused 
questionable outcomes.  
In these three case studies I will show that all of the elements of the structural model of 
proportionality and deference are present in the UK case law, provided account is taken 
of institutional differences. The case studies will show that the structural model is 
applicable to the HRA case law and that it provides a significant improvement on 
existing explanations of the operation of proportionality in the UK. To date, little 
doctrinal order has been shown in the case law. These case studies will go some way to 
remedying this deficit. 
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Chapter 4: Case Study One: Proportionality and 
Administrative Decision-Making – Immigration 
 
 
In Chapter 2, I set out the elements of Alexy’s structural theory of proportionality. 
Alexy describes the minimal impairment and overall balance stages of proportionality 
in terms of the factual and legal optimisation of principles. He divides deference into 
‘structural’ and ‘epistemic’ and integrates these into specific stages of the 
proportionality test. In Chapter 3.2, I explained three key areas of difference between 
institutions which are subject to rights-based judicial review by the courts. These were: 
1) the choice of objectives available to the decision-maker; 2) the range of measures 
available to the decision-maker in order to pursue those objectives; and 3) the scope of 
the decision insofar as it applied to a specific individual or applied generally. These 
areas of difference are in effect three scales along which can be found various forms of 
government activity. In Chapter 3.4, I discussed the institutional reasons why a 
decision-maker would be afforded deference by a reviewing court, which I grouped 
under the headings of democratic legitimacy and institutional competence. 
In order to show the operation of the structural, institutionally sensitive model of 
proportionality and deference in the UK I have chosen three case studies, the first of 
which is immigration. There has been a substantial body of judicial consideration of the 
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compatibility of immigration decisions with the European Convention on Human Rights 
(‘the Convention’), which was incorporated into UK law by the Human Rights Act 
1998 (‘the HRA’). Therefore, there is much case law upon which to draw for an 
analysis of the structural model. Where the Home Secretary seeks to deport a person, 
that decision can, in certain circumstances, be appealed to a statutory body.1 The 
decisions of the statutory body can be appealed to the courts.2 In much of the case law, 
the courts have focused on how proportionality should have been addressed by a 
statutory authority. Nonetheless, insight into the operation of proportionality in the 
context of review of immigration decisions can be gleaned from this. 
Where a court is called upon to review an immigration decision on HRA grounds, the 
first instance decision will ordinarily be found at the extreme end of the three areas of 
difference identified in Chapter 3.2. First instance immigration decisions are ordinarily 
made by appointed officials. The decision-maker will not choose the objective which 
they are pursuing. This means that a reviewing court will have little cause to afford 
structural deference to the choice of legitimate objective, since that objective will have 
been set externally. 3 Immigration officials do not have a wide range of measures 
available to pursue their objectives. They are usually confined to refusal of leave to 
remain in the UK. As the range of measures is so confined, the factual optimisation 
stage of the test will be of very limited application, since it involves an analysis of 
whether the least rights-intrusive option was chosen. The absence of a significant 
factual optimisation stage will eliminate the need for structural deference. Following on 
                                                
1 The Immigration Appeal Tribunal (IAT) was set up under the Immigration Appeals Act 1969. This has 
now been replaced by the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal, which was established under the Asylum 
and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc.) Act 2004. These bodies can hear an appeal on human 
rights grounds. See section 65 Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 and section 84 Nationality, 
Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. 
2 Since these tribunals are ‘public authorities’ for the purposes of section 6 of the HRA, they can also be 
judicially reviewed on Convention grounds. However, an appeal is the more common means of 
challenging their decisions. 
3 However, it is possible that structural deference to the body which did set the policy will be appropriate. 
This issue will be considered in more detail in Chapter 6, when multi-level decision-making will be 
examined. 
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from this, legal optimisation will be a very significant element in these decisions. It has 
the potential to be very effective because the scope of the decision is so limited; it will 
be possible to measure the impact on the affected rights with some degree of certainty. 
A heavy focus on legal optimisation would indicate that any deference paid to the 
decision-maker will be epistemic deference, since it is more closely connected with 
legal optimisation than is structural deference. 
Immigration decisions are multi-level decisions in the sense that I described in Chapter 
3.3. However, the vast bulk of HRA-based cases on immigration have involved 
challenges to the administrative decision only and not to the rules within which that 
decision was made. So, while the immigration decisions are multi-level, the case law 
dealing with them has been concerned with a single level. As such, immigration cases 
are not an especially good example of proportionality cases dealing with multi-level 
decisions. Housing cases have involved far more judicial analysis of the proportionality 
of multiple interacting levels of government. These cases are considered in Chapter 6.3. 
The reasons for affording deference to an immigration official will primarily be based 
on institutional competence. Immigration officers will have specific expertise related to 
their field and will be able to draw on expert information from other government agents, 
such as the security services. However, there is little reason to afford deference to an 
immigration official on the basis of democratic legitimacy. In all but one of the cases 
considered in this chapter, the primary decision-maker was an appointed official with 
no meaningful direct accountability to the electorate.  
This chapter is divided into three substantive sections. In the first, I will examine the 
identification of human rights and public interest principles in immigration cases. In the 
second, I will look at factual optimisation, which is of limited application in this 
institutional setting. In the third section I will discuss the use of legal optimisation in 
immigration proportionality cases. This has been the key battleground in these decisions 
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and epistemic deference has had an important role. As I will show, the approach to 
proportionality and deference in this thesis helps to impose a sense of order on the 
existing case law. 
 
 
4.1: THE IDENTIFICATION OF PRINCIPLES 
The starting point of Alexy’s structural model is that the proportionality analysis 
requires the balancing of two competing principles, ordinarily a fundamental rights 
principle and a public interest principle. In the UK the fundamental rights protections 
are contained in the Convention. The Convention contains norms of broad application 
and so the precise principles to be balanced may not be explicitly stated in the text and 
often need to be derived from the Convention norm by the courts. As was discussed in 
Chapter 2.2, not every public interest objective will have enough normative force to 
count as a ‘principle’ and be justified as a basis for limiting human rights. The courts 
will be guided in this by the terms of the proportionality test and the text of the 
Convention. 
Inevitably certain patterns emerge and some principles recur. In this section, I will show 
that the UK courts have been identifying and deriving Convention rights principles and 
public interest principles in proportionality cases dealing with immigration. Certain key 
principles have recurred and the courts have been guided by the jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights (‘the ECHR’). 4   
It is important to note at this stage of the analysis that the principles identified are 
optimisation requirements. They are reasons which suggest a certain outcome, but do 
not conclusively require it. Principles do not include a rule for their own realisation and 
                                                
4 This is in accordance with section 2 of the HRA. 
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they must be optimised by balancing them against a competing public interest 
principle.5 The recognition of principles derived from Convention rights at this point in 
the analysis does not seek to imply that those principles are conclusive, quite the 
contrary. As shall be seen in the later sections, many of these principles were not in fact 
prioritised after the proportionality analysis was complete. At this stage, I am merely 
seeking to establish the identification of principles as a preliminary step in the 
proportionality analysis. 
 
4.1.1: Human rights principles 
A great deal of the proportionality case law on the subject of immigration has concerned 
Article 8 of the Convention, in particular the right to respect for family life. Much of the 
case law has related to the maintenance of family units and the prevention of separation 
of family members. Non-separation of family members has not always been the precise 
principle identified; other human rights principles have been derived from Article 8.  
Prevention of permanent separation of family members 
Perhaps the most obvious principle to be derived from the Article 8 right to respect for 
family life is that family members ought not to be permanently separated from one 
another. There are a series of cases where the courts accepted that families should not 
ordinarily be forced to move en masse to another country where all but one of them are 
entitled to reside in the UK. This principle is evident in cases such as Samaroo v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department.6 The applicant was a Guyanan national 
who had lived in the UK since 1988. He was married to a Guyana-born UK citizen and 
had three stepchildren and one child, all of whom had been born in the UK. The court 
accepted that it was unlikely that his family would move to Guyana with him in the 
                                                
5 See further Chapter 2.2 & 2.3. 
6 [2001] EWCA Civ 1139. 
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event that he was deported, and so the Article 8 principle at stake was the separation of 
the members of a family unit. 
A similar principle arose in the case of Edore v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department.7 The applicant had been in the UK illegally since 1990 and during that 
period had two children with a married man, whose wife and three other children all 
lived in the UK. The children’s father was very involved in the lives of the two children 
he had with the applicant. However, due to his existing family in the UK, he was not in 
a position to move to Nigeria with the applicant in the event that she was deported. The 
human rights principle at issue in the case was that children should have access to their 
father, notwithstanding the fact that the parents and children were not all residing 
together as a family unit. This suggests that it is the closeness of the familial ties that is 
the basis for this principle of non-separation, rather than any formal requirement of co-
habitation. 
Similar Article 8 principles arose in the cases of Secretary of State for the Home 
Department v Rehman8and Huang v Secretary of State for the Home Department.9 In 
Huang the House of Lords held that the Article 8 guarantee of respect for family life 
included not only a negative duty on the state not to interfere, but also a positive duty to 
respect family life.  
R(Acan) v Immigration Appeal Tribunal10 concerned the reuniting of family members 
rather than their separation. The applicants were four Ugandan siblings aged between 
14 and 20. They all had the same father but two different women had each given birth to 
two of the children. One of these mothers (whom the court referred to as the ‘sponsor’) 
had been primarily responsible for all four children until she moved to the UK in 1994. 
                                                
7 [2003] EWCA Civ 716; [2003] 1 WLR 2979. 
8 [2001] UKHL 47; [2003] 1 AC 153.  
9 [2007] UKHL 11; [2007] 2 AC 167. 
10 [2004] EWHC 297 (Admin). 
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Since then the children had lived with the sponsor’s mother and sister respectively, but 
now wished to live with the sponsor in the UK. The sponsor herself had been given four 
years exceptional leave to remain in 2000 after an unsuccessful asylum claim and she 
made an application for the children to join her in 2001. Gibbs J recognised that the 
applicants’ right to family life entailed the principle that they should be permitted to live 
with the sponsor. 
In Beoku-Betts v Secretary of State for the Home Department11 the House of Lords held 
that the rights to be considered when examining the proportionality of a proposed 
deportation were not merely the family rights of the person being deported, but also the 
family rights of the other members of the family group who would be left behind in the 
event of a deportation. 
Prevention of temporary separation of family members 
The Article 8 right to respect for family life has also been found to include the principle 
that family members should not be separated temporarily. One of the earliest cases to 
explicitly consider proportionality in immigration was R (Mahmood) v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department.12 The applicant was a Pakistani national whose asylum 
claim in the UK had failed and who had married a Pakistan-born British citizen two 
weeks before receiving a deportation order. He was entitled to reside in the UK on the 
basis of the marriage but did not meet the requirement of entry clearance, since he had 
originally entered the UK illegally. If he were to return to Pakistan, there was no doubt 
but that his application for entry clearance would be granted and he could return to the 
UK once this had been processed. The Convention right principle being considered in 
Mahmood could not have concerned permanent separation and so it is clear that the 
                                                
11 [2008] UKHL 39; [2009] 1 AC 115. 
12 [2001] 1 WLR 840. 
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right in Article 8 includes the principle that family members should not be temporarily 
separated either. 
The principle of not temporarily separating family members has been a recurring theme 
in the case law on proportionality and immigration. For example, the applicant in R 
(Ala) v Secretary of State for the Home Department13 was an ethnic Albanian from 
Kosovo who applied for asylum in the UK. In 1999 he married a UK citizen who had a 
teenage daughter and in 2001 his wife gave birth to another child. The Home Secretary 
sought to send the applicant to Germany (where he had made his first failed asylum 
claim) in order to gain entry clearance. The High Court examined the case on the basis 
that Article 8 provides a principle against the temporary separation. Similarly, in Shala 
v Secretary of State for the Home Department14 the applicant’s asylum claim had been 
rejected but during his time in the UK he had married a UK resident and developed a 
strong bond with her children. When the Home Secretary sought to deport him and 
require him to seek entry clearance, the Court of Appeal proceeded on the basis that 
Article 8 entailed the principle that the family should not be separated temporarily. The 
same principle can be seen in later Court of Appeal cases such as in Secretary of State 
for the Home Department v Akaeke15and Mukarkar v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department16 and in the House of Lords in Chikwamba v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department17 
No principle of a choice of place of residence 
There are limits to the principles that can be derived from a Convention provision. For 
example, in R (Mahmood) v Secretary of State for the Home Department18  the Court of 
Appeal stressed that Article 8 did not encompass a general principle that a married 
                                                
13 [2003] EWHC 521 (Admin). 
14 [2003] EWCA Civ 233. 
15 [2005] EWCA Civ 947. 
16 [2006] EWCA Civ 1045. 
17 [2008] UKHL 40; [2008] 1 WLR 1420. 
18 [2001] 1 WLR 840. 
151 
 
couple should be entitled to choose their place of residence.19 In making this finding, 
Laws LJ cited with approval the ECHR decision of Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali 
v United Kingdom.20 In his assessment of the Abdulaziz case, Laws LJ found the 
absence of a general choice of residence principle within Article 8 was not a matter of 
the margin of appreciation being afforded to a member state of the Council of Europe. 
He found instead that this was a feature of the substantive right itself. In this way, the 
Court of Appeal has shown a willingness to use ECHR cases in the derivation of 
Convention rights principles for the purposes of proportionality analysis. This is 
notwithstanding the important differences between the Convention based review in the 
ECHR and in domestic courts.  
Making relationships beyond the family 
B v Secretary of State for the Home Department21 concerned an Italian national22 who 
had been convicted of assaulting his son and of offences of gross indecency involving 
his daughter. He no longer had any contact with his former wife or either of his 
children. He could not therefore make out a case based on an Article 8 right to remain 
with his family. He challenged the Home Secretary’s attempt to deport him in the Court 
of Appeal. Sedley LJ, giving the leading judgment, cited the ECHR case of Niemietz v 
Germany23  which establishes the principle that the right to private life in Article 8 of 
the Convention included the right to ‘establish and develop relationships with other 
human beings’.24 This indicates that the courts are prepared to recognise a Convention 
principle that non-familial social networks are not to be disrupted, which is derived 
from the right to respect for private life, rather than family life. This again shows that 
                                                
19 [2001] 1 WLR 840, at 854. 
20 (1985) 7 EHRR 471. 
21 Unreported, Court of Appeal, 18 May 2000. 
22 While this case predated the entry into force of the HRA, it concerned an EU national and so the Court 
of Appeal considered the application of both EU law and Article 8 of the Convention. 
23 (1993) 16 EHRR 97. 
24 B v Secretary of State for the Home Department Unreported, Court of Appeal, 18 May 2000 at 
paragraph 37. 
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the UK Courts are guided by ECHR jurisprudence when seeking to establish the 
principles to be derived from a Convention rights norm.  
The protection of mental health 
The applicant in R (Razgar) v Secretary of State for the Home Department25was an Iraqi 
who had been refused asylum in Germany and had subsequently arrived in the UK and 
made an asylum claim. There was evidence that he had been tortured in Iraq and he 
claimed to have been mistreated while in Germany. The Home Secretary sought to 
return him to Germany on the basis of the Dublin Convention. He had serious mental 
health problems and argued that he would not get adequate treatment in Germany, but 
that such treatment was available to him in the UK. In examining the human right 
principle at stake, the House of Lords looked to the ECHR case of  Bensaid v United 
Kingdom26 in which it was held that Article 8:  
‘protects a right to identity and personal development, and the right to 
establish and develop relationships with other human beings and the 
outside world. The preservation of mental stability is in that context an 
indispensable precondition to effective enjoyment of the right to respect 
for private life.’27  
This is a clear example of both courts looking to define the principles which can be 
derived from a Convention rights norm. The derivation is itself interesting, as the 
principle that an individual’s mental stability should be preserved is derived from the 
human rights principles of identity, personal development and the establishment of 
relationships. The mental stability principle is derived from principles which are 
themselves sub-principles of the broader human rights norm. This indicates the 
                                                
25 [2004] UKHL 27; [2004] 2 AC 368. 
26 (2001) 33 EHRR 205. 
27 ibid, at 220. Cited by Lord Bingham: [2004] UKHL 27; [2004] 2 AC 368, at 382. 
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complexity of the process of identifying Convention rights principles and highlights the 
importance of explicitly recognising the process by which that derivation occurs. 
 
Freedom of expression 
R(Farrakhan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department28 was a case which 
concerned an order made in 1986 by the then Home Secretary excluding the applicant 
from entering the UK. The applicant was a well known figure and the leader of a group 
known as ‘The Nation of Islam’, based in the United States of America and he wished 
to come to the UK in order to express his beliefs directly to his British followers. In 
identifying the human rights principle to be protected, the Court of Appeal held that the 
applicant had a right under Article 10 freely to express his views, which entailed a 
corollary right of his supporters in the UK to receive his views. It was effectively the 
Article 10 rights of the supporters that were the basis of the proportionality challenge, 
since they were within the jurisdiction. 
 
4.1.2: Public interest principles 
Not every public interest goal will qualify as a ‘principle’. The determination of 
whether a public interest goal meets the standard of a principle is a complex normative 
question. As was discussed in Chapter 2.2, the structural model of proportionality and 
deference does not provide a mechanism for deciding this issue. The model treats public 
interest principles as inputs of the proportionality process and assumes that courts will 
determine which public interests meet the required normative standard. Reasonable 
disagreement about this issue of political morality is to be expected but such 
disagreement can be accommodated within the framework provided by the structural 
                                                
28 [2002] EWCA Civ 606; [2002] QB 1391. 
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model. The value of the model on this point is that it allows those normative debates to 
take place at the appropriate stage of the proportionality analysis (i.e. at the very start). 
This avoids the problems associated with these normative debates obscuring the 
proportionality process itself. 
In the UK, there is, as yet, no comprehensive test for deciding whether a public interest 
is of sufficient weight to qualify as a principle. To date, two overlapping factors have 
been considered in deciding this issue, each of which allows for a certain amount of 
normative disagreement. The first is contained in the first stage of the UK 
proportionality test as laid out in de Freitas v Permanent Secretary of Ministry of 
Agriculture, Fisheries, Lands and Housing.29 This stage states that the public interest 
objective must be ‘sufficiently important to justify limiting a fundamental right’.30 In 
addition to this, the courts have been guided by the public interest reasons listed in the 
limitation clauses of specific Articles of the Convention.31  The reasons stated in the 
Convention are very broad principles from which specific sub-principles can be 
derived; in much the same way as occurs with the Convention rights themselves. These 
two factors have aided the UK Courts in their assessment of which public interest goals 
will be accepted for the purposes of limiting a human right. This process of assessment 
is the means by which certain public interests can be classified as ‘principles’ for the 
purposes of Alexy’s model. 
It is noteworthy that for the most part, immigration cases in the UK have tended to use 
the limitation clause in Article 8(2) as the basis for public interest principles, rather than 
                                                
29 [1999] 1 AC 69. 
30 ibid, at 80, as adopted by the House of Lords in R (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department  
[2001] UKHL 26; [2001] 2 AC 532; R v A (No 2) [2001] UKHL 25; [2002] 1 AC 45 and in a modified 
form in Huang v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 11; [2007] 2 AC 167. 
31 The most relevant Article for the purposes of this chapter is Article 8.  Article 8(2) gives six reasons for 
limiting the right: 1) National security, 2) public safety 3) the economic well-being of the country 4) the 
prevention of disorder or crime 5) the protection of health or morals 6) the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others. 
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the ‘legitimate objective’ part of the de Freitas test (although it has been cited in some 
of the immigration cases32).  
Control of immigration 
The most obvious public interest principle to be applied in immigration cases is the 
control of immigration generally. Decisions of European Commission of Human Rights 
(which were upheld by the ECHR) indicate that this public interest principle is derived 
from the Article 8(2) ground of the interests of the ‘economic well-being of the 
country’.33 Immigration control has been repeatedly accepted as a legitimate objective 
for the purposes of limiting Article 8 in HRA decisions of the UK Courts, without any 
detailed consideration of its derivation. In Edore v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department34 Simon Brown LJ cited with approval dicta of Moses J in R (Ala) v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department35 to the effect that ‘[t]here is no dispute 
that the Secretary of State’s decision was taken in pursuance of a legitimate aim, 
namely effective immigration control.’36 Similarly, the analysis of Gibbs J in R (Acan) v 
Immigration Appeal Tribunal37 proceeds entirely on the basis that the limitation of the 
claimant’s Article 8 rights must be in ‘proportion to the requirements of immigration 
control’38 While it might be lamentable that the courts have not been more explicit in 
their derivation of this principle from Article 8(2) it does seem evident that that is its 
source.  
                                                
32 See Samaroo v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] EWCA Civ 1139, at paragraph 16. 
33 See Ahmut v Netherlands (1997) 24 EHRR 62; Gül v Switzerland (1996) 22 EHRR 93. 
34 [2003] EWCA Civ 716; [2003] 1 WLR 2979. 
35 [2003] EWHC 521 (Admin). 
36 ibid, at paragraph 39. 
37 [2004] EWHC 297 (Admin). 
38 ibid, at paragraph 99. 
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In Huang v Secretary of State for the Home Department39 the House of Lords held that 
there were various sub-principles related to immigration control. Lord Bingham, giving 
the judgment of the house listed the following: 
‘… the general administrative desirability of applying known rules if a 
system of immigration control is to be workable, predictable, consistent 
and fair as between one applicant and another; the damage to good 
administration and effective control if a system is perceived by 
applicants internationally to be unduly porous, unpredictable or 
perfunctory; the need to discourage non-nationals admitted to the 
country temporarily from believing that they can commit serious crimes 
and yet be allowed to remain; the need to discourage fraud, deception 
and deliberate breaches of the law; and so on.’40 
This indicates that public interest principles can have derivative sub-principles in the 
same way that human rights do.  
An interesting institutional feature of the immigration case law is that the objective of 
immigration control is repeatedly referred to as being set externally from the decision-
maker in the instant case. In the Court of Appeal decision in Huang v Secretary of State 
for the Home Department41 Laws LJ stated that ‘[h]ere the legitimate aim is the 
maintenance of the integrity of the state’s immigration policies, given by statute and by 
immigration rules’.42 In R (Razgar) v Secretary of State for the Home Department43 
Lord Bingham identified the need to implement a ‘firm and orderly immigration 
policy’44 as a legitimate aim. However, he also indicated that where a removal is in 
pursuance of a lawful immigration policy, it  will almost always be ‘necessary’ in the 
                                                
39 [2007] UKHL 11; [2007] 2 AC 167. 
40 ibid, at 185. 
41 [2005] EWCA Civ 105; [2006] QB 1. 
42 ibid, at 10. 
43 [2004] UKHL 27; [2004] 2 AC 368. 
44 ibid, at 389-390 per Lord Bingham. 
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interests of one of the legitimate aims listed in Article 8(2), in the absence of bad faith, 
ulterior motive or a deliberate abuse of power. This ‘lawfulness’ criterion as the basis 
for a strong presumption of both ‘necessity’45 and a legitimate aim suggests that it is 
immigration legislation which is the source of the legitimate aim. This is very much in 
line with the arguments I set out in Chapter 3.2. Both Laws LJ and Lord Bingham are 
expressly recognising that the administrative decision-maker is not free to set their own 
objectives, which are in fact contained in rules of general application. Furthermore, by 
raising a strong presumption of a legitimate objective, Lord Bingham is suggesting a 
wide degree of policy choice freedom for the rule-maker when setting goals in the field 
of immigration control. This is structural deference at the legitimate objective stage of 
proportionality, but it is being afforded to the rule-maker, not the administrative 
decision-maker. 
The prevention of queue-jumping 
R (Mahmood) v Secretary of State for the Home Department46 was the first in a series of 
cases that were concerned with ‘queue-jumping’. As the applicant was married to a UK 
citizen, there was no dispute that he would be entitled to reside in the UK, provided he 
first returned to his country of origin and applied for entry clearance there.  Lord 
Phillips noted that the applicant had conceded that ‘the decision of the Secretary of 
State was taken in the interests of immigration control, which control is imposed in the 
interests of legitimate aims set out in the second paragraph of article 8.’47 Laws LJ held 
that ‘[f]irm immigration control requires consistency of treatment between one aspiring 
                                                
45 ‘Necessity’ is another term used to describe minimal impairment or factual optimisation. This aspect of 
the immigration cases is discussed further below at 4.2. 
46 [2001] 1 WLR 840. 
47 [2001] 1 WLR 840, at 857. He went on to cite ECHR jurisprudence directly on this point: ‘as a matter 
of well-established international law and subject to its treaty obligations, a State has the right to control 
the entry of non-nationals into its territory.’ Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v United Kingdom (1985) 
7 EHRR 471, at 497; cited with approval: [2001] 1 WLR 840, at 858. 
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immigrant and another’48 which suggests that the prevention of queue-jumping was a 
sub-principle being pursued, which was derived from the principle of immigration 
control, itself derived from Article 8(2) by the ECHR.  
Secretary of State for the Home Department v Akaeke49 was based on the same principle 
and the same issue arose. Carnwath LJ, giving the leading judgment, accepted that the  
‘[m]aintenance of a fair and consistent immigration policy demands that even applicants 
with an indisputable claim to enter the country should not be able to jump the queue by 
entering illegally’.50 This again affirms the prevention of queue-jumping as a sub-
principle of immigration control.  
More recently, the prevention of queue jumping has had less judicial support as a public 
interest principle under the HRA. In Chikwamba v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department51 Lord Brown (with whom the other Law Lords agreed) seemed to 
undermine the derivation of the prevention of queue jumping as a principle in the first 
place. He noted that in prior cases queue jumping had been given as a reason for forcing 
people to return to their country of origin to apply for entry clearance. However, he 
maintained that there was no actual delay for others in the queue and that ‘[o]n the 
contrary, the very fact that those within the policy do not apply for entry clearance 
shortens rather than lengthens that queue’.52 He went on to suggest that the real 
principle being pursued in such cases was ‘one of deterring people from coming to this 
country in the first place without having obtained entry clearance’.53 This would suggest 
the pending demise of the prevention of queue-jumping as a legitimate objective.  
 
                                                
48 [2001] 1 WLR 840, at 850. 
49 [2005] EWCA Civ 947. 
50 [2005] EWCA Civ 947, at paragraph 4. 
51 [2008] UKHL 40; [2008] 1 WLR 1420. 
52 [2008] UKHL 40; [2008] 1 WLR 1420, at 1431. 
53 ibid, at 1431. 
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Prevention of crime – deportation of convicted offenders 
In B v Secretary of State for the Home Department54 the applicant had been convicted 
of serious crimes against members of his own family and there was understandable 
concern that he might threaten public safety. The Court of Appeal did not think it 
necessary to make a specific determination on the public policy being pursued, but 
recognised that it could come within a number of the headings of Article 8(2) including 
the prevention of crime and the protection of the rights of others.55 Sedley LJ explicitly 
excluded the possibility that the legitimate objective was deportation, since nothing 
short of deportation could achieve that aim.56 Sedley LJ also noted that an analysis of 
the limitation of rights under Article 8(2) of the Convention was ‘likely to engage 
questions of propensity rather than of past conduct’.57 This is an important addendum to 
the principle and indicates that prior wrongdoing alone may not be sufficient as a basis 
for a public interest principle in favour of deportation. 
A similar principle arose in Samaroo v Secretary of State for the Home Department58 
which involved an application by a Guyanan national who had lived in the UK since 
1988. He had been convicted of drug trafficking offences in 1994 and, upon his release 
in 2000, the Home Secretary sought to deport him. The Court of Appeal identified the 
‘prevention of crime and disorder’59 as the public interest principle which was to be 
balanced against the applicant’s Convention right to family life. It is interesting to note 
that while Dyson LJ used the specific words of Article 8(2) when describing the 
legitimate aim, he also noted that it satisfied the de Freitas/Daly standard of ‘sufficient 
importance to justify limiting a fundamental right’.60 
                                                
54 Unreported, Court of Appeal, 18 May 2000. 
55 ibid, at paragraph 38. 
56 Unreported, Court of Appeal, 18 May 2000, at paragraph 34. 
57 ibid, at paragraph 38. 
58 [2001] EWCA Civ 1139. 
59 ibid, at paragraph 20. 
60 [2001] EWCA Civ 1139, at paragraph 20. 
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Prevention of disorder 
In R (Farrakhan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department61 the public interest to 
be pursued was the prevention of disorder, an aim specifically recognised by Article 
10(2) of the Convention. The Home Secretary was of the view that the applicant’s 
presence in the UK would pose a risk to community relations, given the forthright 
nature of his views and the fact that he was a controversial figure. Here again, the Court 
was following the text of the Convention for guidance on whether or not an objective 
was legitimate. 
National Security 
Secretary of State for the Home Department v Rehman62 was not strictly speaking a 
proportionality case, but it did involve issues of the definition of the public interest 
which are of great relevance to proportionality and deference. The applicant was a 
Pakistani national who had been permitted to enter the UK in 1993 for a period of four 
years on the basis that he would be working as a minister of religion. The Home 
Secretary was of the view that he was the British point of contact for a fundamentalist 
militant group and that he was actively recruiting people in Britain for that group. The 
applicant disputed this. The group he was suspected of working with only carried out 
their militant activities within the sub-continent and there were no suggestions that they 
had plans to target the UK. The Home Secretary’s decision to exclude the applicant was 
appealed to the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC) which held that in 
order for a person to be deemed a threat to national security, the person had to engage 
in, promote or encourage violent activity targeted at the United Kingdom, its system of 
government or its people. The Court of Appeal overturned the SIAC’s ruling and the 
applicant brought an appeal to the House of Lords. The House was explicit that the 
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applicant’s Article 8 rights could be limited on the basis of national security in 
accordance with Article 8(2).63 The House accepted that national security could include 
the public interest principle of the prevention of threats to a foreign state that were not 
imminent threats to the UK. This is a very broad reading of the public interest principle 
of national security. 
 
4.1.3: Rational Connection 
Questions of suitability or rational connection have arisen in two prominent queue-
jumping cases. In Shala v Secretary of State for the Home Department64 the Home 
Secretary had delayed a great deal in processing the applicant’s case and Keane LJ held 
that allowing the applicant to apply for leave to remain in from within the UK would 
not encourage others to exploit established procedures. While it was not expressly 
stated, this reasoning indicated that the Court was doubtful whether there was a rational 
connection between the measure and the public interest principle of preventing queue-
jumping. 
Similarly in Secretary of State for the Home Department v Akaeke65 there had been very 
long delays in the applicant’s case, which the special adjudicator in the case had 
described as ‘a public disgrace’. This view was affirmed by the Immigration Appeals 
Tribunal.  Carnwath LJ found that ‘the tribunal was entitled to take the view that 
confidence was unlikely to be materially improved by maintenance of a rigid policy of 
temporary expulsions.’66 As with the Shala case this reasoning suggests that severe 
delay can give rise to the conclusion that deportation is not a suitable measure to pursue 
the prevention of queue jumping. Without any deterrent effect, the measure bears no 
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64 [2003] EWCA Civ 233. 
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rational connection to the aim. The reasoning in Akaeke, like the reasoning in Shala, 
does not make it explicitly clear whether the measure fell at the rational connection 
stage or the overall balance stage. However, it is important to note that issues of rational 
connection have been considered by the UK courts in immigration cases. 
 
 
4.2: FACTUAL OPTIMISATION (MINIMAL IMPAIRMENT) 
The choice of least intrusive means has not been a significant element of proportionality 
analysis in the vast majority of immigration cases (in many of the immigration cases, 
the term ‘necessity’ is used to describe the minimal impairment/factual optimisation 
test.) As was discussed in Chapter 3.2, appointed officials who are responsible for one-
off administrative decisions tend to have a very limited range of measures open to them 
in order to pursue the public interest. In most immigration cases, they are faced with a 
binary choice between allowing the applicant to remain in the UK and deporting them.  
This means that factual optimisation tends to have a very limited role in immigration 
decisions. Since there are only two measures available, the question of whether there is 
a less rights-restrictive measure for achieving the public interest becomes meaningless. 
Ian Leigh has suggested that the minimal impairment test has been effectively ruled out 
in certain immigration cases because of the courts’ view that certain restrictions on 
rights ‘flow axiomatically from deportation’.67  
This in turn minimises the role of structural deference, which is closely related to 
factual optimisation and arises where a reviewing court defers to a decision-maker’s 
choice from a number of equally rights-intrusive measures. If the choice of measures is 
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absent, then there is little cause for structural deference. Even if this was not the case, 
appointed decision-makers have very limited democratic legitimacy and so there might 
not be much basis for affording structural deference in any event. 
The policy choices underlying the decision in immigration cases will invariably have 
been made elsewhere at a different time, whether in the Immigration Rules, legislation 
or some other statement of governmental policy, meaning that the decision-maker is 
following objectives which have been set externally. This also means that in order to 
conduct an examination of whether there was a less rights-intrusive measure available, 
the reviewing court would need to examine the framework of rules within which the 
challenged decision was made. Deference to such rules would depend on the institution 
from which they emanated. Gibbs J has held that in a case which ‘concerns rules as 
opposed to an Act of Parliament  …  this court could disapply or strike down as 
unlawful any rule which was shown to be contrary to the Human Rights Act and 
therefore unlawful.’68 Nonetheless, as was noted above, challenges to the rules in 
immigration cases have been uncommon, and most cases have tended to focus on the 
proportionality of the specific decision relating to the applicant. 
In B v Secretary of State for the Home Department69 Sedley LJ implied a limited role 
for factual optimisation. He held that the UK is not required to keep someone whose 
conduct strikes deeply at the social values of the society. This suggests that deportation 
is the least restrictive measure available to achieve the aim of pursuing public policy. 
There was no half-way house measure available in the B case which would also have 
afforded the same protection of the public interest principle at stake. The decision was 
therefore reached primarily on the basis of overall balancing with no express 
consideration of the least restrictive means part of proportionality analysis. Similarly, in 
                                                
68 R (Acan) v Immigration Appeal Tribunal [2004] EWHC 297 (Admin),at paragraph 91. 
69 Unreported, Court of Appeal, 18 May 2000. 
164 
 
R (Mahmood) v Secretary of State for the Home Department70 the Court gave no 
significant consideration to whether there were less restrictive alternatives available. As 
with B this analysis suggests a limited role for factual optimisation.  
A slightly more sophisticated approach was taken in Samaroo v Secretary of State for 
the Home Department.71 Dyson LJ held that ‘in deciding what proportionality requires 
in any particular case, the issue will usually have to be considered in two distinct stages. 
At the first stage, the question is: can the objective of the measure be achieved by 
means which are less interfering of an individual’s rights?’72 He then went on to state 
the second stage as: ‘does the measure have an excessive or disproportionate effect on 
the interests of affected persons?’73 This is a very clear endorsement of both factual and 
legal optimisation as the basis for proportionality review.  
Dyson LJ referred to Lord Steyn’s discussion of proportionality in the Daly case and 
noted that ‘it is clear that what Lord Steyn said about proportionality was intended to be 
of general application.’74 This is a recognition that the basic structure of proportionality 
is to be universally used across the range of rights and governmental action. However, 
Dyson LJ sought to differentiate between a decision in a specific case and a blanket 
policy. He held that as Daly and de Freitas had both concerned blanket policies that 
were overly broad in scope they could be held to fail the minimal impairment stage of 
proportionality. As Samaroo involved a specific decision, Dyson LJ was not prepared to 
countenance that the right to family life had been restricted any more than was 
necessary. He therefore held that the case fell to be decided on the question of overall 
balance alone. This is a direct judicial acceptance that there is a universal structure to 
proportionality but that there is a limited role for factual optimisation in certain types of 
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case. By implication this also discounts the possibility of structural deference in such 
cases, since it is also dependent on a choice of measures.  
A brief examination of the subsequent cases on immigration and proportionality shows 
that factual optimisation plays a limited role or no role in the vast majority. There is an 
absence of any meaningful consideration of the minimal impairment arm of 
proportionality in Shala v Secretary of State for the Home Department.75 Even though 
the Daly case was cited, the minimal impairment analysis which it implies was not 
conducted. Similarly in R (Ala) v Secretary of State for the Home Department,76 Edore 
v Secretary of State for the Home Department77and R (Acan) v Immigration Appeal 
Tribunal78 the legal optimisation test does all of the work of proportionality and factual 
optimisation is nowhere to be seen.  
These four cases are all good examples of an issue which recurs throughout the 
proportionality case law in this area. In each case the primary decision-maker was faced 
with the binary choice of removing the applicant or permitting them to remain. This did 
not allow for any significant leeway in terms of choosing from among a range of 
measures on the basis that one was more proportionate than the other. The number of 
options available was two. As a result, the question of whether the least intrusive means 
of achieving the public interest aim was used is functionally irrelevant. In each of these 
cases the analysis of proportionality fundamentally turned on the question of overall 
balance, rather than the question of minimal impairment.   
In Machado v Secretary of State for the Home Department79the Court of Appeal set out 
the proportionality test in terms almost identical to the test in Daly80and so expressly 
included consideration of minimal impairment. Sedley LJ contended that minimal 
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impairment ‘commonly requires an appraisal of the relative importance of the state’s 
objective and the impact of the measure on the individual.’81 Notwithstanding this, the 
analysis of the primary decision-maker’s decision is couched almost entirely in terms of 
balancing and the issue of whether there was a less rights-restrictive means of achieving 
the public interest is not addressed at all. 
In R (Razgar) v Secretary of State for the Home Department82 Lord Bingham set out 
five questions which a statutory appellate authority would have to ask when reviewing 
an immigration decision. The questions relate to: whether the right is affected; whether 
the right is engaged, whether the deportation is in accordance with law; whether the 
deportation is necessary for the pursuance of a legitimate objective; and whether the 
deportation is proportionate to the legitimate objective pursued. He then found that 
where the deportation was lawful it would almost always be proportionate, noting that: 
‘decisions taken pursuant to the lawful operation of immigration control [would] be 
proportionate in all save a small minority of exceptional cases’.83 He was of the view 
that a lawful deportation would be necessary for the pursuance of the aim in the absence 
of bad faith, ulterior motive or abuse of power. This is an interesting conclusion to 
draw. The Razgar decision suggests that the decision as to whether a deportation is the 
least intrusive means it is actually set at the level of the law regulating the deportation, 
not at the level of the deportation decision itself. This is similar to the reasoning that 
was used in Samaroo. In Razgar Lord Bingham seems to have placed great emphasis on 
the structural deference to be afforded to the setting out of immigration law, rather than 
to the individual decision-maker in a specific immigration case.84  
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In the Court of Appeal decision in Huang v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department85 Laws LJ stated that the policy questions involved in the case had already 
been set down by the Immigration Rules and that the adjudicator was not reviewing 
those. This case again deems factual optimisation to be a non-issue in immigration cases 
regarding administrative decisions.  When the case was further appealed to the House of 
Lords,86 the House expressly endorsed the Daly test and extended it to include overall 
balancing along the lines of the test in the Canadian case of R v Oakes.87 Even though 
factual optimisation is a central part of both the Daly and Oakes tests, factual 
optimisation was noticeably absent from the House’s reasoning in Huang. 
In Huang the House considered the role of democratic legitimacy in deference. Lord 
Bingham, giving the judgment of the House, used the example of housing policy, which 
he described as being the product of sustained democratic discussion with the interests 
of all sides represented. He contrasted this with the Immigration Rules, which are not 
the product of sustained active debate in Parliament and are not based on any 
representation of the interests of non-nationals. This finding suggests that if policy 
makers are to be afforded structural deference based on democratic legitimacy, then that 
democratic legitimacy will need to be established as a fact, rather than being an 
institutional principle. This is an interesting departure from Bingham’s comments in 
Razgar where he contended that any decision that was lawfully made (i.e. within the 
parameters of the Immigration Rules) would be necessary almost by definition. The line 
of reasoning in Huang shows the impact that the actual features of specific institutions 
can have on the level of deference to be paid.88 
Despite the lack of any use of factual optimisation in the majority of immigration cases, 
it is still possible to apply this part of the test if the institutional setting is appropriate. R 
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(Farrakhan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department89 is one of the only 
immigration cases where the court engaged in a direct assessment of the minimal 
impairment of the challenged measure. The applicant had been refused a visa to travel 
to the UK, where he had hoped to address followers of his high profile organisation. 
The Court of Appeal looked at the features of the restriction and held that Mr 
Farrakhan’s freedom of expression was only restricted to a limited extent, as he was 
only being denied access to a particular forum and there was nothing stopping him from 
disseminating his ideas in the UK through any means other than physical presence in 
the country. This examination of the level of impairment and the other options open to 
Mr Farrakhan is evidence of factual optimisation.  
The Court in Farrakhan placed great emphasis on the fact that the decision has been 
reached by the Home Secretary personally. The Court’s willingness to give detailed 
consideration to the issue of minimal impairment in this case is indicative of the 
significance of institutional differences as between a cabinet minister and an appointed 
decision-maker. The Home Secretary would have had a greater choice of means than 
the administrative officials. Notwithstanding the principle that immigration decisions 
made in the Home Secretary’s name are attributable to the Home Secretary, the reality 
of most immigration cases is very different and this is highlighted by the Court’s focus 
on the exceptionality of the fact that the Home Secretary did make the decision 
personally in this case. The significance of this is expressly noted in the Farrakhan case 
and it is further evidence that factual optimisation is of limited relevance to one-off 
decisions made by administrators. 
The use of factual optimisation in Farrakhan shows that the various sub-elements of the 
proportionality test are themselves consistent and universal, but that the institutional 
setting of a particular decision can lead to particular elements being de-emphasised. 
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Since there was a range of options and a choice of goals available to the Home 
Secretary in Farrakhan, the factual optimisation test could be effectively applied in a 
way which was not possible in other cases, such as Samaroo. 
The preceding consideration of the leading cases in this area gives a clear indication that 
factual optimisation is of very limited importance in immigration decisions. As a 
governmental activity, such decisions are predominantly concerned with one-off 
administrative decisions, where the decision-maker has a limited choice of measures 
and no rule-setting power. It is clear that such activity gives little scope for factual 
optimisation by the primary decision-maker, despite what the phrasing of the 
proportionality test in the UK suggests. However, as has been shown, this is not a 
failure of proportionality, it is a feature of the institutional setting in which the primary 
decision is made.  
 
 
4.3: LEGAL OPTIMISATION (OVERALL BALANCE) 
This final stage of the proportionality test requires an overall balance to be struck 
between the public interest principle and the human rights principle. Alexy calls this 
‘legal optimisation’, which is summed up in his first law of balancing: ‘the greater the 
degree of non-satisfaction of, or detriment to, one principle, the greater must be the 
importance of satisfying the other.’90 As has been seen, administrative decision-makers 
often have limited ability to set the rules within which they operate or to choose from a 
range of alternative measures to achieve an objective. It is therefore unsurprising that in 
the bulk of the case law on proportionality and immigration, the reviewing court 
focused very heavily on legal optimisation.  
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In judicial review of one-off administrative decisions, legal optimisation will entail a 
detailed analysis of the impact of the measure on the human rights principle at stake in 
the specific case and the level of realisation and/or importance of the public interest 
principle. Unlike a consideration of a rule or policy that is of general application, an 
overall balancing analysis of an administrative decision need only be concerned with 
the facts of the specific case before it, rather than paying much regard to the impact of a 
rule in the abstract. As I discussed in Chapter 3.2.2, this analysis is likely to be easier 
for a court which is reviewing an administrative decision than it would be for review of 
a rule. 
Legal optimisation has been repeatedly applied in immigration proportionality cases. In 
Samaroo v Secretary of State for the Home Department,91 Dyson LJ placed heavy 
emphasis on legal optimisation noting that: ‘[i]t is important to emphasise that the 
striking of a fair balance lies at the heart of proportionality’.92 He held that ‘[b]roadly 
speaking, the more serious the interference with a fundamental right and the graver its 
effects, the greater the justification that will be required for the interference.’93 This is 
almost identical to Alexy’s description of the legal optimisation test in his ‘law of 
balancing’.94  
Similarly, in R (Mahmood) v Secretary of State for the Home Department,95 legal 
optimisation was central to the decision of the Court of Appeal. As was noted above, 
the case concerned the balancing of the principle that the applicant’s family life should 
not be disrupted with the public interest principle in preventing queue-jumping in the 
immigration process. It was not disputed that the applicant would be successful if he 
made an application for leave to enter from Pakistan. The Court of Appeal held that, 
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while a return to Pakistan to make such an application would be disruptive, there was no 
reason why the whole family could not go to Pakistan while he made the application. 
The Court was conscious of the fact that the applicant’s wife had married him knowing 
that his immigration status was dubious. Furthermore, the Court held that the threat that 
removal posed to the applicant’s current employment in the UK was not a sufficient 
reason for permitting him to stay. This weighing up of the factors in the specific case 
shows the Court engaging in some level of legal optimisation of competing principles, 
(notwithstanding the fact that the decision is phrased in terms of reviewing the 
reasonableness of the original decision, see further below at 4.3.2.) 
In Samaroo and Mahmood, legal optimisation was the main basis for the decision. 
However it is not necessary for legal optimisation to take over from factual optimisation 
as can be seen in R (Farrakhan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department.96 As 
was discussed above, the Court of Appeal engaged in a factual optimisation in 
Farrakhan, but the decision also considered legal optimisation. The Court was satisfied 
that the Home Secretary had decided to exclude the applicant from the UK for the 
purpose of the prevention of disorder. Lord Phillips MR, giving the judgment of the 
Court held that the Home Secretary had ‘struck a proportionate balance between that 
aim and freedom of expression, to the extent to which that was in play on the facts of 
this case.’97 In addition to being an endorsement of the overall balancing process in 
proportionality, the Farrakhan decision shows how the full range of the proportionality 
test can be used when a decision involves both policy choice and a specific case. The 
availability of legal optimisation in addition to factual optimisation was further 
underlined in the later case of Huang v Secretary of State for the Home Department. 98 
The distinction between Farrakhan and cases where factual optimisation was not 
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applied is the institutional setting of the decision, particularly the range of measures 
open to the decision-maker. 
Deference to a primary decision-maker can be integrated into legal optimisation. At this 
stage of proportionality, the deference paid to the primary decision-maker is usually 
empirical epistemic deference, which is concerned with the reliability of factual 
assessments.99 The level of realisation of a public interest goal and the level of intrusion 
on a Convention right may not be easily quantifiable or even knowable. As such, the 
appropriate weight to be given to each principle will not always be easy to gauge. 
Where this is the case, the reviewing court may take the view that the primary decision-
maker is in a better position than the court to make an assessment of either the level of 
intrusion on the protected human right or the level of realisation or importance of the 
public interest. Empirical epistemic deference has repeatedly arisen in the immigration 
case law.  
The other form of deference which has been seen as relevant in immigration cases is 
normative epistemic deference. This applies where there is uncertainty as to the correct 
balance to be struck. A reviewing court may take the view that the primary decision-
maker has given a certain basic level of protection to both the human rights and the 
public interest principle. In such cases, the court may afford normative epistemic 
deference to the decision-maker. As I will show, while this form of deference was 
applied repeatedly in immigration cases, it has been roundly rejected after a series of 
cases culminating in the Huang decision. The reasoning of this rejection is in line with 
the reasons for deference I set out in Chapter 3.4 and highlights the importance of 
institutional sensitivity. 
In the rest of this section I will show how the courts have applied legal optimisation in a 
way which makes space for both empirical and normative epistemic deference, but that 
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the latter was ultimately rejected on grounds related to institutional sensitivity. I will 
also discuss the extensive consideration which has been given to delay in immigration 
cases and show how it underlines the importance of legal optimisation. 
 
4.3.1: Legal optimisation and empirical epistemic deference 
One of the earliest immigration proportionality cases is B v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department100 in which the Court of Appeal paid great attention to the overall 
balance of the challenged measure. The Home Secretary sought to deport the applicant 
on the basis that he had been convicted of serious crimes against his own children. The 
Home Secretary’s decision was appealed to the Immigration Appeal Tribunal (‘the 
IAT’), which upheld it. The parties in the case agreed to treat the IAT decision as the 
first instance decision for the purposes of the Court of Appeal case. Sedley LJ held that 
the applicant’s opportunity to re-offend would be greatly limited were he to remain in 
the UK and that his extremely strong links to this country were such that to deport him 
would be a very serious restriction of his Article 8 rights. He held that the overall 
balance between public interest and individual rights had not been adequately struck 
and that removal would be disproportionate. He stated that: ‘[w]hat is proposed in the 
present case, although in law deportation, is in substance more akin to exile. As such it 
is in my judgment so severe as to be disproportionate to this man’s particular offending, 
serious as it was, and to his propensities.’101 This is an excellent example of legal 
optimisation of a human rights principle and a public interest principle. 
In reaching its decision on legal optimisation, the Court of Appeal was open to 
empirical epistemic deference based on institutional competence. The Court held that 
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the IAT’s decision included findings of primary fact, inferences of fact, propositions of 
law, and reasoning.102  Given the IAT’s knowledge of the specific circumstances of 
another country (although not adduced in this case), its findings would be given great 
deference unless they could be shown to be wrong. However, the Court held that the 
IAT’s inferences from fact, its propositions of law and its reasoning for its decision 
would all be scrutinised and if a Court disagreed with them, the decision should be 
overturned. This early decision gives a narrow scope for deference in legal optimisation 
and limits it to empirical epistemic deference based on institutional competence 
exclusively.  
As was noted above, legal optimisation was the central plank of the decision in 
Samaroo v Secretary of State for the Home Department103 Notwithstanding certain 
compassionate circumstances of the applicant’s situation, Dyson LJ held that a fair 
balance had been struck between the applicant’s right to family life and the public 
interest of preventing and deterring drug trafficking. Dyson LJ went on to find that the 
Home Secretary was entitled to place great weight on the importance of preventing drug 
trafficking. He found that the Home Secretary is in a better position than the Court to 
judge the deterrent effect of the deportation and that the subject matter was such that 
conclusive proof of the deterrent effect would be impossible.104 This suggests a large 
degree of empirical epistemic deference on the grounds of institutional competence with 
regard to assessing the level of achievement of the public interest.  
In R (Farrakhan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department105 The Court held that 
‘the Secretary of State is far better placed to reach an informed decision as to the likely 
consequences of admitting Mr Farrakhan to this country than is the court.’106 The court 
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therefore deferred to his assessment of the level of detriment that the applicant’s 
presence in the UK would be to the public interest. This was a consideration of 
empirical epistemic deference within the legal optimisation stage of the proportionality 
test. 
In Shala v Secretary of State for the Home Department107 Keene LJ explicitly used the 
language of legal optimisation noting that the proportionality issue was whether the 
decision-maker had ‘struck a fair balance between that legitimate objective and the 
appellant’s right under Article 8.’108 He went on to hold that there would be a 
‘significant margin of discretion’ applied when assessing whether the decision-maker 
was mistaken in the ‘relative weight which he has attached to the conflicting 
interests’.109 The basis for this deference was that immigration control was within the 
constitutional responsibility of the Home Secretary. This indicates a large measure of 
empirical epistemic deference for the decision-maker, based on institutional 
competence. 
The issue of empirical epistemic deference in matters of national security was 
considered at length in Secretary of State for the Home Department v Rehman.110 Lord 
Slynn expressly excluded the possibility of the Home Secretary using national security 
as a blanket justification for excluding non-nationals. He held that some possibility of 
risk or danger to the nation must exist; however it does not necessarily need to be a 
direct threat targeting the UK.  Lord Slynn held further that: 
‘There must be material on which proportionately and reasonably he can 
conclude that there is a real possibility of activities harmful to national 
security but he does not have to be satisfied, nor on appeal to show, that 
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all the material before him is proved, and his conclusion is justified to a 
“high civil degree of probability”. Establishing a degree of probability 
does not seem relevant to the reaching of a conclusion on whether there 
should be a deportation for the public good.’111 
Echoing these sentiments, Lord Hoffmann held that: 
‘The question of whether something is “in the interests” of national 
security is not a question of law. It is a matter of judgment and policy. 
Under the constitution of the United Kingdom and most other countries, 
decisions as to whether something is or is not in the interests of national 
security are not a matter for judicial decision. They are entrusted to the 
executive.’112  
These two quotations indicate that the Courts are prepared to afford a large degree of 
epistemic deference to the executive, on institutional competence grounds, when the 
public interest being pursued is national security. 
In R (Razgar) v Secretary of State for the Home Department113 Lord Bingham set out 
five questions to be considered by a special adjudicator when deciding whether a 
decision to deport a person is proportionate (the details of the first four questions are 
discussed above in section 4.2). As was noted above, Lord Bingham’s reasoning 
indicated a minor role for the minimal impairment limb of proportionality in deportation 
cases. The fifth question was whether the deportation was proportionate to the 
legitimate aim pursued. Lord Bingham held that the adjudicator’s role must always 
involve the striking of a fair balance between the rights of the individual and the 
interests of the community. Lord Bingham also placed great emphasis on the severity of 
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the applicant’s situation, which is another indication of the courts’ fact-sensitivity in the 
overall balancing exercise in these cases. 
In Razgar Lord Bingham mentioned his anticipation that almost all lawful deportations 
would be ‘necessary’ and those that were not would involve exceptional circumstances. 
This ‘exceptional circumstances’ criterion was taken up by Laws LJ in the Court of 
Appeal decision in Huang v Secretary of State for the Home Department.114 Laws LJ 
interpreted Lord Bingham’s dictum as setting out a requirement of ‘exceptional 
circumstances’ for applicants in deportation decisions where the planned deportation 
was pursuant to lawful authority. This greatly restricted the process of overall balancing 
in immigration decisions. Laws LJ’s formulation requires a court to find exceptional 
factors in the applicant’s favour, rather than weighing up all the factors which the court 
deems relevant. This is a de facto blanket empirical epistemic deference with regards to 
public interest factors. The exceptional circumstances test sets a higher threshold for 
factors related to the intrusion on human rights. By extension, this means that the 
relative importance of the public interest will be increased in all cases and so the overall 
balance will be weighted in favour of the public interest. As a result, public interest 
factors will not need to be as convincing as they would otherwise be.  
The skewing effect of the ‘exceptional circumstances’ test on legal optimisation can be 
seen in Mukarkar v Secretary of State for the Home Department.115 The applicant was 
approaching his 65th birthday and suffered from very ill health. All of his children lived 
in the UK and once he was 65 years old he would be entitled to reside with them. The 
Court of Appeal considered the exceptional circumstances test set out by Laws LJ in 
Huang. While the applicant in Mukarkar was ultimately successful, the human rights 
argument had to be much stronger than would have been necessary in an ordinary legal 
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optimisation. The Court noted that a removal from the UK, even for a short period, 
would cause a serious disruption to the applicant.  
In the House of Lords decision in Huang116 Lord Bingham, giving the judgment of the 
House, referred to his previous comments in Razgar and emphasised that they were not 
intended to set down a test of exceptional circumstances, as had been suggested.117 The 
House gave overall balance a resounding endorsement within proportionality analysis 
and emphasised that the striking of a fair balance between the rights of the individual 
and the interests of the community was a part of the proportionality test which was 
inherent in the whole Convention.  
In EB (Kosovo) v Secretary of State for the Home Department118 Lord Bingham 
reaffirmed the importance of overall balance, referring specifically to the Huang 
judgment. He also gave detailed consideration to the effect that delay can have on the 
balancing exercise. This will be discussed further below, but for the purposes of 
empirical epistemic deference, one point he raised is of particular interest. Lord 
Bingham noted that if the delay in an asylum application is caused by a ‘dysfunctional 
system which yields unpredictable, inconsistent and unfair outcomes’119 then less 
weight would be afforded to the requirements of firm and fair immigration control. As I 
discussed in Chapter 3.4, the main reason to afford empirical epistemic deference is that 
the primary decision-maker has superior expertise in the relevant field. These dicta of 
Lord Bingham suggest that where that quality of a decision-maker’s findings is in doubt 
because the decision-maker is using a flawed system, less empirical epistemic deference 
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is to be afforded. This approach shows the courts being sensitive to the actual level of 
expertise displayed in a given case, rather than affording deference solely because a 
particular institution has a general level of expertise.  
 
4.3.2: Legal optimisation and normative epistemic deference 
In R (Mahmood) v Secretary of State for the Home Department120 the Court of Appeal 
engaged in a detailed weighing up of the factors in the specific case. As was discussed 
above, this evidenced a legal optimisation approach to the Court’s reasoning. However, 
the ultimate outcome of the case was that the Court found that it was open to a 
reasonable decision-maker to find that deportation was justified under Article 8(2).  The 
Court was of the view that it its role was supervisory and that it must afford some 
principled distance from democratic decision-makers. The Court held that the courts 
should only intervene where the decision that had been made was outside the range of 
responses which would be made by a reasonable decision-maker.121 If the challenged 
decision fell within that range, then the decision-maker was to be afforded a ‘margin of 
discretion’.122 The Court of Appeal held that there were reasonable grounds for the 
decision-maker’s finding that deportation was justified under Article 8(2) and so the 
decision was upheld.  
In terms of the structural model of proportionality, this ‘margin of discretion’ is 
normative epistemic deference in legal optimisation.123 Normative epistemic deference 
arises where a certain basic level of protection has been given to both the human right 
and the public interest and so the reviewing court defers to the decision-maker’s 
assessment of the correct balance to be struck between the two principles. As I 
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discussed in Chapter 3.4.1, democratic legitimacy is the primary reason to afford a 
decision-maker normative epistemic deference and this is borne out in the Court of 
Appeal’s judgment in Mahmood.  Laws LJ paid significant attention to the democratic 
legitimacy of ‘those functions of government which are controlled and distributed by 
powers whose authority is derived from the ballot box’124 and the Court noted the need 
for deference where there were economic or social policy questions involved.  
However, the setting of such policy was not at issue in Mahmood and as has been 
shown, is rarely an issue in HRA challenges to one-off immigration decisions. The 
institutional context of these decisions is such that there is arguably very little role for 
that sort of deference based on democratic legitimacy. This indicates the significance of 
institutional sensitivity in developing a model of proportionality. Had there been a 
greater degree of institutional sensitivity in Mahmood, then this inconsistency could 
have been avoided. 
As was noted above, in Samaroo v Secretary of State for the Home Department,125 the 
Court of Appeal decision turned primarily on legal optimisation and the Court afforded 
the IAT a degree of empirical epistemic deference. However, the Court of Appeal also 
held that the courts’ role is not to make their own proportionality decision but to 
supervise the Home Secretary’s decision and to apply anxious scrutiny as to whether a 
fair balance was struck. Dyson LJ found that it was not up to the courts to engage in 
their own balancing assessment if the primary decision-maker’s balancing was 
reasonable. Dyson LJ’s analysis, like that of the Court of Appeal in Mahmood indicates 
a willingness to afford normative epistemic deference in the legal optimisation stage of 
immigration cases.  
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This line of reasoning can be seen further in Edore v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department.126 The case concerned the proper interpretation of section 65 of the 
Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, which permits an appeal to a statutory authority 
where a person alleges that an immigration decision was in breach of their human 
rights.127 These statutory authorities apply a proportionality test in the same way as the 
courts. The Court of Appeal held that in order for the challenged decision to be deemed 
proportionate, the decision needed to strike a fair balance between the competing 
principles. Simon Brown LJ held that the statutory authorities should not disrupt the 
finding of the decision-maker on proportionality so long as it was reasonable.128 In 
Edore the Court of Appeal held that having regard to the facts of the case, the decision 
reached was outside the range of reasonable balances which could be struck. This 
indicates that the decision-maker had exceeded the normative epistemic deference that it 
was afforded with regard to legal optimisation. 
Normative epistemic deference to the balancing done by the primary decision-maker 
eventually became known as the ‘M (Croatia) issue’.129 In M (Croatia) v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department130 the IAT held that statutory authorities should 
‘normally hold that a decision to remove is unlawful only where the disproportion is so 
great that no reasonable Secretary of State could remove in those circumstances.’131 
Understandably, the courts are loath to intrude on the powers of the other arms of 
government and are seeking a principled basis on which to set the level of scrutiny. 
However deference to all ‘reasonable’ decisions on proportionality has not proved to be 
                                                
126 [2003] EWCA Civ 716; [2003] 1 WLR 2979. 
127 This provision was superseded by section 84 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. 
There are some distinctions between this mechanism and judicial review, however they mostly relate to 
findings of fact (see further Huang v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 11; 
[2007] 2 AC 167, at 184, per Lord Bingham). As such, the case law dealing with section 65/section 84 is 
instructive on the courts’ approach to proportionality.  
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a workable basis on which to do this. In these cases, substantial normative epistemic 
deference was being applied in circumstances where there was no possibility of factual 
optimisation. The M (Croatia) approach, like much of the spatial discussion of 
proportionality, oversimplifies proportionality to the point of rendering it a minor 
offshoot of Wednesbury unreasonableness. It is perfectly understandable that the courts 
might wish to defer to the decision-maker’s findings of fact. However, the normative 
epistemic deference afforded in these cases is also inappropriate because it lacks 
institutional sensitivity. As I argued in Chapter 3.4.1, the reason to afford a decision-
maker normative epistemic deference is that the decision-maker is more democratically 
legitimate than the courts. This is not true of immigration decision-makers and the 
decision to afford this type of deference shows a lack of institutional sensitivity with 
regard to proportionality. There is no reason to afford normative epistemic deference to 
a decision-maker on the basis of institutional competence, since the decision-maker’s 
ability to conduct a balancing exercise is no greater than that of the courts. To afford 
normative epistemic deference in balancing on the basis of institutional competence 
would be to undermine the competence of the courts and shirk their responsibility to 
adjudicate on matters of human rights. 
This logic can be seen in the reasoning of the Court of Appeal and House of Lords in 
Huang v Secretary of State for the Home Department132 which finally put the M 
(Croatia) issue to rest. In the Court of Appeal Laws LJ, giving the judgment of the 
Court, gave a detailed consideration of the issue of deference based on democratic 
legitimacy, which he found to be directly related to the formulation of policy. He went 
on to hold that where non-policy questions were in issue, the decision-maker was not to 
be afforded deference on the basis of democratic legitimacy and that there was no 
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question of deference to policy in any of the three cases before the Court.133 As such the 
duty of the statutory appeal authority in these cases was the protection of individual 
fundamental rights. This is a dismissal of normative epistemic deference in immigration 
cases and is an express recognition of the effect that the institutional setting of such 
decisions will ultimately have on the operation of proportionality analysis. 
Laws LJ also recognised the need for some means of deciding the intensity of 
proportionality review. He held that it must vary with the subject matter but suggested 
that there were no ‘principles with sharp edges’134 and that there probably never would 
be. He suggested the approach that the greater the interference with the right, the more 
intensive should be the review. This is in line with the formal principle suggested by 
Rivers.135 The level of interference with a human right is certainly one valuable basis 
for measuring the appropriate level of deference. As was discussed in Chapter 3.4, 
institutional reasons for deference need not detract from this criterion; they can operate 
in addition to it. 
The House of Lords upheld the decision of the Court of Appeal in Huang.136 Lord 
Bingham expressly discounted the argument that a statutory authority was limited to 
reviewing the immigration decision based on irrationality.  He accepted that 
consideration could be given to the assessments made by the decision-maker but was 
very clear that: 
‘[t]he giving of weight to the factors upon which the original decision is 
based is not ‘deference’. It is performance of the ordinary judicial task of 
weighing up the competing considerations on each side and according 
appropriate weight to the judgment of a person with responsibility for a 
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given subject matter and access to special sources of knowledge and 
advice.’137 
While Lord Bingham eschews the term ‘deference’, for the purposes of the structural 
model, it is clear that he is rejecting normative epistemic deference and endorsing 
empirical epistemic deference. He rejects the notion of deference to the balance struck, 
but accepts the notion of deference to findings of fact. Lord Bingham’s finding indicates 
that when undertaking the overall balancing stage of the proportionality test, the 
reviewing court or tribunal should take account of the findings of the primary decision-
maker but not abrogate its responsibility to engage in its own analysis of the 
proportionality of the decision. This is in line with the criticisms of the M (Croatia) 
issue which I set out above. Lord Bingham’s reasoning in Huang shows that empirical 
epistemic deference can operate within the overall balancing stage of proportionality 
review, without the court abrogating that stage of analysis.  
As was mentioned above in relation to structural deference, the Huang decision also 
shows that the reasons for deference are an important factor in deciding whether 
deference should be paid. The basis for affording normative epistemic deference is the 
democratic legitimacy of the primary decision-maker. In rejecting the use of normative 
epistemic deference in Huang, the House of Lords also rejected the argument that there 
was substantial democratic legitimacy in the immigration rules. The immigration rules 
do not enjoy the level of sustained democratic debate that housing policy does and such 
debates as there are on the immigration rules do not take account of the interests of 
potential immigrants.138 Admittedly this is an indictment of the democratic legitimacy 
of the Immigration rules, rather than of the decisions of immigration officials; however, 
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if the rules lack democratic legitimacy, then those who apply them cannot claim to have 
any, and so the basis for normative epistemic deference is absent. 
 
4.3.3. Legal optimisation and delay 
The courts have repeatedly found delay to be of great weight within legal optimisation. 
When a court is balancing the benefit to the public interest relative to the intrusion on 
the applicant’s Convention rights the legal optimisation process requires an analysis of 
the impact of the measure on each of the two competing principles. The repetition of 
delay as a significant factor indicates the sort of patterns that can emerge in the 
balancing stage when there have been a series of cases on similar points. Alexy 
contends that each time a court makes a decision on proportionality, a conditional, fact-
sensitive rule of precedence between the two competing principles is established. Other, 
similar, cases will tend to follow this rule insofar as their facts are similar. As I 
discussed in Chapter 2.2, this model of proportionality is particularly appropriate in a 
common law jurisdiction, where the body of precedent builds up over time. In this 
section, I will show how a series of cases, beginning with Shala v Secretary of State for 
the Home Department139 established delay as a significant factor to be considered in the 
legal optimisation of competing principles in immigration decisions. 
In Shala the Court of Appeal weighed up the factors to be considered in balancing the 
public interest principle of preventing queue-jumping with the Article 8 principle that 
the applicant’s family life should not be disrupted. Schiemann LJ pointed out that at the 
time the applicant entered the UK he had been a meritorious candidate for asylum and 
had there not been such a substantial delay, he would not have had any difficulty getting 
refugee status. Keane LJ held that it would be a disproportionate intrusion on his Article 
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8 rights if he were made to suffer as a result of a delay that was entirely the fault of the 
Home Office itself. As was noted above, there were doubts raised in this case about 
whether the deportation bore a rational connection to the public interest principle at 
stake. Nonetheless, the Court did go on to consider the balancing stage of 
proportionality and its reasoning is instructive in that it put great emphasis on the delay 
as a factor tending to tilt the balance in the applicant’s favour. 
In R (Ala) v Secretary of State for the Home Department140 the Home Secretary sought 
an order that the applicant’s case was ‘manifestly unfounded’. Such an order would 
require the court to be satisfied that it was not possible for the applicant’s case to 
succeed if it was heard by a statutory appellate body. After examining the balance 
struck by the Home Office between the public interest in preventing queue-jumping and 
the applicant’s Article 8 rights, Moses J held that the failure to take account of the delay 
in processing the claim meant that it was not ‘manifestly unfounded.’ In doing so, 
Moses J specifically noted that: ‘Shala is authority for the proposition that the 
consequences of considerable delay are a relevant factor in striking the balance.’141 
R (Acan) v Immigration Appeal Tribunal142 was a case where the applicant’s case had 
been certified as manifestly unfounded. Gibbs J quashed that certification after having 
considered the balance between the aim of immigration control and the applicants’ 
rights to family life. He held that there was at least an arguable case that the decision to 
refuse them entry was disproportionate. He considered the Shala decision as being of 
value in his reasoning, but was careful to take account of differences of fact between the 
cases. He held that: ‘[w]hilst the case of Shala was, as I have said, very different, 
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nevertheless the delay here was an arguably highly relevant factor to the claimants' 
case.’143 
A more direct endorsement of Shala was given by Owen J in Mthokozisi v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department.144 The applicant had arrived in the UK at the age of 13 
and claimed asylum. There was considerable delay and by the time his application was 
rejected, he was an adult and the outcome was different than it would have been if he 
had still been under 18. Owen J placed heavy emphasis on the importance of delay 
finding that: 
‘Shala is authority for the wider proposition that when striking the 
balance between an applicant's rights under Article 8 and the legitimate 
objective of the proper maintenance of immigration control, the decision-
maker must have regard to delay in determining an application for 
asylum and its consequences.’145 
In Secretary of State for the Home Department v Akaeke146 there were concerns over 
whether the measure was suitable to achieve the aim pursued, just as there had been in 
Shala.147  However, as with Shala the court did address the overall balance point. There 
had been extreme delays in processing Mrs Akaeke’s case and the Court, citing Shala, 
held that unreasonable delay was a ‘relevant’ factor to be weighed by the reviewing 
tribunal. This shows that the delay was part of the overall balancing test. As with Shala, 
it is not entirely clear whether the deportation failed the proportionality test on the basis 
of the threshold criterion of suitability or on overall balancing. However, the IAT had 
considered the ‘striking of a fair balance’148 and had given great weight in that balance 
to the delay. As the decision of the IAT was upheld by the Court of Appeal, this would 
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appear to be an endorsement of legal optimisation approach with delay as a major 
factor, notwithstanding the focus on rational connection. 
In Strbac v Secretary of State for the Home Department149 the applicant and his wife 
had come to the UK from Croatia in 1999 and claimed asylum. There was some delay 
in processing their application and by the time it was considered, the situation in Croatia 
had improved to a significant extent and there was no longer any basis for an asylum 
claim. The Court of Appeal rejected the notion of a concrete rule whereby delay always 
leads to a breach of Article 8. Laws LJ took the view that delay was only a relevant 
factor to be considered in balancing and that Shala did not set out a ‘a principle which, 
with some qualifications, came close to a rule’150 
In EB (Kosovo) v Secretary of State for the Home Department151 Lord Bingham gave 
detailed consideration to the way in which delay can affect balancing. He explained that 
it could arise in three ways. Where the delay leads to the establishment of deeper ties 
with people legally residing in the UK, then it may strengthen the Article 8 claim. 
Conversely, where a person’s immigration status is uncertain, then any relationships 
built with that person are built in the knowledge that he may not be entitled to remain in 
the UK. The third sense in which delay arises is where the system as a whole is 
dysfunctional and produces ‘unpredictable, inconsistent and unfair outcomes’152 in 
which case it will reduce the weight to be given to the public interest principle of firm 
and fair immigration control. 
Lord Bingham held that ‘[A]rticle 8 calls for a broad and informed judgment which is 
not to be constrained by a series of prescriptive rules.’153 However, the line of reasoning 
is indicative of the manner in which the proportionality analysis leads to conditional 
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rules generated by the operation of precedent which can then be followed in later, 
similar cases. According to Alexy’s model, once two principles have been factually154 
and legally optimised in a particular set of facts, then a fact-specific rule arises. Later 
cases with the same facts will follow this. Later cases where the facts are considerably 
different will not. The rejection by the House of a prescriptive rule on delay can be 
accommodated within this, because of the House’s recognition of delay as an important 
factor. The dominance of the initial Shala decision in the later cases on delay shows 
how this process works and the way in which it links together successive 
proportionality decisions. Where a court is undertaking a proportionality analysis and 
there is a previous case, with similar facts, then the court will take account of the 
analysis in that previous case.  
 
 
4.4: CONCLUSION 
In this chapter I have shown the operation of the structural model of proportionality and 
deference in the specific institutional setting of immigration decisions under the HRA. 
The courts have been engaged in an exercise of identifying Convention principles and 
public interest principles and then balancing them against each other. The main 
principles to be balanced in immigration cases have recurred repeatedly. The human 
rights principles are predominantly based on Article 8 of the Convention and the public 
interest principles are predominantly derived from Article 8(2).  
There has been little scope for factual optimisation in these cases, notwithstanding the 
fact that this element was expressly confirmed by the House of Lords in Huang. As I 
have shown, immigration officials are almost always faced with a binary choice, and so 
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there is no meaningful range of measures available to them. As such, the question on 
minimal impairment does not arise in a meaningful way. This in turn reduces the need 
for structural deference.  
Proportionality analysis in HRA immigration decisions has been dominated by legal 
optimisation. Throughout the case law, the key issue has been whether the court was 
satisfied that a proportionate overall balance was struck between the Convention right 
principle and the public interest principle at stake. This has involved empirical 
epistemic deference where there has been uncertainty as to the measurement of specific 
facts. There was for some time also a use of normative epistemic deference, which was 
afforded to the primary decision-maker’s findings as to the balance struck. However 
this was ultimately rejected in Huang and there are good institutional grounds for doing 
so. Normative epistemic deference is linked to democratic legitimacy, which is not 
something which immigration officials can lay much claim to. Deference to these 
decision-makers is more properly of the empirical epistemic kind, which is based on 
their institutional competence. 
I have also shown how certain factors, in particular delay, have recurred in this 
balancing exercise. This is indicative of the manner in which proportionality 
adjudication builds up a body of fact-specific rules.  
In cases such as Samaroo and Razgar the courts intimated that minimal impairment is in 
fact connected to the policy underlying the immigration decision and not the specific 
decision itself. This is an indication of ‘multi-level decision-making’.155 While the 
courts have expressly accepted the possibility of striking down the underlying policy156 
challenges to the policy have been rare. It is perhaps understandable that, to date, 
applicants have chosen to challenge the decision rather than the rule, as it is an easier 
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target and much more fully within the administrative law tradition in the UK. It is 
therefore clear that immigration decisions involve the interaction of two forms of 
governmental activity at two separate levels, only one of which has been challenged in 
the bulk of immigration decisions. Again this reinforces the crucial role that 
institutional factors play in the operation of proportionality analysis.  
Decisions involving proportionality challenges to multiple levels of decision-making 
simultaneously will be considered in Chapter 6. Prior to that, in the next chapter, I will 
move to the opposite end of the institutional spectrum and test the structural, 
institutionally sensitive model of proportionality and deference in rule-making 
decisions.  
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Chapter 5:  Case Study Two: Proportionality and Rule-
making – Criminal Justice 
 
 
In this chapter I will explore the structure of proportionality and deference in cases 
where the courts are reviewing the compatibility of government rule-making decisions 
with the European Convention on Human Rights (‘the Convention’). In this chapter I 
am again concerned with showing that a structural, institutionally sensitive model of 
proportionality and deference can be shown to operate in the existing case law under the 
Human Rights Act 1998 (‘the HRA’).   
The structural model of proportionality and deference describes proportionality in terms 
of the factual and legal optimisation of principles. Deference is classified as normative 
or epistemic and these two forms of deference are integrated into the structure of the 
proportionality test itself. In Chapter 3.2, I identified three specific areas of difference 
between institutions that would affect the operation of proportionality and deference: 
choice of objectives, range of measures and scope of the decision. In Chapter 4, I 
examined the case law at one extreme of these three scales. In this chapter I will look at 
cases at the other extreme. There have been a number of significant criminal justice 
cases which have dealt with the proportionality of rules, as opposed to one-off decisions 
and it is these rule-making cases that I wish to focus on here. I have defined criminal 
193 
 
justice broadly to include prisons and anti-terrorism laws as well as more mainstream 
substantive criminal law. 
The first area of difference identified in Chapter 3.2 was the choice of objectives. Rule-
makers will have a wider choice of objectives available to them than immigration 
officials. These objectives will need to satisfy the first limb of the UK proportionality 
test, in that they must be ‘sufficiently important to justify limiting a fundamental right’.1 
In choosing which objectives to pursue, the rule-maker may be afforded structural 
deference concerning policy choice.  
The second area of difference discussed in Chapter 3.2 was the range of measures 
available to pursue a public interest objective. Most of the time, immigration officials 
effectively have no choice of measures. However, rule-makers will often have a 
substantial range of measures open to them. This indicates that factual optimisation will 
have a much greater role in these decisions than it had in the decisions discussed in 
Chapter 4. Where there are two or more ways of achieving a particular public interest 
objective, then the issue of which one impairs the affected human right to the least 
extent will become central to the proportionality analysis. Related to this stage of the 
proportionality test is structural deference, which affords a decision-maker a choice 
between equally rights-intrusive options. Once factual optimisation is being applied, 
this form of deference has the potential to arise. As was discussed in Chapter 2, 
empirical epistemic deference may also arise in relation to factual optimisation, because 
it may not always be possible to measure precisely the extent to which a challenged 
measure achieves the public interest or impairs a human right. 
The third area of difference identified in Chapter 3.2 was the scope of the decision. 
Rules by their nature are forward looking and apply generally across a group. The group 
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may vary in size: an Act of Parliament can apply to the entire state, whereas a rule in a 
prison will only apply to that specific prison population. In either instance, the breadth 
of the decision will be wider than was the case with immigration decisions. This will 
make measurement of the impact on the protected right and the achievement of the 
public interest more difficult, which in turn increases the likelihood that empirical 
epistemic deference will come into play.  
It is important to note that these three areas of difference give rise to points on a scale 
and the closer to one end of a scale of difference a decision is, the greater the level of 
emphasis on certain aspects of proportionality and deference. As with Chapter 4, I am 
seeking to establish that certain elements of proportionality and deference are 
emphasised and others are minimised depending on where the challenged governmental 
activity falls along those three scales. I am not seeking to show that there is one 
proportionality test for rule-making and another for administrative decisions. Rather, I 
am seeking to elaborate on the way in which the institutional setting of a proportionality 
challenge will affect the operation of the multi-stage test, which is of universal 
application across the various fields of governmental activity.  
As I noted in Chapter 3.1, I am intentionally focusing on cases at opposite ends of these 
scales, but I am conscious that there are many forms of government activity which fall 
at mid-points on the three scales. The smaller distinctions between mid-points are 
doubtless important for the structural model; however in this thesis I will be focusing to 
a large extent on the end points. The starker contrast between the farthest examples will 
enable a fuller examination of the parameters of institutional sensitivity.  
In Chapter 3.4 I identified the two main institutional reasons for affording deference to 
a decision-maker: democratic legitimacy and institutional competence. The former is a 
reason for affording structural deference and normative epistemic deference and the 
latter is a reason for affording empirical epistemic deference. In rule-making cases, 
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there is likely to be much more scope for democratic legitimacy as a reason for 
deference. Many rule-making bodies enjoy substantial democratic legitimacy, most 
obviously Parliament itself. This reason for deference was present to a very limited 
extent in Chapter 4, but it is of far more weight in rule-making cases. Institutional 
competence is also likely to be of significance as a reason for deference in this chapter. 
A further institutional factor was identified in Chapter 3 which is very specific to 
primary legislation: the interaction between sections 3 and 4 of the HRA. Section 3 has 
the potential to cut short a proportionality analysis by ending the analysis at the point of 
factual optimisation. Admittedly, where a measure is deemed to fail the factual 
optimisation stage, there may be little reason for continuing with the analysis, since the 
measure is disproportionate. However, even allowing for this, section 3 permits the 
courts to substitute their own, less rights-restrictive, rule in place of the challenged rule. 
This denies Parliament the opportunity to choose its own less rights-restrictive 
substitute rule, which would be possible if section 4 was used. As such, section 3 
eliminates the possibility of structural deference within the proportionality test. 
I have defined criminal justice broadly, to include terrorism and prisons in addition to 
the mainstream body of criminal law. Although most of the cases in this chapter are 
concerned with primary legislation, I have included some which involved non-
parliamentary rule-making. Some of these cases also have a multi-level decision-
making aspect to them although this is not commonly explored in these cases. Multi-
level decisions are discussed more fully in Chapter 6. 
This chapter is divided into four substantive sections, the first three of which are along 
the same lines as the three sections in Chapter 4. In the first section I will show how the 
UK courts have gone about identifying the principles to be balanced in proportionality 
cases dealing with criminal justice. In the second section I will move on to examine the 
operation of the factual optimisation arm of the proportionality test and the manner in 
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which structural and epistemic deference fit into this stage. I will also examine the 
operation of section 3 of the HRA in this second section. In the third section I will 
examine the operation of legal optimisation and the issues of epistemic deference which 
arise at that stage of the test. In the fourth section, I will show how the UK Courts have 
explained the institutional reasons for deference in a manner which is in line with my 
analysis in Chapter 3.4. 
 
 
5.1: THE IDENTIFICATION OF PRINCIPLES 
As was discussed in previous chapters, the proportionality test is fundamentally 
concerned with the balancing of conflicting principles, one a human rights principle and 
the other a public interest principle. The principled nature of human rights adjudication 
is well summed up by Simon Brown LJ in International Transport Roth GmbH v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department, when he noted that ‘[a]ll that the 
Convention really provides are the central principles and touchstones by which such a 
judgment can be made.’2 This candid admission of the sometimes ephemeral nature of 
adjudication under the HRA is both an indication of its core elements and a spur to 
develop a deeper understanding of the structure of that adjudication. If there is nothing 
concrete to dictate the outcome of cases, then the process by which cases are reasoned 
becomes all the more important. 
In order for the test to work, the precise principles being balanced must be explicit. The 
source of such principles in the UK is the Convention, but the exact principle being 
applied may not necessarily be stated in the text of the convention. As will be shown 
below, the UK courts often look to derivative principles from within the Convention 
                                                
2 [2002] EWCA Civ 158; [2003] QB 728, at 754. 
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rights. In doing so, guidance is often sought from decisions of the European Court of 
Human Rights (‘the ECHR’). The public interest principle being pursued also needs to 
be made explicit prior to the balancing analysis. In this section I will show the 
principles that the UK courts have identified in criminal justice proportionality cases. 
 
5.1.1: Human rights principles 
The two most obviously relevant provisions of the Convention in these cases are 
Articles 5 & 6, which deal with the right to liberty and fair trial respectively. However, 
other provisions have been applied too. 
Liberty 
Article 5 of the Convention guarantees the right to liberty and security of the person. 
One of the most forthright considerations of the meaning of this right is to be found in 
the decision of the House of Lords in A&X v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department.3 The case concerned the detention without trial of non-UK nationals whom 
the Home Secretary suspected of involvement in terrorism. In considering the nature 
and scope of the right to liberty, the House made explicit reference to ECHR 
jurisprudence, notably Chahal v UK.4 The case was primarily concerned with whether 
the derogation to Article 5 was Convention-compatible and the House was clear that 
compatibility depended on balancing Article 5 with the public interest. 
Fair trial 
In a number of cases, including R v Lambert,5 International Transport Roth GmbH v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department6 and Brown v Stott7 the courts have found 
                                                
3 [2004] UKHL 56; [2005] 2 AC 68. 
4 (1997) 23 EHRR 413. 
5 [2001] UKHL 37; [2002] 2 AC 545. 
6 [2002] EWCA Civ 158; [2003] QB 728. 
7 [2003] 1 AC 681. 
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that the requirement that a trial be fair was absolute. On the face of it this would suggest 
that the right to fair trial is a rule rather than a principle. However, the contents of the 
right are not cut and dried. In Brown v Stott, Lord Bingham noted that ‘what a fair trial 
requires cannot, however, be the subject of a single, unvarying rule or collection of 
rules.’8 Salabiaku v France9 makes it clear that provisions which allow for the shifting 
of either the legal or evidential burden of proof to the accused can be Convention-
compatible. Salabiaku was cited by the House of Lords in R v Director of Public 
Prosecutions ex parte Kebilene10 in which Lord Hope noted that: 
‘The cases show that, although article 6(2) is in absolute terms, it is not 
regarded as imposing an absolute prohibition on reverse onus clauses, 
whether they be evidential (presumptions of fact) or persuasive 
(presumptions of law). In each case the question will be whether the 
presumption is within reasonable limits.’11 
Lord Hope then proceeded to cite numerous international examples of proportionality 
cases and engaged in a proportionality analysis of the challenged measure. As such, the 
fair trial protections in Article 6 can operate as principles for the purposes of the 
structural model of proportionality and deference. 
An example of a sub-principle that can be derived from Article 6 is the right of access 
to a court. However, as was recognised by the ECHR in cases such as Golder v United 
Kingdom12 and Ashingdane v United Kingdom13 the right of access to the courts can be 
qualified. This reasoning was expressly endorsed by Lord Bingham in Brown v Stott14 
who held that equality of arms and the privilege against self incrimination are also sub-
                                                
8 [2003] 1 AC 681, at 693. 
9 (1991) 13 EHRR 379. 
10 [2000] 2 AC 326. 
11 ibid, at 385. 
12 (1979-80) 1 EHRR 524. 
13 (1985) 7 EHRR 528. 
14 [2003] 1 AC 681. 
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principles derived from Article 6. He cited ECHR jurisprudence in support of these 
principles. He held that:  
‘The jurisprudence of the European court very clearly establishes that 
while the overall fairness of a criminal trial cannot be compromised, the 
constituent rights comprised, whether expressly or implicitly, within 
article 6 are not themselves absolute. Limited qualification of these 
rights is acceptable if reasonably directed by national authorities towards 
a clear and proper public objective and if representing no greater 
qualification than the situation calls for.’15 
He went on to note that: 
‘The court has also recognised the need for a fair balance between the 
general interest of the community and the personal rights of the 
individual, the search for which balance has been described as inherent 
in the whole of the Convention’.16 
The central thrust of these cases is that the fairness of the trial must not be 
compromised. In establishing the fairness or otherwise, the court can look at the sub-
principles, which may be limited proportionately, provided the overall fairness remains. 
The dicta of Lord Bingham show that both factual and legal optimisation are important 
in assessing the effect of Article 6. 
Presumption of innocence 
Article 6(2) expressly states that ‘everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be 
presumed innocent until proved guilty’. This has been the basis of numerous 
proportionality cases. For example in R v Director of Public Prosecutions ex parte 
                                                
15 [2003] 1 AC 681, at 704. 
16 ibid, at 704. 
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Kebilene17 Lord Hope expressly recognised this fundamental principle and cited a long 
line of domestic UK case law which upheld the principle even prior to the introduction 
of the HRA. The Kebilene decision concerned a reverse burden of proof clause: section 
16A of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989. Lord Hope 
specifically noted that under the HRA, parliament would also be restricted by this 
principle in a way that it had not been previously, indicating the strength with which the 
principle now applies.18 
The later case of R v Lambert19 also dealt with a reverse burden of proof clause, this 
time in section 28 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971. Again, Lord Hope placed emphasis 
on the importance of the principle of the presumption of innocence. He was very clear 
that the presumption was a principle and not a rule. He cited the ECHR decisions in the 
cases of Salabiaku v France20 and Ashingdane v United Kingdom21 and he noted that in 
those cases the ECHR had expressly held that the principle of the presumption of 
innocence could legitimately be limited in the public interest provided it met a 
proportionality test. 
In Sheldrake v Director of Public Prosecutions; Attorney General’s Reference (No 4 of 
2002)22 the House also relied on Article 6(2) as the relevant human rights principle. 
Again the decision of Salabiaku was an important element in the House’s reasoning on 
the scope of that principle. 
Private communication with Legal Representatives 
In R (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department,23 the House of Lords 
accepted a HRA challenge from a prisoner whose letters from his solicitor were being 
                                                
17 [2000] 2 AC 326. 
18 ibid, at 377 per Lord Hope. 
19 [2001] UKHL 37; [2002] 2 AC 545. 
20 (1991) 13 EHRR 379. 
21 (1985) 7 EHRR 528. 
22 [2004] UKHL 43; [2005] 1 AC 264. 
23 [2001] UKHL 26; [2001] 2 AC 532. 
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examined, but not read, in his absence by prison staff as part of the standard cell 
searching policy. The Article 8 right to respect for correspondence was deemed to give 
rise to the principle that legal correspondence should not be read by others. 
Private life 
In a series of cases concerning the notification requirements for people convicted of 
sexual offences, the Courts have accepted that such notification was an interference 
with the Article 8 right to respect for private and family life. Examples of these cases 
include R (F) v Secretary of State for the Home Department,24A v Scottish Ministers,25 
Forbes v Secretary of State for the Home Department26and Gallagher, Re an 
Application for Judicial Review.27 In each of these cases the courts referred to the 
decision of the ECHR in Adamson v United Kingdom28 in which the Convention 
compatibility of the notification requirements was unsuccessfully raised. 
Freedom of Expression 
In Hirst v Secretary of State for the Home Department29 a prisoner who was the 
spokesperson for a body representing prisoners throughout the country wished to be 
interviewed on radio regarding issues relating to prisoners. In considering the nature of 
the rights principle at stake, the High Court made explicit reference to the decision of 
the ECHR in the case of Golder v United Kingdom.30 In each of these cases the courts 
recognised that the Article 10 principle of freedom of expression applied.  
 
 
                                                
24 [2008] EWHC 3170; [2009] 2 Cr App R (s) 325; and [2009] EWCA Civ 792. 
25 [2007] CSOH 189; [2008] SLT 412. 
26 [2006] EWCA Civ 962; [2006] 1 WLR 3075. 
27 [2003] NIQB 26. 
28 (1999) 28 EHRR 209 CD. 
29 [2002] EWHC 602 (Admin). 
30 (1979-80) 1 EHRR 524. 
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Property 
International Transport Roth GmbH v Secretary of State for the Home Department31 
concerned a scheme whereby property could be seized if it had been involved in illegal 
immigration, most notably trucks and other vehicles. The Court of Appeal recognised 
that Article 1 of the First Protocol to the Convention guaranteed the right to private 
property and that this principle would have to be considered in relation to criminal 
penalties. 
 
5.1.2: Public interest principles 
Certain public interests are of sufficient importance to qualify as principles, which can 
be balanced against human rights principles. The identification of such principles is an 
important preliminary issue for the proportionality test. As was discussed in Chapters 
2.2 and 4.1.2, the structural model does not provide a mechanism for determining which 
public interest goals will qualify as principles. This is a normative question and the 
structural model seeks to provide a framework within which normative debate on this 
issue can be accommodated. 
There is no comprehensive legal test for determining this issue in the UK, and so the 
courts have been guided by the requirements of the first stage of the proportionality test 
and the text of the Convention (as interpreted by ECHR jurisprudence). The first stage 
of the UK proportionality test is unequivocal that the objective of the challenged 
measure must be ‘sufficiently important to justify limiting a fundamental right’.32  This 
is usually known as the ‘legitimate objective’ stage of the test. This stage requires a 
reviewing court to consider whether a public interest goal qualifies as a principle, but its 
                                                
31 [2002] EWCA Civ 158; [2003] QB 728. 
32 de Freitas v Minister for Agriculture and Fisheries [1999] 1 AC 69, at 80 per Lord Clyde. Cited with 
approval in R (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] UKHL 26; [2001] 2 AC 532 
and R v A (No 2) [2001] UKHL 25; [2002] 1 AC 45. 
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formulation gives little methodological assistance to the court beyond posing the initial 
question. 
In the case study on immigration, it was evident that the courts were guided by Article 
8(2) when seeking to determine whether an objective was legitimate. With Articles 8-11 
and Article 1 of the First Protocol, the courts have an explicit provision in the text to 
assist them in determining whether or not an objective is legitimate. Some of the cases 
in this chapter involve the right to fair trial and the presumption of innocence, both of 
which are guaranteed by Article 6 of the Convention. There is no express limitation 
clause for Article 6, although both the UK Courts33 and the ECHR34 have repeatedly 
confirmed that Article 6 may be subject to proportionality analysis in order to determine 
the precise parameters of the rights contained in it. The text of Article 6 does not give 
any list of the public interests which will be accepted as legitimate aims for any such 
proportionality analysis. However, the UK courts have been guided by ECHR case law 
in determining whether certain public interests are of sufficient weight to form the basis 
of a proportionate limitation of Article 6 rights. As I will show in this section, the public 
interest principles that have been recognised by the courts are very much in line with 
the principles covered in those Articles that do have limitation clauses. 
The decision-makers in the cases considered in this chapter have much more freedom in 
choosing which public interest they wish to pursue than was the case in the previous 
chapter. This means that there may be a reason for affording some structural deference 
to the choice of objective, since there may be multiple legitimate objectives available. 
Prevention of terrorism 
In R v Director of Public Prosecutions ex parte Kebilene Lord Hope based his analysis 
of the limitation of Article 6 on the prevention of terrorism. He cited ECHR 
                                                
33 See for example R v A (No 2) [2001] UKHL 25; [2002] 1 AC 45, at 65 per Lord Steyn; and R v 
Lambert [2001] UKHL 37; [2002] 2 AC 545, at 588 per Lord Hope. 
34 See Salabiaku v France (1991) 13 EHRR 379; and Ashingdane v United Kingdom (1985) 7 EHRR 528. 
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jurisprudence on reverse burdens of proof35 and accepted that Article 6 could be limited 
such that there was a ‘fair balance’ between ‘the demands of the general interest of the 
community and the protection of the fundamental rights of the individual.’36 He found 
in this case that the legitimate objective is the ‘strong interest in preventing acts of 
terrorism before they are perpetrated’.37 The limitation clauses of the other Articles 
repeatedly refer to national security and the protection of the rights of others. While 
Lord Hope did not make any express reference to either of these, it can easily be argued 
that the aim pursued in this case fits into the general rubric of the limitation of 
Convention rights; the prevention of terrorism does not seem a particularly 
controversial choice as a legitimate aim. 
In the more recent case of A&X v Secretary of State for the Home Department38 a 
majority of the House of Lords was prepared to accept that there was an ongoing risk of 
a terrorist attack on the UK and that this gave rise to a principle that the state could limit 
rights for the prevention of terrorism. The case concerned a derogation to Article 5 of 
the convention which had to be justified on the basis of Article 15.39 The public interest 
principle was expressly stated in Article 15, the text of which requires there to be a 
‘public emergency threatening the life of the nation’ in order for a derogation to be 
permitted. The majority of the House of Lords were prepared to accept the view of the 
Home Secretary on this point. Lord Bingham cited ECHR jurisprudence to the effect 
that widespread loss of life need not have occurred for a public emergency to exist.40 He 
also expressed the view that ‘great weight should be given to the judgment of the Home 
                                                
35 Salabiaku v France (1991) 13 EHRR 379; Sporrong and Lönnroth v Sweden (1982) 5 EHRR 35. 
36 [2000] 2 AC 326, at 384. 
37 ibid, at 387 per Lord Hope. 
38 [2004] UKHL 56; [2005] 2 AC 68. 
39 Article 15 requires a proportionality test to be applied in order to determine if the derogation is 
justified. See Dijk, P. van and Hoof, G.J.H. van Theory and Practice of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (4th ed., Oxford: Intersentia, 2006) at 1062-1064. 
40 Lawless v Ireland (No 3) (1979-80) 1 EHRR 15. 
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Secretary’41 on the issue of whether such an emergency existed. This is an example of 
empirical epistemic deference. Lord Bingham knew that it is not possible precisely to 
measure the threat and so he deferred to the Home Secretary who is more institutionally 
competent to make the assessment. 
Control of the possession of drugs 
R v Lambert42 concerned a reverse burden provision in the misuse of drugs legislation. 
As with Kebilene, the case concerned Article 6, and so the text of the Convention did 
not provide specific guidance on what was a legitimate aim. Lord Hope referred to the 
ECHR Salabiaku case43 and noted that the ‘statutory objective is to penalise the 
unauthorised possession of dangerous or otherwise harmful drugs’.44 This objective 
seemed to pass muster with the House of Lords. It could be closely associated with 
public goals which are contained in other provisions of the Convention, such as the 
protection of public health and the protection of the rights of others. 
Prevention of drunk driving 
In two important proportionality decisions, Brown v Stott45 and Sheldrake v Director of 
Public Prosecutions; Attorney General’s Reference (No 4 of 2002)46 it has been held 
that it is legitimate for the state to pursue the aim of preventing drunk driving. Both 
cases involved reverse burden provisions, and so were limitations of Article 6.  In 
Brown v Stott47 Lord Steyn held that the challenged provision addressed the legitimate 
objective of trying to tackle the high rate of road traffic accidents resulting in death and 
serious injuries. He held that the Home Secretary was ‘entitled to take into account that 
it was necessary to protect other Convention rights, viz the right to life of members of 
                                                
41 [2004] UKHL 56; [2005] 2 AC 68, AT 102. 
42 [2001] UKHL 37; [2002] 2 AC 545. 
43 Salabiaku v France (1991) 13 EHRR 379. 
44 [2001] UKHL 37; [2002] 2 AC 545, at 588. 
45 [2003] 1 AC 681. 
46 [2004] UKHL 43; [2005] 1 AC 264. 
47 [2003] 1 AC 681. 
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the public exposed to the danger of accidents: see article 2(1)’.48 The legitimacy of the 
aim in this case is therefore derived from the protection of the rights of others. Lord 
Steyn also examined the level of deference to be afforded to Parliament in setting its 
legislative objectives. He held that ‘the legislature was in as good a position as a court 
to assess the gravity of the problem and the public interest in addressing it.’49 This is 
evidence of end-setting structural deference at the legitimate objective stage of 
proportionality. 
Protection of complainants in rape cases 
In R v A (No 2)50 the House of Lords considered the operation of the so called ‘rape 
shield’ law contained in section 41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 
1999. The Act had been explicitly targeted at the need to protect complainants in sexual 
offences cases from being questioned on their prior sexual conduct. Lord Steyn noted 
that this measure was designed to combat the ‘twin myths’ that unchaste women are 
more likely to consent and are less credible.51 As with the other fair trial cases, the text 
of the Convention does not provide express guidance on what is a legitimate aim for the 
purposes of Article 6. Lord Steyn made reference to the infliction of ‘unacceptable 
humiliation on complainants in rape cases’52 and Lord Hope commented that 
enforcement of the law would be impaired if the system did ‘not protect the essential 
witnesses from unnecessary humiliation or distress’53 These comments indicate that the 
prevention of crime (through encouraging reporting of rape) and the protection of the 
Article 8 privacy rights of witnesses were the basis for accepting the legitimate aim. As 
with many of the other Article 6 cases, there is no clear reference to either of these 
                                                
48 [2003] 1 AC 681, at 711. 
49 ibid, at 711. 
50 [2001] UKHL 25; [2002] 1 AC 45. 
51 ibid, at 59. 
52 ibid, at 59. 
53 ibid, at 82. 
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points, but the aim can nonetheless be justified on these grounds and such grounds are 
implicit in the reasoning of the House. 
Prevention of illegal immigration 
In International Transport Roth GmbH v Secretary of State for the Home Department54 
Simon Brown LJ accepted that the prevention of illegal immigration was a legitimate 
aim. He noted that: ‘[t]he increasing scale of illegal entry into the United Kingdom over 
recent years is well known. It is acknowledged by all to represent a grave social evil.’55 
As was made clear in the preceding chapter, the control of immigration has often been 
cited as a public interest principle in proportionality cases under the HRA. What is 
significant about the Roth case is that it was applied in a proportionality case concerning 
Article 6, (which contains no specific limitation clause) and Article 1 of the First 
Protocol (which permits limitation of the right to property in the ‘general interest’). 
Maintenance of prison order and discipline 
There have been a number of cases dealing with human rights claims by prisoners 
which relate to their conditions. For example the leading case of R (Daly) v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department56 concerned the need to search prisoners’ cells. The 
applicant accepted that the challenged measure was ‘for the purpose of security, 
preventing crime and maintaining order and discipline’.57 Since the applicant had 
accepted the legitimacy of the aim, there was little reason to examine it in detail. 
However, it is worth noting that Article 8(2) expressly allows for the limitation of the 
right to respect for correspondence in the interests of preventing disorder or crime. As 
such, the legitimacy of this aim can easily be accommodated within the text of the 
Convention. 
                                                
54 [2002] EWCA Civ 158; [2003] QB 728. 
55 ibid, at 737. 
56 [2001] UKHL 26; [2001] 2 AC 532. 
57 R (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] UKHL 26; [2001] 2 AC 532 at 541. 
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Hirst v Secretary of State for the Home Department58 concerned restrictions on the 
freedom of expression of prisoners. The claimant wished to be the subject of a radio 
station interview via the telephone. The Home Secretary defended the blanket ban on 
such contact with the media on the basis that it would be too difficult to monitor and 
regulate such an interview. The Home Secretary sought to justify this restriction on 
prisoners’ right to freedom of expression under Article 10 on the grounds that it was 
necessary for the prevention of crime and disorder and the protection of information 
given in confidence. Both of these objectives are expressly recognised in Article 10(2) 
and Elias J accepted that the aim was legitimate. 
Prevention of sex crime 
As was noted above, there have been a number of cases59 concerning the laws relating 
to the so-called ‘sex offenders register’ which is currently governed by the notification 
requirements in Part 2 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. In each of these cases the 
courts referred to the decision of the ECHR in Adamson v United Kingdom.60 In 
Adamson the ECHR was satisfied that notification requirements were in pursuit of the 
prevention of crime and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others, which are 
two of the specific aims listed in Article 8(2) of the Convention.61 It has been 
emphasised by the UK courts that this aim is prevention of further offending, rather 
than punishment for past offences.62 
 
 
                                                
58 [2002] EWHC 602 (Admin). 
59 Gallagher, Re an Application for Judicial Review [2003] NIQB 26. Forbes v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department [2006] EWCA Civ 962; [2006] 1 WLR 3075. A v Scottish Ministers [2007] CSOH 
189; [2008] SLT 412. R (F) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] EWHC 3170; [2009] 2 
Cr App R (s) 325; and [2009] EWCA Civ 792. 
60 (1999) 28 EHRR 209 CD. 
61 See Adamson v United Kingdom (1999) 28 EHRR 209 CD. 
62 See Gallagher, Re an Application for Judicial Review [2003] NIQB 26. Forbes v Secretary of State for 
the Home Department [2006] EWCA Civ 962, at paragraph 16. 
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5.1.3: Rational connection 
The issue of rational connection has been addressed occasionally by the UK Courts. As 
was noted in Chapter 4.1.3, this issue has sometimes been conflated with consideration 
of legal optimisation in immigration decisions. This has also occurred with criminal 
justice decisions. For example, in A&X v Secretary of State for the Home Department63 
Lord Bingham expressed concern about the efficacy of the challenged measure. Section 
23 of the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act allowed for the indefinite detention, 
without trial, of foreign nationals suspected of involvement in international terrorism 
but permitted them to leave the country in order to end their detention. Lord Bingham 
pointed out that in many cases, the option of deportation would permit suspects to go 
abroad and carry out their terrorist activities there. His analysis of this point is very 
closely wrapped up in his consideration of factual optimisation (see below) and it is not 
entirely clear on which point the case was decided. Similarly, the judgment of Lord 
Hope contains a detailed consideration of whether the measure was ‘strictly necessary’ 
which concludes by stating that there was no rational connection. Again it is very 
difficult to assess which arm of proportionality the challenged law failed on. It is 
nonetheless worthwhile to note that issues of rational connection have been addressed in 
these cases. 
 
 
5.2: CHOICE OF LEAST INTRUSIVE MEANS: FACTUAL OPTIMISATION 
Factual optimisation has been a key element of many criminal justice proportionality 
cases in a way that sets them apart from the immigration decisions considered in the 
preceding chapter. Factual optimisation requires a court to address whether the means 
                                                
63 [2004] UKHL 56; [2005] 2 AC 68. 
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chosen to pursue the public interest principle have impaired the human rights principle 
as little as possible. As I explained in Chapter 3.2.1, this part of the proportionality test 
will be greatly affected by the range of measures available to the rule-maker. At the 
level of parliament, the range of measures is very wide, at the lower levels of decision-
making, the options may be much narrower, as with a policy in a prison. In either case, 
rule-makers will have more choice of measure than is available to immigration officials, 
and so, as I will show in this section, factual optimisation has much more scope to 
operate in such cases. In addition to establishing the use of factual optimisation in the 
UK, this section will also show how the courts’ reasoning on questions of deference in 
factual optimisation can be described in terms of structural and epistemic deference.  
The earliest HRA proportionality case dealing with criminal justice legislation was R v 
A (No 2).64 The case involved a challenge to section 41 of the Youth Justice and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1999 (‘the 1999 Act’) which prevented the inclusion of a 
complainant’s prior sexual conduct in sexual offence trials. Such evidence could only 
be admitted with leave of the court and even then, only where the prior sexual conduct 
took place as part of the same event, or was so similar to the event in question that it 
could not be a coincidence. The accused had had sex with the complainant at various 
points over the preceding few weeks, most recently a week before the alleged rape. The 
complainant had had sex with a friend of the accused earlier on the evening of the 
alleged rape. The House of Lords considered whether the provision intruded as little as 
possible onto the right of the accused to a fair trial under Article 6.  
Lord Steyn applied the proportionality test used by the Privy Council in the de Freitas 
case. This test entails three parts: legitimate objective, rational connection and minimal 
impairment.  
‘In determining whether a limitation is arbitrary or excessive he 
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said that the court would ask itself:  
“whether: (i) the legislative objective is sufficiently important 
to justify limiting a fundamental right; (ii) the measures 
designed to meet the legislative objective are rationally 
connected to it; and (iii) the means used to impair the right or 
freedom are no more than is necessary to accomplish the 
objective.”  
Their Lordships accept and adopt this threefold analysis of the 
relevant criteria.’65 
The overall balancing requirement is notable by its absence (although it was alluded to 
in the judgment of Lord Hope). Lord Steyn stated that the minimal impairment arm of 
the test was the ‘critical matter’66. He went on to consider whether the provisions of the 
1999 Act impaired the right to fair trial no more than was necessary to accomplish the 
objective. He found that the ordinary meaning of the words in the 1999 Act were such 
that they could not permit the admission of the evidence that the accused and the 
complainant had been in a sexual relationship previously. Lord Steyn was of the view 
that in some cases, the blanket ban on all such questioning could be incompatible with 
the right to fair trial in that it would exclude evidence that was ‘logically relevant’ to the 
issue of consent. For Lord Steyn, this would be going too far. His finding is clearly an 
example of factual optimisation insofar as he is trying to find the most rights-
compatible meaning that is factually possible.  
Lord Steyn held that the interpretative obligation in section 3 of the HRA should be 
used to ‘read down’ section 41 of the 1999 Act so that a trial judge should not exclude 
evidence where to do so would be incompatible with Article 6. He held that such an 
                                                
65 de Freitas v Minister for Agriculture and Fisheries [1999] 1 AC 69, at 80 per Lord Clyde; cited with 
approval at [2001] UKHL 25; [2002] 1 AC 45, at 65, per Lord Steyn. 
66 [2001] UKHL 25; [2002] 1 AC 45, at 65. 
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interpretation would ensure that section 41 ‘achieved a major part of its objective but its 
excessive reach will have been attenuated’.67 In doing this, Lord Steyn found an 
alternative, less rights-restrictive measure which still protected the public interest 
principle at stake.68 
In R (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department69 the House of Lords 
considered a challenge to a provision in the prison rules, which permitted the searching 
of cells in the absence of the prisoner. As part of these searches, correspondence – 
including correspondence with legal representatives – would be inspected but not read 
by prison staff. The House found that this went further than was necessary to achieve 
the aim of preventing the prisoners from being sent anything that might endanger prison 
security or be used to commit a crime within the prison. The main thrust of the decision 
was set out in the judgment of Lord Bingham (who concerned himself primarily with 
common law rights), although it was the speech of Lord Steyn that contained a detailed 
exposition of the nature and scope of proportionality. Nonetheless, Lord Bingham’s 
speech did involve factual optimisation, albeit in relation to common law rights rather 
than Convention rights. He considered the blanket nature of the ban and whether it was 
more rights-intrusive than was necessary to achieve its aim. He held that: 
‘The policy cannot in my opinion be justified in its present blanket form. 
The infringement of prisoners’ rights to maintain the confidentiality of 
their privileged legal correspondence is greater than is shown to be 
necessary to serve the legitimate public objectives already identified.’70 
Lord Bingham bolstered his finding with a discussion of a number of other mechanisms 
which could be used but which would be less rights-intrusive. While he found that it 
                                                
67 [2001] UKHL 25; [2002] 1 AC 45, at 68. 
68 Lord Hope expressly concurred with Lord Steyn’s direction to trial judges. See [2001] UKHL 25; 
[2002] 1 AC 45, at 69 per Lord Steyn; and at 87-88 per Lord Hope. 
69 [2001] UKHL 26; [2001] 2 AC 532. 
70 ibid, at 543. 
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would be inappropriate for the House to formulate a specific rule to replace the one 
challenged, he clearly gave examples of rules that would be acceptable. This is again an 
indication not only of the operation of factual optimisation in the UK case law. It also 
shows that in order for factual optimisation to operate, there must be a range of 
measures available which are capable of achieving the public interest principle. It is also 
of significance that the House declared the incompatible sections of the Prison Security 
Manual to be void. This would not have been possible with primary legislation, but it 
shows the capability of the courts to quash rules at other levels without the need to send 
them back to the original rule-maker for revision. 
Having shown the operation of factual optimisation in these two leading examples, I 
will now move on to show how factual optimisation has operated in other criminal 
justice cases. In doing so, I will also address the manner in which factual optimisation 
interacted with the different forms of deference. 
 
5.2.1: Factual optimisation and structural deference 
As was discussed in Chapter 2.4.1, structural deference can arise in factual optimisation 
where a primary decision-maker has a choice of measures available to achieve the 
public interest. If there are multiple measures available, each of which have the same 
impact on the protected human right, then the courts will defer to the decision-maker’s 
choice of measure. This relationship between factual optimisation and structural 
deference can be seen in the criminal justice case law. 
In Brown v Stott71Lord Steyn engaged in an assessment of the alternative means that 
were available to the legislature in its efforts to combat dangerous driving, the aim 
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which the challenged measured pursued.72 The measure at issue was section 172 of the 
Road Traffic Act 1988, which required a person keeping a vehicle to identify the driver 
when there is an allegation that the vehicle was involved in one of a specified list of 
offences, including driving under the influence of alcohol. In the instant case, this had 
given rise to the defendant giving information which could be used as evidence against 
her. Lord Steyn looked at two alternatives to the measure: Parliament could merely have 
called upon the police and the prosecuting authorities to ‘redouble their efforts’, 
however he accepted that such a policy could be regarded as inadequate. Alternatively 
Parliament could have introduced a reverse burden of proof on the owner of the vehicle 
to show that he or she was not the driver at the time the alleged offence was committed. 
On the basis of the earlier ECHR reverse burden cases, Lord Steyn took the view that a 
reverse burden clause would have been lawful in this instance. He also held that such a 
reverse burden clause and section 172 involved the same level of intrusion on Article 6, 
stating that: ‘[i]n their impact on the citizen the two techniques are not widely 
different.’73 Set in this context, his acceptance of section 172 as Convention-compatible 
can be seen to be based on a factual optimisation of the principles at stake, since he 
concluded that the least rights-intrusive means of achieving the aim had in fact been 
used. 
As regards deference, Lord Steyn concluded that it was for Parliament to choose 
between the equally rights-restrictive measures:  
‘It really then boils down to the question whether in adopting the 
procedure enshrined in section 172(2), rather than a reverse burden 
technique, it took more drastic action than was justified. While this is 
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ultimately a question for the court, it is not unreasonable to regard both 
techniques as permissible in the field of the driving of vehicles.’74 
Lord Steyn is separating out two questions: the question of whether a measure is 
factually optimised – which is for the court to decide – and the question of which one of 
the range of factually optimised measures available should be deployed – which is for 
Parliament to decide. This shows structural deference within the factual optimisation 
stage of proportionality. 
The petitioner in A v Scottish Ministers75 was a 28-year-old man who had been 
convicted of two counts of attempted rape when he was 15. As a result of these 
convictions, he was subject to the notification requirements in the Sexual Offences Act 
2003 (the ‘sex offenders register’) for the rest of his life. The petitioner had no means of 
reviewing their continuation. Lord Turnbull in the Court of Session gave detailed 
consideration to whether this was the least rights-intrusive means available for 
achieving the legitimate public interest aim. He paid particular attention to the effect 
that introducing a system of review would have and noted that ‘[i]t would have the 
disadvantage of uncertainty, it would be resource intensive and it would create the risk 
that the data base of information was incomplete.’76 He ultimately took the view that the 
scheme as it stood had sufficient flexibility already and that it was not difficult for the 
petitioner to comply with the notification requirements. The reasoning is to some extent 
conflated with the analysis of legal optimisation, but it is clear that Lord Turnbull was 
satisfied that the minimal impairment criterion was satisfied.  
Lord Turnbull also made explicit reference to the importance of permitting Parliament 
to choose between equally proportionate measures, stating that ‘[t]he question is 
whether the measures complained of fall within the umbrella of proportionality. If they 
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do it is for Parliament to decide which of a range of measures to implement.’77 This is a 
clear example of structural deference in factual optimisation. Lord Turnbull’s references 
to representative legislature and democratic government make it clear that his reason for 
affording deference is the democratic legitimacy of Parliament. 
As was noted above, the House of Lords in R v A (No 2)78 ‘read down’ section 41 of the 
Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 so that it would be Convention-
compatible. In his analysis of section 3 of the HRA, Lord Steyn accepted that the 
ordinary meaning of the words in section 41 could not support a Convention-compatible 
reading, but went on to find that an interpretation that went beyond the ordinary 
meaning could be used if this would bring about a Convention-compatible result. He 
noted that the HRA required a broader version of statutory interpretation than had been 
used previously.79 Conversely, Lord Hope was not prepared to read in a general 
provision, instead finding that if a trial judge felt that section 3 had to be applied in a 
particular case, then that might be appropriate, but he was not prepared to change the 
system as a whole, because the system as a whole could not be shown to be 
disproportionate. In reaching this conclusion, Lord Hope noted that ‘there is no single 
answer to the problem as to how best to serve the legitimate aim. There are choices to 
be made.’80 
This difference between their Lordships can be understood as a dispute over the level of 
structural deference to be afforded to Parliament within factual optimisation. There is 
no structural deference when section 3 is used, because it inserts one specific measure 
in place of the challenged one (albeit an altered version of the original measure). This 
prevents Parliament from having any choice of measure at all, unless it devises a new 
scheme entirely. Admittedly, Lord Hope agreed with the model direction which Lord 
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Steyn proposed should be given to trial judges. However, his analysis suggests that he 
would prefer to afford Parliament greater structural deference in factual optimisation. 
A number of important proportionality decisions have dealt with reversals of the onus 
of proof in various statutory regimes. In 2000, the House of Lords considered the case 
of R v Director of Public Prosecutions ex parte Kebilene81 which concerned section 
16A of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) 1989 Act. Section 16A set 
out a system whereby a person who had in their possession certain articles in 
circumstances which gave rise to a suspicion that it would be used for a terrorist 
purpose would be guilty of an offence. There was no requirement that the prosecution 
prove that it was in fact held for a terrorist purpose, but it was open to an accused 
person to prove that their purpose was innocent. There was also an assumption as 
regards possession, which again could be rebutted by the accused. Both the Court of 
Appeal and the House of Lords held that this mechanism not only placed an evidential 
burden on the accused person, but in fact reversed the legal burden of proof. The House 
declined to make a final ruling on the proportionality for jurisdictional reasons.82 
However, Lord Hope gave a detailed and considered analysis of whether this was the 
least intrusive means of achieving the aim sought. He considered the distinction 
between shifting the evidential burden and shifting the full persuasive burden and was 
clearly of the view that an evidential burden would be a less rights-intrusive means of 
pursuing the aim of the prevention of terrorism.83 
Although no section 3 interpretation was made in the Kebilene case, Lord Steyn did 
describe section 3 as imposing a ‘strong interpretative obligation’,84 suggesting that if a 
ruling had been procedurally possible in this case, the section would have been ‘read 
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down’ in accordance with section 3. As was noted above in relation to R v A (No 2) 
such a reading would display a very limited amount of structural deference in factual 
optimisation. 
The rationale set out in Kebilene was followed by R v Lambert85 which was heard after 
the entry into force of the HRA and did not involve any of the jurisdictional issues of 
judicial review involved in Kebilene. The Lambert decision concerned an offence under 
section 5 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 (‘the 1971 Act’). Section 28 of the 1971 Act 
provided an accused person with a defence if he could prove that he neither knew nor 
believed nor had reason to believe that the substance in his possession was a controlled 
drug. The House found that this provision shifted the burden of proof onto the accused. 
A majority of the House also considered that this was not the least intrusive means of 
achieving the public interest principle of preventing the possession of unlawful and 
otherwise dangerous drugs. In reaching this conclusion, the majority considered what 
the effect of ‘reading down’ the section would be. The Lords were content that a 
shifting of the evidential burden, rather than the legal burden would be sufficient to 
optimise the public interest principle but would also be less intrusive on the human 
rights principle.  
This shows that in gauging whether the measure was factually optimised, the House 
considered an alternative measure. The House was satisfied that it was less rights-
intrusive than the challenged measure and so their Lordships were content to find that 
the challenged measure was Convention incompatible. However, rather than making a 
declaration to that effect, the House substituted the less restrictive measure in place of 
the disproportionate one, using section 3.86 Lord Hope was eager to stress that what the 
House was doing was mere interpretation and was in no way to be thought of as judicial 
legislation. He argued that a section 3 reading down would only be possible where it 
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was not contradictory to a decision that had clearly been made by Parliament.87 
However, there may have been other less rights-restrictive alternatives available, 
besides the one inserted by the court. The use of section 3 prevented the court from 
affording Parliament structural deference in choosing between the less rights-restrictive 
measures. By inserting a specific rights compatible meaning, the House was choosing 
the least rights-restrictive option itself. To that extent, there was no structural deference 
afforded to Parliament within factual optimisation. 
It is worth noting that Lord Hutton, who was in the minority in Lambert, found that the 
provision was in fact Convention-compatible. He took the view that a shifting of the 
legal burden was required to achieve the public interest aim being pursued and that an 
evidential burden would not be sufficient. This is a factual optimisation analysis which 
came down on the side of the impugned measure – Lord Hutton took the view that the 
challenged measure was the least rights-restrictive available that would still achieve the 
public interest. 
Following on from Kebilene and Lambert was Sheldrake v Director of Public 
Prosecutions; Attorney General's Reference (No 4 of 2002)88 which involved two 
different cases, both of which involved reverse burden of proof provisions. Lord 
Bingham held that section 11(2) of the Terrorism Act 2000 placed a legal burden on an 
accused to disprove that he was a member of a terrorist organisation at any time since it 
became such an organisation and that he had never participated in its illegal activities.  
Unsurprisingly perhaps, the House found both of these to be incompatible with the 
Convention. Again, the public interest principle was being pursued by means of a 
reversal of the burden of proof and again, the House found that an evidential burden 
would be a less rights-intrusive means of achieving the aim. Sheldrake, like Lambert 
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resulted in the offending provision being ‘read down’ under section 3 in order to redress 
the incompatibility. In both cases the provisions were to be read as imposing an 
evidential burden only.  
As section 118 of the Terrorism Act 2000 listed a number of burdens that were 
evidential only, Lord Bingham accepted that it was the intention of Parliament to create 
a legal burden in section 11(2). However, he was content that reading that down to an 
evidential burden was not dismissing the will of Parliament, holding that ‘[s]uch was 
not the intention of Parliament when enacting the 2000 Act, but it was the intention of 
Parliament when enacting section 3 of the 1998 Act.’89 Again, this shows a very low 
level of structural deference as to the choice of measure. 
It must be considered whether this approach in these reverse burden of proof cases is 
more or less deferential than if a declaration of incompatibility had been made. On the 
one hand, the courts in these cases went out of their way not to expressly declare that 
legislation was Convention incompatible. On the other hand, in order to do so, the 
courts have twisted the meaning of the statutes in question to an extent that arguably 
(and in the case of Sheldrake openly) undermined the intention of Parliament at the time 
of the passage of the challenged legislation. By attempting to be deferential to the 
institution of Parliament, the courts have, in some instances acted in a manner that is 
directly contradictory to the intention of the legislation being challenged. The effect of 
this is that section 3 affords Parliament a lesser degree of structural deference than a 
declaration of incompatibility.  
As I stated in Chapter 3.4.3, I am not seeking to express a view on whether this is a 
positive or negative aspect of the HRA. My purpose here is merely to show the different 
operation of deference under sections 3 and 4 and to establish that section 3 entails a 
lesser degree of structural deference. 
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5.2.2: Factual optimisation and empirical epistemic deference 
Epistemic deference relates to issues of uncertainty when they arise in a proportionality 
analysis (see Chapter 2.4.2). When a court is assessing whether or not a particular 
government measure is the least restrictive measure available, questions of uncertainty 
can arise in relation to both the level of intrusion on the protected right and the level of 
realisation of the public interest. This can affect a court’s assessment of factual 
optimisation. In such instances, the court may afford the decision-maker empirical 
epistemic deference. 
Factual optimisation can be seen in A&X v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department90in which the House of Lords considered the Convention compatibility of 
section 23 of the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001. The section had been 
based on a derogation from Article 5 of the Convention on the basis of a threat to the 
life of the nation posed by international terrorism. Article 15 of the Convention states 
that any derogation must not go beyond what was ‘strictly required by the exigencies of 
the situation’. This imposes a proportionality test on the measure.91 Lord Bingham 
equated the derogation test with proportionality and cited the test set out in de Freitas. 
As was noted above there is no express overall balancing requirement in the wording of 
the de Freitas, although Lord Bingham also cited the Canadian test in R v Oakes,92 
which does include the overall balancing test. At it transpired, the case was decided on 
the basis of factual optimisation. 
Having stated the test, Lord Bingham then went on to examine whether or not the 
appellants’ proportionality arguments had merit and he found that they did. He was 
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concerned that the regime which was applied to UK nationals who were suspected of 
being a similar terrorist danger was very different from that applied to non-nationals; 
the UK national system did not entail detention in prison. He elaborated on the details 
of the regime imposed on UK nationals and noted that it would be hard to see why such 
a system could not inhibit terrorism.93 This is a very clear and direct example of a 
minimal impairment or factual optimisation analysis. The House examined the 
alternatives available to the challenged measure and found that they were not the least 
intrusive means available. As the impugned measure was an Act of Parliament, there 
was a very wide range of alternative measures which could have been deployed to 
achieve the public interest aim. There was therefore potentially no impediment to the 
control system used for UK nationals being extended to foreign suspects. The 
challenged provision was therefore declared incompatible with the Convention. 
In reaching its decision, the House also gave consideration to the role of deference in 
this case on the basis of ‘relative institutional competence’.94 The analysis is couched in 
terms of empirical epistemic deference. Lord Bingham held that the finding on whether 
there was a threat to the life of the nation involved a ‘factual prediction of what various 
people around the world might or might not do’.95 He accepted that this was a pre-
eminently political decision. This is a recognition of empirical epistemic deference: 
there was uncertainty as to the level of national security threat, and so the Lords were 
prepared to give ‘great weight’ to the assessment of the Home Secretary and Parliament 
as to what the level of that threat is. However Lord Bingham also held that the right to 
liberty in Article 5 is very much within the expertise of the courts, and so far less 
deference should be afforded where government action is related to that right.96 This is 
an example of far less empirical epistemic deference being afforded on the basis that the 
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judiciary have as much, if not more, expertise in this field than do the other branches of 
government.  
In Hirst v Secretary of State for the Home Department97 the factual optimisation stage 
went in favour of a finding that the challenged measure was disproportionate, despite 
the fact that the High Court made substantial reference to empirical epistemic deference. 
The case concerned a policy of the Home Secretary that prevented prisoners from being 
interviewed on radio. The claimant was the head of a prisoners’ representative body and 
wished to be interviewed regularly to discuss issues related to prisons and prisoners 
interests. Elias J cited the Court of Appeal decision in Samaroo v Secretary of State for 
the Home Department98 as authority for the proposition that the minimal impairment 
analysis would only be relevant where the restriction on freedom of expression was in 
addition to the punishment of imprisonment, rather than being an inherent part of it. His 
reasoning was that where the restriction was intrinsic to the punishment, then it was not 
open to the Home Secretary to choose a less restrictive means: 
‘Once it is determined that the appropriate sentence requires the denial of 
the right to exercise freedom of speech in certain contexts, then there is 
no other step which can secure that particular objective. If that element 
of the sentence were not imposed, the sanction would be a different and 
lesser one.’99 
Elias J held that the restriction on freedom of expression was not part of the 
punishment, and so the factual optimisation stage of the test could be used. Before 
coming to a conclusion on factual optimisation, Elias J expressed a large degree of 
confidence in the Home Office’s ability to assess and address the requirements of prison 
management. He found that: 
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‘In this case the policies are based on the experience and knowledge of 
the Home Office about the working of prisons and the cast of mind and 
attitude of prisoners.   I accept that it would be absurd to require the 
government to adopt a policy which it considered to be wholly 
inappropriate and potentially damaging merely so that its predictions of 
disaster could be shown to be correct.   It cannot be right to require the 
adoption of harmful policies simply to provide the empirical evidence 
needed to satisfy a court that the authority was right all along and that 
any interference with human rights was justified.’ 100 
This confirms that empirical epistemic deference can be afforded to decision-makers in 
cases where there is uncertainty as to the achievement of the public interest. It is 
noteworthy however, that there is little mention of any structural deference in the 
judgment. Elias J seemed to be content that the High Court could legitimately scrutinise 
the levels of protection afforded to rights in this instance without making policy 
undemocratically. It is also important that all of the various arguments for restricting 
freedom of expression of prisoners were examined quite closely by Elias J, 
notwithstanding his comments regarding deference. 
The Court ultimately compared the outright ban on radio interviews with a system 
proposed by the claimant which would permit the interview but with significant 
safeguards directed at serving the objectives of the ban. Elias J was satisfied that the 
‘the proposed conditions go a considerable way to meeting the concern of the prison 
authorities’.101 On this basis, the policy was quashed, which shows that the blanket ban 
failed the factual optimisation stage of proportionality. 
It is noteworthy that the Court was not prepared to quash the section of the prison rules 
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upon which the policy of a blanket ban was based, but it did quash the policy itself on 
the basis that it was a disproportionate interference with the claimant’s Article 10 rights, 
insofar as it made no allowances for any exceptions to the rule. This is a significant 
outcome. The Hirst case involved three levels of rules. There was the Prisons Act 1952, 
which gave the Secretary of State the power to make rules for prisons by statutory 
instrument. There were the various statutory instruments and there was the policy made 
under them. The High Court chose to quash the lowest level of rule in this case. It could 
feasibly (if the challenge had been made) have examined the proportionality of any of 
the levels. Also, as has been discussed, the Court noted that if a restriction on freedom 
of expression was inherent in the punishment, then there would be no place for factual 
optimisation (although that was not held to be the case in Hirst itself). This suggests that 
in the event that a restriction is deemed to be part of punishment, then a factual 
optimisation challenge would need to be directed higher up the ladder, at the Prison 
Rules or the Prisons Act itself.102 
The case of Gallagher, Re an Application for Judicial Review103 was a challenge to the 
notification requirements for sex offenders contained in the Sex Offenders Act 1997 and 
subsequent legislation. Kerr J in the High Court of Northern Ireland accepted that the 
notification requirements were onerous and were becoming increasingly so with each 
new piece of legislation. On this basis, the court examined whether the intrusion on the 
Article 8 right was proportionate to the legitimate aim of prevention of crime contained 
in Article 8(2).   
Kerr J gave some consideration to the notification requirements in other jurisdictions 
where mechanisms for review were available. This examination of the alternatives 
available shows that he was engaged in a factual optimisation analysis. While he 
accepted that the availability of such measures in other jurisdictions was ‘undoubtedly 
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relevant to the issue’ that fact alone could not ‘dictate the outcome of the scheme’s 
proportionality.’104  
In discussing this, Kerr J made much of the fact that the decision to introduce the 
notification measures without a system of review had been made by Parliament and 
held that other countries’ approaches ‘while interesting as examples of alternative 
methods, cannot automatically provide the answer’105 and that ‘legislation should reflect 
the perceived needs of the particular society it is designed to serve.’106 
While he accepted that the applicant had been inconvenienced by the system, he refused 
to consider the proportionality of the measure solely in relation to the individual 
concerned, stating that ‘[t]he scheme as a whole must be examined to see whether it 
goes beyond what is necessary to achieve the aim of protecting the public and deterring 
sex offenders from engaging in further criminal behaviour.’107 
He held that the automatic nature of the notification requirements was a necessary 
element of the scheme on the basis that: ‘[i]f individual offenders were able to obtain 
exemption from the notification requirements this could – at least potentially - 
compromise the efficacy of the scheme.’108 This is the language of factual optimisation. 
Kerr J is expressing the view that no less restrictive mechanism will in fact achieve the 
required level of public interest. His deference to Parliament is epistemic empirical 
deference, which arises where there is uncertainty as to precise measurements in 
proportionality analysis. Kerr J is of the view that the levels of public interest protection 
in the current scheme would not be met by the alternative proposed. In reaching that 
conclusion, he pays a good degree of deference to the fact that Parliament has chosen 
this measure.  
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5.2.3. Factual optimisation and section 4 of the HRA 
As I discussed in Chapter 3.4.3, section 4 of the HRA involves an in-built deference to 
Parliament, in that the challenged legislation continues to apply after a declaration of 
incompatibility until such time as Parliament chooses to repeal it. Therefore, there may 
be less reason to afford deference within the proportionality analysis in section 4 cases, 
because deference is already included in the mechanism. 
This is illustrated in the recent case of R (F) v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department.109 The case involved a factual optimisation analysis, but with no mention 
of deference and no consideration of legal optimisation. The case concerned the 
application of the sex offenders register to two claimants: the first claimant (‘F’) had 
been convicted of the relevant sexual offence at the age of 11 and would be on the sex 
offenders register for the rest of his life. The second claimant (Thompson) had 
committed his crimes as an adult. In the Divisional Court, Latham LJ, with whom the 
other members the Court agreed, considered the impact of the sex offenders register on 
F. He paid particular attention to the fact that he was a child at the time of the offences 
and that there was no means by which he could seek a review of their continued 
application. Latham LJ stated that ‘[i]f the question is whether the requirements, at least 
in the context of a child, are the minimum necessary to achieve the legislation (sic) 
legitimate objective, it seems to me that in the absence of an opportunity for review, the 
only answer must be no.’110 With regard to Thompson, Latham LJ, took a similar view, 
holding that because the notification requirements prevented an offender from 
establishing that he no longer presents a risk of re-offending they were disproportionate. 
Again, the reasoning is based on the availability of a less rights-restrictive alternative 
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and so can be classified as factual optimisation. Latham LJ made a declaration of 
incompatibility under section 4 of the HRA. He took the view that the provisions could 
not be read down under section 3 ‘without doing unacceptable violence to the statutory 
words.’111 In neither instance was deference considered. This approach can be 
contrasted with the much more deferential approaches in the other sex offenders register 
cases, in which the courts applied a large degree of structural deference (A v Scottish 
Ministers) and epistemic deference (Gallagher). 
The Home Secretary unsuccessfully appealed the decision in R (F) to the Court of 
Appeal. The Court explicitly couched its reasoning in terms of factual optimisation and 
addressed itself to the question of whether a sex offenders register without a right of 
review went no further than was necessary to achieve the legitimate objective. 112 The 
Court concluded that a right of review would not diminish the level of achievement of 
the legitimate objective, but would be less restrictive of the offender’s Article 8 
rights.113 The Court of Appeal upheld the declaration of incompatibility made by the 
Divisional Court.  
In both R (F) and the earlier burden of proof cases, a measure was found to fail the 
factual optimisation stage of the proportionality analysis. However, R (F) gave rise to a 
section 4 declaration, whereas the burden of proof cases gave rise to section 3 ‘reading-
down’. The tensions between sections 3 and 4 have been well rehearsed elsewhere114 
and I am not seeking to resolve those tensions here. However, it is worth noting that 
section 4 makes deference a separate issue, parallel to the proportionality test, whereas 
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section 3 removes it from within the test.115 Section 4 is deference after the fact of 
proportionality analysis because there is no direct consequence from the declaration of 
incompatibility. Section 3 functions to remove structural deference from the factual 
optimisation stage of proportionality, by preventing the rule-maker from choosing a 
different, rights-compatible measure instead of the challenged incompatible measure. 
Instead, the replacement measure is chosen by the court. As I noted in Chapter 3.4.3, 
this issue of parallel deference in section 4 and the denial of structural deference 
entailed in section 3 can only arise in relation to Acts of Parliament. This again 
emphasises the need for institutional sensitivity when addressing proportionality and 
deference. 
Given that there is an in-built deference in the application of section 4, it is arguable 
that the Divisional Court was correct not to afford Parliament any structural deference 
in R (F), since the deference flowed automatically from the manner in which section 4 
operates. This point is implicit in the decision of the Court of Appeal in that case. The 
Court held that in remedying the incompatibility, it would be up to Parliament to set the 
standard for any right of review incorporated into the sex offenders register system.116 
This indicates an acceptance that it is up to Parliament to determine the precise details 
of a less rights-restrictive measure. 
 
 
 5.3: OVERALL BALANCE: LEGAL OPTIMISATION 
The legal optimisation stage of proportionality requires a reviewing court to assess 
whether the challenged measure strikes an overall balance between the public interest 
principle and the human rights principle at stake in the case. This is often described in 
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terms of a ‘means-ends fit’.117 The proportionality test set out by Lord Steyn in R v A 
(No 2) 118 and R (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department,119 does not 
involve an explicit balancing criterion, a point which has been criticised by Rivers.120  
However, there are quite a few instances where legal optimisation has been applied as 
part of the proportionality analysis in criminal justice cases dealing with rule-making. 
The criterion of overall balance has been less accentuated in these cases than in 
immigration cases. One obvious reason for this is that, as was shown in Chapter 4, 
factual optimisation rarely functions in immigration cases, and so legal optimisation has 
to do all of the work.  
Furthermore, if a measure is found to fail the factual optimisation stage, then there is 
little reason to move on to the legal optimisation analysis. The criminal justice cases in 
which legal optimisation has been applied have predominantly been ones in which the 
measure was deemed to be factually optimised. To some extent, section 3 accentuates 
this. Where a court takes the view that a measure is not factually optimised and so reads 
it down under section 3, the legal optimisation stage is dispensed with. However, this is 
not necessarily a product of section 3 itself. For example in the Gallagher case the High 
Court made a declaration of incompatibility under section 4 and yet the legal 
optimisation element of the test was still surplus to requirements, since it had already 
been established that the measure was disproportionate. 
Despite the heavy emphasis on factual optimisation in criminal justice cases, there are 
nonetheless indications of the use of legal optimisation too. For example, in R v A (No 
2) Lord Hope expressed proportionality in terms that are very much in line with legal 
optimisation stating that: ‘[t]he principle of proportionality directs attention to the 
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question whether a fair balance has been struck between the general interest of the 
community and the protection of the individual.’121  
There is also much discussion of balancing in R v Director of Public Prosecutions ex 
parte Kebilene.122 Lord Hope expressly used the language of overall balancing stating 
that: ‘[a]s a matter of general principle therefore a fair balance must be struck between 
the demands of the general interest of the community and the protection of the 
fundamental rights of the individual’.123 His reasoning drew on the ECHR case of 
Salabiaku v France.124  
Lord Hope also used the language of legal optimisation in the Lambert case, although 
he seemed to conflate factual and legal optimisation, stating:  
‘It is now well settled that the principle which is to be applied requires a 
balance to be struck between the general interest of the community and 
the protection of the fundamental rights of the individual. This will not 
be achieved if the reverse onus provision goes beyond what is necessary 
to accomplish the objective of the statute.’125 
This quote suggests that Lord Hope was of the view that factual optimisation was the 
means of achieving the end of legal optimisation, rather than a separate element of the 
test. However, subsequent cases already discussed in Chapter 4 have shown that factual 
optimisation is a stand-alone element of proportionality. 
As was noted above, in Brown v Stott126 Lord Steyn applied a factual optimisation test 
with structural deference. Lord Bingham’s findings in the same case are phrased very 
much in the language of legal optimisation. Having set out a detailed account of the 
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ECHR case law on the privilege against self incrimination, he considered whether the 
requirement in section 172 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 was incompatible with Article 
6. Section 172 requires a person keeping a vehicle to identify the driver if there is an 
allegation that whoever was driving was guilty of one of a list of offences under the 
1988 Act. As the appellant had identified herself as the driver of the car and she was 
over the legal alcohol limit, her answer was being used as evidence against her. Lord 
Bingham recognised the potential of cars to cause great injury and noted that all those 
who drive them know that they are subjecting themselves to a particular regulatory 
regime. Within that context he was satisfied that the balance between the respective 
interests of the community and the individual had been struck in a manner that was not 
unduly prejudicial and so he was satisfied that the section was Convention-
compatible.127 This is a clear instance of the use of the overall balancing element of 
proportionality. 
International Transport Roth GmbH v Secretary of State for the Home Department128 
concerned the proportionality of property seizure legislation. The public interest being 
pursued was the control of immigration. Simon Brown LJ cited the de Freitas test, 
which as has been noted lacks an express overall balancing requirement. However, he 
went on to hold that:  
‘It is further implicit in the concept of proportionality, however, that not 
merely must the impairment of the individual's rights be no more than 
necessary for the attainment of the public policy objective sought, but 
also that it must not impose an excessive burden on the individual 
concerned.’129 
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He bolstered this position by citing ECHR cases such as James v United Kingdom130 
and his ultimate finding on the proportionality point centred on the legal optimisation 
rather than factual optimisation. He found the challenged measure to breach Article 1 of 
the First Protocol on the basis that the penalty in question placed an excessive burden 
on carriers whose vehicles might be used for illegal immigration. He noted that a 
heavier burden would probably achieve the legitimate aim all the more, but that was not 
the point, in his view, the ‘price in Convention terms becomes just too high’.131 This is 
very clearly an overall balancing or legal optimisation assessment. In the view of Simon 
Brown LJ, the overall proportionality was not appropriately struck between the 
competing principles and that is reflected in his reasoning. It is worth noting that his 
proportionality analysis involves very little consideration of whether the means used 
only infringed the right insofar as it was necessary. It is possible that an acceptance of 
this is implicit in his reasoning but it is not expressed fully as a minimal impairment 
analysis. If the factual optimisation is assumed, then it could be said that the measure 
passed the factual optimisation hurdle but failed the legal optimisation hurdle.  
As a side issue it is also important to be aware that Simon Brown LJ drew a distinction 
between analysing a rule and an individual case stating that: ‘What is presently in issue, 
however, is the intrinsic legality of the scheme itself rather than the liability of carriers 
in individual cases.’’132 This shows that he was clearly of the view that it was the rule 
itself he was assessing for Convention compatibility and not the individual decision 
made under that rule. This highlights the important difference between a proportionality 
review of a rule and of an administrative decision. 
Counsel for the defendant suggested that if the challenged statutory scheme was 
incompatible with the Convention, it should be ‘read down’ under section 3 of the 
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132 ibid, at 742. 
234 
 
HRA. Simon Brown LJ roundly rejected this idea. He expressed the view that 
Convention compatibility could only be achieved through a radically different scheme 
and held that when applying section 3 the ‘court’s task is to distinguish between 
legislation and interpretation, and confine itself to the latter’.’133 He concluded by 
noting that to rework the scheme using section 3 would be ‘failing to show the judicial 
deference owed to Parliament as legislators.’134 This is connected to the point I raised 
above in relation to the burden of proof cases. Section 4 declarations of incompatibility 
are a deference mechanism which exists outside of the proportionality test, whereas 
section 3 removes the element of structural deference from the test. In this instance, 
Simon Brown LJ paid more deference to Parliament than if he had read the legislation 
down under section 3.  
 
5.3.1: Legal optimisation, empirical epistemic deference and the general 
scope of rules 
In Gallagher, Re an Application for Judicial Review135 Kerr J assessed the factual 
optimisation of the sex offenders register, as was discussed above. He also used the 
language of legal optimisation, although he did not explicitly separate it from factual 
optimisation in his proportionality analysis. He drew the conclusion that:  
‘the fact that the notification requirements persist indefinitely does not 
render the scheme disproportionate.’  While this is unquestionably an 
inconvenience for those who must make the report, that inconvenience 
must be set against the substantial benefit that it will achieve of keeping 
the police informed of where offenders are living and of their travel 
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plans so that further offending may be forestalled both by rendering 
detection more easily and deterring those who might be tempted to 
repeat their offences.’136 
Kerr J placed a heavy emphasis on deference, noting that ‘Parliament has determined 
what is required for the protection of the public from sex offenders’.137 This suggests 
that the Court was deferring to the assessment of Parliament as to what was required to 
achieve the realisation of the public interest principle in this case. This is empirical 
epistemic deference. 
As was noted above, in reaching his conclusion, Kerr J was explicit about the need for 
proportionality to be measured in general, rather than just in relation to the specific 
individual claimant: 
‘It is inevitable that a scheme which applies to sex offenders generally 
will bear more heavily on some individuals than others.  But to be viable 
the scheme must contain general provisions that will be universally 
applied to all who come within its purview. The proportionality of the 
reporting requirements must be examined principally in relation to its 
general effect.  The particular impact that it has on individuals must be of 
secondary importance.’138 
This highlights the issue I raised in Chapter 3.2.3, concerning the effect which the scope 
of the challenged measure has on the proportionality analysis. If the High Court in 
Gallagher had only been concerned with the applicant’s situation and not those of 
others affected, then it may have reached a different conclusion. As it turned out, the 
fact that the rule was of general application affected the measurement of the overall 
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balance. It also seems to have given rise to a wider degree of empirical epistemic 
deference. 
The reasoning of Kerr J was expressly adopted by the Court of Appeal in Forbes v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department.139 Forbes had been convicted of importing 
child pornography. In his defence, he had contended that although he knew he was 
importing prohibited videos but he was unaware that they contained child pornography. 
He sought to challenge the Convention compatibility of the automatic imposition of 
notification requirements on him, without any discretion for the trial judge. Sir Igor 
Judge P, giving the judgment of the Court and following Kerr J in Gallagher held that 
‘[t]he consequent, automatic, notification requirements contribute to the protection of 
children everywhere, as well as the detection of offenders minded to exploit them, or to 
involve themselves in the exploitation of children by others.’140 The Court held that this 
was not a disproportionate interference with the rights of a person who has been 
convicted of importing such material. Again this shows legal optimisation being 
affected by the generalised scope of the measure being challenged. This reasoning was 
re-affirmed in the later Court of Appeal case of R v H141 although no detailed 
consideration of proportionality was involved in that case. 
 
5.3.2: Legal optimisation and normative epistemic deference 
As was noted above, A v Scottish Ministers142 involved a challenge to the notification 
requirements of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. The Court of Session was satisfied that 
the measure did not impair the petitioner’s Article 8 right to respect for family any more 
than was necessary (factual optimisation). While the main thrust of the decision focused 
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on this minimal impairment element of proportionality, the court also gave 
consideration to the overall balance struck and ultimately concluded that the measure 
‘does not result in this petitioner having to bear an individual and excessive burden’143 
which is evidently the language of overall balancing. 
Lord Turnbull also alluded to the deference to be afforded to Parliament within 
balancing, stating that ‘when it comes to the Court examining the way in which 
Parliament chose to strike this balance it will give weight to the decisions of a 
representative legislature and a democratic government within the discretionary area of 
judgement accorded to those bodies’.144 This is normative epistemic deference in legal 
optimisation, based on democratic legitimacy. As we have seen, normative epistemic 
deference arises where both the public interest principle and the human rights principle 
have received a certain basic level of protection. In such situations, a court may wish to 
defer to the normative assessment of the decision-maker as to where the precise balance 
between the two principles lies.  
 
 
5.4: THE REASONS FOR DEFERENCE  
In the preceding analysis I have shown that both factual and legal optimisation have 
been applied in the proportionality case law dealing with criminal justice rules. I have 
also showed how both structural and epistemic deference have operated within those 
stages of the proportionality test. However, much of this analysis only goes to show 
how deference is afforded within proportionality. Some of the criminal justice cases 
have also addressed the question of why deference is afforded.  
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The tightrope act involved in setting the right degree of deference is well summed up in 
the following dictum of Simon Brown LJ in the case of International Transport Roth 
GmbH v Secretary of State for the Home Department:145 
‘Constitutional dangers exist no less in too little judicial activism as in 
too much. There are limits to the legitimacy of executive or legislative 
decision-making, just as there are to decision-making by the courts.’146 
In R v Director of Public Prosecutions, Ex p Kebilene,147 Lord Hope held that there was 
a ‘discretionary area of judgment that the courts would afford to the other arms of 
government. He stated that: 
‘[i]t will be easier for it to be recognised where the issues involve 
questions of social or economic policy, much less so where the rights are 
of high constitutional importance or are of a kind where the courts are 
especially well placed to assess the need for protection.’148 
This early consideration of deference suggests that there are certain fields of decision-
making which are more appropriate for the courts and others which are best left to the 
other arms of government. In Chapter 3.4 I highlighted the importance of making the 
reasons for deference explicit. The courts can use proportionality to review the actions 
of a wide range of government bodies. The reasons for deferring to them are not 
uniform. As was noted in Chapter 1.3.3, this issue was given detailed consideration by 
Laws LJ in International Transport Roth GmbH v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department.149 Although Laws LJ was in dissent with the majority of the Court on the 
outcome of the case, he set out four central principles for setting the level of deference, 
which have been repeatedly cited with approval since:  
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1) More deference is due to an Act of Parliament than to an executive decision.150 This 
shows that a primary basis for structural deference is democratic accountability. It also 
recognises that a distinction must be drawn between different forms of governmental 
action. Not all forms of government action involve the same level of democratic 
legitimacy, so the actual level is the basis for the deference.  
2) There is more scope for deference where the convention itself requires a balance to 
be struck.151 This indicates that limitation analysis is particularly well suited to certain 
rights, but Laws LJ was quick to note that while the right to fair trail could not be 
abrogated, what was or was not fair might involve a balancing exercise between 
competing principles.  
3) Greater deference is due where the subject matter is within the particular 
responsibility of the ‘democratic powers’.152 This is an indication of structural deference 
or normative epistemic deference based on the recognition that the courts are not well 
placed to address the required balance in certain areas. It is important to read this in 
conjunction with Laws LJ’s first point regarding the distinctions between executive and 
legislature. What is in the constitutional responsibility of Parliament is not necessarily 
in the constitutional responsibility of the executive. As was discussed in Chapter 4.3.2, 
normative epistemic deference has been rejected by the courts when it comes to the 
decisions of appointed officials, who lack democratic legitimacy.  
4) More or less deference is due depending on whether the subject matter lies within the 
particular expertise of the courts or the democratic powers.153 It is of significance that 
this point was separated out from the third point (although Laws LJ sees it as emanating 
from it). Constitutional responsibility is related to structural deference and normative 
epistemic deference insofar as a particular institution of government is well placed to 
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choose a particular balance. Expertise is related to empirical epistemic deference insofar 
as a particular institution of government is well placed to find a particular fact. This is 
an important distinction to draw.  
The first, third and fourth of these principles affirm the analysis I set out in Chapter 3.4, 
i.e. democratic legitimacy and epistemic deference are both reasons for deference. What 
is explicit in the first of Laws LJ’s principles, and implicit in the third and fourth, is that 
the levels of expertise and democratic legitimacy are not uniform across all 
governmental bodies which a court might be called upon to review on proportionality 
grounds. This confirms the need for institutional sensitivity when dealing with questions 
of deference. 
The judgment of Lord Bingham in A&X v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department154 involves a thoughtful consideration of the reasons for affording 
epistemic deference based on institutional competence. At issue was the question of 
whether or not there was a public emergency threatening the life of the nation. Lord 
Bingham held that this question involved a ‘factual prediction of what various people 
around the world might or might not do’.155 He stated that this was a pre-eminently 
political decision. In granting the Home Secretary empirical epistemic deference, Lord 
Bingham was recognising that the judiciary are not well placed to make predictions 
about possible future incidents and that the Home Secretary is better qualified to do so. 
This deference was expressly based on the Government’s greater level of expertise in 
the area relative to that of the courts. 
However, notwithstanding this finding, their Lordships were loath to accept that it was 
not for the courts to decide on matters relating to security of the person. Following on 
from his comments about institutional competence, Lord Bingham pointed out the level 
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of expertise the courts had in this area. He drew on the reasoning on Lord Hope in 
Kebilene, as well as these dicta of La Forest J, in the Canadian Supreme Court: 
‘Courts are specialists in the protection of liberty and the interpretation 
of legislation and are, accordingly, well placed to subject criminal justice 
legislation to careful scrutiny. However, courts are not specialists in the 
realm of policy-making, nor should they be.’156 
Lord Bingham considered the argument made by the Attorney General that it was anti-
democratic for the courts to reject the decisions of Parliament in this area. He pointed 
out that the HRA itself had given the courts a duty to address such issues and that even 
a finding of incompatibility did not undermine the sovereignty of Parliament. He went 
so far as to hold that an independent judiciary is a ‘cornerstone of the rule of law 
itself.’157  
Like Lord Bingham, Lord Hope is very quick to recognise that a wide margin of 
discretion should be afforded to the executive on matters of national security but with 
the caveat that matters relating to liberty of the person should attract the most anxious 
scrutiny. 158   
This analysis shows that institutional competence is relative. The House was prepared 
to defer to the expertise of the Home Secretary in relation to national security, where the 
judiciary has little expertise. However, in the field of security of the person, the courts 
have a great deal of expertise, and so the level of empirical epistemic deference should 
be reduced accordingly. The courts will only afford deference based on institutional 
competence when the decision-maker’s expertise in a particular field is greater than that 
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of the courts.159 The rejection of the Attorney General’s argument on democratic 
legitimacy also shows that democratic legitimacy and institutional competence are two 
separate reasons for deference, which will apply differently in different situations.  
 
 
5.5: CONCLUSION 
In this chapter I have set out the leading cases on proportionality in the field of criminal 
justice in the UK. I have examined them thematically, showing how each of the 
elements of the structural theory of proportionality and deference is at work. Human 
rights and public interest principles are identified and then subject to factual 
optimisation and in some instances legal optimisation. 
Certain observations can be made at this stage of the analysis. The role of the minimal 
impairment arm of proportionality has been far more significant in these cases than in 
the immigration cases in the preceding chapter. Almost all of the cases involved some 
examination of whether there was a less rights-restrictive alternative available. Central 
to the analysis of minimal impairment have been the features of the rule being 
challenged and their impact on the rights principles at stake. In many cases, alternative 
measures have been given detailed consideration. Alternatives have even been 
substituted for the challenged measure using section 3 of the HRA as was particularly 
evident in the burden of proof cases. This shows that the availability of alternative 
measures is a prerequisite for factual optimisation. Rule-making is a governmental 
activity which usually involves choosing from a range of measures and so it is 
particularly amenable to this stage of the proportionality test, unlike administrative 
decision-making. 
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Another important observation that can be made at this point is that overall balancing 
has played a limited role in the proportionality cases on criminal justice. Unlike 
administrative decision-making, there is nothing inherent in the activity of rule-making 
which suggests that certain parts of the proportionality test do not readily apply to it. 
The first, and most obvious reason for this sidelining of overall balancing is that where 
a measure is deemed to have failed the factual optimisation stage of the test, there is 
little reason for the court to then move on to discuss legal optimisation. A measure that 
is not factually optimised is not proportionate. In cases where the measure has been 
deemed to be factually optimised, such as Brown v Stott and A v Scottish Ministers the 
courts have gone on to consider legal optimisation, although as was made clear in 
Gallagher, Re an Application for Judicial Review the analysis of overall balance 
requires the general nature of the rule to be considered, which as I indicated in Chapter 
3.2.3, is a more difficult measurement than is the case with individualised 
administrative decisions. As such, there is more scope for epistemic deference. 
A second reason for the absence of overall balancing arises in the cases dealing with 
Acts of Parliament. In many of these cases the reviewing court has used its interpretive 
role under section 3 of the HRA to ‘read down’ a measure in legislation such that a 
court is effectively substituting its own less rights-intrusive measure for the challenged 
measure. This substitution concludes the proportionality analysis and so precludes the 
possibility of overall balancing. Admittedly, since the measure is deemed to have failed 
the factual optimisation stage, there is perhaps no reason to have a legal optimisation 
analysis anyway. However, it must be noted that this ‘reading down’ involves a denial 
of structural deference. By substituting a particular measure in place of the challenged 
measure, the reviewing court denies Parliament the opportunity to choose its own 
replacement for the disproportionate measure. After the individual case has concluded, 
Parliament does have the power to replace the court’s substituted measure with new 
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legislation. However as regards the structure of the proportionality analysis undertaken 
by the court, section 3 must be recognised as affording no structural deference in factual 
optimisation. 
Epistemic deference has been evident throughout this case study. Many of the issues 
involved with the criminal justice system entail uncertainties which the courts are not 
well placed to navigate. As such, empirical epistemic deference has been applied at both 
the factual and legal optimisation stages. Similarly, in A v Scottish Ministers the precise 
balance to be struck was uncertain from the court’s point of view and so normative 
epistemic deference has been afforded to Parliament. Some of the cases in this chapter 
have also given consideration to the reasons for affording deference. These have been 
very much in line with the institutional bases for deference set out in Chapter 3.4: 
democratic legitimacy and relative institutional competence. 
Some of the cases in this chapter, most notably Hirst have dealt with challenges to a 
measure that was the outcome of multiple levels of government decision-making. As 
with the immigration cases in Chapter 4, the proportionality challenges to multi-level 
criminal justice decisions have been directed to a single level of the decision. This can 
be contrasted with housing cases, in which there have been a number of significant 
decisions in which the courts addressed the proportionality of more than one level in 
multi-level cases. It is to these cases that I turn in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 6: Case Study Three: Proportionality across the 
Range of Government Action - Housing 
 
 
In this third and final case study I apply the structural, institutionally sensitive model to 
proportionality cases dealing with housing rights under the Human Rights Act 1998 
(‘the HRA’). Housing cases have given rise to proportionality decisions that relate to 
multiple institutions of government. Much of the legislation in this field sets up 
statutory systems for the regulation of social housing and the courts have considered 
proportionality challenges to these systems. The courts have also considered challenges 
to the exercise of administrative powers under these systems. In addition, there have 
been a number of cases which have dealt with the exercise of administrative power 
within a statutory scheme in which the proportionality of both the administrative action 
and the legislation was at issue.  
As I explained in Chapter 2, and then illustrated in subsequent chapters, Alexy’s model 
of proportionality and deference describes proportionality in terms of the factual and 
legal optimisation of principles. Deference is classified as normative or epistemic and 
these two forms of deference are integrated into the structure of the proportionality test 
itself. In Chapter 3.2, I identified three types of difference in the institutional features of 
government bodies: choice of objectives, range of measures and scope of the decision. 
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These three scales of difference can impact on the operation of the structural model of 
proportionality and deference. In Chapters 4 and 5, I showed how these distinctions 
would affect the model in two institutional settings at opposite ends of each of these 
scales: immigration decisions and criminal justice. 
In this chapter I will consider the operation of the structural model in cases which deal 
with numerous institutions of government. In some of the cases I will consider, only one 
institution was challenged. In others, the activities of multiple institutions were 
examined by the courts to determine the compatibility of each with the European 
Convention on Human Rights (‘the Convention’). 
This chapter is set out in three sections. In the first section I will show that the courts 
have engaged in the identification of human rights principles and public interest 
principles in their application of proportionality. In the second section I will show that 
factual and legal optimisation have been used in cases dealing with only one level of 
government. I will confine section two to cases that concern either administrative 
decisions or rule-making but I will take note of institutional factors and their effect on 
the proportionality analysis. In the third section, I will look at the case law dealing with 
multiple layers of government and show how the proportionality analysis has become 
stratified over different institutions in the hierarchy of governmental decision-making. 
In the second and third sections I will address issues of structural and epistemic 
deference where they arise. 
In Chapter 4 it became clear that factual optimisation played a limited role in relation to 
one-off administrative decision-making. In Chapter 5, it was evident that factual 
optimisation played a very substantial role in relation to rule-making and that legal 
optimisation was minimised. Housing cases throw up an interesting merging of these 
two formats. While some of the cases have been concerned solely with a rule or an 
administrative decision, certain cases have dealt with administrative decisions which 
247 
 
 
were made pursuant to a rule and the courts have had to consider the Convention 
compatibility of both the administrative decision and the rule. These multi-layer 
proportionality situations have been at their most prevalent in the housing case law. In 
this chapter I will explore the institutional patterns that have emerged in such cases. 
 
 
6.1: THE IDENTIFICATION OF PRINCIPLES 
Proportionality is essentially a sophisticated balancing exercise. In order to undertake 
that exercise, it is important to be clear about what is being balanced. As was discussed 
previously, the choice and definition of principles can have a profound impact on the 
outcome of the analysis. This section explores the human rights principles and public 
interest principles which have been identified by the UK courts in housing cases under 
the HRA. 
 
6.1.1: Human rights principles 
The nature of Convention rights is such that it is extremely difficult for them to function 
as rules. They must be treated as principles insofar as they lack the instructions for their 
own realisation.1 This was implicitly recognised by the High Court in R (Baker) v First 
Secretary of State2 in which Nicholas Blake QC (as he then was), sitting as a deputy 
judge of the High Court, noted that guidance given to local authorities in relation to 
compulsory purchase orders must be ‘sufficient to give effect to human rights 
principles.’3 The use of such language is noteworthy since it belies the notion of human 
rights as rules and reflects their actual nature. The number of human rights principles at 
                                                
1 See Chapter 2.2 above. 
2 [2003] EWHC 2511 (Admin). 
3 ibid, at paragraph 21 (emphasis added). 
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issue in housing cases has been somewhat less than in the preceding two case studies, 
arguably because fewer rights apply directly to the area. The Article 8 right to respect 
for home life is the most common. The UK Courts have been guided by the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (‘the ECHR’) in identifying 
principles under the Convention. What follows is a brief consideration of the principles 
which have been recognised by the courts in housing cases. 
Respect for home life 
The most obvious right at issue in housing cases is the right to respect for the home, 
which is expressly guaranteed in Article 8(1) of the Convention. The House of Lords 
stressed in Harrow London Borough Council v Qazi4 that while Article 8 requires that a 
person’s home life needs to be respected, this is not a right to be given a home. Lord 
Bingham cited ECHR jurisprudence to the effect that the ‘European Court of Human 
Rights has made clear that Article 8 does not in terms give a right to be provided with a 
home and does not guarantee the right to have one's housing problem solved by the 
authorities’.5 As such, the right is based on the core principle that whatever home you 
have should not be interfered with, rather than that you have a right to claim a home 
from the state.  
The exercise of Article 8 rights is not limited to individuals who have an enforceable 
legal right to their property. In situations where a person’s tenancy has ended, they may 
still rely on the right to respect for home life, if the court accepts that the dwelling in 
question is, in fact, their home. This can be seen in the early case of Poplar Housing 
and Regeneration Community Association Ltd v Donoghue6 in which the claimant had 
been granted a non-secure week-to-week tenancy, which nonetheless gave rise to an 
Article 8 issue and engaged the principle that her home life should be respected. It is 
                                                
4 [2004] 1 AC 983. 
5 ibid, at 989. 
6 [2002] QB 48. 
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worth noting that she had been living in the property under those circumstances for over 
a year at the time the social landlord sought to evict her. This is further bolstered by the 
judgment of Laws LJ in Sheffield City Council v Smart:7 ‘“Home” is an autonomous 
concept for the purpose of ECHR, and does not depend on any legal status as owner.’8 It 
is clear therefore that the right to respect for home life is dependent primarily on where 
a person is living day-to-day, rather than whether they have any concrete legal claim to 
that residence. 
In Harrow London Borough Council v Qazi9 the House of Lords gave detailed 
consideration to what is entailed in the Article 8 right. They cited ECHR jurisprudence 
to the effect that home has an autonomous meaning that is separate from any contractual 
or legal entitlement to a particular piece of property and that the property will be 
considered the person’s home where it is shown that they have a sufficient and 
continuous link with it.10 The House unanimously agreed that the fact that the 
claimant’s tenancy had come to an end did not extinguish his right to respect for home 
life in respect of the property; the issue was solely whether the interference with that 
right could be justified. 
Caravan as home 
In South Buckinghamshire District Council v Porter (No 1)11 the House of Lords 
recognised that the human rights principle of respect for home life can include 
situations where a person is living in a caravan. Lord Hutton cited the ECHR decision in 
the case of Buckley v United Kingdom12 as authority that the right to a home could 
include a caravan, even where the caravan has been erected in breach of planning 
                                                
7 [2002] EWCA  Civ 04. 
8 ibid, at paragraph 26. 
9 [2004] 1 AC 983. 
10 ibid, at 1008-1010 per  Lord Hope. 
11 [2003] UKHL 26; [2003] 2 AC 558. 
12 (1997) 23 EHRR 101. 
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control.13 Again, this underlines the point that it is the plain fact of living in a place that 
gives rise to the Article 8 principle, and this is not dependent on whether the individual 
lives there lawfully. 
Non-eviction 
Once it is established that a particular property is a person’s home, there is a human 
rights principle that they should not be evicted, which must be balanced against any 
countervailing public interest. This can be seen in the decision of Sedley LJ in Lambeth 
London Borough Council v Howard where his lordship expressed the following 
opinion:  
‘It seems to me that any attempt to evict a person, whether directly or by 
process of law, from his or her home would on the face of it be a 
derogation from the respect, that is the integrity, to which the home is 
prima facie entitled.’14 
The Court of Appeal held that once there was an attempt at eviction, Article 8 would be 
engaged and as such, the measure would have to be proportionate in accordance with 
Article 8(2). This principle was tempered to a large extent in Harrow London Borough 
Council v Qazi15 in which Lord Hope held that where the eviction was pursuant to the 
law the eviction would almost always be justified under Article 8(2). Nonetheless, the 
human rights principle still stands as a basis for a proportionality challenge, despite the 
fact that such challenges may not always be successful.  
Right to property 
The other main source of a Convention argument in housing cases is the right to 
property contained in Article 1 of the First Protocol to the Convention. Like the right to 
                                                
13 [2003] UKHL 26; [2003] 2 AC 558, at 596-597. 
14 [2001] EWCA Civ 468. 
15 [2004] 1 AC 983. 
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respect for the home, this right is qualified by its own terms and allows for the 
limitation of the right, where necessary, to control the use of property in the general 
interest and to secure the payment of taxes or penalties. The breadth of these provisions 
is indicative of the operation of this right as a principle rather than a rule. In Clays Lane 
Housing Co-operative Ltd v The Housing Corporation16 the Court of Appeal considered 
the Convention compatibility of a decision by the Housing Corporation, which 
regulated social landlords, to order the transfer of housing stock from the claimant to 
another social landlord on the grounds of mismanagement. It was accepted that Article 
1 of the First Protocol applied in the case, and the only Convention issue was whether 
the deprivation of property was justifiable. 
 
6.1.2: Public interest principles 
When a court is considering the proportionality of a government intrusion on 
Convention rights, it must be satisfied that the intrusion is in pursuit of a legitimate 
objective.17 In terms of Alexy’s structural model, the objective must be sufficiently 
important to be a norm, and so have the character of a principle, to be optimised relative 
to the competing human rights principle. As was noted in previous chapters,18 the 
structural model does not seek to provide a means of determining which public interests 
have the necessary normative force. Rather, the model provides a framework within 
which normative arguments about this issue can be made.  
The UK courts do not have a comprehensive mechanism for deciding whether a public 
interest meets the standard of a principle. They are guided in the first instance by the 
first stage of the proportionality test (the ‘legitimate objective’ stage) and in the second 
                                                
16 [2005] 1 WLR 2229. 
17 See de Freitas v Minister for Agriculture and Fisheries [1999] 1 AC 69; and Huang v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 11; [2007] 2 AC 167. 
18 See Chapter 2.2, 4.1.2 & 5.1.2. 
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instance, by the text of the Convention and ECHR case law. The text of the Convention 
has been used repeatedly in housing cases. Article 8(1) guarantees the right to respect 
for home life. Article 8(2) gives a specific list of government aims that are sufficiently 
important to be a basis for limiting a Convention right. As the cases in this chapter are 
primarily concerned with Article 8 rights, the public interest principles have tended to 
be derived from Article 8(2). 
Housing needs of the community 
In Poplar Housing and Regeneration Community Association Ltd v Donoghue19 the 
Court of Appeal recognised that the rights of the claimant should be balanced against 
‘the needs of those dependent on social housing as a whole’.20 The case concerned the 
repossession of local authority housing. The Court of Appeal expressly endorsed the 
reasoning of the district judge at first instance, who had held that any limitation on the 
applicant’s Article 8 rights was justified by the Article 8(2) proviso relating to the rights 
and freedoms of others. This is a reference to the Article 8 rights of others who are 
waiting for local authority housing.  
A similar public interest principle was recognised by Laws LJ in the Court of Appeal 
decision in Sheffield City Council v Smart.21 He identified the purpose of the challenged 
measure as the ‘fair and orderly management of the council’s housing stock.’22 In doing 
so, Laws LJ made explicit reference to Article 8(2), although he did not discuss which 
specific aspect of Article 8(2) gave rise to this legitimate aim. However, it would not be 
difficult to justify this objective on the basis of the need to protect the rights and 
freedoms of others or the economic well-being of the country. 
                                                
19 [2002] QB 48. 
20 ibid, at 70-71 (emphasis in original). 
21 [2002] EWCA  Civ 04. 
22 ibid, at paragraph 14. 
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A similar public interest principle was recognised in Clays Lane Housing Co-operative 
Ltd v The Housing Corporation.23 The case concerned the compulsory transfer of 
housing stock from the claimant, a social landlord, to another social landlord, over the 
objection of the claimant that it should be transferred to a third social landlord. In 
choosing between the two potential transferees, the regulatory body highlighted the 
greater degree of financial strength, certainty and security that would be afforded to 
tenants if the housing stock was transferred to its preferred of the two, on the basis that 
it would provide greater security for the tenants. This public interest was accepted by 
the Court of Appeal as the basis for an intrusion onto the property rights of the claimant. 
The Court did not give any detailed consideration to the derivation of the public 
interest, although it did cite the text of Article 1 of the First Protocol in full, which 
includes a provision allowing the ‘state to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to 
control the use of property in accordance with the general interest’. It is difficult to see 
how the protection of the security of tenants in social housing would not have been 
accepted under this provision if the legitimacy of the objective had been examined in 
detail. 
Public Health and preservation of the environment 
In South Buckinghamshire District Council v Porter (No 1)24 the House of Lords 
accepted that there was a public interest principle that the environment should be 
preserved. This particular goal had been identified by the Court of Appeal decision in 
the same case and was expressly endorsed by Lord Steyn, who made direct reference to 
Article 8(2); although he did not specify which precise aspect of Article 8(2) this goal 
was derived from.25 The case concerned three separate cases involving gypsies who 
were camped on land they owned, but did not have planning permission for them to 
                                                
23 [2005] 1 WLR 2229. 
24 [2003] UKHL 26; [2003] 2 AC 558. 
25 ibid, at 588. 
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reside there. The pieces of land being used by two of the respondents were in green belt 
areas. Lord Bingham recognised that control of planning, one of the purposes of which 
was to protect the environment, was an ‘important process, since control, appropriately 
and firmly exercised, enures to the benefit of the whole community.’26 Lord Bingham 
went on to refer to ECHR jurisprudence on Article 8(2) dealing with the eviction of 
gypsies27 and noted that in those cases it was ‘effectively common ground’ that the 
measures ‘pursued aims entitled to recognition under the Convention as legitimate.’28 
Since the claimants had accepted that the objective was legitimate, there was little 
detailed discussion of precisely how that objective could be derived from Article 8(2). It 
could feasibly be linked to the protection of the rights of others, economic well-being or 
public health. 
A related point was recognised in R (Baker) v First Secretary of State29 which 
concerned the compulsory purchase of a property that was no longer fit for human 
habitation. Again, the parties had agreed that the measure was taken in the public 
interest and so the court did not need to give detailed consideration to the legitimacy of 
the objective.30 However the Court described the public results sought by the measure 
as ‘preventing it from continuing to pose a serious threat to the health of both the 
occupant and the immediate environment’.31 There is no clear discussion of the 
derivation of the principle in the judgment. However, Article 8(2) does include 
provision for limitation for the protection of health and public safety and Article 1 of 
the First Protocol includes provision for limitation in ‘the general interest’. It seems 
likely that this was the derivation, although it is not possible to be certain. 
                                                
26 [2003] UKHL 26; [2003] 2 AC 558, at 568. 
27 Buckley v United Kindgom (1996) 23 EHRR 101; and Chapman v United Kindgom (2001) 33 EHRR 
399. 
28 [2003] UKHL 26; [2003] 2 AC 558, at 581. 
29 [2003] EWHC 2511 (Admin). 
30 ibid, at paragraph 16.  
31 ibid, at paragraph 16. 
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A more direct derivation can be seen in R (Wilson) v Wychavon District Council.32 The 
Court of Appeal accepted that the public interest principle being pursued was the 
protection of the environment, which it held to be derived from the Article 8(2) 
recognition of the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.33  
Urban regeneration 
In Pascoe v First Secretary of State34 the High Court recognised that urban regeneration 
was an environmental benefit which could constitute a legitimate public aim for the 
purposes of proportionality analysis. The High Court made reference to Chapman v 
United Kingdom35 in which the ECHR recognised that Article 8(2) can be used as a 
basis to pursue the legitimate aim of protecting the rights of others through preservation 
of the environment.36  Forbes J also accepted that the urban regeneration would be in 
pursuit of the economic well-being of the country, which is one of the public interest 
principles expressly set out in Article 8(2). This analysis of urban regeneration shows 
how a sub-principle can be derived from two separate principles in Article 8(2) 
simultaneously. 
In Smith v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry37 Wyn Williams J in the High 
Court heard a challenge to a decision to confirm a compulsory purchase order of lands 
being used as gypsy halting sites. The order was confirmed notwithstanding the fact that 
alternative accommodation had not yet been found. The lands were to be developed to 
provide facilities for the London Olympic Games in 2012. The basis of this limitation of 
their Article 8 rights was the economic well-being of the country, which is recognised 
in Article 8(2). The High Court subsequently defined the public interest down even 
                                                
32 [2007] EWCA Civ 52; [2007] QB 801. 
33 ibid, at 819-820. 
34 [2006] EWHC 2356 (Admin); [2007] 1 WLR 885. 
35 (2001) 33 EHRR 399. 
36 ibid, at 422; Cited with approval: [2006] EWHC 2356 (Admin); [2007] 1 WLR 885, at 907 per Forbes 
J. 
37 [2007] EWHC 1013 (Admin); [2008] 1 WLR 394. 
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further to the objective of needing to have the land in place by mid-2007. Defining the 
principle in such a narrow way affected the operation of the proportionality analysis; it 
drastically reduced the range of measures which could feasibly have achieved the public 
interest. The definition of the public interest by the High Court has been criticised on 
the basis that it relieved proportionality of any effective role. 38 
The use of such a narrow definition of the public interest by the High Court could also 
be criticised on normative grounds. It could be argued that the High Court failed 
properly to apply the legitimate objective element of the proportionality test. Such 
criticism can be made within the framework of the structural model: it could be 
described as an excessive level of deference at the legitimate objective stage.  
Prevention of anti-social behaviour and non-payment of rent 
R (McLellan) v Bracknell Forest Borough Council39 involved a challenge to a statutory 
scheme established by the Housing Act 1996, which empowered local authorities to 
grant ‘introductory tenancies’ to tenants. This meant that for the first year of their 
tenancy they were essentially on probation. The aim of the scheme was to prevent anti-
social behaviour and the non-payment of rent, both of which had a significant 
detrimental impact on other local authority housing tenants. Waller LJ held that in order 
to be Convention-compatible, the measure would need to be justified under Article 8(2) 
as protecting the rights and freedoms of others.40 McLellan also involved Article 6 
issues, but these did not give rise to a proportionality analysis. 
Discrimination: an illegitimate aim 
Article 14 establishes that the rights enjoyed under the Convention shall be secured 
without discrimination on any ground. This was at issue in Ghaidan v Godin-
                                                
38 See further Hickman, T. ‘The Substance and Structure of Proportionality’ [2008] PL 694, at 704-705. 
39 [2001] EWCA Civ 1510; [2002] QB 1129. 
40 ibid, at 1147. 
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Mendoza.41 The House of Lords examined the Convention compatibility of a provision 
in the Rent Act 1977 (as amended) which granted a surviving spouse a secured tenancy 
in a property on the death of the tenant spouse. This had been extended to include 
couples living together as husband and wife. The respondent in the case was the 
homosexual partner of a deceased tenant of the claimant’s and the claimant sought to 
evict him from the property subsequent to the death of his partner.  The House of Lords 
accepted that this involved discrimination against the respondent in his enjoyment of 
Article 8 rights on the basis of his sexual orientation. Lord Nicholls held that such 
discrimination would have to pursue a legitimate aim and bear a reasonable relationship 
of proportionality between the means and ends. He abruptly dismissed the legitimacy of 
the discrimination, stating: ‘[h]ere, the difference in treatment falls at the first hurdle: 
the absence of a legitimate aim.’42 Since no public interest principle could be provided 
to balance against the principle of non-discrimination, the human rights principle won 
outright. 
 
 
6.2: FACTUAL AND LEGAL OPTIMISATION AT INDIVIDUAL LEVELS OF 
GOVERNMENT 
According to Alexy’s model, once the human rights and public interest principles have 
been identified, the court then moves on to optimise both principles factually and 
legally. Factual optimisation (also known as ‘minimal impairment’) involves an 
examination of what is factually possible, i.e. the court looks to see if there is another 
way of achieving the public interest aim which is less rights-intrusive. The next stage of 
proportionality, which Alexy terms ‘legal optimisation’, requires that there be an overall 
                                                
41 [2004] 2 AC 557. 
42 ibid, at 568. 
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balance between the aim pursued and the means used to achieve it. As we have seen 
Alexy accommodates deference within his model. Structural deference permits the 
decision-maker to choose between two equally rights-intrusive measures at the factual 
optimisation stage. Epistemic deference arises where there is uncertainty as to specific 
issues within proportionality and gives leeway to the decision-makers findings of fact 
(empirical epistemic deference) or findings as to the precise balance required between 
the public interest and the human right (normative epistemic deference). As I discussed 
in detail in Chapter 3, various aspects of this model are institutionally contingent, and so 
will be more or less applicable in relation to HRA-based judicial review of certain 
institutions of government. 
In this section I will show how housing rights cases under the HRA can be explained 
using this structural, institutionally sensitive model. As indicated above, this section 
will be limited to cases where courts looked at either a one-off administrative decision 
or a rule of general application. These decisions are more straightforward than the cases 
involving multiple levels of government. My primary aim in this section is to show that 
the optimisation elements of the test and the related forms of deference are at work in 
the cases. In the subsequent section I will go on to develop the difficulties inherent in 
proportionality cases which involve an interplay between different levels of 
government. 
Poplar Housing and Regeneration Community Association Ltd v Donoghue43 was an 
early HRA case on housing and the language of proportionality is not as explicit in the 
judgment as it is in later decisions.44 Nonetheless, the reasoning does indicate that the 
Court of Appeal gave some consideration to factual optimisation. The challenged 
measure was a provision of primary legislation: section 24(1) of the Housing Act 1988, 
                                                
43 [2002] QB 48. 
44 It is worth noting that this case pre-dates the celebrated Daly decision by about a month. 
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which required the courts to make an order for possession where a social landlord 
sought to evict an occupant at the end of a tenancy. Once it was shown that the tenancy 
had ended, the legislation made it mandatory for the court to grant the order, and no 
discretion was available. The claimant had been deemed to have become intentionally 
homeless by the local authority and on this basis the tenancy was ended and so the court 
was required to make an order for possession. The principles at stake were the tenant’s 
Article 8 right to respect for family life and home on the one hand, and the public 
interest in protecting the Article 8 rights and freedoms of others who were in need of 
local authority housing.  
It was the compulsory nature of the provision that the claimant argued was a 
disproportionate infringement of her Article 8 right. Lord Woolf CJ, giving the 
judgment of the Court, looked at the alternative remedies that were available to an 
occupant in the claimant’s circumstances. He noted that there were a number of ways of 
challenging the decision to evict, such as an appeal to the County Court, the 
ombudsman or to the authority itself.45 While Lord Woolf CJ did not expressly discuss 
this in the terms of minimal impairment, by looking at the surrounding arrangements, 
his reasoning included the level of impairment of this particular measure in the broader 
context of the statutory and institutional framework in which local authority housing 
operates. As such, it is an early indication of the courts engaging in factual optimisation 
analysis in housing cases. The focus on factual optimisation was appropriate, since this 
was a piece of legislation and various options were available to government in setting it 
out. The choices made and duly reflected in the statute were at the core of the Court of 
Appeal’s reasoning. This is particularly appropriate for proportionality analysis of rule-
making powers where the decision-maker has a range of measures available. In such a 
                                                
45 [2002] QB 48, at 71. 
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situation, since other, less rights-intrusive options could be chosen in a way that is not 
always possible for administrative decisions. 
The Court took the view that the field of housing policy was an area in which ‘the 
courts must treat the decisions of Parliament as to what is in the public interest with 
particular deference.’46 This suggests epistemic deference in the factual optimisation 
stage. Parliament’s view on what is required is being deferred to. It is not entirely clear 
whether this is empirical or normative epistemic deference. Lord Woolf CJ was not 
explicit about whether the deference was being paid to the Parliament’s measurement of 
the public interest or to the balance it struck between the competing principles. The 
judgment also made a very brief allusion to legal optimisation. Having accepted that the 
measure was ‘necessary in a democratic society’ Lord Woolf CJ held that the question 
remaining was whether the measure was ‘legitimate and proportionate.’ He took the 
view that ‘this is the area of policy where the court should defer to the decision of 
Parliament.’47 Again, this seems to be epistemic deference, probably normative. While 
the Article 8(2) analysis is very sparse in this case, it is nonetheless possible to see the 
patterns of the structural model within the reasoning.  
The decision in R (Baker) v First Secretary of State48 involved a detailed factual 
optimisation analysis of an administrative decision by Nicholas Blake QC (sitting as a 
Deputy Judge of the High Court). The case concerned a decision by a local authority to 
compulsorily purchase the home of a woman who had let it fall into an extreme degree 
of disrepair, as a result of which the property was causing problems for the surrounding 
environment. The rights at issue were the claimant’s Article 8 right to respect for home 
and her right to property under Article 1 of the First Protocol. As was discussed above, 
the parties agreed that the measure was in the public interest, so the Deputy Judge did 
                                                
46 [2002] QB 48, at 71. 
47 ibid, at 71. 
48 [2003] EWHC 2511 (Admin). 
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not specify them in great detail, but his reasoning specifically mentions the protection of 
health.  
The Court made reference to the two stage analysis recognised by Dyson LJ in Samaroo 
v Secretary of State for the Home Department:49 the first stage was to examine whether 
the objective could have been achieved by less rights-intrusive means and the second 
was to examine the overall balance. This is a clear recognition of factual and legal 
optimisation.50 The Court considered the report of the inspector who had approved the 
compulsory purchase order on the Secretary of State’s behalf and concluded that all 
other options had been considered but none were thought to be effective. The Court was 
satisfied that the least rights-intrusive measure had been chosen. 
The Court also recognised that if there had only been one means of achieving the aim 
available to the Secretary of State, then the measure would have been justified. This is 
an important recognition of the limitations of the application of this arm of the test in 
certain institutional settings. As I discussed in detail in Chapter 3.3.2 and Chapter 4.2: 
where there is a very limited range of measures open to a decision-maker, the minimal 
impairment arm of proportionality becomes far less relevant. The range of measures 
available to the decision-maker to achieve the public interest aim will be determinative 
of how much use factual optimisation will be in assessing proportionality. The more 
measures available, the more meaningful can be the factual optimisation analysis.  
It is also interesting to note the divergence between the Baker and Samaroo decisions. 
In the Samaroo case, Dyson LJ held that there was no need to consider whether the least 
intrusive means had been used in an administrative decision where it was made 
pursuant to a rule or policy made at a different level of government. The Samaroo 
decision therefore turned completely on the overall balancing point. By contrast, the 
                                                
49 [2001] EWCA Civ 1139. This case is discussed in detail in Chapter 4 above. 
50 [2003] EWHC 2511 (Admin), at paragraphs 40-42. See above, Chapter 4.2 and 4.3. 
262 
 
 
Baker case turned almost entirely on minimal impairment. This inconsistency can be 
reconciled by the fact that there were alternative measures available to the decision-
maker in Baker, which were worth considering. This can be contrasted with the 
Samaroo decision, which, being an immigration decision, involved a choice between 
deportation and leave to remain. Baker is therefore a good example of an administrative 
decision-making case in which factual optimisation played an important role. The key 
distinction is the different institutional setting as between the two. 
In Baker the Court was at pains to set out the need for both a minimal impairment and 
an overall balancing stage in proportionality analysis. The Court concluded that given 
that the least rights-intrusive means of achieving the public interest aim had been used, 
there could be ‘very little debate about the justification overall, as a fair balance, given 
the benefits that the public would achieve by the compulsory purchase of these 
premises.’51 While there was scant analysis on the legal optimisation point, a finding 
was made that there was overall balance. As such the Baker decision not only shows 
how the two arms of the test can be used together but also that it is possible for one arm 
of the test either to be more important or to do more of the heavy lifting in any 
particular application. To that extent, it compares well with some of the cases discussed 
below in which only one arm of the test was applied. Whether it is factual or legal 
optimisation that does most of the work will be substantially affected by the 
institutional setting.52 
Clays Lane Housing Co-operative Ltd v The Housing Corporation53 involved an 
administrative decision by the respondent, which was a regulatory body for social 
landlords. The respondent had ordered the compulsory transfer of housing stock from 
the claimant, a social landlord to another social landlord, the ‘Peabody Trust’. The 
                                                
51[2003] EWHC 2511 (Admin), at paragraph 57.  
52 See Chapter 3.2. 
53 [2005] 1 WLR 2229. 
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claimant had wanted the housing stock to be transferred to a different social landlord, 
‘Tenants First’. At issue were the claimant’s property rights under Article 1 of the First 
Protocol and the public interest in securing the welfare of tenants in social housing.  
The claimants argued that both the respondent and the High Court had failed adequately 
to address the proportionality of the transfer on the basis that they had used a 
proportionality test from the ECHR case of James v United Kingdom54 which relied 
solely on overall balancing and did not involve a minimal impairment analysis. The 
claimant contended that the Daly test superseded the James test as a matter of domestic 
law and it required that the least intrusive means of achieving the public interest be 
applied. Maurice Kay LJ accepted that the Daly test was authoritative but disagreed 
with the claimant on how it operated in the instant case. There was no dispute in the 
case about the fact that a transfer was going to occur, the issue was which of the two 
other social landlords the housing stock would be transferred to. He held that this 
signified ‘that what is “necessary” is driven by the balancing exercise rather than by a 
“least intrusive” requirement’.55 On this basis, his reasoning was much more heavily 
focused on legal optimisation rather than factual optimisation. However, some 
recognition of factual optimisation was made. Maurice Kay LJ denied that the least 
restrictive means had to be found on the basis that such a means would be ‘strictly 
necessary’. Instead he preferred to describe factual optimisation as requiring the means 
to be ‘reasonably necessary’. Having done this, he recognised the two elements of the 
test: ‘I conclude that the appropriate test of proportionality requires a balancing exercise 
and a decision which is justified on the basis of a compelling case in the public interest 
and as being reasonably necessary but not obligatorily the least intrusive of Convention 
rights.’56 Maurice Kay LJ then went on to note that a ‘strict necessity’ test rather than a 
                                                
54 (1986) 8 EHRR 123. 
55 [2004] EWCA Civ 1658; [2005] 1 WLR 2229, at 2241.  
56 ibid, at 2241. 
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‘reasonable necessity’ test might force a decision-maker to take a decision which was 
‘fraught with adverse consequences’ on the basis that it was ‘perhaps quite marginally, 
the least intrusive.’57 He then examined the decision made by the respondent, which has 
included doubts whether Tenants First would be able to discharge its regulatory 
responsibilities in the public interest if the property was transferred to it. The respondent 
was satisfied that a transfer to Peabody would provide that certainty. While Maurice 
Kay LJ accepted that the respondent had not applied the correct proportionality test, he 
was satisfied that if they had done so, they would have reached the same outcome.58 
The reasoning of Maurice Kay LJ is somewhat unsophisticated in relation to factual 
optimisation. If his reasoning is unpacked, it is possible to show the structural model at 
work. The decision-maker had made a finding that a transfer to Peabody Trust would 
provide greater security for the tenants than would a transfer to Tenants First. As such, a 
transfer to Tenants First would not be a factually optimised outcome because it did not 
provide the requisite level of realisation of the public interest principle. On that basis, 
transfer to Peabody Trust was in fact the least intrusive measure which would achieve 
the required level of realisation of the public interest. Furthermore, empirical epistemic 
deference could be afforded to the decision-makers findings in relation to the level of 
public interest realisation which would be provided by each measure. This reasoning is 
completely in line with the findings of Maurice Kay LJ, but it makes the process of 
proportionality reasoning more explicit than his ‘strictly/reasonably necessary’ concept, 
notwithstanding the fact that he derived it from ECHR Jurisprudence.59 
Aside from this, the heavy emphasis on legal optimisation was nonetheless justified on 
institutional sensitivity grounds, given the limited range of measures available to the 
                                                
57 [2004] EWCA Civ 1658; [2005] 1 WLR 2229, at 2242. 
58 This is a recognition of the importance of proportionate outcomes as opposed to the use of 
proportionality language in decision-making. This question was considered in detail in a series of 
immigration cases and ultimately the proportionality of outcomes approach was preferred there also. See 
above, Chapter 4. 3. 2. 
59 James v United Kingdom (1986) 8 EHRR 123, at 145-146. 
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decision-maker. In this case, the decision-maker was faced with only two options as to 
the transfer of the housing stock, one of which achieved the public interest to a greater 
degree. This limits the extent to which a wide ranging factual optimisation analysis 
would have been possible and so the focus on legal optimisation was understandable. 
Maurice Kay LJ cited Lough v First Secretary of State60 as authority for the proposition 
that the ‘balancing’ test (legal optimisation) was more appropriate than the ‘least 
intrusive’ test (factual optimisation) where a case involved a conflict between two or 
more groups of private interests, rather than a direct interference with a Convention 
right by a public body. However, once an institutionally sensitive analysis is conducted, 
it becomes clear that it is the limited range of measures available in such cases that is 
determinative of the usefulness of factual optimisation, rather than the subject matter.  
Clays Lane was followed by Pascoe v First Secretary of State.61 The case concerned a 
compulsory purchase order pursuant to a statutory power to designate certain areas for 
urban regeneration and subsequently to redevelop them. The principles at stake were the 
claimant’s right to respect for the home under Article 8 and her right to property under 
Article 1 of the First Protocol. The public interest aim was urban regeneration. Counsel 
for the claimant argued that because the decision-maker had not expressly applied a 
minimal impairment proportionality test when deciding the issue, the decision was not 
Convention-compatible.  
Forbes J then proceeded to consider whether or not there were any alternative less 
rights-restrictive measures available for achieving the public interest. Before doing so, 
he noted that ‘the intensity of review depends upon the particular context in question in 
a given case.’62 Forbes J concluded that the decision-maker had examined all of the 
                                                
60 [2004] EWCA Civ 905; [2004] 1 WLR 2557. 
61 [2006] EWHC 2356 (Admin); [2007] 1 WLR 885. 
62 ibid, at 910. Forbes J had already accepted that there was a wide margin of appreciation in this area, 
suggesting he was prepared to afford a large degree of deference, see [2006] EWHC 2356 (Admin); 
[2007] 1 WLR 885, at 909. 
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proposed alternatives and that he was satisfied ‘that the inspector’s assessment 
(accepted in due course by the Secretary of State) that there were, in fact, no less 
intrusive alternatives available to the proposed scheme was properly made.’63 This is a 
clear example of factual optimisation tempered by empirical epistemic deference. The 
court deferred to the decision-maker’s findings of fact concerning the viability of 
alternative less rights-restrictive measures (empirical epistemic deference). Having 
accepted those findings of fact, the court was satisfied that there was no less rights-
restrictive alternative which would achieve the public interest (factual optimisation). 
Forbes J in the High Court contended that Clays Lane was authority for the proposition 
that the two stage Samaroo approach was not of universal application.64 It is worth 
noting that the first of the two stages, factual optimisation, was not actually applied in 
Samaroo. Furthermore, as has been shown, Forbes J did engage in a factual 
optimisation analysis to the extent that it was possible, but the limited range of 
alternative measures meant that the analysis was necessarily scant. While it is not 
explicit in the judgment of Forbes J, I contend that the limited role for factual 
optimisation in this case was caused by the institutional features of the decision-maker. 
Forbes J concluded his analysis of proportionality by accepting that the overall balance 
struck by the decision-maker was ‘sufficient to meet the requirement of 
proportionality’.65 This is a clear indication of the Court’s acceptance that the 
challenged measure was legally optimised (although the challenge was ultimately 
successful on an alternative non-HRA ground). The Court also noted that there was no 
need for the decision-maker to adopt a formulaic approach to the human rights 
balancing exercise. The Court’s focus appears to be on the proportionality of the 
outcome, rather than whether some form of proportionality reasoning was used by the 
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64 ibid, at 911. 
65 ibid, at 914. 
267 
 
 
decision-maker. This is in line with the reasoning of the Court of Appeal in Huang v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department.66 
R (Wilson) v Wychavon District Council67 concerned a challenge to a provision which 
Parliament had inserted into the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. The original 
legislation had afforded an exemption from local authority stop notices to both dwelling 
houses and residential caravans. The new provision removed the exemption for 
residential caravans. The appellants were gypsies and claimed that the measure 
discriminated against them on the basis of ethnic origin. The human rights principle at 
stake was the Article 14 prevention of discriminatory treatment concerning the 
enjoyment of Article 8. Richards LJ gave detailed consideration to the decisions of the 
ECHR and the UK Courts concerning Article 14 and held that where there was indirect 
discrimination, the level of scrutiny should be ‘intense or severe’ but not ‘very strict’ as 
is required in cases of direct discrimination. The Court accepted that the protection of 
the environment was a legitimate objective derived from the Article 8(2) recognition of 
the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.68 
Richards LJ rejected the contention that Parliament was bound to choose the least 
restrictive alternative when pursuing the public interest. This suggests that he was 
working on the basis that he must choose between factual and legal optimisation. 
However, he went on to hold that:  
‘It does not follow that the existence of a less restrictive alternative is 
altogether irrelevant in the context of Article 14 … the narrower the margin 
of appreciation or discretionary area of judgment, or the more intense the 
                                                
66 [2005] EWCA Civ 105; [2005] 3 WLR 488 and  [2007] UKHL 11; [2007] 2 AC 167. See above, 
Chapter 4.3.2. 
67 [2007] EWCA Civ 52; [2007] QB 801. 
68 ibid, at 819-820. See further above at 6.1.2. 
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degree of scrutiny required, the more significant it may be that a less 
restrictive alternative could have been adopted.’69 
He then proceeded to give detailed consideration to both the balance struck between the 
impact of the measure on the Article 8 rights of the claimants and the public interest in 
protecting the environment. He also considered the effect that such a measure would 
have had on those living in fixed dwelling houses and concluded that there were 
material differences between the two situations which permitted the differential 
balance.70 This was clearly legal optimisation at work.  
He subsequently examined whether or not a qualified exemption could have been 
adopted instead of removing the exemption entirely. He ultimately concluded that the 
application of such an exemption ‘would bring the position very close to the exercise 
that has to be carried out anyway in individual cases even in the absence of a qualified 
exemption.’71 In examining the alternative and concluding that its effects were 
substantially similar to the challenged measure, Richards LJ was engaged in a factual 
optimisation analysis, notwithstanding his contention that it was not part of the 
proportionality test under Article 14. The range of measures available to parliament is 
extremely wide, so there is no institutional reason why factual optimisation should be 
minimised in this case. However, the focus on overall balancing in this case shows that 
factual optimisation is part of the proportionality test, not necessarily all of the test. By 
deferring to Parliament’s choice between the two equally rights-intrusive measures, 
Richards LJ was affording Parliament structural deference. 
In Smith v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry72 the human rights principle was 
the claimant gypsies’ right to respect for the home under Article 8(1) and the public 
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71 ibid, at 832. 
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interest principle was derived from the economic well-being of the country under 
Article 8(2). The specific aim of the measure, accepted by the court as meeting the 
‘legitimate objective’ test, was that the lands all be in the ownership of the State by a 
particular date. As was noted above, this was an extremely narrow public interest 
principle which has been heavily criticised. The case involved a compulsory purchase 
order of land owned by the claimants made by the London Development Agency. 
Facilities for the London 2012 Olympic games were due to be built on the land. The 
respondent had confirmed the compulsory purchase order, even though no alternative 
sites were available for the claimants. 
In defining the public interest principle, Wyn Williams J gave the Secretary of State a 
very wide degree of empirical epistemic deference. The Secretary of State argued that 
the Olympic development would be put at risk if the lands were not in the possession of 
the London Development agency by mid-2007. This was not challenged by the claimant 
and the Court found that it was ‘unchallengeable’.73 While the question of deferring to 
the Secretary of State’s expertise was not addressed, the lack of any examination of 
whether the public interest did require the lands to be transferred by mid-2007 shows 
that there was a de facto acceptance of this finding of fact. This was a dramatic level of 
deference to afford and it arguably skewed the analysis towards a particular outcome.  
Wyn Williams J went on to examine whether minimal impairment had to be strictly 
applied in every case. Having looked also at Samaroo, Pascoe and Clays Lane he came 
to the conclusion that in this case a ‘compulsory purchase order may be proportionate 
even though it does not amount to the least intrusive interference of the land owner's 
rights under article 8.’74 Notwithstanding this finding, the Court elected to examine 
whether the challenged measure was in fact the least restrictive available. Wyn 
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Williams ultimately found that the confirmation of the compulsory purchase was 
proportionate stating that ‘[n]o other measure, in my judgment would have achieved 
that objective.’75 This is clearly factual optimisation. Furthermore, this quote 
undermined the Court’s assertion that the least restrictive intrusive alternative need not 
be followed in all cases. If nothing else would have achieved the public interest, then 
there was no less restrictive alternative.  
The Court also noted that in reaching his conclusion that the measure was proportionate, 
he had had regard to the whole of the claimants’ rights under Article 8 and the fact that 
the respondent was taking all reasonable steps to resolve the provision of alternative 
sites expeditiously. This consideration of the factors weighing on either side of the 
balance is a brief application of legal optimisation.  
In this section I have shown that both factual and legal optimisation are deployed by the 
courts when addressing the proportionality of housing decisions made at a single level 
of government. While the courts have not always used both arms of the test to their 
fullest extent, each has been repeatedly applied, giving a clear indication that the 
structural model can be applied to the UK case law. As I have shown, the emphasis or 
minimisation of aspects of the proportionality test can be explained by looking at the 
institutional setting. These institutional patterns have been along much the same lines as 
was seen in Chapters 4 and 5. The role of deference has not been made explicit in every 
case, but as I have shown, if an institutionally sensitive approach is taken, these cases 
can be interpreted in line with the structural model of deference outlined in Chapter 2.4. 
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6.3: FACTUAL AND LEGAL OPTIMISATION IN MULTI-LEVEL CASES 
In the previous section I showed how factual and legal optimisation have been 
addressed by the courts when dealing with HRA based challenges to decisions made at 
a single level of government. While certain institutional issues presented themselves, 
they were largely explicable, as were the issues which arose in Chapters 4 and 5. In this 
section I will move on to examine housing cases addressing the Convention 
compatibility of decisions which are rooted in multiple levels of government. Most of 
these concern administrative decision-making under statutory schemes. The 
proportionality analysis in some of these cases has struggled with the stratification 
inherent in this sort of decision-making. My aim in this section is to show that the 
structural, institutionally sensitive model of proportionality and deference can be 
applied to HRA case law involving review of multi-level decision-making. However, as 
I will show, a misunderstanding of the institutional factors which affect proportionality 
has severely undermined the quality of the reasoning in some recent judgments.  
This thesis has argued that certain aspects of the proportionality test can be either 
played down or emphasised in different institutional settings. As was shown in Chapter 
4, where an administrative decision-maker has a limited range of options available, then 
factual optimisation will be minimised and legal optimisation will be emphasised. 
Conversely, as was established in Chapter 5, where a rule-making authority has a wide 
range of measures available to it, factual optimisation will be emphasised in certain 
circumstances, and legal optimisation may be less rigorous, particularly if the rule is of 
very wide application.76 
A multi-level decision is likely to involve a rule-maker with a wide choice of measures 
whose rules affect a large number of people. This can be described as the ‘macro level’. 
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At the lower level, it is likely to involve an administrative decision-maker with a very 
limited choice of measures whose decisions will affect one person or group. This can be 
described as the ‘micro level’.77 These macro and micro levels are two distinct 
measures, each of which is open to proportionality challenge on HRA grounds.78  
For proportionality to be effectively applied a court must take one of two courses. The 
first option is for both limbs of proportionality, along with the attendant issues of 
epistemic and structural deference – to be applied in full to each of the two levels of the 
decision. The second option is to stratify the test in an institutionally appropriate 
manner. This would involve the application of factual optimisation to the rule-maker 
and legal optimisation to the administrative decision-maker. The rule-maker would be 
afforded structural and epistemic deference where appropriate and the administrative 
decision-maker would be afforded epistemic deference. While this second option is less 
rigorous than the first option, it is conceivable that it could be done in such a way that 
maintains the internal logic of the structure of proportionality and deference.  
There is some case law which indicates that proportionality will be applied in a 
substantial way to both levels of a decision being followed. However there are also 
examples of cases where the test is fragmented in a way which fails adequately to take 
account of institutional factors: the rule-maker is reviewed according to legal 
optimisation and the administrative decision-maker is reviewed according to factual 
optimisation. It is hoped that the analysis of proportionality in preceding chapters of this 
thesis has shown that such an approach is logically flawed and undermines the 
institutional premises upon which the proportionality test is based.  
                                                
77 I have taken the terms ‘macro level’ and ‘micro level’ from the judgment of Waller LJ in R (McLellan) 
v Bracknell Forest Borough Council [2001] EWCA Civ 1510; [2002] QB 1129. 
78 Where the rule is an Act of Parliament, the challenge would be on the basis of section 3 or 4 of the 
HRA. If the rule is set at a lower level, then the challenge would be on the basis of section 6. In either 
case, the proportionality test can be applied, as was shown in Chapter 5. 
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An example of an approach which suggests that both limbs of proportionality analysis 
should be applied to each level of a multi-level decision can be seen in R (McLellan) v 
Bracknell Forest Borough Council.79 The Court of Appeal considered the Convention 
compatibility of a statutory scheme that put council tenants on an unsecured tenancy for 
the first twelve months to ensure that they would not engage in anti-social behaviour or 
non-payment of rent. The human rights principle was the Article 8 right to respect for 
the home and the public interest principle was the protection of the rights and freedoms 
of others under Article 8(2). In looking at the Article 8 issue, Waller LJ, with whom the 
rest of the Court agreed, addressed the issue at the macro and micro level. The macro 
level concerned the Convention compatibility of the legislative scheme itself and the 
micro level concerned the Convention compatibility of individual decisions made under 
the scheme. Waller LJ affirmed the judgment of the first instance judge, Longmore J, 
who held that the statutory scheme was Convention-compatible. This was based on the 
Handyside80 version of the proportionality test, which includes requirements that the 
measure be justified by reasons that are relevant and sufficient; address a pressing social 
need and be proportionate to the aim pursued. This is very clearly the language of 
overall balancing (legal optimisation) and it was this point that was the main thrust of 
the decision. 
While the Court did not expressly conduct a minimal impairment analysis, the features 
of the scheme were considered in a way that suggested that the Court was satisfied that 
the scheme went only as far as was necessary. This is a rudimentary form of factual 
optimisation similar to that seen in Poplar Housing. Waller LJ cited the case of 
Mellacher v Austria81 in which the ECHR gave the Austrian legislature a wide margin 
of appreciation in relation to housing matters. He then went on to hold that Parliament 
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had decided that the scheme was ‘necessary in the interest of tenants generally and the 
local authorities’.82 He then went on to note that the scheme involved ‘important 
safeguards’ and listed six procedural protections that were available to a tenant whom 
the council sought to evict. He further noted the availability of judicial review in such 
cases. By looking at the features of the measure and their impact on the protected right, 
the Court of Appeal was assessing the level of impairment involved. This shows that a 
degree of factual optimisation was applied, although a detailed analysis of alternative 
measures was not undertaken. The reference to a wide margin of appreciation suggests 
that deference was being paid to Parliament; although it is not entirely clear what form 
this deference took. It was arguably a combination of empirical epistemic deference 
concerning the assessment of what measures would achieve the public interest and 
structural deference regarding the choice of measure. This would explain why the 
factual optimisation analysis (such as it was) involved such light scrutiny of alternative 
measures. 
While the analysis of the macro issue involved some degree of both factual and legal 
optimisation, the analysis of the micro level was far less exhaustive. To some extent this 
may be explained by the fact that the court of first instance did not address the micro 
level issue and for various factual reasons it did not need to be addressed in detail by the 
time the case reached the Court of Appeal. The important thing to note is that the Court 
of Appeal held that the mere fact that the statutory scheme was Convention-compatible 
did not exclude the possibility of a court reviewing the Article 8 compatibility of a 
decision made under that scheme.  Waller LJ was satisfied that a tenant had the right to 
raise the issue of whether their eviction was justified under Article 8(2). While the 
precise proportionality test to be applied in such a challenge was not discussed by the 
Court of Appeal, there is no reason to think that factual or legal optimisation would be 
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excluded from a HRA challenge to a decision made under the statutory scheme. The 
McLellan case can therefore be characterised as a proportionality analysis of the 
primary legislation using both factual and legal optimisation. The micro level issue of 
challenges to decisions made under the legislation was left open to further 
proportionality review. While this is by no means a perfect example of full 
proportionality analysis at both stages of a multi-level decision, it does support the 
proposition that factual and legal optimisation can each operate at both levels of 
government which are challenged in multi-level cases.  
The relationship between legislation and administrative decisions was also examined in 
South Buckinghamshire District Council v Porter (No 1).83 At issue was section 187B 
of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, which permitted local authorities to seek 
injunctions when an enforcement order had been issued. Three local authorities were 
seeking injunctions on foot of enforcement orders requiring a number of gypsies to 
cease living on land which had not been zoned for residential use. The local authorities 
argued that section 187B should be read as requiring the courts to automatically grant 
the injunctions once the enforcement order had been made. The respondents rejected 
this argument. 
This case required an assessment of two levels of government: the section 187B itself 
and decisions made under it. The two issues were so closely related that the analysis of 
each is somewhat intertwined, however, it is possible to discern the approach taken by 
the House to each level. 
On the issue of section 187B itself, The House of Lords held that the provision should 
be read as retaining the courts’ full original jurisdiction in relation to the injunction. The 
exact language of factual optimisation is absent, but the analysis does pay some 
attention to the alternative means of achieving the public interest. For example Lord 
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Steyn considered whether it would be sufficient to let the local authorities themselves 
make a determination on the Article 8 issues involved in these cases. He took the view 
that this would not be an effective protection. This shows the House analysing the 
alternative means and concluding that the least rights-intrusive means would be to retain 
full original jurisdiction with regard to the granting of injunctions. This indicates that 
the court was applying factual optimisation in interpreting the Act. Since the alternative 
interpretations proposed by the local authority were not factually optimised, they were 
disproportionate. This could be the reason why no legal optimisation analysis was 
undertaken in relation to them. It could also have been the view of the court that only 
factual optimisation was appropriate at the rule-making level. It is not possible to 
discern which approach was being followed.  
Lord Bingham cited with approval the judgment given by Simon Brown LJ in the Court 
of Appeal decision in this case.  Simon Brown LJ had held that injunctive relief should 
only be granted where the court deemed it to be proportionate, making the point that 
regardless of the merits of the enforcement order, the court should only grant an 
injunction where it was prepared to commit a person for failure to obey it and so all of 
the circumstances of those subject to the injunction must be considered by the court.84 
This indicates a very low level of epistemic deference being afforded to the local 
authorities. This is noteworthy for two reasons. First, it is the local authority which is 
receiving very limited deference even though it is the Act of Parliament that is being 
interpreted at this stage. This highlights the complex interplay of levels of governance 
that is involved in these cases. The second point to note about this low level of 
deference is that the granting of injunctions is something that is within the institutional 
competence of the courts. As such, relative to other arms of government, the courts 
have much greater expertise in this area. As has been noted previously, institutional 
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competence is relative. Where a court is well equipped to make a decision itself, it will 
not defer to a decision-maker on institutional competence grounds. 
At the level of the individual decisions on enforcement notices, Lord Bingham held that 
where Convention rights were at issue, the activities of the local authorities would not 
merely be supervised but would be required to serve a legitimate aim, be in accordance 
with law and be proportionate. It was common ground that the enforcement orders 
would be in accordance with law since they were made under the Town and Country 
Planning Act 1990. As such, the overall proportionality would be the central issue in 
deciding injunctions. This finding is similar to earlier decisions in relation to 
administrative decision-making, particularly immigration decisions, in which the factual 
optimisation issue was deemed to have been dealt with by the legislation setting out the 
powers of the public body. Here again, Lord Bingham seems to be focusing on overall 
balancing on the understanding that factual optimisation is not relevant to the exercise 
of a statutory power by an administrative decision-maker. 
Lord Steyn cited with approval the following dicta of Simon Brown LJ from the Court 
of Appeal decision in the same case: 
‘Proportionality requires not only that the injunction be appropriate and 
necessary for the attainment of the public interest objective sought— 
here the safeguarding of the environment— but also that it does not 
impose an excessive burden on the individual whose private interests— 
here the gypsy’s private life and home and the retention of his ethnic 
identity— are at stake.’85 
This is very clearly the language of overall balancing and it puts legal optimisation to 
the fore in the decision to grant an injunction.  
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The House of Lords repeatedly pointed out that it was not up to the courts to decide the 
merits of the planning decision itself.86 However, they were not prepared to limit the 
powers of the courts to address all of the circumstances, including the human rights 
issues, when deciding whether to grant an injunction. Lord Steyn noted that as an 
injunction was an equitable remedy, there was inherently a wide measure of discretion 
for the court in deciding whether to grant one.87 Lord Bingham considered the level of 
deference that a court should afford to the local authority when determining whether or 
not an enforcement notice passes the overall balance test. Having found that it was up to 
the court to determine proportionality, he went on to hold that: 
‘This did not mean that the court would pay no heed to the decisions of 
local planning authorities: issues as to whether or not planning 
permission should be granted are exclusively a matter for them, and the 
planning history of the site, including any recent decisions, will be 
highly relevant. Respect should be accorded to the decisions of a 
democratically accountable body. But it is still for the court to reach its 
own independent conclusion on the proportionality of the relief sought to 
the object to be attained.’88 
These comments indicate that epistemic deference is a significant issue at the level of 
the individual decision to grant an injunction. Lord Bingham is clearly accepting that 
empirical epistemic deference should be afforded with regard to factual matters. He is 
also accepting that some element of normative epistemic deference on the basis of 
democratic legitimacy may be appropriate. However, the relative institutional 
competence of the courts in such matters is a factor working in the opposite direction to 
reduce the level of deference at this overall balancing stage of the analysis. Not only 
                                                
86 This can be seen in the judgment of Lord Clyde: [2003] UKHL 26; [2003] 2 AC 558, at 590-592. 
87 [2003] UKHL 26; [2003] 2 AC 558, at 587. 
88 ibid, at 574. 
279 
 
 
does this show that epistemic deference can be integrated into overall balance, but it is 
also illustrative of the need to be sensitive to the particular institutional features of the 
government body being reviewed relative to the courts. 
The Porter case shows the application of factual optimisation to the framework of rules 
and legal optimisation to individual decisions made within those rules. As such, the 
proportionality test has been effectively split across two levels of government. It is not 
entirely clear whether this was an intentional fragmentation of the test or if it just 
happened that those were the aspects of the test which did the hard work at each level. 
In either event, the analysis is consistent with the underlying premises of the structure 
of proportionality and deference. 
A somewhat less satisfactory analysis was undertaken by the Court of Appeal in 
Sheffield City Council v Smart.89 Laws LJ considered the balance to be struck between 
the human rights principle of respect for home life and the public interest principle of 
ensuring fair and reasonable management of local authority housing. The applicants had 
been deemed unintentionally homeless by the housing authorities and had been granted 
non-secure tenancies, which the local authorities subsequently sought to terminate on 
the basis of complaints made by the applicants’ neighbours. Throughout the judgment, 
Laws LJ refers to the requirement of balancing, both in his own findings and with 
regard to the arguments of counsel. It is clear from the language used that legal 
optimisation is at the crux of the decision.  
As with the McLellan case, the judgment includes important observations about which 
precise level of government the Court of Appeal was reviewing. The appellants argued 
that the Court should restrict itself to looking at the balance struck by the local authority 
in deciding to seek possession from the appellant. However, Laws LJ rejected this. He 
took the view that what was at issue was not the specific administrative decision, but the 
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legislation upon which it was based. He held that: ‘the balance of interests arising under 
Article 8(2) has in all its essentials been struck by the legislature.’90 The analysis is 
solely in terms of legal optimisation and the court did not undertake a factual 
optimisation analysis of the challenged legislation. 
Laws LJ held that the UK Courts ‘will give a margin of discretion to elected decision-
makers, all the more so if primary legislation is under scrutiny.’91 While he accepted 
that conflict between primary legislation and the Convention was possible, he held that 
‘one would expect such clashes between the policy of main legislation and the 
Convention rights to be exceptional, not least for the good reason that distribution of the 
Convention rights has to go hand-in-hand with deference to the democratic 
legislature.’92 These comments and the heavy focus on the balance struck by Parliament 
indicate that the Court was affording a large degree of normative epistemic deference to 
Parliament in legal optimisation. This was based on the democratic legitimacy of the 
Parliament. 
As regards the micro level of the individual decisions made under the legislation, Laws 
LJ did accept that the courts could scrutinise the decision of the local authority to seek 
possession on a Daly basis, rather than limiting themselves to Wednesbury review. The 
Court did not expressly set out the elements of the proportionality test that should be 
applied in such a case. The Daly test is stated in terms of factual optimisation without 
any recognition of legal optimisation, which would suggest that legal optimisation 
would not be applicable to individual decisions made under the scheme. However, this 
was not explicit in the judgment and there is now a wealth of case law on overall 
balancing and so the full proportionality test might be applied in these cases. 
                                                
90 [2002] EWCA  Civ 04, at paragraph 40. 
91 ibid, at paragraph 42. 
92 ibid, at paragraph 41. 
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Laws LJ’s acceptance of the possibility of proportionality review at the micro level was 
deeply qualified and he suggested that such instances might involve ‘something wholly 
exceptional’ having occurred in relation to the case. In the instant case he found that no 
Article 8 point arose in the possession proceedings. This suggests that a significant level 
of deference is also to be afforded to any local authority whose decisions under the 
scheme were challenged on proportionality grounds.  
Overall, therefore, it would appear that the approach to multi-level decision-making and 
proportionality in Smart is somewhat flawed. The analysis of the macro level was based 
on legal optimisation with a large degree of epistemic deference. The standard 
suggested for the micro level may have been the full proportionality test, but by 
explicitly citing Daly it is possible that Laws LJ had in mind only a factual optimisation 
standard. If this was the case, it would invert the logic of the proportionality test. As 
was shown in Chapter 5, rule-making is especially amenable to factual optimisation, 
whereas administrative decisions tend to be more amenable to legal optimisation, as 
was discussed in Chapter 4. To apply only legal optimisation to the rule-making aspect 
of a decision would be to ignore the possibility that a less rights-intrusive rule might be 
possible. Furthermore, at the level of the individual decision made under the rule, 
factual optimisation is of little use.  Local authorities in eviction cases are unlikely to 
have a meaningful range of measures from which to choose. To apply only factual 
optimisation to the micro would be to remove the important safeguards of legal 
optimisation. Even if Laws LJ was not seeking to exclude legal optimisation from the 
micro level, the introduction of a ‘something wholly exceptional’ test will skew the 
analysis very heavily in favour of the local authority. As was seen in Chapter 4.3.1 the 
requirement of exceptional circumstances impacts dramatically on legal optimisation.  
The implicit reasoning of Smart concerning the fragmentation of the proportionality test 
was subsequently made explicit by the House of Lords in Harrow London Borough 
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Council v Qazi.93 The case concerned the eviction of a local authority tenant whose wife 
had left the property where they both lived. At the time of taking up the tenancy, the 
respondent was aware that if his wife left the house his own tenancy would come to an 
end. Lord Hope took the view that the existing laws relating to the termination of 
tenancies were proportionate in this instance. Lord Hope’s analysis is developed in 
terms of overall balance, although that language is not expressly used. His reasoning is 
based to some degree on the fact that the claimant was aware of this at the outset and 
further on the fact that ‘the premises, once recovered, will be available for letting to 
others who are in need of housing in their area.’94 The language of minimal impairment 
was absent from his reasoning, notwithstanding the fact that this was a rule, and 
alternative measures would arguably have been available for consideration. 
Lord Millett accepted that Article 8 would require a balance to be struck between 
respect for the home and one of the public interest principles listed in Article 8(2) but 
distinguished the listed public interest principles from the rights of others. He held that 
‘[c]onsideration of the question whether interference with the right is “necessary for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others” may also call for a balance to be struck, 
but it need not do so.’95 He went on to hold that since the tenancy had been lawfully 
terminated and as such, the outcome of the possession order was a forgone conclusion, 
there was no need for a balancing analysis to take place in the instant case. 
The House of Lords was split over the issue of whether the case should be remitted to 
the county court for consideration of whether the eviction of the claimant could be 
justified under Article 8(2), with the majority ruling that it should not. This again 
highlights the distinction between the macro and micro issue. The majority of the House 
of Lords in Qazi were satisfied that the general domestic property law of England and 
                                                
93 [2004] 1 AC 983. 
94 [2004] 1 AC 983, at 1013. 
95 ibid, at 1019. 
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Wales was enough to satisfy 8(2) save in exceptional circumstances. This meant that the 
mere fact that the determination of the tenancy was lawful at the macro level was 
deemed to be a sufficient basis for justification under Article 8(2) of anything done at 
the micro level. The minority of the House was open to the possibility of the County 
Court looking at each individual application for possession to ensure that the 
administrative decision on which it was based was Convention-compatible. This split 
between the rules at the macro level and the rulings at the micro level again highlights 
the effect that institutional roles can have in proportionality cases. For the majority, the 
macro level of domestic property law rule-making had done the balancing act already. 
For the minority, this would need also to be done at a micro level of administrative 
decision-making. The majority did not see fit to engage in a minimal impairment 
analysis of the macro level and it precluded the possibility of any proportionality 
analysis of decisions made under the legislation. As such, legal optimisation operated at 
the macro level, but not factual optimisation, and neither form of optimisation was 
permitted at the micro level. 
As has already been discussed, rules, including legislation, are particularly amenable to 
factual optimisation but can be difficult to assess according to legal optimisation. What 
the House of Lords did in this case was to break the proportionality test in half, apply an 
inappropriate half to one level of the decision (the legislation) and refuse to apply either 
half to the other level (the local authority decision to evict). This is a significant 
weakening of the proportionality test, which could have been avoided if a structural, 
institutionally sensitive approach had been taken. If the House had indicated that 
proportionality analysis of the micro level was acceptable, but been clear that a wide 
degree of epistemic deference would be afforded, then the integrity of the 
proportionality test could have been maintained. As it stands, the decision denies the 
possibility of any proportionality analysis at the micro level, which is tantamount to 
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relieving local authorities of any responsibility to exercise their eviction powers in a 
Convention-compatible way. 
Mr Qazi sought to appeal his decision to the ECHR but his appeal was deemed 
inadmissible. Subsequent to the Qazi case, the ECHR delivered judgment in two cases 
dealing with similar issues: Connors v United Kingdom96 and Blecic v Croatia.97 In 
each of these two cases the appellants had no domestic law rights to their homes and in 
each case, the ECHR held that the lack of a domestic law entitlement was not, on its 
own, sufficient to justify the infringement of the right to respect for home life.  
While Mr Qazi’s situation was unchanged by these cases, the minority of the House of 
Lords in his case did get a second bite of the cherry. In Kay v Lambeth London Borough 
Council,98 The House was called upon to revisit this precise issue in light of the 
intervening Strasbourg jurisprudence. Lord Bingham had been in the minority in the 
Qazi decision and maintained the same position in Kay, bolstered somewhat by the 
ECHR judgments. He held that Article 8(2) required an interference with the Article 
8(1) right to meet certain conditions. With regard to micro level decisions, he accepted 
that compliance with domestic property law was one such condition, but held that it was 
not a sufficient condition. He stated that ‘other conditions must also be met, notably that 
the interference must answer a pressing social need and be proportionate to the 
legitimate aim which it is sought to achieve. This must now be recognised as the correct 
principle.’99 He did not suggest that all attempts at eviction must be justified by the 
public authority from the outset in Article 8 terms, but held that an Article 8 issue 
should be permitted as a defence in proceedings for possession. He was also satisfied 
                                                
96 (2004) 40 EHRR 189. 
97 (2004) 41 EHRR 185. 
98 [2006] UKHL 10; [2006] 2 AC 465. 
99 ibid, at 491. 
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that the Article 8 points could be considered by the County Court and would not require 
a separate judicial review.100  
Despite his efforts to open the door for proportionality to operate in micro level housing 
decisions, Lord Bingham was however in the minority again on this occasion. The 
majority again reiterated that where a decision was made pursuant to the domestic law it 
was deemed to be justified under Article 8(2). The majority accepted that it would be 
permissible to challenge the Convention compatibility of the law upon which the 
possession was sought but not the decision to seek possession. Lord Hope held that ‘a 
defence which does not challenge the law under which the possession order is sought as 
being incompatible with article 8 but is based only on the occupier's personal 
circumstances should be struck out.’101 The only challenge at the micro level that Lord 
Hope and the rest of the majority were prepared to contemplate was one based on 
traditional Wednesbury grounds.102 This indicates that the House was willing to hear 
proportionality based challenges to housing legislation generally, but expressly 
precludes the possibility of proportionality challenges to decisions made under these 
legislative schemes. As with Qazi this shows a massive focus on a single institutional 
setting and totally ignores the proportionality issues that might arise at the micro level. 
This is regrettable. Lord Hope expressed concerns regarding the burden that would be 
imposed on the courts if every order for possession required a lengthy discussion of 
proportionality.103 While this is a legitimate concern, it could have been answered in a 
fashion which did not remove proportionality entirely from the micro level of the 
decision. If the micro issue had been addressed in a manner which gave strong support 
                                                
100 It is worth noting that Lord Bingham did not accept that the Strasbourg decisions overruled the Qazi 
decision via section 6 of the HRA. In his view, application of Strasbourg decisions to domestic situations 
was best governed by the existing system of precedent. See [2006] UKHL 10; [2006] 2 AC 465, at 497-
498. 
101 [2006] UKHL 10; [2006] 2 AC 465, at 516-517. 
102 ibid, at 516-517. 
103 ibid, at 504-507. 
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for a wide degree of deference for administrative decision-makers, the proportionality 
of decisions made under the scheme could still have been examined without unduly 
burdening the State. This deference could have been empirical epistemic  (based on the 
local authority’s expertise in planning matters) and normative epistemic  (based on the 
local authority’s democratic legitimacy). Such a position would have reduced the 
likelihood of the use of proportionality challenges in most cases of eviction by a local 
authority, but it would have retained the protection of Article 8 for more severe cases. 
By failing adequately to take account of the structure of the proportionality test, the 
House of Lords gave local authorities carte blanche to act in a manner that is highly 
restrictive of Convention rights. 
The issue of the relationship between the micro and macro levels was addressed by the 
House of Lords for a third time in Doherty v Birmingham City Council.104 In the period 
between Kay and Doherty, the ECHR had decided the case of McCann v United 
Kingdom105 in which the Strasbourg Court had refused to accept that local authority 
decisions made under statutory schemes should be excluded from proportionality 
review. 
The Doherty case involved a challenge to a decision to evict the claimant gypsies from 
a halting site. The respondent local authority had been exercising its powers under the 
Caravan Sites Act 1968. The Court of Appeal in Doherty106 interpreted Kay as 
providing two options available to a tenant who sought to challenge their eviction. The 
first option (‘gateway (a)’) would be to challenge the Convention compatibility of the 
legislation under which the decision to evict was made. The second option (‘gateway 
(b)’) would be to challenge the decision to evict on conventional public law grounds, 
most obviously Wednesbury unreasonableness. Kay had made it clear that challenging 
                                                
104 [2008] UKHL 57; [2008] 3 WLR 636. 
105 (2008) 47 EHRR 40. 
106 Birmingham City Council v Doherty [2006] EWCA Civ 1739; [2007] HLR 32. 
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the local authority’s decision to evict on Convention grounds was not an option, so 
there was no ‘gateway (c)’. The Court of Appeal held that there was no basis for such a 
challenge, as the decision to evict had been made in accordance with the statutory 
scheme, which compatible or not, had to be followed. The majority of the House of 
Lords followed this reasoning and again reiterated that proportionality review was 
excluded from the micro-level.107 Notwithstanding the findings of the ECHR in 
McCann, Lord Hope expressly stated that Kay would not be overruled without good 
reason and even then only by a panel of nine Law Lords.108  
At the macro level (‘gateway (a)’), the House held that the legislative provision was 
incompatible with Article 8, however, their Lordships declined to make a finding of 
incompatibility, since the offending provision had been repealed by the Housing and 
Regeneration Act 2008, although this new legislation had not yet come into force. At 
the micro level, the majority of the House again endorsed the ‘gateway (b)’ approach 
and was only prepared to countenance common law judicial review. The House 
remitted the case to the County Court for consideration on that basis. 
However, Lord Hope did accept that the standard of judicial review could include 
slightly more than a strict application of the irrationality test. He held that: ‘it would be 
unduly formalistic to confine the review strictly to traditional Wednesbury grounds.  
The considerations that can be brought into account in this case are wider.’109 He went 
on to affirm that the test should be ‘whether the decision to recover possession was one 
which no reasonable person would consider justifiable’.110 He accepted that certain facts 
of an individual case could be relevant to this matter, such as the length of time a person 
had been living in their home.  
                                                
107 [2008] UKHL 57; [2008] 3 WLR 636, at 646 per Lord Hope. 
108 ibid, at 645. 
109 [2008] UKHL 57; [2008] 3 WLR 636, at 657. 
110 ibid, at 657. 
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The nature of this widened form of reasonableness review has been examined by the 
Court of Appeal in a number of recent cases.111 The Court has suggested that the 
reasonableness review will be influenced by Article 8. However, the Court of Appeal 
has not sought to introduce full-blown proportionality review at the micro level, which 
is appropriate, since the Court is bound by the decisions in Kay and Doherty. If 
proportionality is ever introduced at the micro level, it will be done by the incoming 
Supreme Court. 
In Doherty Lord Hope gave two other reasons (apart from the Kay precedent) for 
excluding the possibility of a Convention challenge to the local authority decision made 
under the statutory scheme. First, he was concerned that opening the door to such 
challenges would result in a huge amount of costly litigation on Article 8 points in the 
County Court. The second reason was that 6(2)(b) exempts a public authority from the 
requirement to act in a Convention-compatible manner if it is acting to give effect to 
provisions of primary legislation which are themselves Convention-incompatible and 
cannot be read down to remove the incompatibility. This has been interpreted to mean 
that where a public authority is acting to give effect to a Convention-incompatible 
statute and it has both compatible and incompatible courses of action open to it, section 
6(2)(b) will not require the public authority to choose the compatible course.112 Lord 
Walker accepted that in light of Kay this reasoning must also be applied to housing 
decisions of local authorities. This was also the position taken by Lord Hope. 
There is however a chink in the armour of section 6(2)(b). The finding in both Kay and 
Doherty is that in these multi-level cases, proportionality analysis can only be applied to 
the legislation and not to the local authority decision. If the legislation fails the 
                                                
111 Doran v Liverpool City Council [2009] EWCA Civ 146; Central Bedfordshire Council v Taylor 
[2009] EWCA Civ 613; Manchester City Council v Pinnock [2009] EWCA Civ 852. 
112 See further R (Hooper) v Secretary of state for Work and Pensions [2005] UKHL 29; [2005] 1 WLR 
1681; and R (Wilkinson) v Inland Revenue Commission [2005] UKHL 30; [2005] 1 WLR 1718. 
Discussed at Chapter 3.3 above. 
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proportionality analysis, then section 6(2)(b) would indeed protect the decision of the 
local authority. However, if the legislation is deemed to be proportionate, then section 
6(2)(b) does not arise, since it only applies in cases where a public authority is acting 
pursuant to Convention-incompatible legislation. An incompatible decision made under 
compatible legislation would be subject to section 6(1), and so would be unlawful. The 
legislation in Doherty was deemed incompatible with the Convention, so section 6(2)(b) 
was applicable. However, no such finding was made in Kay and the logic of the section 
6(2)(b) point in Doherty would seem to suggest that it would not apply in such cases.  
Arden has noted that ‘Doherty is itself unlikely to be the last word on the subject’.113 It 
is certainly conceivable that the House of Lords might take a fourth run at this multi-
level issue if it were faced with a Convention-incompatible decision of a local authority 
acting pursuant to Convention-compatible statute. 
The line of reasoning in the Qazi, Kay and Doherty decisions can be contrasted with 
that taken in the earlier decision of Runa Begum v Tower Hamlets London Borough 
Council.114 Runa Begum concerned a challenge to a statutory scheme which provided 
that where the decision of an accommodation officer was challenged, the local authority 
could conduct its own internal review. The appellant argued that this was incompatible 
with Article 6, as it did not provide for an independent review. The House of Lords 
disagreed, and accepted that an internal review would be satisfactory, since it would be 
amenable to judicial review, which could then provide for proportionality based review. 
As with the Shayler decision discussed in Chapter 1.3.2, this decision holds that 
legislation at the macro-level passes muster on the basis that decisions made under it, at 
the micro-level are judicially reviewable. Indeed, in Runa Begum, the House held that 
the statute itself did not even engage the Convention right. Just as Qazi and Kay 
supported the individual decisions on the basis that the statute was acceptable, the Runa 
                                                
113  Arden, A. ‘Doherty: The Facts of the Matter’ (2008) 11 HLR 96, at 102. 
114 [2003] UKHL 5; [2003] 2 AC 430. 
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Begum case supports the statute on the basis that the individual decisions will be 
susceptible to proportionality based review.   
Looking at all these cases in the round reveals a deeply conflicted approach.  
Admittedly, in Runa Begum the House did find that the Act itself did not engage the 
Article 6 right, so a proportionality review of the legislation was excluded. However, 
the logical extension of the tension between these two lines of reasoning is that where a 
piece of legislation does not engage a Convention right, a challenge to a decision made 
under that legislation will be amenable to judicial review on human rights grounds. 
However, where a piece of legislation does engage a right, but the intrusion by the Act 
is deemed proportionate, then decisions made under the legislation are immune from a 
HRA based challenge. This is extremely difficult to sustain. A piece of legislation 
which engages a right would seem to pose a much higher risk of creating the possibility 
of Convention incompatible decisions, and yet decisions made under that legislation are 
deemed immune from challenge. 
In this section I have shown the development of an inconsistent body of case law 
dealing with multi-layer housing decisions. The McLellan case shows that it is possible 
for factual and legal optimisation to be applied both to a framework of rules and to 
administrative decisions made under those rules. This approach is supported by Porter. 
Although Porter seems to fragment the test, it does so in a way which is consistent with 
the structure of the test. While not as thorough as the McLellan approach, the Porter 
reasoning is sustainable. As has been shown throughout this thesis, rule-making is a 
prime target for factual optimisation and administrative decisions are particularly 
amenable to legal optimisation. The approach taken in the other multi-level housing 
cases is very difficult to support, in that it excludes large swathes of government 
decision-making from any sort of Convention challenge at all. If a structural, 
institutionally sensitive approach had been taken to these cases, then these outcomes 
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could have been avoided. It is clear that the courts wished to be very deferential in 
many of these cases, but that end would have been far better served by addressing the 
issue of deference at the micro level head on, instead of eliminating the proportionality 
analysis entirely. 
 
 
6.4: CONCLUSION 
In this chapter I have set out the leading proportionality cases in the area of housing. I 
have shown how both human rights principles and public interest principles have been 
defined and derived in order to set up the balancing operation inherent in 
proportionality. I have shown that both factual and legal optimisation are utilised by the 
courts in housing decisions and that in most instances where deference arises, it can be 
integrated into the proportionality test by classifying it as structural or epistemic. 
I have examined the housing cases involving a proportionality challenge to a single 
level of government. Certain patterns that were observed in earlier chapters have been 
replicated in these cases. Administrative decisions are somewhat more amenable to 
legal optimisation, as was evident in Clays Lane, and rule-making is somewhat more 
amenable to factual optimisation, as was evident in cases such as Poplar Housing. 
However, in Baker it was possible to apply factual optimisation to an administrative 
decision because the decision-maker had a range of measures available.  
Some of the reasoning in the single-level housing cases has obfuscated the process of 
proportionality by failing to make the operation of deference explicit. The courts have 
been at pains to point out in a series of cases that the least rights-intrusive means does 
not necessarily need to be used in order for a measure to be Convention-compatible. In 
some decisions, such as Clays Lane and Smith the suggestion was made that factual 
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optimisation should not apply because it requires that a less rights-restrictive alternative 
might be chosen even if that measure does not achieve the public interest to the required 
extent. This is not the case. Factual optimisation requires that the least restrictive 
measure be chosen from among those which actually achieve the public interest. These 
cases have purported to limit the factual optimisation arm of proportionality 
substantially, but this issue could have been addressed differently. For example in Clays 
Lane, in which the court sought to set out a strictly necessary/reasonably necessary test 
rather than recognising that some sort of deference was owed to the decision-maker. By 
working either structural or empirical epistemic deference into the optimisation 
analysis, the courts could have permitted decision-makers to choose an appropriate 
measure while still keeping the proportionality analysis intact.   
I have also shown the problems encountered in decisions dealing with multiple layers of 
governmental activity. The institutional split poses tricky questions for the courts, but in 
cases such as McLellan the proportionality test has been set out in a manner that allows 
it to apply comprehensively to both levels of government. Later decisions such as Qazi, 
Kay, and Doherty have been unduly focused on the institution of Parliament to the 
expense of the possibility of analysing the administrative decisions made under primary 
legislation. If a greater level of institutional sensitivity had been applied, these issues 
could have been resolved through the use of deference. The issue of housing is very 
firmly embedded in social and economic policy, which is at the core of the institutional 
competence of Parliament and local government, both of which have significant 
democratic legitimacy. As such, it seems inevitable that the courts would afford a 
substantial deference in such cases. If this is accepted, then there is no need to preclude 
proportionality analysis from the micro level entirely. There is no reason to think that 
structural or epistemic deference would be ineffective in affording local authorities 
leeway where it is due. 
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The core argument of this thesis is that proportionality and deference have a structure 
through which deference is integrated into proportionality. This structural model can be 
made explicit in the UK case law if sufficient attention is paid to the distinctions 
between various institutions of government. I have shown that certain institutional 
factors affect the manner in which this operates. In this case study, I have also shown 
the difficulties the courts have got into in their attempts to address proportionality 
across multiple layers of government simultaneously. While decisions such as Porter 
and McLellan manage to navigate these tempestuous waters, the bulk of the multi-level 
decisions have shown a marked lack of judicial understanding of the relationship 
between proportionality on the one hand and institutional factors on the other. It is 
hoped that a functioning structural theory of proportionality will go some way to 
addressing this confusion. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 
 
The HRA incorporates the European Convention into domestic UK law. Many of the 
rights guaranteed in the Convention can be limited in the public interest. Where an 
individual wishes to challenge a government measure which infringes upon their 
Convention rights, he or she will ask the court to make a determination on the issue. 
When the UK courts are adjudicating such cases, they often use the proportionality test 
in order to determine whether or not the measure before them is Convention-
compatible. In this sense, judges are the primary ‘doers’ of proportionality. The level of 
scrutiny of the proportionality analysis will often be tempered by the principle of 
deference to the primary decision-maker. 
The proportionality test has become one of the dominant features of HRA-based judicial 
review. It seems highly likely that even if the HRA were to be repealed, it would be 
replaced by or supplemented by a ‘British Bill of Rights’. The proposals of the two 
main political parties indicate that the rights in any such document will be subject to 
limitation in the public interest.1 Therefore, there is no reason to believe that 
proportionality would not survive the transition to a new Bill of Rights; such a 
                                                
1 See speech by David Cameron MP to the Centre for Policy Studies, 26 June 2006. Full text available at 
www.guardian.co.uk  (last checked 21 May 2009); and See speech by Prime Minister Gordon Brown MP 
to Liberty, 27 October 2007. Full text available at www.number10.gov.uk (last checked 30 May 2009). 
There are also moves being made to introduce a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland (see 
www.borini.info), although it seems likely that this would supplement the HRA, rather than replacing it 
within that jurisdiction. 
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document would almost certainly require a test along the lines of proportionality. 
Furthermore, even if the HRA were to be repealed without replacement, proportionality 
has entered into the tapestry of public law in the UK to such an extent that it is highly 
likely to continue as a basis for assessing the limitation of common law rights.2 
Proportionality, it seems, is here to stay, and so a detailed and comprehensive account 
of its operation is needed. In this thesis, I have set out a structural, institutionally 
sensitive model of proportionality and deference. This model overcomes the limitations 
of the spatial metaphor, which has dominated discussion of proportionality and 
deference in the UK. The model also takes explicit account of institutional factors 
which have, until now, not been fully explored. This model is a basis for a more 
complete investigation of proportionality under the HRA. It provides both a bulwark 
against institutionally perverse uses of proportionality and a framework for a more 
deeply focused discussion of the normative issues at stake in proportionality-based 
judicial review. 
 
 
7.1: A STRUCTURAL, INSTITUTIONALLY SENSITIVE MODEL OF 
PROPORTIONALITY AND DEFERENCE 
In this thesis, I have used the work of Robert Alexy to show that it is possible to 
integrate deference within the proportionality test. This model is focused on the 
structure of proportionality and deference. Existing UK theories of proportionality are 
based on the spatial metaphor, which describes proportionality and deference as being 
in opposition to each other, rather than making space for their synthesis. The structural 
                                                
2 See for example the reasoning of Lord Bingham in R (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2001] UKHL 26; [2001] 2 AC 532, in which he used common law rights as a basis for a 
proportionality-type review. 
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model is only effective in the UK if an institutionally sensitive approach is taken to the 
governmental activity which is the subject of HRA-based judicial review. This is 
because the HRA covers a wide range of governmental bodies whose specific features 
can affect the operation of proportionality and deference. I will briefly summarise the 
model. 
 
7.1.1: The structure of proportionality and deference 
I have shown that proportionality entails the optimisation of competing principles: 
ordinarily a public interest principle and a human rights principle (although it can also 
be used for two competing human rights principles). These can both be characterised as 
principles because they are norms which require realisation, but they do not contain the 
terms of that realisation in the way that rules do. Not all public interest goals are of 
sufficient importance to achieve the status of principles.  Whether a public interest goal 
meets that standard is an important preliminary issue which must be determined by a 
reviewing court. This issue involves issues of political morality and is open to 
normative disagreement. To date, the UK courts have used the first stage of the 
proportionality test (‘legitimate objective’) and the text of the Convention (as 
interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights (‘the ECHR’)) as a guide in 
determining this issue. It is arguable that a better legal mechanism for deciding this 
point would be desirable. However, any such mechanism could easily be 
accommodated within the structural model, since it seeks to provide a framework for 
such normative debates. It is not the purpose of this thesis to conclusively resolve the 
question of which public interests are sufficiently weighty to be classed as principles. 
The optimisation of the competing principles occurs at two levels. First, factual 
optimisation seeks to establish whether the challenged measure was the least rights-
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intrusive means of achieving the public interest principle. Secondly legal optimisation 
seeks to establish whether there is an overall balance between the two competing 
principles. 
Deference can be structural or epistemic. Structural deference relates to the structure of 
the proportionality test itself. Epistemic deference arises where there is uncertainty as to 
the measurement of some element within proportionality. This can be either empirical: 
where the uncertainty relates to facts; or normative: where the uncertainty relates to the 
precise balance to be struck between the two competing principles. These forms of 
deference can arise in different ways at different points in the proportionality test. It is 
important to note that there must be a reason for deference. It will not automatically be 
afforded the various stages of the proportionality analysis without some evidence that 
deference is appropriate. This evidence will be based on either institutional competence 
or democratic legitimacy.  
When a court is undertaking a proportionality analysis of a government measure, it 
works through the various steps of the proportionality test. First, the court must identify 
precisely which public interest principle and which human rights principle are being 
optimised. These two principles are effectively the inputs of the proportionality process.  
Structural deference may arise at this stage. The body being reviewed may have a 
choice as to the objectives it pursues. If there are multiple objectives available, each of 
which can be described as ‘legitimate’ for the purposes of the proportionality test, then 
structural deference may be afforded to the decision-maker’s choice between these 
legitimate objectives. This deference can be afforded to both the choice of a particular 
public interest objective and to the setting of the desired level of achievement of that 
objective. Once the level of achievement being sought is established, the rest of the 
proportionality test can be used to determine what level of limitation of human rights is 
justified by that level of public interest. 
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After the principles have been identified, the court will look to see whether or not the 
challenged measure is rationally connected to the public interest. This requires that the 
challenged measure actually be capable of realising the public interest principle to some 
extent. If it does not, then the human rights principle will have been limited for no 
reason. The legitimate objective and rational connection stages of proportionality are 
essentially threshold issues.  
Once the principles have been identified, and a rational connection has been established, 
the first of the two forms of optimisation will be applied. Factual optimisation (referred 
to as ‘minimal impairment’ or ‘least restrictive means’ in the UK) requires the court to 
examine whether or not there were any less rights-intrusive measures available to the 
decision-maker which would have achieved the public interest principle to the same 
extent. If there is such a measure available, then the challenged measure will fail the 
proportionality hurdle at this point. 
Both structural and epistemic deference can arise at the factual optimisation stage. 
Where there are multiple measures available each of which are equally rights-intrusive, 
then the decision maker may be afforded structural deference and so the court will defer 
to the decision-maker’s choice of measure. Where there is uncertainty as to the level of 
intrusion on the human rights principle or the level of importance or achievement of the 
public interest, then empirical epistemic deference may be afforded. Where there is 
uncertainty as to the precise normative balance to be struck between the two principles, 
then normative epistemic deference may be afforded.  
After the factual optimisation stage, the court then moves on to consider legal 
optimisation (referred to as ‘overall balancing’ in the UK). This requires an overall 
balance between the level of achievement or importance of the public interest and the 
level of intrusion on the Convention right. In assessing this, the court may afford the 
decision maker empirical or normative epistemic deference. If it is difficult for the court 
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to measure the level of intrusion on the right or the level of realisation of the public 
interest, then the decision-maker’s view may be deferred to. If there is normative 
uncertainty about the precise balance to be struck, then deference may be afforded on 
that basis also. 
The outcome of the proportionality analysis is a fact-specific human rights rule. This 
rule dictates the relationship between the two competing principles in that specific 
situation. This rule will guide courts dealing with future proportionality cases in a way 
that is very familiar to common lawyers. 
I have attempted to show the structure of the model in the form of a diagram (see Figure 
1, on next page) For the purposes of clarity, I have intentionally omitted rational 
connection and legitimacy of aim from the diagram, as they are effectively threshold 
issues. 
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Figure 1: Diagram of the structural model of proportionality and deference 
 
 
 
7.1.2: Institutional sensitivity 
As I have shown in this thesis, the structural model of proportionality and deference can 
only function if it is applied in an institutionally sensitive manner. Proportionality is 
used by the courts when reviewing the Convention compatibility of a range of 
government bodies. There are specific institutional factors which can affect both the 
operation of proportionality and the reasons for deferring to the decision-maker. While 
there is a standard structure to proportionality and deference, certain aspects of that 
structure may be minimised or emphasised, depending on the institutional setting.  
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There are three specific institutional factors which can affect the structural model of 
proportionality and deference. Variations in these three factors can arise at different 
points on the scale: the three factors are scales rather than binary either/or distinctions 
and different institutions can be placed at different points on each of the three scales. 
The first factor is the choice of objectives. Some institutions, such as Parliament, will 
have a wide-ranging choice of which objectives to pursue. Others, such as appointed 
officials exercising statutory powers, will have a very limited choice. Many other 
institutions of government will fall at mid-points on this scale. This factor has 
implications for the definition of principles at the start of the proportionality analysis as 
well as for structural deference at this stage. If a decision-maker has had their objective 
set for them by a separate institution of government (e.g. where an official works 
according to a statutory authority) then the definition of the public interest principle will 
be more straightforward for the court than if the decision-maker has a wide choice. 
The second factor is the range of measures available to the decision maker. Some 
institutions of government will have a wide choice of measures available to pursue the 
public interest. For others this will be much more limited. This will inevitably affect 
factual optimisation and structural deference. It is meaningless to ask whether a less 
rights-intrusive measure is available to a decision-maker who has no significant choice 
as to which measure is used to pursue the public interest principle. There is also no 
scope for affording structural deference in such situations, since a range of equally 
rights-intrusive measures is not available. 
The third factor which will affect the operation of proportionality and deference is the 
scope of the challenged measure. This impacts on legal optimisation and epistemic 
deference. A one-off administrative decision will have a narrow scope and affect very 
few people. This will generally mean that it will be quite straightforward for a 
reviewing court to measure both the level of intrusion on the Convention right and the 
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level of realisation of the public interest. This makes legal optimisation easier and 
reduces uncertainty and by extension the need for epistemic deference. Where the 
measure is of general application and affects a wide range of people, then there is much 
greater scope for uncertainty, which will give rise to a more difficult legal optimisation 
stage and a greater need for epistemic deference, be it empirical or normative.  
In addition to these three scales of difference, institutional sensitivity can be required 
where a challenged decision emanates from multiple levels of government. For 
example, where an official is exercising a statutory power, both the exercise of the 
power and the legislative provision which established that power could feasibly be 
challenged on HRA grounds. In these cases, it is important for the reviewing court to 
consider the institutional factors involved at each level of the decision separately when 
applying the proportionality test. 
It is commonly accepted that the level of intrusion on the Convention right is one 
specific ground against which the level of deference should be measured. I would 
certainly endorse this as an important consideration in deciding the correct level of 
deference (although I am not seeking to make a normative argument about where that 
level of deference should be set). However, institutional factors can also affect the level 
of deference to be afforded. Different forms of deference are based on different 
institutional presumptions. Structural deference involves a choice between two equally 
Convention-compatible measures. Such decisions are more appropriately the domain of 
elected bodies than of the courts. Similarly, normative epistemic deference entails a 
choice about which principle to prioritise in situations where the precise balance is 
uncertain. Both of these forms of deference are grounded in concepts of legitimacy of 
decision-making, and so they can be linked to the criterion of democratic legitimacy. 
Not all institutions have the same degree of democratic legitimacy. The greater the 
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democratic legitimacy of the decision-maker, the stronger the reason for affording 
structural deference or normative epistemic deference.   
Conversely, empirical epistemic deference relates to uncertainty in measurement of 
facts. In such situations, expertise, rather than legitimacy is the core institutional 
criterion for affording deference. The expertise of decision-makers will vary 
substantially across the range of government activity. Where the decision-maker has a 
high degree of institutional competence in relation to the measurement of a particular 
factor, then the courts will have a reason for affording deference. This institutional 
competence must, however, be measured relative to that of the courts. Where the 
reviewing court has a substantial expertise in a field, then there will be less reason to 
defer to the decision-maker, regardless of their level of institutional competence. 
 
 
7.2: THE MODEL AT WORK IN THE HRA CASE LAW 
I have shown through three case studies that the structural model of proportionality and 
deference can be found in the existing case law on the HRA. I have shown that in order 
for the structural model to work, it must be applied in an institutionally sensitive 
manner. I have used existing HRA case law to establish this. The first two case studies, 
immigration and criminal justice, arise at opposing ends of the three institutional factor 
scales I identified in my analysis of institutional sensitivity. By using diametrically 
opposed examples, I have shown the full extent of the need for institutional sensitivity. 
The third case study, housing, has shown the complications which arise in multi-level 
decisions. 
The case studies have gone some way to imposing order on the existing HRA case law. 
By tracing the structural model through a large number of cases, I have shown 
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connections and patterns in the proportionality jurisprudence that were not previously 
evident. 
 
7.2.1: The model in pure administration cases 
I have used the example of immigration cases to elaborate the operation of the structural 
model in cases where the governmental activity being judicially reviewed is a solely 
administrative decision, with no rule-making element. By examining the leading case 
law in the area, I have shown that such cases generally involve the decisions of 
appointed officials exercising statutory powers and the decision is usually a binary 
choice between permitting an applicant to remain in the UK or refusing to let them stay. 
In these cases, the decision-maker will have no choice as to which objective to pursue, 
there will be no range of measures available and the decision will be of individual 
application, meaning it has a very narrow scope. I have shown how in such cases factual 
optimisation has been minimised to a near total extent, as has structural deference. I 
have shown how the legal optimisation stage of proportionality has done most of the 
work in these cases. I have explained how empirical epistemic deference has been 
applied repeatedly within legal optimisation.  I have also shown that while normative 
epistemic deference was afforded for a time, it has since been rejected. The decision-
makers in these cases have institutional competence, but no democratic legitimacy, so 
this splitting of epistemic deference fits well into the structural, institutionally sensitive 
model. 
 
7.2.2: The model in pure rule-making cases 
I have used the example of criminal justice rules (broadly defined) to elaborate the 
operation of the structural model in cases where the governmental activity being 
305 
 
judicially reviewed is a solely rule-making decision, with no administrative element. 
Most of these HRA cases have involved primary legislation, but I have also examined 
some cases involving rules promulgated at lower levels of government. The choice of 
objectives is usually wide, as is the range of measures available and the decision will be 
of general application and affect numerous individuals. I have shown how factual 
optimisation is greatly emphasised in these cases and legal optimisation is often 
(although not always) sidelined. I have also shown the operation of structural and 
empirical epistemic deference within factual optimisation as well as the operation of 
both forms of epistemic deference within legal optimisation. Where deference has been 
afforded, I have established the institutional basis for that deference, be it democratic 
legitimacy or institutional competence.  
I have also addressed the operation of section 3 of the HRA which requires legislation 
to be read in a convention-compatible manner whenever possible. I have shown how 
this can lead to a total denial of structural deference in factual optimisation and 
contrasted it with the operation of section 4, which includes an in-built deference to 
Parliament which operates in parallel with proportionality. 
 
7.2.3: The model in multi-level decision cases 
I have used the example of housing cases to elaborate the operation of the structural 
model in cases where multiple levels of government interact. I have shown how, in 
cases where only one level was challenged, the structural model has held up well. The 
application of factual or legal optimisation has been dependent on the institutional 
factors I have identified. Where deference has arisen, I have shown how its application 
can be integrated into proportionality using the structural model.  
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I have also shown how, in cases where there have been multiple levels of government 
challenged simultaneously, the courts have not always applied the test in a manner 
which is institutionally sensitive. The reasoning has at times been perverse, when 
viewed from an institutionally sensitive perspective. In certain instances, the structure 
of the proportionality test has been fragmented across the institutional levels in a way 
which is internally inconsistent. Factual optimisation is of limited use in low-level 
administrative decision making and legal optimisation can be difficult to apply to a rule 
of general application. Despite this, there are examples of an inverted fragmentation of 
proportionality: in some cases the courts have applied legal optimisation to the statutory 
framework within which the administrative decision is made, and applied factual 
optimisation to the administrative decision itself. In some instances, the courts have 
gone so far as to deny the possibility of any proportionality analysis of the 
administrative decision. This is inconsistent with the premises upon which the 
proportionality test is based and, once an institutionally sensitive approach is taken, 
these sorts of decisions can be avoided.  
 
 
7.3: OUTCOMES OF THIS THESIS 
The primary goal of this thesis is to elaborate the relationship between proportionality 
and deference in a deep analytical manner in order to transcend the spatial metaphor and 
flesh out the institutional dimensions of proportionality-based judicial review. In 
addition to achieving this, there are three other future prospects for this research.  
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7.3.1: Scope for further study  
The examples I have used in this thesis, particularly in Chapters 4 and 5, have been case 
studies where the institutional differences were at extreme ends of the three institutional 
factors affecting the operation of the proportionality test. In order to establish the need 
for institutional sensitivity, I have focused on these examples because they are the best 
way to highlight the effect that these distinctions will have on proportionality and 
deference. However, there will be cases where institutional factors are at play, but are 
far less pronounced. For example, a Secretary of State making a decision in accordance 
with a statutory instrument which she herself promulgated will be at a mid-range point 
on the three scales of institutional difference. In such a case, there will be scope for both 
factual and legal optimisation to be applied to either or both of the two levels of 
decision-making involved. Now that I have established the structural, institutionally 
sensitive model, cases such as these will provide fertile ground for exploration of the 
nuances of the structural model.  
The model can also be extended to cover other fields of human rights adjudication. The 
three case studies helped establish the model, but its application is not limited to those 
three areas. 
Another area of potential further study is the interplay between sections 3 and 4 of the 
HRA, which have been the scope of elaborate and sustained academic scrutiny. Now 
that I have set out the structural, institutionally sensitive model, the relationship of 
deference to proportionality in review of primary legislation is more explicit. This has 
the potential to revitalise the discussion of sections 3 and 4 in a way which permits a 
deeper analysis of the interaction between them.  
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7.3.2: Avoidance of the risk of institutionally perverse reasoning 
A recurring theme of this thesis has been the explanation of the premises upon which 
proportionality and deference are based. Now that these are explicit and have been used 
to integrate deference into the proportionality test, there is less risk of decisions being 
made on the basis of reasoning which is contradictory to the institutional premises 
underlying the proportionality test (‘institutionally perverse reasoning’). 
If the courts develop a better understanding of factual optimisation, legal optimisation 
and the various forms of deference in their different institutional settings, there is less 
likelihood that institutionally perverse reasoning will be used. If a court wishes to afford 
significant deference on some valid ground, then it may do so, without straining the 
premises upon which the test is founded. 
In some of the multi-level cases, the courts have held that if legislation is proportionate 
then every decision made under that legislation is also proportionate. Such an approach 
is very difficult to reconcile with Article 6 of the Convention and section 6 of the HRA 
and it removes an important layer of human rights protection. A court may take the 
view that a decision-maker should be afforded a large degree of epistemic or structural 
deference within proportionality when exercising a statutory power. In the case of some 
institutions, such as local authorities, there are strong reasons of democratic legitimacy 
and institutional competence for affording a significant level of deference. However this 
is not the same thing as dispensing with the proportionality analysis of the decision 
entirely. It is only after the spatial metaphor has been overcome and an institutionally 
sensitive approach to multi-level decisions has been developed that institutionally 
perverse decisions of this kind can be avoided. 
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7.3.3: Framework for normative debate 
In Chapter 1, I explained how previous debates about the interaction of proportionality 
and deference were trapped in the spatial metaphor, whereby discussion was dominated 
by arguments about the proper scope of judicial power relative to the power of other 
arms of government. Because these arguments were made in general terms about 
institutional roles, rather than in the context of the structure of the proportionality test, 
they were ultimately unproductive. Once a structural, institutionally sensitive model is 
established, then there is scope to make these arguments in a more focused way. There 
are a number of normative questions within the proportionality test. The identification 
of public interest principles, legal optimisation and the level of deference are all deeply 
normative issues. However, the value of the structural model is that it makes space for a 
normative debate about these specific issues in a way that takes full account of how 
they relate to the rest of proportionality. The structural model does not purport to 
resolve these debates. Its contribution is that it makes clear which stages of the 
proportionality test are connected to which specific normative questions.  As such, 
normative debates can be integrated into proportionality, rather than being viewed as 
somehow prior to it. This is a substantial improvement on the existing spatial 
explanations. 
 
 
7.4: FINAL REMARKS 
Since its introduction, HRA proportionality review has become a substantial feature of 
the British public law landscape. Deference has consistently loomed just behind 
proportionality: sometimes as a shadow, sometimes as a Siamese twin. Proportionality 
and deference have been applied in many judgments of the UK Courts and been the 
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subject of a great deal of academic commentary. However, widespread application and 
discussion are not synonymous with widespread understanding. The judiciary and 
academic commentators have struggled to devise a productive theory of proportionality. 
A great deal of the discussion has been either piecemeal or, more commonly, dominated 
by a desire to link proportionality to other public law reference points, instead of 
understanding it on its own terms. This has prevented the sort of comprehensive 
analysis of proportionality that is required if its full potential as a sophisticated 
mechanism for rights-based judicial review is to be realised. 
In this thesis, I have sought to establish just such a comprehensive analysis. I have 
examined proportionality and deference in terms of the underlying premises, their 
relationship to each other and their institutionally specific features. This multi-faceted 
investigation of proportionality under the HRA has enabled me to set out a model which 
can be applied across the spectrum of proportionality adjudication in a way which is 
sensitive to the features of individual cases but maintains the integrity of the test’s 
structure. In doing this, I hope I have made a contribution towards clarifying what has at 
times been a confusing and confused debate. 
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